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CHAPTER 1: Free trade or fair trade? 
 
The experience with NAFTA and its side agreements represents a significant 
milestone, with potentially important global implications, in the emergence of 
new societal actors into the traditionally closed arena of international 
economic policy-making – an arena long dominated by a limited set of state 
agencies and economic interests (Hinojosa-Ojeda, 2002, 228).  
 
Seattle has managed to reignite the debates about the relationship between 
markets and states as few events have. Rather than reaffirm the marriage of 
capitalism and democracy, the post-communist era is now poised for a 
reconsideration of their perilous relationship. In the words of William Daley, 
US Secretary of Commerce, after Seattle, ‘things will never be the same’ 
(Robin, 200, 2).  
 
 
I) BACKGROUND AND SUBSTANTIVE FOCUS  
A new cause is born 
In January 1991, Stewart Hudson of the National Wildlife Federation (NWF) and 
Pharis Harvey of the International Labor Rights Education and Research Fund 
(ILRERF) organized a forum on Capitol Hill to share their concerns about President 
George H. W. Bush’s intention to negotiate the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA), a project designed to liberalize trade and investment flows 
between the Mexican, American and Canadian economies.1 They shared the 
conviction that decision-makers could no longer push trade liberalization without 
paying attention to the environmental and social conditions in which soon-to-be-
exported foreign goods were produced – Mexico’s infamous maquiladoras2 being the 
archetype of a flawed trade model. This unconventional meeting between labor 
                                                
1 The flyer is reproduced in appendix 1.  
2 Created in 1965 by the Mexican executive branch, the maquiladora (or maquila) program allowed 
foreign, and particularly American businesses to transplant their production facilities on the Southern 
side of the US-Mexican border where they would import components duty-free from outside on a 
temporary basis. These goods would then be assembled or repaired before being exported either to the 
country of origin (often the United States) or to a third country (Mayer, 1998, 36; for more details, read 
Morales, Aguilera & Amstrong (1994). 
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advocates and environmentalists – two groups often at odds in American politics3 – 
aimed to discuss the creation of panels on the impact of trade on labor, environmental 
and agriculture issues with delegates from Canada, Mexico and the United States (see 
Magraw, 1995, 644-5). This event was a first step in coalition-building efforts at both 
cross-movement and cross-border levels.  
Only a month later, 62 groups representing environmental, labor, religious and 
consumer interests formed the Mobilization on Development, Trade, Labor, and the 
Environment (MODTLE).4 This was the official birth of an alliance that would 
become a central actor in globalization debates in the United States over the next 
decade. Its primary motive was to oppose the renewal of fast track authority that 
would allow President Bush to launch the NAFTA negotiations. Shortly after its 
creation, American activists agreed to divide the coalition between two entities with 
two different mandates: the Alliance for Responsible Trade (ART) focused on cross-
border cooperation with Canadian and Mexican activists; and the Citizens Trade 
Campaign (CTC), composed of interest groups endowed with greater resources, led 
the lobbying campaign against trade liberalization (Mayer, 1998, 75-7). 
What caused such a sudden political awakening? Starting with the Tokyo 
Round (1973-1979), international trade negotiations had begun to focus on “non-tariff 
barriers” (NTBs), a new set of issue-area that ranged from product standards to 
systems of taxation. By the end of the 20th century, free trade agreements like NAFTA 
went far beyond trade matters to include complex provisions on investment, 
procurement, food safety, regulatory standards etc. This raised sensitive questions 
about national sovereignty, finally sparking the mobilization of new stakeholders like 
                                                
3 For a discussion, see chapter 2. 
4 This acronym was an allusion to a Wall Street Journal article that had referred to the coalition as a 
“motley crew of special-interest groups.” (Cavanagh, Anderson and Hansen-Kuhn, 2002, 188). 
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environmentalists, consumer organizations and human rights advocates. These groups 
joined labor’s prolonged efforts to reform U.S. foreign economic policy and cushion 
the effects of international import competition and offshoring since the 1970s. 
Of course, one could also interpret the mobilization of environmental and 
consumer actors in the trade policy sphere as a consequence of the increased 
specialization of interest groups. Following Lowery (2007), one could argue that “fair 
trade” could be another “issue niche” that organizations created under a logic of 
survival, i.e. to maintain the interests of their membership in their lobbying activities. 
If one cannot completely disclaim opportunism in the mobilization of public interests 
groups against NAFTA, one should not, however, reduce fair trade advocacy to a 
mere product of interest groups’ competition for resources. Doing so would, indeed, 
be akin to underestimating the far-reaching ramifications of globalization over the 
past few decades.  
The joint mobilization of these eclectic interests marked the emergence of the 
“new politics of American trade” (Destler & Balint, 1999). Never before the NAFTA 
debates had such a variety of civil society groups attempted to participate in the 
arcane decision-making process of American trade policy (Hinojosa-Ojeda, 2002; 
Mayer, 1998; Vogel, 1997; Destler & Balint, 1999; Esty, 1998). The activists’ list of 
political grievances – from the strict enforcement of workers’ rights to consumer 
protection and environmental sustainability – represented an alternative to the 
economic logic that had long characterized Washington’s commercial policy. Starting 
with the NAFTA debates, “fair trade” – broadly defined as a socially and 
environmentally responsible policy5 – became the leitmotiv of the new blue (for 
                                                
5 The meaning of fair trade is discussed in the next section.  
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industrial labor) and green (for environmentalists) alliance that took shape in the 
course of the decade. 
Labor and its allies were also assisted by right-wing politicians like Patrick 
Buchanan6 and third-party presidential candidate Ross Perot,7 who played an 
important role in demonizing the agreement. In the long run, however, these 
conservative figures did not sustain their involvement in trade debates, unlike the 
more deeply committed actors from environmental movements.8  
Fair trade advocates soon found allies in the Democratic Congress, who 
conditioned their support for NAFTA on the adoption of environmental and social 
amendments. Their vigorous lobbying efforts would prompt both President George H. 
W. Bush and his Democratic successor to design policy concessions that, despite their 
limited scope, legitimated the linkage between trade, labor and the environment. 
Although these side payments divided the environmental movement between NAFTA 
supporters and opponents, they did little to appease labor unions and consumer 
advocates like Public Citizen. As a result, it was only after a fierce legislative battle 
that the Clinton administration and NAFTA supporters in the business community 
managed to force through Congress an agreement that most economists considered of 
minor importance for the $6+ trillion U.S. economy (BEA, 2008). 
After NAFTA’s ratification, supporters of trade liberalization would have to 
contend with new political forces. The fast track authority debates of 1997 illustrated 
the contentious nature of the trade policy process. Hoping to consolidate his free trade 
                                                
6 Patrick Buchanan is a right-wing conservative or “paleoconservative” who sought the Republican 
presidential nomination in 1992 and 1996.  
7 For more details on Ross Perot, see chapter 3. 
8 For this reason, and for their ideological divergences with blue and green organizations, conservative 
actors are excluded from the scope of this analysis. For a discussion of their role in the NAFTA 
debates, read Mayer (1998) and Rupert (2000).  
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legacy via regional and multilateral negotiations, President Clinton requested the 
renewal of his trade negotiating powers from Congress. The compromise reached by 
the Republican congressional leadership and the White House, however, failed to 
address the concerns of the new blue-green coalition. The decision-makers’ 
indifference to the new reality of fair trade politics would derail the administration’s 
foreign economic agenda. This time, a re-united blue and green alliance rallied 
against the White House’s ambitions to expand NAFTA to the rest of the Hemisphere 
– under the Free Trade Area of the Americas – eventually defeating not only the 1997 
House bill, but also the Republicans’ efforts to force through a sister proposal before 
the Congressional elections of 1998.  
Amidst the fast track controversies of 1997-1998, the fair trade coalition gained 
further credibility thanks to its aggressive campaign against the Multilateral 
Agreement on Investment. This accord had been negotiated under the auspices of the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)9 since 1995 and 
aimed to establish a framework of global rules on investment based on the NAFTA 
model. After two years of negotiations behind closed doors, international delegates 
were suddenly taken aback by Public Citizen’s release of the secret draft of the MAI 
in February 1997. Conjuring up visions of a government-business conspiracy, Ralph 
Nader’s umbrella organization called civil society groups to mobilize against this 
“slow motion coup d’état against democratic governance” (Public Citizen, undated).  
In addition to the secretive nature of the negotiations, the MAI came under 
severe criticisms for its lack of concerns for non-economic issues. What was 
particularly controversial with this so-called “NAFTA on steroids” was the strict 
                                                
9 The United States favored the choice of the OECD as the heart of negotiations, partly on the 
misguided premise that this would be a low profile and uncontroversial venue for such talks (Walter, 
2001). 
18 
   
limits it imposed on performance requirements, which would have allegedly deprived 
governments of their regulatory power. Consequently, a coalition of heterogeneous 
interests (including environmentalists, consumer organizations and labor unions10) 
demanded that the American government include language not only to protect 
investors’ rights but also to address other issues such as environmental protection, 
food safety, workers’ and human rights etc. (Graham, 2000, 8, 35-48; Kobrin, 1998, 
105, Walter, 2001, Varney and Martin, 2000).  
What distinguished the anti-MAI campaign from previous mobilizing efforts 
was the emergence of an international, technology-driven coalition of non-
governmental organizations. The MAI became the target of an Internet-linked 
network of 600 groups from 70 countries that, according to Council of Canadians 
chairwoman and NAFTA-battle veteran Maude Barlow, revolutionized the modus 
operandi of transnational activism (Kobrin, 1998, 106; Drohan, 1998).11 
In addition to these avant-garde tactics, more traditional methods such as letter-
writing campaigns, petition signings, and public protests also put political elites under 
serious political pressure (Ayres, 2002, 201-2; Kobrin, 1998, 99-106). President 
Clinton, who was gathering support for his fast track legislation, assured Congress 
that his bill would not cover the MAI. In France, the Socialist government of Lionel 
Jospin pulled out of the negotiations, before the whole project was finally dropped at 
the end of 1998 (Graham, 2000, 10-2; Destler & Balint, 1999, 32). 
                                                
10 Unlike environmentalists, American labor initially abstained from the fight against the MAI. At the 
outset, labor aimed to further its cause through its official representation as a “social partner” at the 
OECD in the Trade Union Advisory Committee (Walter, 2001). In fact, MAI negotiators did recognize 
the need to address workers’ rights in the agreement, but in the end set forth no clear labor standards, 
created no binding obligations on investors and governments, and established no mechanism to 
scrutinize, let alone, enforce the protection of workers’ rights. The lessons from NAFTA’s 
disappointing institutional provisions and labor’s interaction with environmentalists finally convinced 
the AFL-CIO to reject the MAI (Moberg, 2000, 18). For a comprehensive analysis of the labor 
language of the MAI, read Compa (1998, 685-6). 
11 For more details on the technology-driven tactics used by activists, read Varney & Martin (2000). 
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Although dissension among negotiators also contributed to the collapse of the 
agreement, the transnational coalition of civil society groups “[could] take credit for 
stopping the MAI” (Graham, 1998, 613).12 Like the fast track fiasco, the rejection of 
the MAI was laden with symbolism. The accord could easily be portrayed as a battle 
against an iniquitous, corporate-driven global agenda that was negotiated behind 
closed doors to be imposed on powerless citizens.  
Both the symbolism of the anti-MAI campaign and the empowering virtues of 
new technologies galvanized the expanding coalition of NGOs committed to fairer 
trade and investment policies. Their mobilization against the MAI was only the 
“prologue” to the vigorous activism that would characterize the Seattle protests 
(Graham, 2000, 8; Ayres 2002, 202; Varney & Martin, 2000). 
After the collapse of the MAI negotiations in 1998, many civil society 
organizations believed that Western governments would transfer the investment rules 
agenda from the OECD to the WTO. Hence, building upon almost a decade of 
coalition-building efforts, fair traders rallied en masse to protest the new round of 
WTO trade negotiations in Seattle in November 1999 (Walter, 2001). Their display of 
grassroots power and the response of the Clinton administration once again raised the 
prominence of the blue-green coalition, which claimed – rightly or wrongly – another 
political victory in the trade policy sphere.  
What happened in the streets of Seattle went beyond the imagination of all 
international trade delegates. An estimated 40,000 activists – representing, according 
to Public Citizen, no fewer than 1,448 civil society groups from 89 countries, and 
nearly 20,000 union members (Public Citizen, 2000, 3-4) – protested against the 
                                                
12 Graham’s assessment is all the more credible since he is a critic of the “anti-globalization” 
movement and is, therefore, less likely to exaggerate the movement’s achievements.  
20 
   
WTO’s econo-centric “norm” of trade liberalization and its disregard for the social 
and environmental implications of globalization (Destler, 2005, 272; Navarro, 2000, 
41; Smythe, 2001, 159).  
For a time, the “Teamsters and Turtles”13 and their allies managed to block 
access to the meeting hall, keeping U.S. Trade Representative Charlene Barshefsky 
captive in her hotel (Hawken, 2000, 17; Summers, 2001, 61). When a few radical 
protesters shattered shop windows and burned trashcans, the police forcefully reacted 
and local authorities called out the National Guard.14 Amidst this explosive 
atmosphere, international delegates failed to launch the “Millennium Round.”  
If the protesters often claimed victory for the unforeseen collapse of the Seattle 
talks, other factors, particularly North-South divisions over the multilateral trade 
agenda, contributed to the WTO’s misfortunes (Gantz, 2000, 352; Butigan, 2000, 49-
51).15 Yet, beyond the differences among meeting participants, it is clear that the 
massive protests added pressure on the American delegation and complicated the 
efforts of the WTO negotiators (Schott, 2000, 5-6; Cohen, Blecker & Whitney, 2003, 
327).  
What proved controversial among international delegates was Clinton’s 
ostensible support for the enforcement of international labor standards16 and, 
                                                
13 In Seattle, many environmentalists wore turtle costumes to protest against a recent WTO ruling 
against a U.S. legislation protecting turtles. For more details on the case, read Shahin (2002, 57-61) and 
Vogel (2000). 
14 Conway notes that, among the coalition, more confrontational forms of political protests were on the 
rise in Canada before the events of Seattle (Conway, 2004, 5). 
15 With historical hindsight, it became clear that there was much more at stake in the negotiations than 
fair trade issues, as illustrated by the slow pace of negotiations in the subsequent rounds of negotiations 
(Doha in 2001, Cancun in 2003, Hong Kong in 2005, Potsdam in 2007 and Geneva in 2008).  
16  I believe the WTO must make sure that open trade does indeed lift living standards -- respects 
core labor standards that are essential not only to worker rights, but to human rights. That's 
why this year the United States has proposed that the WTO create a working group on trade 
and labor. To deny the importance of these issues in a global economy is to deny the dignity 
of work -- the belief that honest labor fairly compensated gives meaning and structure to our 
lives. I hope we can affirm these values at this meeting (Clinton, 1999).  
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particularly, his reference to “a system in which sanctions would come for violating 
[such provisions].”17 This last point outraged representatives from developing 
countries who feared that any labor-related initiative would only be a step down a 
“slippery slope” threatening the competitive advantage they drew from their country’s 
cheap labor (Sanger, 1999; Gantz, 2000, 354; Summers, 2001, 65). Undeniably, 
President Clinton’s controversial proposal contributed to the collapse of the WTO 
negotiations (Destler, 2005, 272-3; Charnovitz, 2002; see also Elliott, 2000, 189; 
French, 2002, 303).  
The fact that the “social clause” – the consideration of labor standards as a 
condition for trade – became a bone of contention in international trade negotiations 
was a sign that fair trade had become a major element of American trade politics. This 
shift was not confined to workers’ rights. By signing Executive Order No. 13,141 a 
month before the WTO ministerial, the Clinton administration committed the U.S. 
government to conduct environmental reviews for major free trade agreements and 
signaled to other WTO members that Washington was increasingly sensitive to the 
linkage between trade and the environment (Seelye, 1999).18    
The Seattle battle was a historical landmark in trade liberalization debates. As 
Destler writes, “in its outcome and theatrics, [it was] a significantly greater triumph 
for the antiglobalist coalition than the MAI or fast track had been” (Destler, 2005, 
273). With historical hindsight, Seattle was, indeed, a symbol of the rising power that 
free trade opponents had managed to acquire since the NAFTA debates (Robin, 
2000).  
                                                                                                                                      
For a discussion of Clinton’s proposals, see Elliott (2000, 194) and Summers (2001, 65-66). 
17 Cited in Schott (2000, 6). 
18 For more details on environmental reviews, see Saltzman (2001) and American Journal of 
International Law (2001).  
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The massive protests revealed the potential of coalition-building efforts. At the 
national level, the alliance between environmental groups and trade unions – 
epitomized by the Alliance for Sustainable Jobs and the Environment (ASJE)19 – 
captured the media’s attention. While the ties between the blue and the green 
movements should not be exaggerated, their joined mobilization had a symbolic 
dimension: the idea that American trade policy could no longer be the fief of business 
groups and trade bureaucrats.  
Beyond domestic politics, the Seattle protests were also unprecedented for their 
international dimension. The battle of Seattle was the culmination of years of 
transnational outreach during which anti-NAFTA and anti-MAI opponents had 
broadened their network. For both activists and scholars, it marked the advent of a 
larger “global justice” or “antiglobalization” movement that inspired many activists 
in the developed world.20  
Finally, like the controversies surrounding the North American agreement, the 
Seattle protests considerably raised public awareness on trade issues and reignited 
U.S. debates on globalization to an extent that the MAI and the fast track battles had 
not (Esty, 2000a, 1501; Robin, 2000). As Medea Benjamin (2000, 66) writes, “[T]he 
protests turned the WTO from an obscure acronym into a household name for 
millions.”   
In sum, at the end of the century, fair trade seemed to have become an 
unavoidable plank of American trade policy. After the fast track fiasco, the collapse 
                                                
19 This alliance regrouped, among others, the Sierra Club, Friends of the Earth and the Earth 
Island Institute on the environmental side, and United Steelworkers, Teamsters along with 
teachers and postal service unions on the labor side (Obach 2004, 67-8). It should not be confused 
with the Unions for Jobs and the Environment, a corporate-sponsored organization that questions 
the reality of global warming (Moberg, 2000, 7). 
20 The term “altermondialiste,” more positive than anti-globalization or anti-trade is also used to 
describe the movement. For a discussion on these terminologies, read Chesters (2003, 228). 
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of the MAI negotiations and the Seattle debacle, it seemed that American decision-
makers could no longer ignore the environmental and social grievances of fair trade 
advocates.  
 
Research question 
More than a decade and a half after the seminal NAFTA debates, have these 
political changes lived up to the hopes they elicited among labor, consumer and 
environmental advocates? What influence has the blue-green alliance actually exerted 
on the trade policy process? What factors have facilitated or constrained its political 
progress in the trade policy sphere?  
This dissertation seeks to assess the impact of the mobilizing efforts of the blue-
green alliance from 1991 to 2005. To do so, it analyzes the clash between fair and free 
traders in five major legislative battles from the NAFTA debates (1991-1993) to the 
ratification of the Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) in 2005. I seek 
to identify the factors that have hitherto promoted or impeded the progress of the fair 
trade coalition.  
This analysis reveals that the “special relationship” between the internationally-
oriented business community and the White House has been a key obstacle to the 
achievements of the blue-green alliance from the beginning to the end of the policy 
process. First, the private sector21 has enjoyed privileged access to the negotiations 
phase under the aegis of the executive branch. Through both institutional conduits and 
informal channels with administration officials, corporate actors have managed to 
                                                
21 In this analysis, the expressions “business community”, “private sector” and “corporate interests” are 
used interchangeably. Each of these terms refers to the internationally oriented businesses involved in 
trade politics, individually or through cross-sectoral business associations. For clarity purposes, 
questions of definition and debates on the nature of interest groups are discussed in chapter two. 
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control the terms of the debates and exclude enforceable blue and green provisions 
from the scope of free trade agreements.  
Second, the Oval Office also proved to be a key ally of business coalitions during 
the final lobbying phase of the legislative debates – preceding the ratification of trade 
agreements or the renewal of fast track authority. Regardless of party affiliation, the 
president’s involvement in free trade campaigns has been instrumental in rallying 
support for trade legislation in Congress and countering the offensive of fair trade 
advocates. The joint lobbying efforts of the White House and the private sector – a 
process here defined as “countermobilization” – is a distinctive product of the 
contentious nature of contemporary trade politics.  
From a theoretical perspective, understanding the outcomes of these trade 
battles is crucial, because they shed light on the special relationship between the 
president and interest groups (in this case, business organizations) and the 
idiosyncratic dynamics of countermobilization. From a political perspective, the fair 
trade debates have much broader implications than the narrow scope of American 
politics. The rising prominence of labor and environmental issues in the commercial 
sphere has the potential of redefining the normative framework upon which 
globalization rests. Since the institutionalization of these norms at the international 
level might arguably depend on the success of the blue- green coalition in the United 
States, it seems all the more crucial to understand the mechanisms that have hitherto 
hampered the political progress of the fair trade cause. 
The rest of this introductory chapter is structured as follows. The next section 
situates this analysis within the prolific scholarship on American trade policy. It 
points to the lacunae of the field and draws insights from two bodies of literature – 
focusing respectively on political institutions and the relationship between the 
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American presidency and interest groups – to lay out the theoretical framework 
underpinning this dissertation. The third section summarizes the main findings of this 
analysis in the form of two claims. The fourth part describes the methodology and 
research design upon which these findings are based. The final section outlines the 
chapter-by-chapter structure of this dissertation.  
 
II) UNDERSTANDING AMERICAN TRADE POLITICS  
Three approaches to American trade policy 
 
The study of American trade policy has been the subject of considerable interest 
among economists and political scientists, whether at the system-, state-, or society-
level (Ikenberry, Lake & Mastanduno, 1988; Odell, 1990; Milner, 1999). At the 
systemic level, hegemonic stability theory focuses on the international distribution of 
economic power as a determinant of commercial openness (Kindleberger, 1973; 
Gilpin, 1975; Krasner, 1976; Keohane, 1980).22 Alternatively, Marxian frameworks 
like theories of imperialism, world-system and dependencia view trade policy as 
embedded in the exploitative logic of capitalism, serving the interests of the ruling 
class of the developed or “core” countries to the detriment of the “periphery” (Lenin, 
1939; Luxemburg, 1968; Wallerstein, 1979; Frank, 1967 & 1969; Dos Santos, 1970; 
Etherington, 1982; Chilcote, 1974).  
A second genre of analysis focuses on the state level and more specifically on the 
ability of the government – generally reduced to a unitary actor – to use trade policy 
to promote the national interest: from Hamilton’s “infant-industry” case for protection 
                                                
22 For a critique, read Eichengreen (2000), Snidal (1984), Stein (1984), McKeown (1983), Milner 
(1998). 
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(Hamilton, 1791)23 to strategic trade theory (Krugman, 1986) and other state-centered 
affiliates (Gilpin, 2001).24  
The third, and most common approach to trade theory directly focuses on 
domestic politics, and thus seems better equipped to understand fair trade battles. 
Conventional society-centered accounts of trade theory fall under two standard 
economic paradigms: the factor model and the sector model. Based on the Stolper-
Samuelson theorem, the first claims that trade will reward abundant factors (e.g. 
capital in the United States or labor in China), but punish or reduce the income of 
scarce factors (American workers or Chinese capital-owners), leading eventually to 
“factor-price equalization” or the convergence of factor costs (Oatley, 2006, 70-4). 
Under this assumption (also referred to as the Hecksher-Ohlin model), trade policy is 
driven by the competition between mobile factors of production. From these 
principles of neo-classical economic theory, Rogowski (1989) has derived political 
implications: scarce factors are likely to lobby for protectionism, while abundant 
factors will pressure the state for increased openness. “Losers” from trade 
liberalization will experience declining political leverage, while the economic winners 
will become increasingly powerful (Rogowski, 1989, 318-9). 
The second and dominant society-centered paradigm rejects the mobility of 
production factors and the monolithic vision of class interests upon which the factor 
model is based, pointing not only to the problematic conversion of low-skilled 
workers into high-skilled technicians, but also to the lack of fungibility of capital 
from one sector (e.g. mining industry) to another (e.g. biotechnology). Instead, the 
Ricardo-Viner model holds factors as “specific” to industries and focuses on the 
                                                
23 For a rich historical analysis of “infant-industry” arguments, read Irwin (1996).  
24 For more details see Oatley (2006, 91-110). 
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conflict of interests between sectors, and more precisely on the competition between 
import-competing industries and export-oriented companies (Schattschneider, 1935; 
Bauer, de Sola Pool, & Dexter, 1972; Baldwin, 1985; Magee & Young 1987; Alt & 
Gilligan 1994; for a review, read Alt et al, 1996).  
While the sector model provides crucial insights into the interest groups dynamics 
of trade policy making, three caveats must be raised. First, its emphasis on sector 
preferences tends to ignore the class conflicts that have become increasingly 
prominent in contemporary trade debates. Hiscox (2001, 2002) is a notable exception 
to this trend. Seeking to bridge the gap between factor and sector models, Hiscox 
argues that coalition patterns depend on inter-industry factor mobility. Thus, broad 
class-based coalitions are more likely where factor mobility is high, while narrow 
industry-based coalitions are more common where mobility is low.  
Although Hiscox’s fluid conception of interindustry factor mobility is a welcome 
departure from the dichotomous sector and factor approaches, what is missing from 
his analysis and most societal trade models is the importance of the growing 
geographic mobility of capital over the past three decades. The second half of the 
twentieth century has seen a rapid integration of world markets through the expansion 
of trade and investment, and the internationalization of the production process. Both 
technological innovations and political decisions have accelerated the mobility of 
capital. Since the 1970s, overseas production by multinational corporations has 
increasingly become part of international value chains, leading to an acceleration of 
intrafirm trade flows on a global scale (Held et al. 1999, 246-7).25 The U.S. economy 
has not been exempt from these trends. While the share of international trade (exports 
                                                
25 At the end of the century, intrafirm trade represented between one fourth and one third of the world’s 
total trade (Held et al. 1999, 175). 
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plus imports) in the U.S. economy has grown from 7.5% of GDP in 1947 to more 
than 27% in 2005 (Business Roundtable, 2007, 4), intrafirm trade now represents 
approximately 40% of America’s total trade with the rest of the world (Chase 2003, 
142).  
The rapid liberalization of international trade and investment flows contrasts with 
the enduring immobility of labor. This asymmetry generates intra-sectoral class 
conflicts that conventional sector-specific models can hardly explain. On the one 
hand, large business owners, especially in labor-intensive industries, can benefit from 
the cost reductions associated with outsourcing and are, therefore, prone to support 
laws that liberalize trade and investment flows.26 On the other hand, domestic workers 
are the first victims of offshoring and will logically oppose the very same legislative 
proposals – as witnessed by organized labor’s protectionist retrenchment since the 
1970s (Helleiner, 1977; Moody, 1997; Dreiling and Darves, 2002).  
The growing class cleavages of American trade politics have been particularly 
visible during recent debates on NAFTA, which, for instance, pitted autoworkers 
against their employers (Chase, 2003; Cox, 2000). These class conflicts, however, are 
not endemic to regional trade agreements. In an increasingly interconnected world 
economy, value chains are not confined to the regional scale but have become truly 
global. This means that intercontinental trade agreements like the Permanent 
Normalization of U.S. Trade Relations with China (PNTR) are as prone to class 
conflict as NAFTA was. In sum, societal approaches to American trade policy need to 
recognize the effects of increased capital mobility on business preferences and the 
                                                
26 Admittedly, offshoring is not a viable option for all corporations. In effect, small domestic 
subcontractors are at a clear disadvantage vis-à-vis large multinational corporations. Similarly, not all 
jobs are conducive to offshoring. See chapter two for a discussion of the relationship between labor, 
business and trade.  
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intra-industry class conflicts that have become integral parts of contemporary trade 
politics 
A second lacuna of both factor- and sector-based models is related to another 
feature of contemporary trade politics that cannot be captured by class-based 
analyses: the political mobilization of non-commercial actors such as 
environmentalists or consumer advocates. By reducing trade policy outcomes to either 
free trade or protectionism – or a combination of the two27 – trade economists 
foreclose the study of fair trade advocacy, a defining characteristic of American trade 
politics since the early 1990s.   
Finally, society-centered analyses have often been criticized for their disregard of 
the role of decision-makers and institutions. In fact, trade economists do not generally 
distinguish between the executive and congressional branches (Baldwin, 1998). 
Making matters worse, they often reduce the role of undefined policymakers to 
“disinterested referees” (Ikenberry, Lake and Mastanduno, 1988, 8). Yet, to fully 
comprehend the trade policy process, one needs to open the “black box” and focus not 
only on the demand for policy, but also on the supply, i.e. the role played by state 
institutions (ibid, 9). This is particularly important to the extent that in the United 
States, the legislature and the executive play two very different roles. Understanding 
the active role played by the executive and its relation with free trade advocates is 
crucial to decode the political dynamics of contemporary trade politics.  
 
                                                
27 See the discussion of Milner and Yoffie (1989) in chapter 2. 
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The rise of fair trade politics  
Before examining the peculiar role that the executive branch plays in the trade 
policy process, it is important to discuss the meaning of “fair trade.” This broad 
concept has been used to defend a variety of causes: from equitable pricing with 
developing countries (e.g. for coffee, fruit, soccer balls etc.) to protection against 
subsidized competitors – or opposition to the so-called “unfair trade” practices of 
Japanese firms in the 1980s, also referred to as the “new protectionism”.28 The 
definition of fair trade adopted here will broadly refer to a trade policy model that 
seeks to address the social and environmental “externalities” that are corollary to the 
exchange of goods, services and capital, i.e. to solve the problems related to intra-
industry class conflicts (workers’ dislocation) and relax the tensions between national 
regulation (e.g. environmental and consumer protection, the enforcement of labor 
standards etc.) and international economic liberalization.   
 Admittedly, tariff protection such as import surge mechanisms can be interpreted 
as fulfilling objectives of social justice. In addition, the unions’ ostensibly selfless 
demand for the enforcement of workers’ rights in Central America or elsewhere can 
obscure the protectionist proclivities of the labor movement. However, the unions’ 
recent advocacy efforts in favor of international labor standards cannot simply be 
equated with the old politics of trade. To reduce fair trade advocacy to a new form of 
protectionism is to misread the growing complexity of the global economy and its far-
reaching ramifications (Destler & Balint, 1999, 2; Stokes, 1999-2000, 89; Stokes, 
                                                
28 This expression more specifically refers to the proliferation of new trade-restrictive measures – e.g. 
orderly marketing agreements, “voluntary” export restraints, product standards etc. – that started after 
the conclusion of the Tokyo Round in 1979 and were designed to cope with the rising competition 
from the Japanese and European economies. For more details, read Nivola (1986) and Goldstein 
(1986).  
* References to interviews are marked with an asterisk. 
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2008*). Without disclaiming the protectionist undercurrents of unions’ claims, fair 
trade will be seen as an alternative to both free trade and protectionism, a policy that 
falls under the radar of most trade economists. 
If one acknowledges the ambiguities of fair trade, one should also evoke the 
inconsistencies surrounding the notion of “free trade.” Despite its ostensible support 
for liberal trade policies in the postwar era, Washington has repeatedly granted 
protection to sectors threatened by international competition (e.g. steel, textiles). 
More recently, “free” trade agreements have exempted many sectors from trade 
liberalization, whether through rules of origin or farm subsidies.29  
To be sure, not all accounts of contemporary trade politics have ignored the new 
character of the post-NAFTA context. Several studies have focused on the 
mobilization of labor advocates (Shoch, 2001; Ross, 2000; Turner, 2001; Stillerman, 
2003; French, 2002; McDonald, 2005; Compa, 2001; Moody, 1997), while a few 
reviewed the participation of ecological organizations (Esty, 1998; Audley, 1997,  
2004; Vogel, 1997, 2000). However, few analyses have captured the new dynamics of 
coalition-building in post-NAFTA politics or examine the role of fair trade networks 
such as Citizens Trade Campaign or the Alliance for Responsible Trade, with the 
exception of Dreiling (2001) and Mayer (1998) who both focus on NAFTA.  
To this day, Destler and Balint’s pioneering work (1999) provides the only tour 
d’horizon of the “new politics of American trade.” Yet, even this analysis suffers 
from two shortcomings. First, the fact that it was published in 1999 – presciently, two 
months before Seattle – means that it cannot fully account for the challenges that the 
blue-green alliance has faced after its apogee on the trade policy stage. Second, 
however insightful, Destler and Balint’s condensed analysis cannot fully explore the 
                                                
29 The terms of NAFTA and CAFTA illustrate his point. See chapters 3 and 7. 
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internal and external dynamics of fair trade advocacy. This dissertation will seek to 
provide a more thorough picture of fair trade politics, an analysis embedded in the 
theoretical literature on American political institutions.  
 
Why institutions matter  
Understanding the institutional context in which fair trade organizations mobilized 
is crucial to fathom the challenges that they have faced over the past decade. The 
literature on American trade institutions provides invaluable insights into the 
idiosyncratic nature of inter-branch relations, and more specifically, the ways through 
which the institutional reforms of the twentieth century affected the course of 
American trade policy. This dissertation will take this scholarship one step further on 
the institutionalist path by analyzing more thoroughly the impact of these structural 
changes on the distribution of power among interest groups. It will also draw from the 
literature on the American presidency to unpack the relationship between the 
executive branch and the private sector so as to shed light on the role that these two 
sets of actors played to thwart the efforts of the fair trade coalition.  
The trade reforms of 1934 and 1974 changed the dynamics of trade policy 
making. Designed by the visionary Secretary of State Cordell Hull, the Reciprocal 
Trade Agreements Act (RTAA) of 1934 transferred tariff-making authority from the 
legislature – constitutionally mandated to “regulate commerce with foreign nations” 
(U.S. Constitution, Art. I, sect. 8) – to the executive branch. This reform put an end to 
a long era of protectionism, during which congressional deal-making protected 
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sectional interests with high tariffs,30 the Smoot-Hawley Act of 1930 being only the 
most notorious example of political “back scratching”.31 By authorizing the executive 
branch to lead the negotiations of reciprocal trade agreements, the RTAA geared 
American trade policy toward more liberal policies (Haggard, 1988; Goldstein, 1994; 
Hody, 1996; Bailey, Goldstein and Weingast, 1997, 309).  
Forty years later, the Trade Act of 1974 once again redefined inter-branch 
relations. Originally, this reform was intended to rebalance power between the two 
governing branches by granting Congress more consultation and oversight over an 
executive branch that was deemed slightly too internationalist (Dryden, 1995, 184-5; 
Aaronson, 2001, 80).32 It also required the president to establish a system for 
obtaining advice from the private sector so as to limit the executive’s independence to 
select where tariff cuts should be made (Baldwin, 1985, 116).  
Yet, paradoxically, the Trade Act of 1974 also empowered the executive branch in 
two regards. First, it expanded the scope of agreements that the Chief Executive could 
negotiate by granting him and his empowered U.S. Trade Representative33 the 
authority to negotiate non-tariff barriers (NTBs) such as product standards, 
regulations and subsidies (Stokes & Choate, 2001, 15-18). Second, the delegation of 
negotiating power from Congress to the Executive under the RTAA was prolonged by 
the creation of “fast track authority,” a procedure that gives the executive the 
authority to conduct international commercial negotiations while restricting 
                                                
30 Eckes (1995) remains the authoritative historical analysis of American trade policy. See also 
Stanwood (1903). For a more synthetic view, read Eckes (1999).  
31 For a close analysis of the domestic politics of the Smoot-Hawley Act, see Schattschneider’s 
pioneering analysis (1935).  
32 The Trade Expansion Act of 1962 had already reduced the role of the State Department in the trade 
policy sphere by creating the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations (precursor of the U.S. 
Trade Representative).  
33 The Trade Act of 1974 increased the degree of consultation between the USTR and congressional 
committees and put the USTR in charge of evaluating demands from business for protection from 
imports.  
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congressional votes on trade bills to a yes-or-no vote within 90 days (Goldstein, 1994, 
170; Destler, 2005, 71-2, 346).  
If most trade scholars recognize that Congress still retains control over the trade 
policy process, they generally agree that these institutional reforms were at least 
partly designed to insulate congressional members from the pressures of protectionist 
interest groups. As a result, the RTAA and the 1974 Trade Act not only led 
Washington to embrace trade liberalization, but also sustained support for free trade 
policies in an increasingly competitive era (Destler, 1986a; Pastor, 1980; Goldstein, 
1994; Bailey, Goldstein & Weingast, 1997).  
Underpinning this rationale is the common idea that the legislative and executive 
branches of government have different relations with constituent interests. More 
specifically, from the Founding Fathers to modern scholars, political analysts have 
long argued that the president’s “national constituency” makes him less subject to 
pressure from local interest groups. As such, the Chief Executive is said to rise above 
factional politics in the pursuit of the “public interest” (see e.g. Hamilton, 1788; 
Wilson, 1908, 65-9; Tulis, 1995, 96-100; Sundquist, 1981, 440-59).  
Along these lines, students of American trade policy typically contrast Congress’s 
vulnerability to protectionist pressures – particularly in the more parochial House of 
Representatives – with the president’s inclination toward free trade, which is assumed 
to increase the country’s welfare as a whole (Destler, 1986a; Pastor, 1980; Baldwin, 
1985; Dobson, 1903; Baldwin, 1998; for a critique, see Karol, 2007). The president’s 
liberal trade proclivities not only stem from questions of representation under the 
Constitution, but are also linked the president’s foreign policy mandate. In this view, 
the Chief Executive favors free trade over protectionism because it serves America’s 
foreign policy objectives including national economic prosperity and international 
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political stability (Baldwin, 1985, 120-1; Cohen, Joel & Blecker, 1996, 136; see also 
O’Halloran, 1994; Baldwin, 1998). 
The problem with the president-as-national-voice perspective is that it seems to 
ignore a century and a half of American history, when presidents (and particularly 
Whigs or Republicans after them) often took a more protectionist stand than Congress 
(especially under Democratic majorities). For instance, between 1849 and 1853, a 
Democratic Congress thwarted the efforts of Whig Presidents Zachary Taylor and 
Millard Fillmore to raise tariffs. In the next century, Republican Presidents Taft and 
Hoover both vetoed liberalizing bills passed by Democratic congresses.34  
The second lacuna of this postulate is that it downplays an important aspect of the 
Trade Act of 1974. This law not only delegated trade-negotiating authority to the 
executive, but also set the terms of this transfer of power, by requiring that the 
president establish a system of private-sector advisory committees. Understanding the 
logic of the system of trade advisory committees (TAC) is crucial to fathom the 
dynamics of U.S. trade policy making. The purpose of TACs is to provide 
information and advice to the President with regard to: A) “negotiating objectives and 
bargaining positions before entering into a trade agreement;” B) “the operation of any 
trade agreement once entered into;” C) “other matters arising in connection with the 
development, implementation, and administration of the trade policy of the United 
States” (Trade Act of 1974, subchapter I, part 3, §2155). 
Revised under four subsequent trade-related acts, this system has grown into a 
complex three-tier system. The President’s Advisory Committee for Trade Policy and 
Negotiations (ACTPN) is the most influential organ of this pyramid. Its forty-five 
members are appointed by the president for two-year terms (renewable indefinitely). 
                                                
34 For more details, see Karol (2007, 486). 
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Not only does the ACTPN provide the main negotiating objectives of free trade 
agreements but its members often play a role in rallying business support for lobbying 
Congress. The second tier of advisers consists of policy advisory committees whose 
members are appointed by the USTR either alone or in conjunction with other Cabinet 
officers. Its structure has changed under the Trade Act of 2002 and now includes only 
four committees: the Intergovernmental Policy Advisory Committee (IGPAC), the 
Agricultural Policy Advisory Committee (APAC), the Labor Advisory Committee 
(LAC) and the more recent Trade and Environment Policy Advisory Committee 
(TEPAC).35 The third tier regroups twenty-two technical advisory committees 
organized in two areas: industry and agriculture. Their members are appointed jointly 
by the USTR, and the Secretaries of Commerce and Agriculture, respectively. Today, 
the whole trade advisory committee (TAC) system consists of 26 committees 
regrouping a total membership of more than 700 advisors.36  
Under the 1972 Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA), these committees are 
required to be “fairly balanced in terms of point of view represented and the functions 
to be performed by the committee.”37 However, when the 1974 Trade Act was passed, 
the U.S. economy was only beginning to experience the economic and political 
implications of globalization. At the time, capital mobility had only started to split 
industries along class lines, and neither public interest groups nor decision-makers 
had fully fathomed the implications of opening “non-tariff barriers” to international 
trade negotiations. In this context, it seemed perhaps uncontroversial that the ACPTN, 
                                                
35 The TEPAC was created in the aftermath of the NAFTA debates. The Trade Act of 2002 abolished 
the Trade Advisory Committee on Africa and the Defense Policy Advisory Committee, whose interests 
are now represented in the third sectoral tier. 
36 These three paragraphs borrow from Stokes & Choate (2001, pp. 54-6) and the USTR’s website: 
http://www.ustr.gov/Who_We_Are/Mission_of_the_USTR.html  
37 Congress enacted the FACA to prevent industries from exerting undue influence on government 
policymaking (Hilliard, 1991, 8-9).  
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the top advisory committee would primarily represent business interests, with a 
“balance among sectors, product lines, between small and large firms, among 
geographical areas and among demographic groups” (DOC & USTR, undated, cited 
in Hilliard, 1991, 9). Admittedly, one section of the Trade Act of 1974 did ask that the 
committee “include representatives of non-Federal governments, labor, industry, 
agriculture, small business, service, industries, retailers, nongovernmental, 
environmental and conservation organizations, and consumer interests” (19 U.S.C. § 
2155(f); IUST 12/20/02). Yet, at that time, non-business interests were deemed to 
have little interest in U.S. trade policy. As one congressional staff member recalls, 
when the Trade Act of 1974 was established, “trade was about trade” (Reif, 2008*). 
Thus, the trade advisory committee was, and remains to this day, overwhelmingly 
dominated by private interests. These interests continue to be the essential voice 
providing information and advice on trade policy matters.  
This picture of the trade policy process contrasts with the idea that the president 
stands somehow above domestic politics in his pursuit of free trade. In fact, through 
the trade policy process, the executive branch is in constant dialogue with certain 
segments of the business community from the onset of trade negotiations to the final 
hours preceding a trade vote. To determine the political implications of these 
institutional arrangements, this analysis will draw from the “new institutionalist” 
scholarship with the prospect of shedding light on the stalled progress of the fair trade 
coalition.  
The “new institutionalism” scholarship has shown that domestic structures can 
determine “who gets what,” i.e. the extent to which they can privilege particular sets 
of interests or “policy clienteles” while excluding other stakeholders from decision-
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making (Orren & Skowronek, 2002; March & Olsen, 1984; Immergut, 1998). 
Through a self-reinforcing process of access and exclusion, inequalities of power can 
become embedded in institutions and political discourse (Pierson & Skocpol, 2002; 
March and Olsen, 1998). Thus, institutionalists speak of “path dependence,” a process 
defined as “the causal relevance of preceding stages in a temporal sequence” (Pierson, 
2000, 252).  
This dissertation will draw upon institutionalist scholarship to analyze the impact 
of institutional reforms on the distribution of power among interest groups. It will aim 
to show that the delegation of trade negotiating authority to the executive branch 
cannot be simply viewed as reducing the influence of protectionist forces. Instead, it 
should be seen as remapping the political access of the constellation of pressure 
groups gravitating around the trade policy process, by opening doors to some 
interests, while closing doors to others. 
Along those lines, two recent works have offered a more sophisticated picture of 
the relations between institutions of American trade policy and interest groups, 
seeking to assess the relevancy of the decision-making process in the global era. 
Although more inspired by policy prescriptions than theoretical concerns, both Stokes 
& Choate (2001) and Aaronson (2001b) have examined the extent to which “process 
shapes substance” (Stokes & Choate, 2001). Pointing to the increasing conflicts 
between domestic interests and international trade policies, they both recommend that 
the decision-making process represent the interests of a broader range of stakeholders. 
However insightful, these analyses lack both empirical evidence (e.g. case studies) to 
support their assertions and theoretical foundations to fully understand the causes and 
consequences of the skewed design of the trade policy process. 
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This dissertation will build upon these recent works and (re)connect the trade 
policy scholarship with the “new institutionalist” literature to show the extent to 
which structural obstacles might have impeded the progress of the blue-green 
coalition.   
 
Countermobilization  
As explained earlier, society-centered approaches to American trade policy 
provide little insight into the peculiar relation between the presidency and pressure 
groups to the extent that they generally do not differentiate state institutions. The 
problem with this bottom-up approach to the policy process – modeled primarily with 
congressional politics in mind – is that, in the trade sphere, the executive branch plays 
a central role, not only in the negotiating phase, but also during the legislative battles, 
when the president pressures congressmen to defend his liberal agenda (Baldwin, 
1998). 
 In contrast, analyses of presidential politics have painted president-interest groups 
relations as truly interactive. On the one hand, they recognize that pressure groups can 
exert a large influence on the executive (Pika, 1983; Scholzman & Tierney, 1986). 
This political power stems from two types of resources that presidents need from 
interest groups. First, candidates to the White House rely on electoral resources – 
whether in the form of financial contributions or votes – that are often exchanged for 
policy concessions. Second, presidents need to build coalitions in order to pursue their 
political agendas. Here, interest groups commonly provide policy proposals, 
information and broader political support that can help decision-makers become 
successful leaders (Tichenor 2003, 330; Kumar & Grossman, 1984). 
40 
   
On the other hand, the president retains considerable autonomy over the decision-
making process. Although all presidents need allies to support their political agendas, 
they remain free to favor one interest group over another. To a broader extent, 
presidents have the capacity to “alter the prevailing interest group system they 
encounter” i.e. to encourage the mobilization of certain interest groups, discourage the 
mobilization of others, create or split coalitions etc. (Tichenor 2003, 330-1; Peterson, 
1986; Polsky, 2000; Kumar and Grossman, 1984, 289; Cupitt, 2000). 
In her insightful case study of U.S. corporate tax policy, Martin (1989) examines 
the side-by-side mobilization of corporate interests and the president on behalf of tax 
bills. Her “coalition model” portrays business influence and state power as truly 
interactive processes and captures dynamics that are very similar to those at play in 
recent trade debates. This dissertation will build upon this framework to shed light on 
the dynamics of “countermobilization,” a process defined as the counteractive 
lobbying efforts jointly undertaken by the White House and the business community 
in response to the mobilization of fair trade organizations (labor unions, 
environmentalists, consumer advocates and human rights organizations).  
 
In sum, this dissertation will contribute to the discipline of political science in 
several respects. At the very least, it will go beyond the free trade/protectionism 
dichotomy and enrich the study of contemporary trade politics with an empirical 
analysis of the internal and external dynamics of fair trade advocacy: from the 
challenges and rewards of coalition-building to the response of political elites and, 
most importantly, the obstacles to political success. From a theoretical standpoint, this 
dissertation will call on American trade policy scholars to reconsider the president’s 
putative insulation from interest groups politics. In particular, this analysis will 
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borrow from the new institutionalism literature to shed light on the power 
implications of structural reforms and the ways in which they have favored so-called 
“free” traders over “fair” traders. In addition, this study will contribute to the 
literature on the American presidency and interest groups by decoding the process of 
presidential-corporate “countermobilization.” It will provide empirical evidence on 
the formal and informal channels that connect the executive branch and pressure 
groups. Last but not least, it will examine the tactics that the White House and its 
allies can use to exert pressure on the legislature and counter the lobbying efforts of 
their political opponents.  
 
III) THE ARGUMENT 
This dissertation seeks to examine the political impact of environmental and labor 
activism in trade politics from NAFTA to CAFTA. It will examine five major 
legislative battles between fair traders and free traders to shed light on the factors that 
impeded the progress of the blue-green coalition. The main argument of this 
dissertation is that the “special relationship” between the executive branch and the 
business community has been a key obstacle to the success of organized labor and its 
non-governmental allies in the trade policy sphere. This argument rests upon two 
claims: 
Claim 1: The institutional design of American trade policy has favored the 
voice of the business community over those of environmental, labor and 
consumer interests.  
 
During the phase of trade negotiations, the private sector has used its privileged 
access to the policy process to oppose the inclusion of enforceable labor and 
environmental provisions in trade agreements. Instead, it has managed to secure 
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strong clauses on investment and intellectual property rights, as illustrated by the 
design of NAFTA, the terms of China’s accession to the WTO, and the scope of the 
Central American Free Trade Agreement. 
To achieve their political objectives, corporate interests have made ample use of 
the opportunities created under the 1974 Trade Act. First, they have capitalized on 
their privileged access to the system of trade advisory committees to push their 
political priorities – whether they be protectionist clauses or market openings.  
Second, they have indirectly benefited from the procedure of fast track authority, 
which restrains congressional intervention in the design of trade agreements, thereby 
limiting the influence of fair trade advocates on lawmakers.  
The current trade policy process was designed at a time when the full social and 
environmental ramifications of globalization were only starting to emerge. As 
mentioned earlier, it was not until the second half of the 1970s that international trade 
negotiations began to intrude into new sensitive issue-areas such as tax, regulatory 
standards, or procurement policies. The architects of the Trade Act of 1974, which 
gave the president the power to launch negotiations in these new political spheres, did 
not anticipate the conflicts that would later emerge over such matters as 
environmental standards and, thus, favored trade associations and other politically 
active business interests, creating “policy clienteles” that would dominate the policy 
process. This meant that other stakeholders such as consumer and environmental 
advocates, who only became involved in trade politics in the early 1990s, would be at 
a clear disadvantage to influence the negotiation of trade agreements. 
In addition, the system of trade advisory committees was designed under the 
premise that workers and employers within a given industry share common interests 
as far as international trade is concerned. As a result, both groups were represented on 
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a sectoral basis, with business owners or trade association leaders commonly speaking 
on behalf of their industry.38 However, the decline of American manufacturing 
industries and the transfer of production operations overseas39 led to an obvious 
divergence of interests: while large capital owners benefit from the cost-savings 
resulting from outsourcing, workers can be displaced by the trade and investment 
agreements that facilitate the global integration of production processes.  
As a result, the domestic politics of American trade have acquired a class-conflict 
dimension, as illustrated by the stark contrast between the fierce opposition to free 
trade agreements from the labor leadership and the strong support of most major 
business organizations (Business Roundtable, U.S. Chamber of Commerce, National 
Association of Manufacturers etc.) for trade liberalization (Faux, 2006; Moody, 
1997).40 In this new global era, business members of trade advisory committees no 
longer represent the interests of their industrial workers, as illustrated by their 
repeated clash over recent trade initiatives including NAFTA or Washington’s 
bilateral trade agreement with China. Absent a reform of the trade advisory committee 
system, workers lack a voice in trade negotiations.  
Finally, the marginalization of labor, environmental and other interests stemming 
from institutional arrangements are exacerbated by the procedure of “fast track” 
authority, which restricts Congress’s intervention in the policy process to a yes-or-no 
vote within 90 days. Thus, institutional arrangements have not only denied fair traders 
                                                
38 In the Trade Act of 1974, Congress prescribed that the trade advisory committee system be “broadly 
representative of the key sectors and groups of the economy, particularly with respect to those sectors 
and groups which are affected by trade.” See Trade Act 1974 (§ 2155§). 
39 Mexico became a prime destination for outsourcing in the 1980s under the maquiladoras program 
(see chapter 3). By the end of the century, however, it suffered increasingly from import competition 
from China, which would become the world’s first recipient of foreign direct investment. For a 
discussion, read Greider (1997) and Friedman (2005).    
40 Of course, this does not mean that all workers lose in the globalization game, or that all businesses 
win. The class dimension of American trade politics is discussed in chapter 2. See also, Destler & 
Balint (1999, 18). 
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access to trade negotiations, but also constrained their ability to press Congress for 
amendments. The skewed design of the trade policy process explains why the 
language of American trade agreements since NAFTA has largely reflected the 
preferences of the business community, despite the strong mobilization of fair trade 
organizations.    
In other words, the long-term consequences of the 1974 trade reforms are not so 
much that they have insulated decision-makers from protectionist pressures. Instead, 
they have embedded inequalities of power in both institutions and political discourse, 
a case of “path dependence” whereby the voices of the private sector prevail under the 
guise of the “free trade” cause while workers, environmental and consumer advocates 
remain underrepresented.  
As the next chapters will show, these structural constraints, however, do not 
operate uniformly for each legislative battle. While the trade advisory committees 
play an instrumental role in designing trade agreements (e.g. NAFTA, PNTR), fast 
track authority bills are primarily designed in congressional committees. This does 
not mean that the executive branch cannot exert any influence on the trade policy 
process, nor that the interests of the private sector are not taken into account.  Yet, the 
pattern of path dependence does not directly apply in the elaboration of these bills. 
However, as mentioned earlier, the renewal of fast track authority is a key aspect of 
the special relationship to the extent that it allows the executive branch to dominate 
the policy process in the design of trade agreements.    
 In addition, the special relationship between the executive branch and the private 
sector, is not the mere product of the institutional legacies of another era. As my case 
studies will illustrate, the president retains a certain degree of independence in his 
conduct of trade policy. Depending on his ideological convictions or his political 
45 
   
calculations, the chief executive can reduce or exacerbate the corporate bias of the 
trade institutional apparatus.  
 
Claim 2: The countermobilization of business coalitions and the president 
offset the lobbying efforts of fair trade advocates and allowed “free traders” 
to win most trade legislative battles.   
 
During the lobbying phase preceding congressional ratification, the special 
relationship between the White House and the private sector has also operated against 
the interests of the blue-green alliance. Through the process of countermobilization, 
the president – regardless of his party – has repeatedly joined corporate interests to 
rally congressional support for “free trade” legislation.  
The intense grassroots pressures of labor and environmental advocates on 
Congress members meant that both presidential leadership and vigorous business 
mobilization would be required to sway decisive votes. In the era of post-NAFTA 
trade politics, complacency could mean defeat, as the rejection of fast track authority 
renewal in 1997 showed. From the NAFTA debates to the political conflicts 
surrounding CAFTA, the respective lobbying efforts of the Chief Executive and the 
business community often proved complementary to win legislative victories. 
To maximize its chances of winning controversial trade votes, the White House 
tightly coordinated its communication and lobbying efforts with the private sector. To 
do so, it relied on weekly briefings on Capitol Hill and constant information exchange 
between the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR), cabinet officials and representatives 
from major business organizations. In addition, free trade advocates emulated the 
tactics of their opponents – e.g. by launching decentralized lobbying campaigns to 
counter the grassroots efforts of fair traders – thereby demonstrating the mimetic 
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virtues of countermobilization. Finally, the “free-trader-in-chief” also used a 
combination of high-profile political endorsements, targeted policy concessions and 
last-minute pork barrel deals to sway the votes of cross-pressured congressmen.  
As mentioned earlier, the fact that the chief executive is generally more inclined 
toward free trade policies does not insulate him from domestic politics. In certain 
contexts, the president, like Congress, can be under strong pressure to make trade 
concessions to powerful interests with vast financial or electoral resources, including 
labor unions (Baldwin, 1985, 122). To use Destler’s expression, the White House 
often has to act like an “executive broker” to negotiate agreements that will liberalize 
trade in a number of sectors without alienating potential protectionists in Congress 
(Destler, 2005, 111).  
Similarly, both Democratic and Republican presidents have at times designed 
labor- and environment-friendly clauses to appease free trade opponents. These blue 
and green provisions, however, are more often than not designed to divide fair traders 
and/or provide political cover for members of Congress. The provisions typically 
provide few solutions to the complex social and environmental problems linked with 
trade liberalization.  
What is important for the purpose of this study is that these tactics are an integral 
part of the lobbying arsenal that the chief executive can rely on behalf of the free 
trade cause. And on most occasions, the countermobilization of free trade advocates 
proved decisive to the ratification of free trade agreements, despite growing 
skepticism about the benefits of trade among Democratic representatives.41 The White 
House’s involvement in free trade lobbying campaigns conferred upon corporate 
                                                
41 From NAFTA to CAFTA, the share of House Democrats voting in favor of major trade-liberalizing 
bills declined from 40% in 1993 to 7% in 2005.  
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interests a great advantage over their fair trade rivals. Despite vigorous lobbying 
campaigns both inside and outside Washington, labor and its allies failed to defeat 
most major trade bills.  
 
IV) RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
This dissertation presents five detailed case studies of the major legislative battles 
that took place between 1991 and 2005: the NAFTA debates of 1991-1993; the battle 
for the renewal of the fast track authority in 1997; the Permanent Normalization of 
Trade Relations with China (PNTR - 2000); the Trade Promotion Authority (fast 
track) in 2001; and the ratification of CAFTA (2005). It focuses on the debates in the 
House of Representatives, where trade votes are traditionally more contested than in 
the Senate. The fact that representatives are more vulnerable to the pressures of local 
constituencies makes legislative outcomes more uncertain.42 This means that 
mobilization and countermobilization processes, though not absent from Senate 
politics, are typically more vigorous in the House. 
This research combines primary and secondary sources to test the dissertation’s 
two claims. To test the first claim, this dissertation analyzes the extent to which the 
voice of the private sector prevailed in the design of the three trade agreements under 
consideration – NAFTA, PNTR and CAFTA. Here, it relies on discourse analysis 
(Phillips & Hardy, 2002) to compare and contrast the perspectives of business 
organizations and fair trade advocates on labor and environmental provisions. To do 
so, it draws from a variety of primary sources including lobbying materials, 
statements, reports, press releases and congressional testimonies. It also borrows from 
                                                
42 For a critical discussion, read Karol (2007).  
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the reports from the USTR’s trade advisory committees, drawing attention to their 
membership, recommendations and dissenting opinions.  
After clarifying the positions of fair traders and free traders, this analysis 
compares them to the final language of each trade bill under consideration. Since 
analyzing trade laws is both technical and time-consuming, this dissertation 
complements the study of legislative proposals with secondary sources, drawing from 
trade legal experts such as Compa (2001), Elliott (2004) or Alston (2006) on the labor 
side, Esty (1998), Audley (2002) and Gallagher (2005) on the environmental one and 
Alston (2005) and Aaronson and Zimmerman (2008) for issues pertaining to human 
rights. These scholarly studies should provide an objective basis to assess the degree 
to which policy outcomes correspond to the priorities of free traders and fair traders. 
Of course, political influence is always an elusive process to capture, as interest 
groups scholars have long appreciated. Bearing in mind the preferences of decision-
makers and the “win-set”43 of America’s negotiating partners, I will closely trace the 
process of negotiations by relying on both secondary sources and original interviews 
with political actors involved in and excluded from trade negotiations: representatives 
from labor, environmental and business groups, as well as USTR staff members. 
These semi-structured interviews will inquire about: 1) the dynamics of intra-branch 
relations; 2) the importance of access and exclusion during the negotiations phase; 
and 3) the role of alternative factors (e.g. electoral prospects, international pressures) 
in the design of free trade agreements.44   
To test the second claim, this analysis seeks to establish the causal link between 
mobilization/counter-mobilization and congressional trade votes. To do so, it relies on 
                                                
43 Putnam defines a “win-set” as the set of all possible international agreements that would obtain the 
necessary majority among domestic constituencies (1988, 437). 
44 See appendix 2 for sample questions.  
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the flourishing literature of quantitative analyses of congressional trade votes. Often 
influenced by economic theory, this corpus of data lends itself to analyses of 
congressional votes. Using regression analysis, political scientists have sought to test 
a large array of factors, among them constituency factors, economic conditions in 
members’ districts, ideological orientation and party affiliation (see e.g. Baldwin & 
Magee, 2000; Steagall and Jennings, 1996; Conley, 1999). This literature provides 
insights into the impact – or lack thereof – of mobilization of labor and business 
groups e.g. via campaign contributions. Equally important are recent attempts to 
establish the link between “presidential support” and legislators’ backing of trade-
liberalizing initiatives (Uslaner, 1998; Biglaiser, Jackson & Peake, 2004; Magee, 
2007).  
The problem with analyses of congressional votes is that they cannot capture the 
complexity of mobilization tactics (e.g. communications campaigns, grassroots efforts 
etc.) or the interactions between political actors and institutions. To avoid 
oversimplifying the complex confluence of vote determinants, one needs to situate the 
findings of quantitative studies in political context, and enrich them with a closer 
analysis of congressional action (e.g. roll call votes) on the one hand, and the 
president’s lobbying efforts on behalf of legislation on the other.45 Shoch’s rich work 
on partisan trade politics under the Clinton administration demonstrates the benefits 
of this approach (2001).   
Accordingly, this dissertation complements congressional analyses with a 
thorough analysis of the mobilization of fair trade advocates on the one hand, and of 
the counter-mobilization of the free trade coalition on the other. To do so, it relies on 
lobbying materials from the archives of central organizations like the AFL-CIO, 
                                                
45 For a discussion, read Peterson (1995). 
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Public Citizen, and business organizations (e.g. Business Roundtable, ECAT). 
Furthermore, it draws from reports from main U.S. newspapers (New York Times, 
Washington Post etc.) and the specialized press (Inside U.S. Trade, National Journal, 
CongressDaily). 
Last but not least, it draws on more than 20 original interviews conducted with 
political actors from various sides of the debates: labor, environmental and consumer 
advocates from various organizations; representatives from business trade 
associations; congressional staff members of leading lawmakers on trade policy; 
delegates from the U.S. Trade Representative etc. The interviews can help answer key 
questions: What impact did the mobilization of fair traders / free traders have on 
congressional votes? Did their influence transcend party politics? To what extent did 
the White House and business coalitions coordinate their efforts on behalf of free 
trade? What role did presidential lobbying play in the passage of trade laws under the 
presidency of Bill Clinton and George W. Bush? These interviews will help shed light 
on the process of countermobilization and compare its impact on congressional votes.  
  
V) STRUCTURE OF THE DISSERTATION 
This dissertation is divided into eight chapters. This introductory chapter has 
established the context for the “new politics of trade,” examined the theoretical 
framework underpinning this dissertation and presented the two claims guiding this 
analysis. The next chapter provides further ground for understanding the participation 
of interest groups in the trade policy process. It examines the nature and structure of 
the groups of political actors under consideration in this dissertation, situates them in 
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the context of American politics, and puts their mobilizing efforts in historical 
perspective.  
Each of the five subsequent chapters contains a detailed case study of a major 
trade battle. Chapter 3 analyzes the involvement of interest groups in the design of 
NAFTA, the formation and mobilization of the fair trade coalition against the free 
trade agreement and the successful efforts of the Clinton administration and its 
business allies to save the trade bill. Chapter 4 examines the failure of the “free” trade 
coalition to counter the lobbying offensive of the blue-green alliance against fast track 
renewal in 1997. Chapter 5 illustrates the significance of the special relationship 
between the executive branch and the business community by unveiling the latter’s 
ability to control the terms of the U.S-Chinese trade agreement (in the context of 
PNTR) and reveals the powerful impact of countermobilization on congressional 
votes. Chapter 6 and 7 test the two claims of this dissertation under the presidency of 
George W. Bush: first, in the context of fast track or “trade promotion authority” 
renewal in 2001; second, in relation to the ratification of CAFTA in 2005. Chapter 8 
summarizes the findings of this dissertation before reflecting on recent developments 
in the politics of fair trade and suggesting the likely future of American trade policy.  
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CHAPTER 2: Interest groups  
in the trade policy arena 
 
 
The previous chapter introduced the new political context in which the politics of 
fair trade emerged and focused on the institutional framework in which mobilization 
and countermobilization occur. For the sake of clarity and conciseness, it took for 
granted a number of ideas related to the definition of interest groups like “labor,” 
“environmentalists,” or “business” and underspecified these groups’ relationship with 
trade policy. This chapter seeks to provide context to the study of fair trade politics 
with a focus on two axes: first, the structure and political role of the network of 
interest groups under consideration; second, the nature of their participation in trade 
politics. These two sets of questions are discussed in relation with both “fair traders” 
– labor, environmentalists, human rights and consumer advocates – and business 
interests (both free traders and protectionists).  
The analysis of the former set of interest groups provides background on the 
different civil society groups involved in contemporary trade debates, with a sharper 
focus on labor and environmental groups. To demystify the concept of fair trade 
alliance,46 it analyzes the different political cultures and histories of the civil society 
networks under consideration. It examines the respective role that they play as 
political (and economic) actors and their relationship with American political 
institutions, before focusing on their involvement – recent or not – in trade politics. 
Most importantly, the first sections of this chapter discuss the two main factors that 
have contributed to the recent mobilization of labor and their allies in the trade policy 
                                                
46 Some neo-gramscian and neo-marxist scholars have interpreted the recent rise of social protests 
against globalization as “counterhegemonic” or “antisystemic” challenges to global capitalism 
(Robinson, 2004; Hardt & Negri, 2000 & 2004; Wallerstein, 2003). Their analyses, however, tend to 
downplay the political divisions of these heterogeneous networks, along with the fact that most NGOs 
are not inherently hostile to capitalism.  
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sphere: the rising class conflicts related to increased capital mobility; and the far-
reaching scope of international trade agreements over the past few decades.  
The analysis of corporate interests begins with a historical analysis of the political 
participation of business in American politics. This brief study of corporate power 
highlights the politicization of the private sector over the past few decades. It also 
brings into perspective the growing consensus of corporate interests regarding 
investment and trade agreements in an economy increasingly interconnected with 
international markets.  
 
I) ORGANIZED LABOR 
Labor’s political travails 
The historical development of U.S. labor market institutions sheds considerable 
light on the role of unions in today’s political arena. The labor movement in the 
second half of the nineteenth century faced a particular hostile political context, in 
which powerful business interests enjoyed the support of all levels of government, in 
addition to the assent of anti-union courts (Goldstein, 1978; Forbath, 1989; Yates, 
1998). It took American workers decades of conflicts and the Great Depression to be 
able to break these seemingly insurmountable obstacles, making America’s 
experience the “bloodiest and most violent labor history of any industrial nation in the 
world” (Taft & Ross, 1969, cited in Goldstein, 1978, 3). In the insurgent climate of 
the 1930s, Franklin D. Roosevelt and his Democratic allies finally recognized 
workers’ right to unionize under the 1935 National Labor Relations Act. 
However, labor’s honeymoon with the New Deal Democrats did not make for a 
happy marriage. Admittedly, economic prosperity and growing union membership in 
the postwar era allowed workers to win substantial wage and benefit concessions at 
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the bargaining table. Yet, even under the “Fordist compromise” of postwar 
industrialism,47 the American working class suffered two major political blows: the 
failure of President Truman’s universal healthcare program and the passage of the 
anti-union Taft-Hartley Act (1947).48 The combined pressures of sectional and 
business interests were largely responsible for these setbacks, which weakened the 
New Deal coalition in its infancy, ultimately preventing its emergence as a labor party 
(Piven, 1992, 263).  
And if organized labor’s political leverage was never absolute during the 
prosperous postwar era, the 1970s presented unions with new political and economic 
challenges that would gradually erode their hard-won achievements. First, the 
sectional pressures within the Democratic Party, exacerbated by President Nixon’s 
“Southern strategy,” led the New Deal coalition to collapse under its own weight. As 
Piven notes, this paved the way for the resurgence of the Republican Party backed by 
an increasingly politicized corporate class (Piven, 1992, 261). Second, and in 
conjunction, the economic decline of the 1970s – fanned by stagflation and increased 
international competition – vindicated advocates of “regulatory relief” and 
privatization.49 In this context, Ronald Reagan was elected with a business-friendly 
mandate that aimed to roll back labor’s political gains: from his heavy-handed 
suppression of the Professional Air Traffic Controllers Organization (PATCO) strike 
in 1981, to the roll-back of trade adjustment assistance, budget cuts in unemployment 
                                                
47 For a critical discussion, read Lichtenstein (2002, 98-140). 
48 The Taft-Hartley Act of 1947 was vetoed by President Truman before being overridden by Congress 
with the support of Southern Democrats (Piven, 1992, 250-1). The legislation gave the president the 
power to break strikes, banned the use of solidary tactics such as sympathy strikes or secondary 
boycotts and gave states the right to ban “closed shops,” i.e. mandatory union membership by passing 
“right to work” laws. It was followed, a decade later, by the Landrum-Griffin Act of 1959, which 
imposed further administrative and financial constraints on unions (Asher et al, 2001, 11). 
49 These policies began during the presidency of Jimmy Carter (Harrison and Bluestone, 1981, 94-96; 
Frayssé, 2004, 266). 
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insurance and, last but not least, his hostile appointments to the National Labor 
Relations Board (NLRB) (Vogel, 1989; Piven, 1992; Piven & Cloward, 1982).  
The NLRB never fully recovered its full mandate to protect workers’ rights and 
has since become increasingly passive, despite the common use of union-busting 
tactics among employers. This precarious institutional context means that unions have 
often been on the defensive, as witnessed by the declining number of strikes and the 
institutionalization of “concession bargaining” or “collective begging” (Aronowitz, 
2005) whereby unions discuss employers’ claims instead of workers’ rights (Frayssé, 
2004, 267; Ness, 2002).  In the electoral arena, labor’s misfortunes are not only due to 
the Republicans’ firm grasp on the government in the last quarter of the century, but 
also to the Democrats’ own misgivings about defending pro-labor policies lest they 
might alienate an increasingly powerful business community (Ness, 2002, 55-6; 
Yates, 1998).50 And if the Clinton administration seemed ambivalent about defending 
labor interests against a hostile Republican Congress, its Republican successor had 
few misgivings about further weakening labor institutions.51 
 
Structural changes in the U.S. labor movement 
Labor’s declining influence in the political sphere is closely intertwined with its 
shrinking membership, a decades-long process that has yet to be reversed. The 
absolute number of unionized workers peaked in the mid-1970s with slightly more 
than 22 million members before beginning a long decline. The apex of union density, 
however, came earlier, reaching almost 35 percent of the workforce in the mid-1950s. 
Since then, union membership has plunged back to its 1935-36 level, before the 
                                                
50 For more details on the relationship between unions and the Democrats, read Dark (1999).  
51 Chapter 3 and 6 respectively discuss labor’s relationship with President Clinton and President W. 
Bush. 
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Wagner Act took effect (Asher et al, 2001). Today, it hovers around 12% of the 
workforce,52 with only 7.5 % of private sector workers being unionized, as opposed to 
35.9% in the public sector (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2008).  
In addition to the political factors described earlier, labor’s long-term decline can 
be traced to economic and internal factors. On the economic side, de-industrialization 
has taken a heavy toll on heavily unionized sectors. The decline of the industrial 
sector has recently accelerated, with the U.S. economy losing more than 3 million 
manufacturing jobs between 2000 and 2007 (Lee, 2007). If economic analysts 
continue to debate the exact impact of trade and technology on manufacturing job 
losses and union decline (see e.g. Kletzer, 2002; Baldwin, 2003; Bivens, 2006; The 
Economist, 2006), both factors are at least partly related to the intensification of 
domestic and international competition (Stokes, 2008). Among the usual suspects, 
offshoring has also contributed to the shrinking of union ranks both directly, by 
sending American manufacturing jobs overseas, and indirectly, by discouraging 
organizing efforts in vulnerable sectors (see e.g. Bronfenbrenner, 1997 & 2000).  
Compounding the effects of these external factors, the labor leadership’s lethargic 
response to contemporary political and economic challenges has also largely 
contributed to unions’ misfortunes. The roots of union leadership conservatism can be 
traced to the Cold War era, during which labor leaders collaborated with government 
officials to purge the movement of its left-wing (communists and non-communists) 
elements. As a result, the activist, “social movement unionism” of the 1930s came to 
be replaced by “business unionism” – a bureaucratizing process that led unions to 
retrench into collective bargaining instead of looking beyond members’ interests to 
organize the growing sectors of the U.S. economy. These conservative tendencies 
                                                
52 In 2007, union density rose by 0.1% to 12.1% from its 2006 level (BLS 2008). It is, however, too 
early to interpret this small rise as a sign of reversal.  
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were exacerbated by the strongly hierarchical structure of the AFL-CIO and its top-
down approach to labor politics whereby decisions would trickle down from the 
national leadership through the state and the local unions.53  
Labor’s “business unionism” – at least in the private sector54 – prevented it from 
riding the social movement wave of the 1960s and 1970s. As a result, unions failed to 
harness rising forces within the U.S. workforce – women and minorities (Turner and 
Hurd, 2001). Not until John Sweeney took over the leadership did labor decide to 
broaden its political horizons and boost its organizing efforts. If the spirit of the new 
administration seems to have departed from the conservative policies of the Meany-
Kirkland (1955-1995) era, the jury is still out about its achievements (Aronowitz, 
2005). While organizing efforts have been successful in the public and services 
sector,55 the continuing decline of industrial unions means that the American labor 
movement still faces a daunting task to reverse three decades of decline.  
These contrasting tendencies point to a structural change in labor’s historical 
development. Although the AFL-CIO continues to represent workers’ interests at a 
national level, organized labor was in effect divided into two distinct movements: one 
comprising manufacturing unions, which have been severely hit by the economic 
changes mentioned above; and another one, made up of unions for the expanding 
service sector (Greenhouse, 2006; Ness, 2002, 55). These internal pressures finally 
led to a formal split of the movement in 2005. Disillusioned by the slow pace of 
internal reforms under the Sweeney administration, a group of labor unions – the 
SEIU, UNITE, the Hotel Employees and Restaurant Employees Union (HERE), the 
                                                
53 For more details on the organizational structure of the AFL-CIO, read Asher et al (2001, 8-9) and 
Yates (1998, 41-5). 
54 The public sector was more prone to “social movement unionism.” For a discussion, read Johnston 
(1995).  
55 The Service Employees International Union’s (SEIU) Justice for Janitors campaign in Los Angeles 
was among the notable successes of these organizing efforts. See La Luz & Finn (1998); see also Fine 
(1998).  
59 
   
 
United Brotherhood of Carpenters (UBC) and the Laborers' International Union of 
North America (LIUNA), the Teamsters and the United Food and Commercial 
Workers – decided to leave the AFL-CIO to form the Change to Win coalition, a new 
alliance holding organizing as its top priority.56  
 
A brief history of labor-trade debates  
Before analyzing the effects that the changing nature of the labor movement might 
have on its contemporary role in trade debates, one must step back to examine its 
historical role in American trade debates. The history of labor’s tariff policy brings 
considerable perspective to contemporary trade politics. First, it demonstrates that 
trade-labor debates long antedated the current controversies surrounding the impact of 
globalization and must be situated in a broader historical context. Second, it traces the 
roots of fair trade advocacy to two recent phenomena: first, the intensification of class 
conflicts over trade policy since the 1970s; second, the broader activist context in 
which this mobilization occurred, and particularly the gradual emergence of new 
patterns of coalition-building between unions and new trade actors like 
environmentalists and/or human rights advocates. 
During the protectionist era of American trade history, employment-related 
arguments for tariff protection were invoked on a sectoral basis. In fact, trade-labor 
debates antedated the emergence of organized labor as a unified political actor. From 
the adoption of the constitution, sectional interests and friendly lawmakers commonly 
associated the protection of the manufacturer with the fate of the wage earner (Vear, 
1955, 10). To push the Tariff Acts of 182857 and 1842, protectionists stressed the 
                                                
56 For a discussion of the potential implications of this split, read Milkman (2006). 
57 The 1828 Trade Act or “tariff of abominations” implemented the highest tariff rates in American 
history. For more details, see Stanwood (1903, 243-4) and Eckes (1995, 23).  
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dislocating effects of trading with nations with inferior labor costs.58 According to the 
“pauper labor argument,” the tariff would act as a “poor man’s law” to protect 
American wages and employment against the pauper labor of its European 
competitors (Eckes, 1995, 25; Mangold, 1971, 70).59   
After the Civil War, trade policy became the subject of bitter sectional and 
partisan conflicts, with Whig-Republican politicians praising the tariff as a shield for 
American wages and national industries while free trade Democrats defended export-
oriented farm interests (for more details, read Foner, 1970, 18-21; Bensel, 2000, 
chapter 7). For all the support that import protection enjoyed in the post-bellum 
period, the position adopted by the emerging labor leadership on the tariff was 
surprisingly ambivalent. After adopting a protectionist plank at its founding 
convention in 1881, the Federation of Organized Trades and Labor Unions (FOTLU) 
revoked its policy in the face of internal divisions (Foner 1977, 263-4, 371; Fine, 
1961, 131). Subsequently, the labor leadership decided to adopt a neutrality policy on 
the tariff in order to bridge sectional divisions within the movement and honor the 
Federation’s commitment to non-partisanship. Of course, despite its official line, the 
AFL never had the power to restrain its constituent unions from exerting protectionist 
                                                
58 Taussig notes that free traders initially invoked the wage differential between American and 
European workers to oppose the “infant industry” argument, according to which tariffs were needed to 
protect young manufactures. Free traders regarded high salaries as an obstacle to the establishment of 
new industries in the United States. Protectionists soon appropriated the wage differential argument to 
justify the need to protect American workers (Taussig, 1910, 40-1). 
59 The arguments of Samuel Whitcomb, speaking before an early society of workers in 1831, are eerily 
reminiscent of the recent globalization debates in the United States: 
 We import from other regions where the work is still performed by serfs and slaves and thus 
bring the hardy yeomanry of our own land, as well as our skillful manufacturers and mechanics, 
into a ruinous competition with those unfortunate fellow beings of other lands and countries. If one 
portion of them is oppressed and forced to toil for naught the produce of their labor is employed as 
a means of depressing the prices of their brethren in other lands. These products are sent here or 
elsewhere to be offered in competition with similar products of the labor of other men. No wonder 
then that when all the workingmen of Europe, Asia, and Africa are in a state of comparative 
slavery, that we of America should find it necessary to interpose the strong arm of Government to 
protect and cherish our own industries (cited in Mangold, 1971, 86). 
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pressures on Congress. Yet, despite repeated protectionist calls from individual 
unions, the AFL managed to maintain its neutrality policy until 1928 (Vear, 1955, 2-
40).  
In 1928, the creation of a high tariff lobbying organization, America’s Wage 
Earners’ Protective Conference (AWPEC), within the Federation itself signaled a 
policy shift on trade matters. With the rise of protectionist voices, the AFL leadership 
began to lend support to protective tariffs on a sectoral basis (Vear, 1955, 39, 58-89). 
This departure from the neutrality policy coincided with the intense lobbying efforts 
of American trade associations at the end of the 1920s, which resulted in the notorious 
Smoot-Hawley Act in 1930 (Vear, 1955, 40-58). Although the voices of trade 
associations largely predominated in congressional deliberations, employment and 
wage levels were once again an integral part of the trade debates (Schattschneider, 
1935, 287).60  
The 1930s saw a dramatic reversal of American trade policy. Under the leadership 
of Secretary of Commerce Cordell Hull, Washington began to move away from 
protectionism to advocate trade liberalization under the banner of “reciprocity.”61 As 
mentioned in chapter one, the new role of the executive branch in the trade policy 
process played a crucial role in this sudden policy shift. Hull’s political reforms were 
given momentum by the rise of export-oriented industries, whose growing union 
membership led the labor federation to distance itself from protectionist policies and 
gradually support trade-liberalizing initiatives. In other words, structural changes 
                                                
60 For instance, like the Trade Act of 1922, the Smoot-Hawley Act evoked the principle of “cost 
equalization” as a rationale for protection, a concept that included labor costs (Charnovitz, 1987, 568; 
see also Aaronson, 2001, 48). 
61 This was the spirit of the 1934 Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act. However, it must be noted that 
despite its protectionist tendencies, Washington had advocated reciprocity as a basis for its foreign 
economic policy since Jefferson’s Report on Commerce in 1793 (Eckes, 1995, 63). For more details on 
the history of U.S. reciprocity policy, read Setser (1937) and Eckes (1995, chapter 3). 
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within the unions’ movement conditioned its changing attitude toward trade policy 
(Vear, 1955, 138-62). 
By the early 1940s, organized labor had become a “consistent and reliable 
member of the free trade coalition” (Destler, 1998, 389; see also Alben, 2001, 1429). 
Needless to say that unions had not abandoned their commitment to a labor-friendly 
trade policy, as illustrated by their efforts to link international trade and labor 
standards (e.g. minimum wage, right to organize) during the debates on the aborted 
International Trade Organization (ITO).62 Although the founding texts of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) omitted the ITO’s original employment 
chapter,63 a majority of AFL-affiliated organizations, along with the entire CIO 
membership supported the creation of the new multilateral institution (Vear, 1955, 
165-7).  
George Meany’s succession of Green as the AFL president heralded the beginning 
of a more explicit endorsement of free trade policies. As a strong anti-communist, the 
leader of the Federation supported Washington’s strategic use of trade liberalization 
as a way to rally Western and Europe under the banner of the “free world.” In 1953-
54, both the AFL and the CIO expressed unequivocal praise for the GATT. Both 
organizations combined their support for trade liberalization with strong support for 
the improvement of international labor standards and increased assistance to trade-
displaced workers.  
Their common views on foreign economic policy provided ground for the creation 
of Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) in 1962. A stepping-stone for the linkage of 
trade and labor issues, the TAA consisted of granting financial, technical and 
                                                
62 For reasons unrelated to its employment provisions, the ITO agreement failed to reap domestic 
support in the United States.  
63 For more details on the trade-labor debates surrounding the ITO, read George (2007); Charnovitz 
(2006, 138-9); Alben (2001); Aaronson (1996, 30-3, 50). 
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retraining assistance to workers or firms hurt by imports. Its aim was to weaken 
support for protectionism among certain union leaders so as to obtain their support for 
the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 that would launch the negotiations of the Kennedy 
Round. It also fitted with the administration’s emphasis on worker retraining as a 
response to unemployment (Destler, 2005, 23-5; Destler, 1998, 391).64  
If labor leaders were divided along sectoral lines by the stakes of multilateral 
negotiations,65 the TAA won unanimous praise in the newly united union movement 
(Schoepfle, 2000, 105).66 Hence, the AFL-CIO, chaired by the free-trade-leaning 
George Meany threw its support behind the Trade Expansion Act (Pastor, 1980, 111, 
131; Dryden, 1995, 47).67 However, in a world of increasing international 
competition, the restrictive provisions of the TAA program meant that labor’s support 
for liberal trade policies would soon erode unless decision-makers addressed trade-
labor issues in a more comprehensive fashion (Destler, 1998, 392-4).68  
The Kennedy Round marked the apex of the liberal era of American trade policy. 
Yet, its conclusion released protectionist pressures that had hitherto been contained to 
safeguard the multilateral negotiations. At the end of the 1960s, a growing 
protectionist mood began to spread to all political spheres, not only in labor, but also 
within the business community, Congress and even the Executive. The rise of 
protectionist pressures was the byproduct of the changing nature of the international 
economy, and more precisely of the rising competition from European and Japanese 
                                                
64 For instance, the Manpower Development and Training Act of 1962 was designed to respond to 
concerns about the adverse effects of automation (Schoepfle, 2000, 97).  
65 Despite the labor leadership’s liberal proclivities, textile and clothing unions remained opposed to 
trade liberalization (Katz, 1998, 409). 
66 The AFL and the CIO merged in 1955.  
67 Like Kennedy, Meany saw trade liberalization as an important weapon against communism (Pastor, 
1980, 131).  
68 To be eligible for assistance, workers had to petition the U.S. Tariff Commission and demonstrate 
that increased imports “as a result in major part of concessions granted under trade agreements” had 
been “the major factor in causing, or threatening to cause” the group’s unemployment. Between 1962 
and 1969, no petition was accepted as eligible to TAA benefits. The eligibility criteria were relaxed in 
the Trade Act of 1974, as the next section will reveal (Schoepfle, 2000, 105-6; Destler, 1998, 392-3).  
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companies in sectors where American companies had long been considered 
invulnerable (e.g. the computer, aircraft, semi-conductors, and automobile industries) 
(Aaronson, 2001, 61). Thus, the Kennedy Round was followed by “an extraordinary 
counterattack on liberal trade” (Dryden, 1995, 117).  
During the first decades of the Cold War, Washington had unilaterally opened its 
market to promote economic growth and gain ideological allegiance among its 
European and Asian allies, sometimes neglecting the economic priorities of American 
firms.69 Without abandoning its commitment to trade liberalization, America was now 
ready to defend its national economic interest (Dryden, 1995, 133-65; Eckes, 1995, 
213) and declare, to use the words of budget director George Shultz, that “Santa Claus 
is dead” (cited in Dryden, 1995, 156).  
The 1970s marked a dramatic reversal in labor’s trade policy. In the face of rising 
import competition, the labor leadership came under increasing pressure to abandon 
its official support for liberal trade. Compounding the erosion of America’s 
competitive edge, the rise of multinational corporations and the increasing outflow of 
American capital into developing countries alarmed leaders. In 1970, the AFL-CIO 
held its first conference on international trade70 and formulated four policy 
recommendations to absorb the shocks of trade liberalization: 1) the regulation of 
multinational corporations (labor practices, subcontracting etc.); 2) the enforcement of 
international labor standards, particularly in terms of wage levels and collective 
bargaining; 3) the improvement of trade adjustment assistance programs; 4) other 
methods of trade relief such as the escape clause or anti-dumping procedures. The 
support of union leaders for the fourth solution contrasted with their open repudiation 
                                                
69 Russell Long, chairman of the Senate Finance Committee expressed his unwillingness to see U.S. 
grant new trade concessions by stating that he was “tired of the United States being the ‘least-favored 
nation” (Dryden, 1995, 177). 
70 The name of the conference reflected the unions’ growing anxieties: “The Developing Crisis in 
International Trade” (Shelton, 1970). 
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of higher tariffs as a solution to trade-employment problems, a tactic that aimed to 
distance organized labor from discredited protectionist solutions (Shelton, 1970, 51-
4).71 
This attempt to qualify the Federation’s support for trade liberalization was 
followed by a much clearer step in favor of protection. The International Trade and 
Investment Act of 1971, better known as the Burke-Hartke Act, epitomized labor’s 
growing discontent – including from the once complacent George Meany – toward 
liberal trade and investment policies. Designed to restrain imports and foreign direct 
investment by U.S. firms that were deemed to threaten American jobs, the bill 
considerably raised the visibility of labor-trade debates in the United States.  
The debates surrounding the Burke-Hartke Act also had the effect of forcing 
multinational corporations – the explicit targets of labor’s advocacy efforts – out of 
their political passivity (Destler, 1998, 395; Dryden, 1995, 172; Aaronson 2001, 73). 
The anti-trade advocacy of a newly united labor movement coincided with the 
politicization of the business community. These antagonistic tendencies set the stage 
for the class conflicts of the late century.   
The debates on the Trade Act of 1974 arose in this sulfurous atmosphere. The bill 
was the first trade-liberalizing legislation that the unions’ movement actively opposed 
(Pastor, 1980, 180). As with the Burke-Hartke Act, organized labor argued that the 
Trade Act did not appropriately regulate the practices of American multinational 
corporations. For unions, the rising level of unemployment in the early 1970s and 
America’s first deficit (since 1888) in 1971 made a radical change in the U.S. trade 
policy all the more urgent (Kaplan, 1996, 90-4; Pastor, 1980, 138). The testimony of 
I.W. Abel, President of United Steelworkers at a congressional hearing of the House 
                                                
71 Protectionism was partly blamed for the international economic crisis of the 1930s that contributed to 
the rise of totalitarian regimes in Europe.  
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Ways and Means Committee captures labor’s frustration about the bill: “America 
needs an entire restructuring based on the recognition that the concept of free trade 
versus protectionism... is badly out of phase with the vastly changed world of the 
seventies” (cited in Aaronson 2001, 78). Once again, however, labor failed to prevent 
the passage of the bill, which the Nixon administration partly secured by granting 
additional concessions to the steel and textile industries (Pastor, 1980, 180-1). By the 
end of the 1970s, one of the last labor advocates of trade liberalization, the United 
Auto Workers had joined the protectionist ranks, completing labor’s conversion 
against free trade (Destler, 1998, 396).72  
If the 1970s marked the emergence of class conflict in American trade debates, 
the 1980s witnessed labor’s first coalition-building efforts in the trade policy sphere. 
Ironically, the mobilization of a new range of civil society actors, from religious and 
human rights organizations to labor advocacy organizations like the International 
Labor Rights Fund (ILRF), resulted partially from their concern for the narrow 
protectionist positions adopted by many trade unions. They joined labor 
representatives73 and congressional staffers to advocate a new approach to the 
promotion of human and workers’ rights in American foreign policy (Compa & Vogt, 
2001, 199-201; Compa 2001, 322). These embryonic coalition-building efforts would 
provide ground for the fair trade networks of the 1990s.  
The first breakthrough of this new loose alliance was the Caribbean Basin 
Initiative (CBI). Designed to foster economic development in Caribbean countries, 
the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act of 1983 granted duty-free entry for all 
specified products from any countries eligible for beneficiary status. Under this 
                                                
72 The second oil shock had devastating effects on the auto industry, triggering a rising demand for 
fuel-efficient Japanese cars. 
73 The unions represented included the UAW, the International Association of Machinists, United Food 
and Commercial Workers (UFCW), American Federation of Government Employees and officials of 
the AFL-CIO.  
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program, the U.S. president is directed to consider 18 eligibility criteria, two of which 
refer to workplace conditions and collective bargaining rights (Charnovitz, 1987, 573; 
Alston 1993, 3; see also Charnovitz, 1984, 54-55).74 What made the CBI even more 
significant is that it served as a blueprint for a broader recognition of the trade-labor 
linkage under the General System of Preferences (GSP).  
Created in 1974, the GSP grants trade preferences to developing countries – from 
any region of the world – to promote their exports and attract foreign direct 
investment in regions in need of capital (Elliott, 1998). When it came under 
Congressional scrutiny for re-authorization in 1984, organized labor and its new allies 
mobilized to demand that American trading partners meet labor standards in order to 
retain eligibility. As a result of their mobilizing efforts, Congress allowed the 
president to deny trade preferences to any country that “has not taken or is not taking 
steps to afford internationally recognized worker rights” (Elliott, 1998; Destler, 1998, 
396).75 The GSP constitutes a major breakthrough in the institutionalization of the 
trade-labor linkage, culminating decades of debates surrounding the social 
implications of trading with nations with inferior labor standards. For organized labor, 
the CBI and GSP victories were also emblematic of the benefits of coalition-building 
tactics.  
This brief historical analysis of American tariff policy reveals that labor advocacy 
has long been integral part of trade debates. However, until the 1970s, organized labor 
generally remained divided along sectoral lines. Over the past few decades, however, 
                                                
74 These two standards are two implicit references to the International Labor Organization (ILO) 
framework. However, some have stressed the purposeful omission of another core labor principle: non-
discrimination in employment (Alston, 1993, 7; Charnovitz, 1987, 573). 
75 These include: freedom of association; right to organize and bargain collectively; prohibition against 
forced labor; a minimum age for child labor; acceptable conditions of work with regard to minimum 
wages, working hours and occupational safety and health. 
In addition to broadening the CBI’s labor standards framework and geographic scope, the GSP also 
provides tremendous opportunities for public participation through the petition filing procedures. For 
more details, read (Elliott, 1998); Charnovitz (1987, 573-4); Compa and Vogt (2001); and Compa 
(2001, 323-4). 
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the combination of rising import competition and investment liberalization seem to 
have united labor unions against corporate free traders. In addition, to these growing 
class conflicts, labor’s collaboration with non-governmental organizations in the 
1980s prepared the union movement for the broader coalition-building efforts that 
would occur in the fair trade era.  
 
Labor and trade today 
If organized labor has become increasingly united against free trade, not all 
segments of the unions’ movement are likely to respond to trade policy decisions in 
the same manner. This comes from one obvious fact: workers are not uniformly 
affected by international trade.  
Logically, the industrial segment of the labor movement has been much more 
actively involved in trade debates owing to the corrosive impact of import 
competition and outsourcing on the American manufacturing sector. Among the most 
active unions in the trade sphere are the United Auto Workers (UAW), the 
Steelworkers (USW), UNITE (formerly the Union of Needletrades, Industrial and 
Textile Employees),76 the International Association of Machinist and Aerospace 
Workers (IMAW), the United Mine Workers of America (UMWA) and the 
Teamsters.77  
Other segments of organized labor like the National Farmers Union have also 
been involved in trade debates. More sporadically, public and service unions like the 
Service Employees International Union (SEIU), American Federation of State, 
County and Municipal Employees (AFSCME) and the American Federation of 
                                                
76 UNITE merged with HERE (Hotel Employees and Restaurant Employees International Union) in 
2004.  
77 Although the Teamsters represent primarily truck drivers, the union has recently merged with unions 
from the printing and railway industries (International Brotherhood of Teamsters, undated). 
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Teachers (AFT) have also shown their support for fair trade principles (especially 
workers’ rights). Of course, these groups have not mobilized on the same scale as 
industrial unions have. Yet at times they have participated in trade debates not only by 
signing petitions but also by protesting on the streets of Seattle.78 This is surprising to 
the extent that the workers in these unions are not directly affected by the dislocating 
effects of international trade but, as one business representative commented with 
exasperation, may on balance benefit from the lower prices resulting from trade 
liberalization (e.g. for school and office supplies) (Goudie, 2007*).  
The broad opposition of union workers to trade liberalization could be linked with 
working-class solidarity and/or the negative image that free trade agreements have 
had among workers, whether they are more likely to suffer or benefit from them. As 
the subsequent chapters will illustrate, trade and globalization have sometimes elicited 
visceral reactions among the rank-and-file, prompting union leaders to be more 
intransigent than they might have been otherwise. Partly as a response to these 
bottom-up pressures – and partly as a legacy of its industrial tradition – the AFL-CIO 
has been a vocal opponent of recent trade-liberalizing bills. What emerges from this 
brief overview is that, despite its sectoral divisions and the autonomy of its 
international unions79 in regard to political action,80 the U.S. labor movement recently 
has been relatively united in its criticisms of American trade policy. When contrasted 
with the private sector’s large support for free trade agreements,81 the unions’ 
consensus on fair trade – if not import protection – tends to reinforce the class 
dimension of contemporary trade debates.  
                                                
78 This was the case of the AFSCME and the SEIU. Even the International Longshoremen’s 
Association, once one of the few labor unions supporting free trade (Destler and Odell, 1987, 25), was 
a leading force in the demonstrations (Gould, Lewis and Roberts, 2004, 93).  
79 Unions are called “international” for their historical ties with Canadian locals.  
80 For more details on the organizational structure of organized labor and the relation between the AFL-
CIO and its member unions, read Asher, (2001 chapter 1) and Yates (1998, 41-5).  
81 This point is discussed in a subsequent section of this chapter. 
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Labor and human rights NGOs 
As the previous section has shown, unions were not alone in their efforts to defend 
workers’ rights at home and abroad. In the 1980s, a coalition of non-governmental 
organizations began to see American trade policy as a source of political leverage to 
promote the enforcement of human and labor rights abroad. The Caribbean Basin 
Initiative and the General System of Preferences were the legacies of their advocacy 
efforts. Unions’ new allies include social justice advocates like the Institute for 
Agriculture and Trade Policy and the International Labor Rights Education and 
Research Fund, both of which were key architects of the anti-NAFTA coalitions 
(Aaronson 2001, 110-6) as well as the United Students Against Sweatshops82 and the 
National Labor Committee for Human Rights. They have remained active in trade 
policy debates, as witnessed by their strong opposition to CAFTA in 2004-2005.83  
Joining their call for decent working conditions have been human rights 
organizations, which are more erratically involved in trade debates. Like labor 
advocacy groups, human rights NGOs have been strong advocates of workers’ rights, 
fighting to eliminate child and slave labor across the world.84 Their focus, however, 
goes beyond the enforcement of labor standards to include political freedom, rights to 
health etc.  
As with labor advocacy, human rights debates related to trade policy did not 
emerge in the 1990s. From the abrogation of a U.S.-Russian commercial treaty in 
response to Russian pogroms in 1912 to the 1974 Jackson-Vanik Amendment limiting 
trade with foreign countries restricting the emigration of their citizens and Congress’s 
                                                
82 For more information on the anti-sweatshop movement, read Elliott and Freeman (2005). 
83 See chapter 7. 
84 Academic experts still debate the validity of considering workers’ rights as universal human rights. 
For a discussion, read Alston (2005) and Aaronson & Zimmerman (2008), and Srinivasan (1998). 
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sanctions to end South Africa’s apartheid,85 Washington had often used its economic 
leverage to protest against human rights abuse. To this day, the United States 
continues to deny Most Favored Nation (MFN) status86 to three countries on political 
grounds: Cuba, Laos and North Korea (Aaronson & Zimmerman, 2008, 159-63). 
Thus, it would be misguided to interpret recent human rights advocacy in the trade 
sphere as a pure product of fair trade politics.  
On the other hand, for human rights advocates, the rising prominence of “trade 
and…” issues has provided both new political avenues to promote their causes and 
opportunities for coalition-building. Conversely, the support of a broader pool of non-
governmental organizations has granted more credibility to the internationalist claims 
of American labor unions. It has also armed labor advocates with information 
resources about workers’ rights abuse and human rights violations in America’s 
potential trading partners.  
More problematic for fair traders is the fragmented and erratic mobilization of 
human rights NGOs in the trade policy sphere. If large organizations like Human 
Rights Watch or Oxfam have been relatively consistent in their advocacy efforts – 
though far from fully active – the constellation of civil society groups involved in fair 
trade campaigns varies from one legislative battle to another. For instance, NAFTA 
mobilized many women’s rights advocates on both sides of the Rio Grande; the 
PNTR debates featured Tibetan activists and defenders of religious’ rights. In addition 
to their sporadic involvement, not all human rights’ advocates have pursued the same 
political objectives: while some NGOs tend to see trade liberalization as a way toward 
                                                
85 The amendment implicitly targeted the Soviet Union, which imposed restrictions on the emigration 
of Russian Jews (Hook, 2005, 125).  
86 This principle of non-discrimination is a pillar of the international trade system, according to which a 
nation receiving MFN status is assured that its exports are subject to no greater tariffs than those 
imposed on exports from any other country (Destler, 2005, 349).  
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political openness, others have demanded democratic reforms as prerequisites to 
commercial agreements.87  
For the purpose of this study, the participation of human rights organizations in 
trade debates is notable to the extent that it is an integral part of the “new politics of 
trade,” and more precisely the coalition-building efforts undertaken by labor unions. 
Yet, like environmentalists or consumer advocates, the involvement of human rights 
NGOs in trade debates and their leverage in trade debates should not be overstated.  
 
II) ENVIRONMENTALISM  
Whether it is exaggerated by activists or virtually ignored by trade economists, the 
role of environmentalists in the trade policy process has often been misunderstood. 
This section aims to assess the significance (or lack thereof) of the involvement of the 
environmental movement in the trade sphere and, conversely, the importance of 
commercial issues for the ecological community. To do so, it begins with a brief 
historical overview of environmental politics since the emergence of modern 
environmentalism, before mapping out its heterogeneous structure. It then zooms in 
on the relation of the movement with trade issues with a short analysis of the origins 
of trade-environment debates. Finally, it puts recent coalition-building efforts in 
perspective with a brief history of labor-environmental relations in the United States.  
 
Environmentalists in the electoral arena 
In the 1960s, traditional conservationism88 morphed into a more far-reaching and 
assertive branch of environmentalism. Modern environmentalism was born out of the 
                                                
87 See chapter 5. 
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activist culture of the 1960s, capitalizing on the growing field of environmental and 
health science, the increasing media coverage of ecological issues and the advent of a 
“postmateralist” society (Inglehart, 1977) less concerned with bread-and-butter issues 
(Dunlap & Mertig, 1992, 2-3; Hays, 1989, 21-9).  
Unlike labor unions, which struggled for decades before obtaining national 
recognition, modern environmentalists were relatively quick to obtain policy 
concessions from the federal government, as illustrated by the successive passage of 
Clean Air Acts (1963, 1967, & 1970) and Clean Water Acts (1965, 1970, 1972). The 
“environmental decade” of the 1970s not only established the legal, political and 
institutional foundations of America’s environmental policy – most notably with the 
creation of the Environmental Protection Agency in 1970 – but also saw the rise of 
environmental consciousness among American citizens (Rosenbaum, 2002, 19). 
However, the momentum for environmental reforms dissipated as quickly as it had 
formed. Stagflation soon pitted environmentalists against an increasingly politicized 
business community. The latter organized a new form of environmental opposition 
along two corporate axes: the primary sector (farming, mining, lumbering) and the 
secondary sector (e.g. chemical industry, land developers etc.). This anti-
environmental backlash coincided with – or partly encouraged – a decline of public 
awareness for environmental issues in the late 1970s as well as a drop in the 
membership of environmental organizations’ (Hays, 2000, 109-11; Dunlap & Mertig, 
1992, 4). 
If Ronald Reagan’s agenda had damaging effects on unions’ interests, his 
deregulatory policies had mixed effects in the environmental realm. The president 
                                                                                                                                      
88 The conservation movement was born in the late 19th century and sought to make natural resources 
sustainable for production. Hays distinguishes the conservation from modern environmental 
movements as follows: “the first was a part of the history of production; the second, of the history of 
consumption” (Hays, 1989, 22).  
74 
   
 
who famously claimed that trees polluted more than cars, used his federal powers to 
bring the environmental momentum to a halt. While his administration strove to 
cripple national regulatory agencies,89 it also repeatedly invoked federal authority to 
restrict states’ rights to adopt local solutions to environmental problems (Rosenbaum, 
2002, 39; Hays, 1989, 57-8). Paradoxically, Ronald Reagan’s business-friendly 
agenda had the effect of reinvigorating environmental activism, triggering dramatic 
increases in membership and financial donations. No one infuriated environmental 
activists more than Interior Secretary James Watt, who epitomized the 
administration’s anti-environmental stance (Dunlap & Mertig, 1992, 4-5). With the 
support of its reinvigorated environmental constituencies, the Democratic Congress 
resisted the deregulatory attacks of the Reagan administration (Hays, 2000, 118).90   
In this context, George H. W. Bush distanced himself from Ronald Reagan’s 
deregulatory agenda. Although the self-proclaimed “environmental president” never 
re-established the regulatory role of the government, he generally proved to be more 
sympathetic to environmental policies, as revealed by the appointment of 
environmental leaders (e.g. William Reilly at the EPA, Michael Deland) and his 
promotion of the Clean Air Act amendments of 1990 (Rosenbaum, 2002, 20; Tokar, 
1997, x).91  
The Democrats’ return to presidential power elicited considerable hopes among 
environmentalists. The Clinton administration, which had largely benefited from the 
                                                
89 According to Kraft and Vig (2006, p. 19), the massive budget reductions in environmental funding 
during the 1980s had long-term adverse effects on the federal government’s ability to implement 
environmental policies.  
90 In the 1970s and 1980s, two thirds of congressional Democrats supported pro-environmental laws 
against only one third of Republicans (Hays, 2000, 118). 
91 Tokar offers a different interpretation and claims that President Bush implemented an “agenda of 
regulatory sabotage” that was as “vicious as Reagan’s, but considerably more sophisticated” (Tokar, 
1997, 61). 
75 
   
 
support of green voters,92 set an ambitious political agenda that promised to 
strengthen federal regulation, limit carbon emissions and promote green technologies 
(Vig, 2006, 108). As during the Reagan years, however, opposition in Congress 
considerably constrained the executive’s political agenda. Under the leadership of 
Newt Gingrich, the Republican majority confronted the environmental community 
with a hostile legislative climate that undermined the past achievements of the green 
movement. 
Although the Clinton administration managed to resist the deregulatory assault of 
the Gingrich Congress and partly reformed and strengthened environmental 
protection, its environmental legacy was scarred by the bitter partisan conflicts of the 
1990s, as witnessed by the failure of several of its major initiatives (the fuel-
efficiency tax, the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol etc.). If one takes in 
consideration the general apathy of the American public,93 the drift of the membership 
and the ossification of “Big Environment” – a bureaucratic and legalistic version of 
the original environmental movement – the picture of environmental politics at the 
end of the century seemed grim (Vig, 2006, 108-11; Rosenbaum, 2002, 39; see also 
Bosso, 2005, 1-15).  
Yet grim as it may have been, it turned even grimmer under the presidency of 
George W. Bush, who used his administrative powers to re-energize the anti-
regulatory agenda of Ronald Reagan (Vig, 2006, 111). This time, however, 
environmental organizations could no longer count on Democratic support in 
Congress. Thus, President Bush faced fewer checks on his use of presidential powers 
to redefine America’s environmental commitments than any of his predecessors since 
                                                
92 Environmentalists voted for Bill Clinton over George H. W. Bush by more than a 5-1 margin (Vig, 
2006, 108). 
93 Rosenbaum refers to a “passive consensus” according to which Americans generally favor 
environmental laws while paying little attention to their implementation (Rosenbaum, 2002, 39).   
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Richard Nixon proclaimed the first environmental decade in 1970 (Vig, 2006, 117-
8).94 
In sum, after a rapid ascension on the political scene, environmentalists saw their 
policy agenda under the threat of the deregulatory reforms pushed by the GOP-
business alliance. If they could generally count on the sympathy of the Democratic 
politicians – whether in Congress or the executive branch – their ability to influence 
the policy process remained severely constrained by the divided governments of the 
1980s and 1990s. The Republicans’ dominance of both branches of government in the 
early 21st century gave the environmental movement little hope of making political 
progress. Its internal divisions further undermined its chances of success.   
 
Understanding the environmental movement 
Anyone familiar with the environmental community would deem the image of a 
single, monolithic movement inaccurate (Dunlap & Mertig, 1992, 6). The point here 
is not to delve into the intricacies of the American environmental kaleidoscope, but 
rather to clarify the meaning of or correct the misperceptions about what is also 
referred as the “green lobby”.  
Since the late 1960s, when modern environmentalism emerged on the political 
scene,95 it has become increasingly diverse, dividing itself along overlapping 
ideological, organizational and even tactical lines (Scarce, 1990, 27). Yet, as Samuel 
Hays notes, the diversity of the green movement is poorly understood because of the 
media’s almost universal focus on organizations based on K Street, i.e. the most 
visible part of the iceberg (Hays, 2000, 95). Admittedly, financial and political 
                                                
94 Chapter 6 discusses the relationship between the Bush administration and the environmental 
movement.  
95 The origins of the environmental movement dates back to the late nineteenth century, when 
conservationists or “first wave environmentalists” organized to demand a wiser management of natural 
resources (Dunlap & Mertig, 1992, 1-2).  
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resources are concentrated in a small number of non-governmental organizations 
sometimes referred to as the “Big Ten”96 or owing to the growing number of 
environmental organizations, the “Big Twenty Six.” These informal alliances often 
collaborate on national issues. Although not all national environmental groups are 
involved in lobbying activities, the largest ones have become highly professionalized 
and specialized and today use the same modern techniques of advocacy as any 
powerful national lobby.97 Unsurprisingly, these are the organizations that played a 
prominent role in the legislative debates surrounding trade liberalization.  
The professionalization of the national “Green Lobby” notwithstanding, “behind-
the-scenes” local activities have also dramatically expanded from the 1970s through 
the 1990s. Today, “grassroots” environmentalism functions as a loosely structured 
movement with three overlapping, but distinct levels of organizations: community-
based groups, regional or statewide coalitions and national organizations.98 This 
intricate network of activists is often absent from common representations of the 
environmental movement, yet has also played a non-negligible role in trade debates. 
For instance, during the NAFTA debates and at the Seattle protests, grassroots 
organizations not only helped to build alliances with labor unions, but also educated 
the public about the environmental ramifications of trade agreements. In addition, 
their common emphasis on human health also broadened the scope of political 
debates (Freudenberg, 1992, 27-35).   
                                                
96 This alliance regroups: the National Wildlife Federation (NWF), the Sierra Club, the National 
Audubon Society, the Wilderness Society, Friends of the Earth, the Environmental Defense Fund 
(EDF), the National Parks and Conservation Association, the Izaak Walton League, the National 
Resources Defense Council (NRDC) and the Environmental Policy Institute. 
97 This paragraph borrows from Mitchell (1989, 100-7), Hays (2000, 94-108) and Rosenbaum (2002, 
34). 
98 For instance, though often seen as a key member of the “Big Ten,” the Sierra Club coordinates a 
wide network of grassroots organizations via local and state chapters.  
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Apart from their organizational structure, environmental groups also vary 
considerably in their ideological orientation. The Group of Ten tends to adopt 
moderate positions. These organizations stand for the “pragmatic reformers” that play 
by congressional rules and attempt to shape policies through bargaining and coalition 
building (Rosenbaum, 2002, 29). Their moderate, conformist methods have come 
under attack from the radical fringe of the environmental movement, which favors 
direct action tactics ranging from nonviolent demonstrations to “monkeywrenching” 
(sabotage). Radical environmentalists have been deeply frustrated by what they 
perceived as the limits of bureaucratic, co-opted national organizations (Rosenbaum, 
2002, 39).99 For environmental activist Brian Tokar,  
The history of mainstream environmentalism in the 1990s has been one of 
legislative compromise and capitulation, missed opportunities, and the ever 
persistent pursuit of ‘influence’ in a fundamentally corrupt and anti-ecological 
political system (Tokar, 1997, 22-3).  
 
Yet, here again, the picture is not monochromatic in so far as certain anti-
establishment groups such as Friends of the Earth paradoxically rely on traditional 
forms of political activity (Rosenbaum, 2002, 29). 100 Despite its prominence in the 
media, Greenpeace is generally considered not as a mainstream organization, but as a 
“bridge to radicalism” (Scarce, 1990, 47-56).  
Thus, to a much greater degree than the labor movement, the network of 
environmental organizations is divided along organizational and ideological lines. 
Unlike unions, which are at least loosely coordinated by the AFL-CIO, modern 
environmentalism is highly decentralized and functions through a nebulous network 
of grassroots and national organizations.  
 
                                                
99 For a more recent discussion, read Bosso (2005).  
100 In addition, national organizations should systematically be considered as “mainstream”: e.g. 
Environmental Action and the Sea Shepherd Society have a pronounced proclivity for direction action.   
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Environmentalists and American trade policy 
The pervasive divisions of the environmental movement shed light on its uneven 
involvement in trade debates. On the ideological level, there is a general lack of 
consensus surrounding not only the costs and benefits of trade liberalization but, to a 
broader extent, the logic of capitalism. On the one hand, mainstream organizations 
regard economic growth as a positive force that can raise resources for environmental 
protection. On the other hand, more radical groups associate economic growth with 
increased industrial activity and systematic environmental degradation (Esty, 1998, 
28). Their trust – or lack thereof – in market solutions influences their attitude toward 
trade agreements and regulatory issues.  
However, not all environmental organizations have an official position on trade 
policy, an issue-area that doesn’t always have tangible ecological ramifications. As 
Sierra Club Senior Representative of the Responsible Trade Program Margrete Strand 
confesses, one of environmentalists’ main challenges in the trade policy sphere is to 
try to make trade issues relevant to their membership (Strand, 2007*). Although the 
environmental impact of trade initiatives like NAFTA can be framed in vivid terms to 
mobilize environmental activists, most trade bills fall below the radar of ecological 
groups. This is not only due to the limited financial resources available to green 
organizations (particularly local ones) but also to their deliberate choices to privilege 
one issue over another in a context of increased specialization.101 
  What must be clear is that environmentalists are by no means driving forces 
behind the trade policy process. Nor should their coalition-building efforts with labor 
unions be exaggerated. As this chapter will illustrate, the coalition-building efforts of 
the blue-green alliance continues to raise suspicion on both labor and environmental 
                                                
101 For a more general discussion of environmental perspectives on trade, see Esty (1998) and Esty 
(1994, 37-42).  
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sides. However, the participation of environmentalists in trade legislative battles is a 
distinctive feature of contemporary trade politics, as is their joint mobilization with 
organized labor or consumer advocates. The purpose of this dissertation is to reveal 
the distinctive features of fair trade politics without exaggerating its significance. 
Before turning to these coalition-building efforts, this chapter will examine the origins 
of the trade-environment nexus.  
The short history of environmentalists’ involvement in trade politics is commonly 
traced to one catalytic event. In 1991, an international dispute panel concluded that a 
U.S. environmental law violated America’s treaty obligations under the GATT. Since 
1972, the U.S. Marine Mammal Protection Act banned imports of tuna from nations 
whose dolphin protection standards were laxer than American ones. The GATT 
declared that the U.S. law was an unacceptable imposition of extraterritoriality that 
constituted an unfair trade practice as defined by the multilateral trade system.102  
 This event occurred amidst growing debates on sustainable development within 
the environmental community, as illustrated by its criticism of the World Bank in the 
late 1980s (Esty, 1998, 201). The GATT’s unprecedented ruling outraged American 
ecological groups and became a symbol of the contentions between international 
market forces and environmental protection. At demonstrations on Capitol Hill, 
environmentalists vilified the monstrous “GATT-zilla” and its threat to the survival of 
“Flipper” the dolphin, leading Earth Island Institute’s executive director David 
Phillips to prophesize: “In the 1990s, free trade and efforts to protect the environment 
are on a collision course.” (cited in Vogel, 2000, 75). History would prove him right, 
as the next chapter will illustrate. On the heels of the tuna-dolphin controversy, the 
NAFTA debates marked a turning point for the involvement of green organizations in 
                                                
102 For a summary on tuna-dolphin case, see Esty, (1994, 30-1), Vogel (2000) and Tabb (2004, 342-4). 
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trade politics. It was also a peculiar moment of collaboration between the labor and 
environmental movements, whose relationship had historically been tumultuous.  
 
Solidarity and contention between blue and green organizations
103
 
To better understand the nature of the blue-green alliance in the fair trade context 
– its motives, its internal tensions etc. – one must analyze the potential sources of 
conflict and cooperation between the movements and examine their interactions in 
historical perspective.  
Perhaps the greatest source of contention between the blue and green movements 
has been the pervasive idea of the “jobs-versus-the-environment” trade-off, according 
to which environmental regulation lowers corporations’ profits and leads to job 
losses. Without delving into costs-benefits analyses of environmental regulation, two 
general remarks can be made. First, one should acknowledge that not all sectors are 
created equal when it comes to environmental regulation. Thus, certain categories of 
jobs e.g. in the mining or lumber industries seem at first sight more vulnerable to 
environmental regulation. Second, one should also remain cognizant of the 
politicization of such economic debates e.g. the employers’ use of “environmental 
blackmail” – the threat to layoff employees to mobilize the latter against regulation.104  
To compound these potential economic conflicts, institutional and ideological 
obstacles have also commonly hampered coalition-building efforts between blue and 
green organizations. As one leading environmentalist recently noted in an interview, 
the contrast between the decentralized nature of the environmental movement and the 
hierarchical structure of organized labor can be a source of incompatibility (Magraw, 
2008*).  
                                                
103 “Solidarity and contention” is the title of Dreiling’s book on the NAFTA debates (Dreiling, 2001).  
104 For a discussion, read Kazis & Grossman (1982), Miller (1980), Goodstein (1999), Siegmann (1985).  
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Ideologically speaking, the internal divisions of the environmental movement are 
likely to pose problems for alliance-building, with radical green organizations being 
unlikely to build ties with conservative unions (Obach, 2004; Siegmann, 1985; 
Dreiling, 2001). These ideological tensions are also related to the class divide 
between labor unions and environmentalists, with blue-collar union members more 
likely to mobilize for tangible economic benefits, while often upper-middle class 
green constituencies fight “postmaterialist” conflicts.105  
 While analyses of labor-environmentalists interactions have often highlighted 
the sources of conflict structuring their relation, they have also stressed the potential 
benefits of cross-field cooperation, and the conditions under which this might occur. 
From the literature on coalitions (Gamson, 1961; Riker, 1962) to theories of social 
movements (Tilly, 1978; McCarthy and Zald, 1977) and political networks (Knoke, 
1990; Podolny and Page, 1998), the formation of alliances has been widely 
understood as an aggregation of resources and political support, a strategy motivated 
by the prospect of political success. Collective action scholars share a 
multidimensional conception of resources, understood as facilities, labor, capital and 
technical expertise (Tilly, 1978, 69) or legitimacy (McCarthy and Zald, 1977, 1216-
20; see also Podolny & Page, 1998), to which could be added “polity access,” and 
particularly the political support that both environmentalists and unions have enjoyed 
within the Democratic Party (Obach, 2004). 
Here again, the political issue and the economic sector under consideration are 
likely to be crucial determinants of cooperation. If the energy sector is often source of 
conflict between environmentalists and trade unions, health and safety issues provide 
great opportunities to reach common ground. In fact, lower and working classes are 
                                                
105 This is the argument made by “new” social movement theorists. See (Inglehart, 1977; Cohen, 1985). 
For a class-based analysis of labor-environmental relations, read Dreiling (2001) and Gould, Lewis and 
Roberts (2004).  
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often the first victims of ecological degradation. Thus, workers and environmentalists 
can perhaps bridge the class divide to fight for environmental justice (Rose, 2000; 
Gould, Lewis and Roberts, 2004). Identifying common enemies – employers or anti-
regulation administrations – as a common enemy of labor and environmental 
regulation represents another prospect for cooperation (Dreiling, 2001; Kazis and 
Grossman, 1982). In this regard, labor’s relation with management should provide 
key indications about the potential formation of a blue-green alliance.  
 
A brief history of labor-environmentalism relations (1965-1990) 
The first encounters between organized labor and third-wave environmentalists 
occurred in a cooperative atmosphere. Labor’s growing interest in environmental and 
health issues in the 1960s was crucial to these friendly relations. While the AFL-CIO 
showed support for cooperation with green organizations, two unions were 
instrumental in building bridges with the environmental community: the Steelworkers 
Union and the United Auto Workers (UAW).106 The most symbolic incarnation of 
blue-green solidarity was labor’s support for a series of pioneering environmental 
laws, including the 1969 National Environmental Policy Act, the 1970 Clean Air Act 
and the 1972 Clean Water Act (Siegmann, 1985). The unions’ solidarity was 
reciprocated with the environmentalists’ endorsement of the Occupational Safety and 
Health Act (1970), and support of prominent ecological organizations for the Oil, 
Chemical and Atomic Workers’ (OACW) massive strike and boycott against Shell Oil 
in 1973.107   
                                                
106 UAW leader Walter Reuther stated that his environmental ambitions were not confined to 
workplace safety but stood as a “crusade” for “cleaning up the atmosphere, the highways, the 
junkyards and the slums” (cited in Siegmann, 1985, 25).  
107 These friendly relations were the fruit of the coalition-building efforts of OCAW leader Tony 
Mazzochi, a long advocate of labor-environmental cooperation (Kazis & Grossman, 1982; see also 
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The friendly terms of environmentalists-labor relations did not last very long. The 
economic recession of 1973 heralded a period when the “jobs-vs.-the-environment” 
trade-off gained prominence, dividing blue and green advocates. Indeed, the difficult 
economic climate of the 1970s led unions to focus more narrowly on job protection, 
thereby inhibiting their capacities for coalition-building.  
The Alaska Pipeline project constituted a classic example of the debate between 
job protection and environmental regulation. The fire was fanned by the oil industry 
and its political allies who argued that “extreme environmentalists” and the federal 
government prevented the state of Alaska from developing its oil resources, thereby 
depriving the US economy of low energy prices and job creation (Government 
Executive, 1984; Goodstein, 1999, 105).  
Even more divisive for labor and environmental advocates were debates 
surrounding nuclear energy. While environmentalists mobilized to obstruct the 
construction of power plants across the country and pass anti-nuclear referenda, 
organized labor – not only the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers 
(IBEW), but also the AFL-CIO leadership – asked for speeding up the construction of 
nuclear facilities (Siegmann, 1985, 26-7).  
Even initiatives to foster blue-green dialogue suffered from the rising tensions 
between environmentalists and trade unions. At the National Action Conference for 
Environmental and Economic Justice and Jobs in 1976 (the “Black Lake” 
Conference), labor representative Tom Donohue bluntly declared that where the jobs 
come from, and the kind of production they entail “[was] not a big issue with trade 
unions” (cited in Miller, 1980, 35). Labor’s lack of concern for environmental 
protection paralleled the environmentalists’ disregard for the socio-economic 
                                                                                                                                      
Gordon, 1998). Environmentalists’ endorsement of the OCAW’s health and safety demands to the 
reticent management of Shell Oil is likely to have conferred additional legitimacy to the union’s cause. 
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grievances of the working class,108 an inclination that made them more vulnerable to 
the criticisms of industry management.109   
The deregulatory assault launched by the Reagan administration had unexpected 
effects on labor-environmentalism relations. The fight against deregulation provided 
political common ground for the two advocacy networks, a clear shift from the jobs-
versus-the-environment trade-off (Obach, 2004). Other changes helped to relax the 
tensions between the two movements. By 1980, certain labor unions like the UAW or 
the United Steelworkers of America (USWA) were ready to collaborate with the anti-
nuclear movement. As in the 1960s, cooperation was most efficient in the health and 
workplace safety spheres, where blue-green coalitions formed, and largely operated, 
at the local level (Siegmann, 1985).  
An example of this kind of grassroots, cross-field collaboration was the AFL-
CIO’s outreach to local environmental and citizen organizations along the Mexican 
border. In 1989, the labor federation co-founded the Coalition for Justice in the 
Maquiladoras with several grassroots environmental and citizen organizations. This 
blue-green alliance began an information campaign about the pervasive health 
hazards of the maquilas. The unions’ calculated outreach to environmentalists, which 
foreshadowed the coalition tactics of the labor movement in the 1990s, succeeded in 
drawing increasing attention to the negative aspects of the maquiladoras. As Mark 
Anderson, director of the union’s trade taskforce, puts it, “Environment became a 
means of drawing attention to poor company practices in the border... Nobody cared 
                                                
108 Certain radical branches of environmentalism called for “zero-growth,” as a solution to ecological 
degradation, a campaign unlikely to reap the support of unionized workers (Siegmann, 1985, 26). 
109 This does not mean that the second half of the 1970s did not witness attempts of cooperation 
between blue and green organizations. First of all, the Black Lake Conference of 1976 did promote 
cooperation through the creation of regional workshops between environmental, labor and community 
organizations. In addition, ecological organizations did not prove completely indifferent to workers’ 
concerns, as illustrated by the formation of the Environmentalists for Full Employment (EFFE) in 1975 
– a coalition of 100 environmental “labor-friendly” NGOs – or the greens’ support for the aborted 
Labor Law Reform Bill of 1978 (Siegmann, 1985, 29-30). 
86 
   
 
about a worker losing his job his Illinois. They were much more sensitive to toxic 
dumping in Mexico.” (cited in Mayer, 1998, 72). Thus, a search for increased 
legitimacy motivated the unions’ alliance with environmentalists. While these 
coalitions were confined to the local level, they augured well for the future of blue-
green relations, as the NAFTA debates would illustrate a few years later (Mayer, 
1998; Dreiling, 2001).  
However, the mobilizing efforts of labor and environmentalists did not thwart the 
deregulatory offensive that crippled the implementation of both environmental and 
occupational safety laws at the federal level (Siegmann, 1985). Furthermore, a 
number of contentious issues continued to inhibit the formation of a broad-scale blue-
green coalition. The clash over the protection of Northeastern forests proved that the 
cooperation between labor and environmentalists could not be taken for granted. In a 
contentious case where the jobs-versus-the-environment trade-off seemed far from 
illusory, the “spotted-owl controversy” pitted timber industry workers against 
protectors of an endangered ornithological species. The eventual victory of 
environmentalists strained relations between labor and environmentalists at the local 
level (Obach, 2004).  
A few years later, the debates on the Clean Air Act of 1990 would further damage 
their chances of cooperation, this time at the national level. Once again, employers 
exploited job insecurity to mobilize labor – in this case, the United Mine Workers – 
against sulfur restrictions. However, the industry’s anti-ecological campaign was not 
empty “environmental blackmail.” Following the passage of the Clean Air Act, coal 
miners, especially in the East, lost nearly 7,000 jobs (Obach, 2004). 
In sum, the terms of labor-environmental relations since the 1960s have varied 
from one political issue to another, largely preventing the formation of a broad-scale 
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blue-green coalition. On the one hand, the jobs-versus-the-environment debate 
remains a key wedge between environmentalists and union members, with particular 
sectors like the energy or the timber industries particularly likely to pit one activist 
community against the other. On the other hand, organizational, ideological or class-
based differences between the labor and the environmental movements are not 
intrinsic obstacles to cross-field cooperation. In numerous cases, labor and 
environmentalists’ have made common cause to defend social and environmental 
regulation against hostile employers and administrations. This means that when job 
protection and environmental regulation are compatible objectives, there is 
tremendous potential for collaboration, as labor and environmentalists’ joint 
mobilization for health and safety regulation demonstrated. As the rest of this 
dissertation will show, trade policy constitutes precisely an issue-area where blue and 
green can find common ground. 
 
III) CONSUMERS’ ADVOCATES 
Any discussion of American fair trade advocates would be incomplete without 
describing the role played by consumer organizations. Like human rights and labor 
NGOs, environmentalists and consumer advocates share a number of common 
demands – e.g. a more environmentally responsible trade policy, a transparent policy 
process etc. For the purpose of parsimony, this dissertation will often examine jointly 
their involvement in the different legislative battles under consideration. To better 
understand the structure of the fair trade network, it is, however, important to evoke 
the experience that consumer advocates have had in the trade policy sphere, and the 
idiosyncratic role played by Public Citizen in recent trade battles.   
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In the 1960s and 1970s, consumer organizations primarily focused on the 
domestic policies of U.S. regulatory agencies. As they began to pay attention to 
international trade in the 1980s, they initially concentrated their advocacy efforts, not 
on import protection from unsafe products, but on the restrictions of certain U.S. 
export products e.g. DDT and other hazardous pesticides, cigarettes and logs from 
state-owned lands.  
Consumer organizations became alarmed by the GATT’s shifting focus on non-
tariff barriers in the late 1970s, realizing the potential conflicts between domestic 
regulation and international trade.110 As with environmentalists, the tuna-dolphin case 
and the NAFTA debates were two catalyst events in the involvement of consumer 
NGOs in trade debates. They have now generally become critical of both the trade 
policy process and the design of international trade agreements.  
Of course, like environmentalists or unions, consumer advocates do not speak 
with one single voice.111 Thus, depending on the organization and the policy under 
consideration, they have stood on both sides of the trade divide. For instance, some 
groups like the Consumers Union have testified against import restraints. Similarly, 
Consumers for World Trade, despite its lack of connections with the rest of the 
consumer movement, has always been strongly antiprotectionist (Destler and Odell, 
1987, 32; Destler, 2005, 188). Others like the Community Nutrition Institute, National 
Consumers League and Public Citizen (Mayer, 1998, 76-8) have recently mobilized 
against international trade agreements deemed to undermine national regulations.  
Though commonly accused of defending nationalist or protectionist policies, 
consumer advocates generally focus on regulating instead of blocking trade. In fact, 
their recent mobilization in the trade policy sphere is a symbol of the “new politics of 
                                                
110 This paragraph borrows from Vogel (1995, 196-217). 
111 For a more detailed analysis of the consumer network, read Bykerk and Maney (1995). 
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American trade.” It came as a political response to the expanding legal scope of 
international trade agreements that can no longer be captured by the free trade versus 
protectionism dichotomy. In an increasingly interconnected world economy, trade 
liberalization comes into conflict with national regulatory issues that range from 
sanitary and phytosanitary standards to eco-labeling and the use of genetically-
modified organisms (GMOs). Thus, the involvement of consumer advocates in trade 
politics can hardly be reduced to protectionism in disguise. In response to 
protectionist accusations, one fair trade activist replied: ‘Well, if protecting the earth, 
if protecting the air, if protecting the water, and indeed human life on the planet is 
protectionist, then I have to admit that I am protectionist’” (cited in Vogel, 1995, 216-
7).112 
At the forefront of these new advocacy efforts, Public Citizen, through its Global 
Trade Watch division, has become a central actor on the fair trade front. It owes its 
leadership position to the endless efforts of its director, Lori Wallach, who co-
founded the Citizens Trade Campaign (CTC) in 1992 and has been a leading actor in 
fair trade debates since the early 1990s (Anderson, 2007*; Wallach, 2000). As 
mentioned in chapter one, this coalition regroups a large network of activists from 
labor, environmental, human rights and consumer organizations. Through a network 
of state coalitions, fair trade activists coordinate their outside and inside lobbying 
campaigns by exchanging information, aligning their arguments and planning 
campaign events.113  
The Citizens Trade Campaign, like the broader “fair trade” coalition, is a 
heterogeneous conglomeration of interests united by their desire to reshape American 
trade policy in a more environmentally and socially friendly mold. As this chapter 
                                                
112 For a discussion, read Wallach (2000). See also Destler & Balint (1999) and Stokes (1999-2000).  
113 See the Citizens Trade Campaign’s website: 
http://www.citizenstrade.org/memberstatecoalitions.php  
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illustrates, however, it regroups organizations with very different and sometimes 
incompatible priorities. This means that the “fair trade” alliance should not be 
mystified as a powerful unitary actor, or a “counterhegemonic” or “antisystemic” 
movement bound to overthrow the global capitalist system. On the other hand, the 
fact that the blue-green alliance is a divided and fragile political entity does not mean 
that it is irrelevant to trade politics. As the different case studies of this dissertation 
will show, the new stakeholders of trade liberalization (i.e. environmentalists and 
consumer advocates) have played an important role in broadening the scope of trade 
debates and helping organized labor to reframe its political discourse.  
 
IV) BUSINESS INTERESTS 
Just as the network of fair trade actors is a heterogeneous entity, with the internal 
divisions needing to be acknowledged, the meaning of “business” also deserves 
clarification. As mentioned earlier, this dissertation uses the terms “business 
community”, “private sector” and “corporate interests” interchangeably to refer to 
internationally oriented American businesses involved in trade politics. Like “labor” 
or the fair trade “movement,” this network of business associations and individual 
companies should be seen as neither monolithic nor truly representative of all 
corporate interests in America. Indeed, businesses – like workers – are not uniformly 
affected by trade. In fact, a 2007 study by UPS Business Monitor revealed that two 
thirds of American small and mid-sized businesses still rely solely on the U.S. 
economy (UPS, 2007). However, these political actors, like the U.S. Chamber of 
Commerce, the Business Roundtable and the National Association of Manufacturers 
represent, for better or for worse, the face of corporate America in the arena of 
American trade politics – just as the AFL-CIO or other prominent unions represent (or 
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misrepresent) the interests of American workers. Before examining the involvement 
of the private sector in the trade policy process, this section examines the historical 
political development of the business community as a political actor. 
 
Fluctuating fortunes  
The “fluctuating fortunes” (Vogel, 1989) of business in American political history 
are closely related to the rise and decline of labor and public interest groups in the 
electoral arena. Understanding the historical relationship between the private and 
public spheres provides important background to the study of corporate power in the 
trade policy arena.  
Although the birth of the modern corporation dates back to the middle of the 
nineteenth century, it was not until the Reconstruction that business groups became 
powerful political actors (Vogel 1996, 39; Achbar & Abbott, 2003). The Gilded Age 
saw the emergence of unprecedented industrial fortunes at a time when the federal 
government was still at an infant stage. This was the era when the “Robber Barons” 
used their tremendous financial leverage to buy tariff, banking, railroad, immigration 
and land legislation that would serve their interests. They generally enjoyed the 
support of politicians in all branches of government114 and both political parties, with 
a few exceptions such as William Jenning Bryan’s populist upsurge (Korten, 1995; 
Goldstein 1978, 6; Vogel, 1996, 42-3). Business interests maintained their privileged 
position in American politics through the Progressive Era and the roaring twenties 
when wealth concentration reached new heights (Vogel, 1996, 48).  
                                                
114 As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, the judiciary repeatedly sided with business and 
against labor. The most notable example of this support was the Supreme Court’s 1886 Santa Clara 
County v. Southern Pacific Railroad ruling, according to which the private corporation was defined as 
a natural person under the U.S. Constitution and thus, granted the right to participate in the political 
process under free speech protections (Korten, 1995; Kelly 2003, 90).  
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The Great Depression seriously undermined corporate dominance. The crisis of 
laissez-faire capitalism legitimized the intervention of the federal government in the 
U.S. economy. The New Deal saw the emergence of three institutions that would act 
as countervailing powers to corporate interests: labor unions, independent universities 
(whose scholars were often critical of free-market capitalism), and most importantly, 
a federal bureaucracy whose regulatory role would continue to expand in the 
following decades (Vogel, 1996, 49).115 During the postwar era, business interests 
were forced to make economic concessions – wages, benefits, taxes – under the dual 
pressures of a proactive state and a temporarily influential labor movement. Yet, in 
these prosperous times, redistributive policies were not perceived as direct challenges 
to the private sector (Korten, 1995).  
This would change in the mid-1960s, when the growing activism of public interest 
groups – and particularly environmental and consumer advocates – began to threaten 
corporate interests. Between 1965 and 1975, the federal government enacted no fewer 
than 25 major pieces of federal regulatory legislation related to consumer and 
environmental protection, occupational health and safety and labor policy. These 
reforms considerably expanded the state’s regulatory power over the U.S. economy, 
encroaching upon the economic prerogatives of powerful sectors such as the oil and 
automobile industries.116 In sharp contrast with the regulatory agencies of the 
Progressive Era and the New Deal, many of the agencies created in the 1960s and 
1970s proved relatively insensitive to business priorities (Vogel, 1996, 271-5).  
                                                
115 Of course, even during the New Deal, business interests were never fully excluded from the policy 
process, whether this pertains to banking reform (Ferguson, 1995, chapter 2) or the creation of Social 
Security programs (Piven and Cloward, 1997, chapter 9; Domhoff, 1990, chapter 4).  
116 For a fascinating account of the political struggles between public interests advocates, the state and 
the auto industry, read Luger (2000).  
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These challenges to corporate interests had transformational effects on the 
business community.117 Under attack from public interest groups and regulatory 
actors, private actors began to regroup and act as a political class (Piven, 1992, 261). 
In a conscious attempt to unite the business community, they revitalized political 
organizations such as the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the National Federation of 
Interdependent Business and formed the Business Roundtable in 1972 (Vogel, 1989, 
13; Akard, 1992, 603).  
The 1970s witnessed a substantial increase in corporate political participation that 
took several forms. First, business groups intensified their lobbying activities as 
illustrated by the rising number and growing size of corporate public affairs’ offices 
and law firms in Washington D.C.118 These developments paralleled the rapid 
proliferation of Political Action Committees in the second half of the 1970s – from 
248 in 1974 to 1,100 in 1978 and the increasing use of ad hoc business coalitions for 
advocacy purposes (Vogel, 1996, 280). Second, corporate interests intensified their 
grassroots organizing efforts by mobilizing stockholders and employees for political 
campaigns. Third, enlightened by a new class-consciousness, CEOs became 
increasingly involved in public affairs. Finally, the business community launched an 
ideological offensive by creating and boosting funding for conservative think tanks 
(e.g. the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), created in 1973), as well as research 
institutions (e.g. Hoover Institution, American Institute for Public Policy Research) to 
counterbalance the influence of foundations like the Ford Foundation and the 
                                                
117 This paragraph draws heavily from Vogel (1996, 276-285). 
118 According to Vogel, the number of corporate public affairs offices in Washington increased fivefold 
between 1968 and 1978 (Vogel, 1996, 280). 
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Brookings Institution on policy debates. This tactic was paired with an increase in 
advocacy advertising in the media.119  
Of course, given the heterogeneity of the private sector, business interests did not 
always converge. However, in a number of unifying policy areas, the political 
(re)awakening of the business community rapidly bore fruit. The year of 1977 marked 
a political turning point, as the private sector managed both to thwart the 
establishment of the Consumer Protection Agency and to repeal a labor law reform 
designed to strengthen the NLRB’s power to sanction employers’ violations of 
workers’ rights (Vogel, 1996, 285; Akard, 1992, 603-7). The rising power of 
corporate interests was both the cause and effect of the resurgence of the Republican 
Party as a political force. As noted earlier in this chapter, Reagan’s “conservative 
revolution” not only crippled the unions’ movement but also the regulatory powers of 
the state, two tendencies that empowered the business community and intensified 
class conflicts.120 
The GOP’s takeover of Congress in 1994 cemented the business-Republican 
coalition. As part of Newt Gingrich’s “Contract with America,” Republicans 
promised deregulation and tax cuts to lure corporate donors away from Democratic 
lawmakers (Hamburger & Wallsten, 2006, 171-5; Edsall, 2006, 116). If GOP 
strategists generally succeeded in bringing business closer to their party, centrist 
Democrats nonetheless cultivated ties with segments of the private sector. Under the 
influence of the Democratic Leadership Council, the Clinton administration shifted 
the Democrats to the right and proved to be a strong political ally for the high tech 
and financial industries, along with cross-sectoral business organizations (Shoch, 
                                                
119 In his study of business power, Smith (2000, 81-6) shows that, between 1977 and 1994, 
conservative think tanks had been more effective than their counterparts in generating media publicity 
for their views.  
120 For more details, see Harrison and Bluestone (1988). 
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2001, 162-72). This was a sign that corporate power transcended partisan cleavages. It 
also showed that the executive branch, although often seen as detached from interest 
groups politics, could maintain close ties with the private sector.  
Under George W. Bush’s presidency, the relationship between the GOP and the 
private sector became even more intimate than it had been under the congressional 
lead of Newt Gingrich. President Bush’s mix of pro-business policies – ranging from 
tax cuts to deregulation and tort reform – brought Main Street and Wall Street 
interests under a single partisan coalition. Sensing new political opportunities, the 
business community raised its presence in Washington, as a result of which the 
number of registered lobbyists doubled in five years (2000-2005) to 35,000 
(Hamburger & Wallsten, 2006, 105).121 
 
American business and international trade policy 
The last subsection has provided analytical tools to understand the dynamics of 
corporate power in American politics and the factors that have recently contributed to 
the growing political influence of the business community. To complement this 
picture of American businesses as trade policy actors, this final subsection focuses on 
the role played by internationally-oriented corporate interests in the history of U.S. 
trade policy.  
The “free-trade versus protectionism” dichotomy of conventional trade models 
provides crucial insights into the history of American trade policy. These analytical 
tools are particularly well suited to understand sectional conflicts in America’s 
antebellum era. During this period, Southern interests like cotton or tobacco exporters 
as well as New England merchants pressed Congress for trade openness, while 
                                                
121 Chapter 6 examines the relation of the GOP with business, labor and environmental groups in 
greater details. For more details, read Edsall (2006, chapter 4) and Piven (2004, chapter 3).  
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Northeastern manufacturers and farmers sought tariff protection (Taussig, 1910, 70-
2). After the Civil War, powerful industrialists and their Republican allies dominated 
the decision-making process, maintaining protectionist policies until the trade wars of 
the 1930s. America’s protectionist era (1789-1934) was defined by three distinctive 
features: the absence of the executive as trade policy actor; a gradual ratcheting up of 
tariff rates due to congressional logrolling, and a relative isolation of the U.S. 
economy from the global trading system (Cohen, Blecker and Whitney, 2003, 29).122 
This changed with the “1934 system” when Congress began to delegate its trade-
negotiating authority to the executive branch, re-orienting American trade policy 
toward trade liberalization (Destler, 2005, chapter 2). Washington’s new 
internationalist agenda also reflected structural changes in the U.S. economy and, in 
conjunction, the composition of the business class. Both pluralist and Marxian 
analysts agree that the success of Hull’s liberal revolution partly hinged on the rising 
power of U.S. export-oriented interests and the support of industrial unions for free 
trade (Frieden 1988, 83; Nivola 1986, 583; Domhoff, 1990, 210).123  
After World War II, America became a leading force for trade and investment 
liberalization. In the early decades of the Cold War era, U.S. foreign economic policy 
was largely driven by national strategic objectives. With non-reciprocal market 
openings, Washington hoped to lure the fragile European and Japanese economies 
away from the communist threat. However, diplomatic priorities did not necessarily 
trump economic necessities. First, Washington’s international activism was partly 
driven by the competitive edge of U.S. industries, which were the engine of 
America’s economic hegemony. Second, even during the liberal era of American 
                                                
122 For more details on the political economy of the U.S tariff during the protectionist era, read Eckes 
(1995), Taussig (1910), Stanwood (1903), Dobson (1976), Frings (1979) and Bensel (2000). 
123 Ferguson (1995, chapter 2) makes a similar – albeit more controversial – argument in relation to the 
domestic reforms of the New Deal.  
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trade policy, industries seeking protection continued to play a role in the policy 
process. For instance, for each new round of multilateral negotiations GATT, a 
number of interests (e.g. segments of the farm sector, textile and shoes industries etc.) 
would cut separate deals with decision-makers to avoid obstructing the trade-
liberalizing agenda favored by America’s dynamic exporters (Destler, 2005, 185).124  
The limits of Washington’s selflessness became clear with the “agonizing 
reappraisal of the 1970s” (Cohen, Blecker & Whitney, 2003, 38). The confluence of 
domestic and international economic challenges – stagflation on the domestic front; 
rising international competition, oil shocks, and the collapse of the Bretton Woods 
system at the international level – led American decision-makers to reassess their 
conduct of American trade policy.  
Under increased competition from their European and Japanese counterparts, an 
ever-growing range of industrial interests pressed American decision-makers for 
import relief. This protectionist surge came not only from traditional manufacturers 
but also from a variety of capital-intensive sectors such as semiconductors, 
telecommunications and machine tools and, therefore, seemed to challenge the 
international liberal order that America had sought to establish (Destler and Odell, 
1987, 109-10; Destler, 2005, 185-6).  
 
Business and trade in a globalized era 
If this protectionist backlash was a defining element of the 1970s and 1980s, the 
structural changes experienced by the U.S. economy could not be reduced to a 
                                                
124 Shutt goes further to question the very idea of a postwar liberal era:  
“the supposed commitment of the post-war Western World to the ideal of free trade was no more 
genuine than that of previous generations, and that the only distinctive feature of the period since 
1945 was that the availability of a vast new armoury of protectionist weapons permitted countries 
to dismantle traditional tariff barriers with scarcely a qualm” (Shutt, 1985, 110).   
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massive inflow of Asian and European imports. In fact, the internationalization of 
American markets had a much more profound effect on the configuration of interest 
groups. The new dynamics of the ever-complex international trade system prompted 
trade policy analysts to refine their theoretical models. Destler & Odell (1987) and 
Milner (1988) first challenged the conventional wisdom about the “new 
protectionism” (Nivola, 1986; Goldstein, 1986) by pointing to the rise of “anti-
protection” forces. Over the years, the U.S. economy had become increasingly 
dependent on international trade, boosting the support of American businesses for 
trade openness.125 Drawing evidence from a wide range of product-specific trade 
cases, the authors highlighted the growing activism of 4 types of “global industries” 
(Milner, 1988): industrial users of imports like steel, copper or semiconductors; 
retailers of traded consumer goods; U.S. exporters fearing tariff retaliation by other 
countries; companies and governments of American trading partners (Destler and 
Odell, 1987, 23-59). The rising power of anti-protection forces was paired with a 
decline of traditional protectionist forces, both of which contributed to the resilience 
of the international liberal order (Milner & Yoffie, 1989, 263).   
Milner & Yoffie (1989) further questioned the legitimacy of conventional trade 
models by challenging the prevailing free trade versus protection dichotomy. The 
authors pointed to the emergence of a new type of corporate trade demands in the 
1980s. A growing number of American firms called for a “strategic trade policy” that 
consisted of raising trade barriers for the home market if foreign markets were 
protected. As Milner & Yoffie (1989) noted, these growing requests for reciprocity 
                                                
125 International trade represented only 6% of U.S. GDP in 1973. Ten years later, it accounted for 12% 
(Nivola, 1986, 583).  
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justified increased activism – if not purely “aggressive unilateralism”126 – by the 
executive branch in opening foreign markets to American firms.127  
Since the 1990s, the successive administrations of George H. W. Bush, Bill 
Clinton and George W. Bush have followed the call of the business community by 
engaging in the negotiations of free trade agreements on a bilateral or regional 
basis.128 In addition to opening new export markets, international agreements like 
NAFTA or PNTR have provided investment opportunities for labor-intensive 
industries, allowing them to cut their operation costs by transferring some of their 
productive units offshore. As explained in chapter one, the increased mobility of 
capital and the development of intra-firm trade have united the business community 
behind free trade agreements while alienating domestic workers. As a result, trade and 
investment liberalization have split industries along class clines.  
Furthermore, the politicization of the business community described in the 
previous subsection has exacerbated the growing class conflicts over trade policy. If 
cross-sector business organizations were not prominent members of the anti-
protection coalition of the 1980s (Destler & Odell, 1987, 33-4),129 they have now 
become strong advocates of free trade laws (Destler, 2005, 188). As this dissertation 
will illustrate, the threat that fair traders posed to the passage of free trade agreements 
prompted cross-industry organizations to overcome their internal dissensions and 
launch powerful counteractive lobbying campaigns to salvage free trade bills.  
                                                
126 Bhagwati & Patrick (1990).  
127 Similarly, Noland (1997, 365) argues that the emphasis of American trade policy shifted from 
import restriction to export promotion through the removal of barriers to trade in other countries’ 
markets.  
128 The first free trade agreements were negotiated with Israel (1985) and Canada (1988). 
For more details, read, Schmertz, Datlof and Ugrinsky (1997, 359-60). 
129 This was due to the fact that business associations like the U.S. Chamber or ECAT are commonly 
much less active for sector-specific bills than for generic trade bills (Destler and Odell, 1987, 33-4). In 
contrast, business organizations like ECAT were very active against the Burke-Hartke Act of 1971 and 
in favor of the Trade Act of 1974, which President Nixon accepted to support in exchange for the 
Business Roundtable (Destler & Odell, 1987, 118).  
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These organizations include the Business Roundtable (known as the most 
politically influential corporate organization), the Emergency Committee for 
American Trade (a conglomeration of large multinational corporations devoted to the 
promotion of trade and investment liberalization), the U.S. Council for International 
Business (a cross-sectoral affiliate of the International Chamber of Commerce very 
involved in international economic affairs), the U.S. Chamber of Commerce (USCC) 
and the National Association of Manufacturers (NAM) (Dreiling, 2001, 96-7). USCC 
and NAM have a broader membership, composed of generally smaller enterprises, not 
all of which individually support all trade-liberalizing bills. However, like most cross-
sectoral business organizations, they officially support free trade and actively lobby 
for the negotiations of free trade agreements – whether the latter are truly free or not.   
In the 1990s, these business associations systematically formed ad hoc free trade 
coalitions to defeat the lobbying efforts of labor and their fair trade allies. 
Surprisingly, the recent formation of spontaneous free trade coalitions such as 
USA*NAFTA, Go Trade or the Business Coalition for US-China Trade has been 
subject to little empirical analysis. While a few academic studies have focused on 
NAFTA (Mayer, 1998; Dreiling, 2001; McArthur, 2000; Faux, 2006; but see Dreiling 
& Darves, 2007),130 there is a need for a more comprehensive analysis of the 
dynamics of this form of counteractive lobbying, its relation with political institutions, 
and its impact on the trade policy process.  
 
In sum, the last few decades have witnessed the convergence of two tendencies 
that have transformed the role of the private sector in the trade policy sphere. To 
begin with, since the 1970s, the business community has become increasingly 
                                                
130 With a focus on the importance of political parties, Shoch’s analysis of trade debates under the 
Clinton presidency constitutes a rare attempt to fill this void (2001). 
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politically active, consolidating its power both internally through the creation of think 
tanks and business associations, and externally by gaining influence on both the 
Republican and Democratic Parties. The politicization of the business community in 
the electoral arena has dovetailed with structural transformations of the U.S. 
economy. Over the past three decades, the U.S. economy has become increasingly 
internationalized, making more and more American companies dependent on 
international trade and investment transactions. Increasing capital mobility has 
boosted support for economic liberalization, even among import-competing 
companies that were traditionally advocates of import protection. In addition, 
safeguard provisions in trade agreements have consolidated business support for “free 
trade” across the private sector. As a result, corporate interests have been increasingly 
assertive in their advocacy efforts on behalf of “free trade” or, more precisely, in their 
support for business-friendly trade laws. As the subsequent case studies will illustrate, 
their privileged access to the executive branch has been a key political obstacle to the 
mobilization of the new “fair trade” advocates. The NAFTA battle was the first 
example of the extremely contentious nature of the new politics of American trade.  
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CHAPTER 3: The North American  
Free Trade Agreement 
 
 
One particularity of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) lies in 
the fact that it was negotiated and ratified under two different presidents from two 
rival political parties. The negotiations of NAFTA began in 1991, after President 
Bush obtained fast track authority from Congress.131 This marked the beginning of a 
“two-level bargaining” process (Putnam, 1988) by which the Republican 
administration sought to obtain concessions from its North American trading partners 
that would be compatible with the grievances of American domestic interests and 
vice-versa (Mayer 1998, 109-216; see also Cameron & Tomlin, 2000; Avery, 1998). 
NAFTA was officially signed on August 11, 1992. By that time, however, it had 
become entangled in the presidential contest. 
 Bill Clinton distinguished himself from his rivals – the incumbent George H. W. 
Bush and the anti-NAFTA candidate Ross Perot – by conditioning his support for the 
agreement upon the successful negotiation of environmental and labor “side 
agreements.” As a result, he inherited the burden of pushing NAFTA through 
Congress and was forced to confront the new coalition of labor, environmental and 
consumer interests that emerged in the early 1990s.  
The NAFTA debates heralded the advent of the “new politics of American trade,” 
a new political context characterized by the intensification of intra-sectoral class 
conflict and the mobilization of new trade policy stakeholders like environmental and 
consumer advocates. To begin with, the profound resentment of rank-and-file union 
members toward the North American agreement and the intensity of the political 
                                                
131 The renewal of fast track authority in 1991 came only after a fierce lobbying campaign opposing 
free traders to the nascent anti-NAFTA coalition. To be more concise, however, this legislative conflict 
is excluded from the scope of this dissertation. For more details, see Mayer (1998, 67-106).  
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battle surrounding the agreement distinguished the NAFTA debates from earlier trade 
debates in which labor had participated. The vigorous mobilization of labor activists 
was matched by the unprecedented political response of the business community. 
United by the investment and trade opportunities offered by the free trade agreement, 
an alliance of import-competing and export-oriented interests made it their common 
cause to defend NAFTA against its opponents, sometimes workers within their own 
industries. Thus, class conflict became a distinctive feature of the NAFTA battle.   
Second, the NAFTA debates witnessed the emergence of environmentalists and 
consumer advocates as new political actors in the trade policy sphere. If the 
GATTzilla-Flipper case had awakened the environmental and consumer communities 
to the tensions between international trade and national regulation, the negotiations of 
the North American agreement gave unforeseen political leverage to ecological 
groups. Their ascension on the trade policy scene helped them obtain political 
concessions, setting a precedent – albeit fragile – for the inclusion of environmental 
issues in the pursuit of American trade policy.  
In conjunction, the coalition patterns that emerged in the early 1990s were also a 
defining element of the politics of NAFTA. The formation of the blue-green alliance 
was not an epiphenomenon but triggered a long-lasting pattern of alliance-building 
that would reoccur in the following decade. This new activist network helped shape 
the “fair trade” frame, a new policy framework promoting a more socially and 
environmentally responsible trade policy.  
What progress did the fair trade alliance make during its first battle? What 
obstacles did it face? This first case study will attempt to answer these questions by 
tracing the policy process of NAFTA in two sections: the first one focusing on the 
negotiating phase of the agreement; the second one on the lobbying battle preceding 
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the final vote. This chapter will reveal that under the presidencies of both George W. 
H. Bush and Bill Clinton, the special relationship between the executive branch and 
the private sector was a crucial impediment to the advocacy efforts of organized labor 
and its allies. During the tenure of the GOP leader, the business community made 
ample use of its privileged access to the trade advisory committee system to control 
the terms of the agreement so as to marginalize environmental and labor provisions. 
Under Bill Clinton’s presidency, the “free-trader-in-chief ” joined the lobbying 
campaign of internationally-oriented corporate interests to save the NAFTA bill that 
fair traders – through intense advocacy efforts – came within inches of defeating.   
 
I) SHAPING THE TERMS OF THE DEBATES 
The political and economic foundations of NAFTA 
If NAFTA is often conceived as a classic case of regionalism (Mansfield & 
Milner, 1999), it is, before all, the sum of two bilateral relationships that converge in 
the United States. First, the signing of the Canadian-U.S. Free Trade Agreement 
(CUSFTA) antedated the NAFTA negotiations by a few years (1988). It was the 
result of a long-term process of economic rapprochement that began in the early days 
of Cordell Hull’s liberal revolution with a reciprocal trade agreement in 1935, 
followed by the Canada-United States Defense Production Sharing Agreement in 
1956132 and the more ambitious Auto Pact of 1965 – which allowed the restructuring 
of the auto industry on a binational scale (Hart, 1998; Jones, 2002; Clement et al, 
1999, 171). 
Second, although Mexico’s official integration in the North American free trade 
zone (i.e. CUSFTA) was at the crux of the NAFTA controversies, Washington and 
                                                
132 This accord allowed Canadian military contractors to bid for U.S. military contracts.  
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Mexico City’s economic and political collaboration in the second half of the twentieth 
century also laid the ground for their economic reunion.133 Between 1943 and 1964, 
the Bracero Program drew hundreds of thousands of Mexican farm workers to offset 
America’s labor shortage in the agricultural sector. In 1965, the system of 
maquiladoras was established as an export processing zone along the Southern side of 
the U.S.-Mexican border where American businesses could freely import components 
from outside, assemble them, and re-export the finished goods without duties to 
America (Mayer, 1998, 36). In the 1980s, “a new configuration of Mexican-American 
economic relations” emerged out of Mexico’s debt crisis in 1982 (Collomp & 
Menéndez, 1995). With the help of large commercial banks and the international 
organizations like the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, 
Washington organized the financial rescue of the Mexican economy under the 
condition that the Mexican government undertakes a series of economic measures 
prescribed under the “Washington Consensus” – deregulation, privatization and trade 
and investment liberalization.134 From 1989, President Carlos Salinas de Gortari 
accelerated the pace of free-market reforms in Mexico.135 In parallel with these 
economic reforms, Mexico signed a series of bilateral economic agreements designed 
to liberalize trade (on a sectoral basis e.g. textile, steel etc.) and investment flows 
(Collomp & Menéndez, 1995, 53-4). Thus, far from revolutionizing U.S.-Mexican 
relations, NAFTA was, according to Sydney Weintraub, “a way of formalizing a de 
facto integration that was already substantial” (cited in Orme, 1996, 42).  
Yet, if NAFTA is the logical conclusion to two bilateral stories, it also constitutes 
a strategic move toward regionalism first envisioned by Ronald Reagan in 1979 
                                                
133 Despite these efforts of collaboration, U.S.-Mexican relations remained scarred by Washington’s 
long history of interventionism in Mexican affairs. 
134 For more details on Washington’s financial policy, read Krugman (1994). See also Musset (1997, 
49-52). 
135 For more details, read Lustig (1992).  
107 
  
before being concretized by his successor (Nishijima & Smith, 1996, 35). In fact, the 
bilateral and regional stories are best seen as part of the same picture. Although 
economists and political analysts still disagree on the real target behind Washington’s 
regionalist turn –the European Community,136 Japan,137 Mercosur (the customs union 
between Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay)138 or all three – they would 
generally recognize that NAFTA was broadly designed to consolidate the North 
American market and increase the international competitiveness of its multinational 
corporations while opening new markets to American (and Canadian) firms (Clement 
et al, 1999, 18-9; Gauthier & Raffaelli, 2000, 222; Santini, 1994, 31). Of course, 
NAFTA was also driven by political motives, and more specifically by a desire for 
consolidating bilateral cooperation between Washington and Mexico. Yet, as 
Weintraub notes, NAFTA was never a political project in the same vein as that 
envisioned by Jean Monnet and Robert Schuman in Europe (Weintraub, 2004, 221). 
 
Labor’s reaction against NAFTA 
As soon as George Bush unveiled his ambitions to negotiate a free trade 
agreement with Mexico, NAFTA’s potential impact on job losses in the United States 
occupied the center of the debates. The resentment of workers against NAFTA found 
its roots in their bitter experience with the maquiladora program. The US-Mexican 
pact had encouraged American firms to shift their manufacturing operations to 
Mexico and replace expensive U.S. workers with cheap Mexican labor (Mayer, 1998, 
70-3).  
                                                
136 For a discussion, read Randall (1992).  
137 See Orme (1996, 264-87). 
138 Gauthier & Raffaelli (2000, 223). 
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Unions saw NAFTA as a new invitation for U.S. manufacturers to shift their 
production to Mexico. In addition, they feared that the increased mobility of U.S. 
companies would undercut their bargaining power and wages (Shoch, 2001, 146). 
Unions were dissatisfied with the terms of the agreement and its lack of concern for 
workers’ interests. As AFL-CIO Secretary Treasurer Thomas R. Donahue declared in 
a testimony before the Senate Finance Committee,  
 
The NAFTA from start to finish is nothing more than the latest version of 
Reagan-Bush trickle-down economics and enlargement of the interests of U.S. 
and Canada-based multinational corporations, to the detriment of U.S. 
workers. The Congress should reject the agreement and send a new set of U.S. 
negotiators back to the table (cited in Mayer 1998, 178).  
 
This declaration from the leadership of the labor federation exemplifies the 
dimension of class conflict pervading the NAFTA debates. Generally, labor was as 
much if not more united in its opposition to “free trade” than the business community 
would be in its pro-NAFTA advocacy efforts. Labor’s mobilization against NAFTA, 
although variable in intensity, spread beyond traditional manufacturing unions to 
reach the public and service sectors. As Chase (2003, 163) notes, every labor union 
that testified in Congress opposed the free trade agreement. 
The pronounced class dimension was not the only distinctive feature of the 
NAFTA debates. Unions’ fresh experiments with coalition-building – whether in 
relation to the campaign against maquiladoras or the Caribbean Basin Initiative139 – 
led them to gradually raise political grievances that went beyond their members’ strict 
interests. During the NAFTA debates, organized labor would emphasize the need to 
protect workers’ rights and improve health and environmental conditions in Mexico. 
In its “NAFTA Action Source Book”, the AFL-CIO demanded “the establishment of 
strong workplace health and safety standards, appropriate minimum wage structures, 
                                                
139 See chapter 2. 
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the elimination of child labor, a prohibition on forced labor, and guarantees of 
nondiscrimination in employment” (cited in Avery, 1998, 289).  
 
Environmental and consumer advocates’ views on NAFTA 
Unlike organized labor, the environmental movement had hardly ever been 
involved in trade policy before the NAFTA debates. In this sense, the rising 
prominence of ecological issues during the fast track debates of 1991 was an 
unexpected turn of events that gave environmentalists an opportunity to demand a 
seat at the negotiating table. Beyond their ambitions to establish themselves as new 
participants in the trade policy sphere, environmentalists concentrated on four 
interconnected issues: the Mexican-U.S. border, the fear of fostering a “pollution 
haven”, the threat to US national regulatory standards and the anti-democratic nature 
of trade negotiations. As with organized labor, the situation in Mexico (rather than 
Canada) was of primary concern to environmentalists.  
First, American environmentalists claimed that NAFTA would exacerbate the 
negative effects of the maquiladoras program. This argument provided a basis for the 
coalescence of environmental and labor issues. Since the 1980s, border activists had 
been alarmed by the pernicious effects of regional industrialization on air and water 
pollution, a problem exacerbated by inadequate urban infrastructures and the lack of 
enforcement of environmental regulations (Audley, 1997, 50). To environmentalists, 
the legacy of the maquilas was blatant proof that trade agreements had to include 
strong ecological provisions (Habel, 1999, 16; Vogel, 2000, 84-6).  
Second, green organizations warned the American public against the risk that 
Mexico might become a “pollution haven,” where low regulatory standards would 
attract American manufactures, with dramatic consequences for both the Mexican 
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environment and the U.S. workforce. This idea was linked to the fear that NAFTA 
countries might start a downward harmonization of environmental (and social) 
standards or “race to the bottom” to attract foreign investment (Mayer, 1998, 74-5). 
In conjunction, environmentalists and consumer advocates sought to obtain 
safeguards against the “international preemption of domestic standards for protection 
of health” (Arizona Toxics Information et al, 1992, 674). Here, their concern derived 
from their experience with the tuna-dolphin case brought by the Mexican government 
at the end of 1990. Following the GATT’s decision to repeal the U.S. embargo, the 
environmental community feared that NAFTA’s dispute settlement body might 
similarly threaten U.S. environmental regulations by defining them as “non-tariff 
barriers” hindering business activities (Obach, 2004, 63; Mayer, 1998, 74-5). 
Finally, the new “fair trade” advocates condemned the anti-democratic nature of 
free trade agreements for their lack of transparency and their corporate bias. Public 
Citizen attorney Lori Wallach describes the process of international trade negotiations 
in these terms: “rules are set and disputes are settled in an entirely anti-democratic 
fashion by unelected, unaccountable trade bureaucrats lobbied heavily by industry 
interests” (cited in Avery, 1998, 289). Environmental and consumer groups, therefore, 
demanded greater opportunities for public participation in the trade policy sphere (see 
Arizona Toxics Information et al., 1992, 674). As the rest of this section will 
illustrate, their exclusion from the policy process was indeed a key obstacle to their 
political influence.  
Green organizations defined several conditions for their support of NAFTA, 
which primarily focused on protecting American environmental laws, promoting the 
enforcement of Mexico’s regulations, committing to a plan to clean up the U.S.-
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Mexican border and finally, and perhaps most importantly, giving environmentalists a 
permanent place in future trade negotiations.140 
 
A “parallel track:” President Bush’s Action Plan 
George H. W. Bush’s response to the early mobilization of fair traders was born 
out of political necessity. To obtain the fast track authority that would allow him to 
negotiate NAFTA, the president had to satisfy the Democratic majority in 
Congress.141 On March 7, 1991, House Ways and Means Committee Chair Dan 
Rostenkowski and Senate Finance Committee Chair Lloyd Bentsen sent a letter to the 
president stipulating that they would not grant trade-negotiating powers to the 
president unless his trade initiative address “the disparity between [Mexico and 
America] in the adequacy and enforcement of environmental standards (…) and 
worker rights” (cited in Cameron & Tomlin, 2000, 73; see also Vogel, 2000, 86). 
What is less known is that the United States Trade Representative (USTR) Carla 
Hills had in fact requested this public letter so as to enable the Bush administration to 
retain control over the scope of criticisms against NAFTA. Most notably, the letter 
does not mention wage disparities nor demands that environmental and social issues 
be an integral part of NAFTA negotiations themselves (Mayer, 1998, 81-2). In other 
words, the executive branch intervened very early to control the terms of the debates 
on fair trade. To do so, the White House devised an “Action Plan” with both labor and 
environmental components.  
Initially, the Bush administration opposed linking trade agreements with 
environmental issues. Carla Hills declared: “I think to attach a condition on trading 
                                                
140 For more details about the environmentalists’ grievances, see Audley (1997, 60). 
141 For the purpose of conciseness, the fast track debates of 1991 are not treated as a separate case study 
and will be only discussed in relation to the NAFTA negotiations.   
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that talks about similarities of environmental law would not be a good precedent” 
(Audley, 1997, 52). Politically, however, it soon became clear that the Republicans 
could hardly face a united labor-environment front without jeopardizing the support 
of congressional Democrats. The administration was, therefore, compelled to grant at 
least minor concessions to the environmental community (Audley, 1997, 145; Obach, 
2004, 65). 
Under the recommendations of Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 
officials Daniel Esty and Bill Reilly, the USTR adopted a “divide and conquer” 
strategy aimed at “neutralizing the environmental issue” (Mayer, 1998, 83). As the 
rest of this section will illustrate, this was a very different approach from the inclusive 
strategy that the administration adopted to satisfy the needs of the private sector.  
Environmental issues were a surprisingly important element of the politics of fast 
track renewal in 1991 (Orme, 1996, 152). The administration proposed a “parallel 
track” of negotiations and drew up a long list of environmental proposals: a reiteration 
of Mexico’s commitment to environmental protection; a commitment to ensure the 
right to safeguard nature; the right to exclude any products that do not meet health or 
safety requirements; the right to impose pesticide, energy conservation and toxic 
waste standards; the right to limit trade in products controlled by international 
treaties; a commitment to work with Mexico to resolve border problems; the inclusion 
of environmentalists as advisors to trade negotiations; and a commitment to conduct a 
review of environmental issues. Finally, the White House also selected 
representatives from five moderate environmental groups to become members of the 
USTR’s public advisory committee (Audley, 1997, 56-7).  
The Bush administration’s Action Plan succeeded in dividing the nascent fair 
trade movement. Several mainstream green organizations responded positively to the 
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administration’s seduction campaign. Thus, six prominent mainstream ecological 
NGOs142 decided to enter into close negotiations with the Bush administration and 
finally join the pro-NAFTA coalition. (Mayer, 1998, 90-1; McArthur, 2000, 121-2).  
In doing so, they drew fierce criticism from a number of environmental and 
consumer advocates like the Greenpeace, the Sierra Club, Friends of the Earth and 
Public Citizen, who viewed support for NAFTA as a betrayal of the environmental 
cause. For Sierra Club trade specialist Margrete Strand, the promises of the self-
proclaimed “environmental president” remained symbolic concessions that were 
secondary to the commercial priorities of NAFTA (Strand, 2007*).  
Admittedly, the president’s proposals in effect legitimized the trade-environment 
linkage and represented a first step toward their acceptance in the trade policymaking 
process (Aaronson, 2001, 118). Yet, overall, it was clear that the environmentalists’ 
chance of influencing the policy process remained constrained by their limited access 
to the negotiating process and, most importantly, by the administration’s 
determination to protect corporations’ interests (Audley, 1997, 84). Sooner or later, 
environmentalists would realize that the terms of NAFTA would provide little scope 
to environmental and consumer protection.143  
The second pillar of the Republican administration’s Action Plan consisted of 
addressing social concerns related to NAFTA, with the hope of convincing unions-
friendly Democrats to endorse the administration’s trade liberalizing agenda. 
President Bush’s solutions had a similar dose of tokenism, yet lacked the “novelty 
appeal” that it had had among environmental outsiders. More importantly, his 
proposals did little to protect the manufacturing workers against the social 
dislocations that NAFTA was bound to generate.  
                                                
142 These groups were the WWF, the NWF, the EDF, NRDC, the Audubon Society and Nature 
Conservancy (Mayer, 1998, 281). 
143 The second part of this chapter discusses this issue in greater details.   
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As with environmental concessions, the Bush administration seemed at first 
ambivalent about granting concessions to labor advocates. According to Cloud (1991, 
1120), the Bush administration initially disliked the Trade Adjustment program. In 
fact, the initial drafts of the Action Plan did not include labor provisions. However, 
under the pressure of leading Democrats like Dan Rostenkowski (chairman of the 
Ways and Means Committee), Lloyd Bentsen (chairman of the Senate Finance 
Committee) and majority leader Dick Gephardt, the Republican leadership finally 
decided to address social concerns related to NAFTA (Mayer, 1998, 85-6).  
Eventually, President Bush overcame the prevalent skepticism over Trade 
Adjustment Assistance and promised a $10-billion program to provide relief to 
displaced workers. He also created a new Consultative Commission on Labor Matters 
to deal with enforcement of labor laws in America and Mexico.144 In addition, he 
responded to nationalist resentment against Mexican workers by promising to exclude 
labor mobility from the trade agreement. Finally, he pledged to push for longer 
transition periods for the elimination of tariffs in sensitive sectors (Avery, 1998, 294-
5; Cloud, 1991). 145 
These political concessions served their strategic purpose, in so far as they helped 
the Republican president to win the support of undecided (often Democratic) 
members of Congress. According to one administration official, “many people on the 
Hill would not be able to support fast track unless there was worker adjustment” 
(cited in Cloud, 1991, 1120). Yet, the administration failed to win the support of the 
labor movement, which opposed the economic logic of NAFTA.  
                                                
144 This marked a reversal from Ronald Reagan’s policies, which had abolished a Mexican-U.S. labor-
related organ in 1981 and dramatically cut the budget of Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) on the 
same year (Avery, 1998, 294-5; Charnovitz, 1994, 53).  
145 Although the Bush administration managed to negotiate transition periods in 15 sensitive sectors 
(Avery, 1998, pp. 294-5), his adjustment assistance program has been underfunded (see Public Citizen, 
2005, 75). 
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Overall, President Bush’s Action Plan was designed as a set of vote-buying tools 
for wavering Democrats rather than substantive policies designed to cushion the 
shocks of globalization. More specifically, it was a balancing act between the 
grievances of the opposition in Congress and the anti-regulatory demands of the 
private sector. Indeed, a close examination of the congressional testimonies of 
business leaders in the early 1990s reveals that the Republican administration’s option 
for a “parallel track” to the negotiations appeared to be a balancing act between 
different stakeholders, but in reality closely reflected the policy prescriptions of the 
business community.  
 Since the beginning of the NAFTA debates, corporate interests had been wary of 
the linkage between trade and environmental and labor issues for which fair trade 
advocates were pushing. Thus, on repeated occasions, main business organizations – 
including the U.S Council for International Business (USCIB), the U.S. Chamber of 
Commerce (USCC) and the Business Roundtable (BRT) – demanded that trade 
policymakers exclude blue and green issues from the scope of NAFTA. At a House 
Ways and Means Committee hearing, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce outlined a 
vision of NAFTA that summarized the views of the business community: 
The FTA negotiations should be comprehensive. In particular, we should 
negotiate agreements on tariffs, non-tariff barriers, agriculture, investment, 
services, intellectual property, and institutional mechanisms to improve bilateral 
economic relations. (…) However, we do not believe the FTA negotiations should 
be made the catch-all for every economic and non-economic issue between our 
two countries, as some have suggested. Other issues, such as environmental 
degradation, immigration, narcotics and labor conditions, while important in our 
overall relationship, are already being addressed through mechanisms more 
appropriate than the FTA negotiations (Hettinga, 1991).146  
                                                
146 A similar declaration of Kay Whitmore, from the Business Roundtable echoed Hettinga’s words: 
 
On a parallel basis, right. One way to prevent us from having a trade agreement is to weigh it 
down with so many things and so much complexity that nothing will happen. We do not see any 
problem with doing things on a parallel basis. As I indicated in my statement, we have been to 
Mexico. They seem to be prepared to make commitments that could be built into parallel activities. 
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The prevailing idea among representatives of the business community was that 
trade liberalization would foster economic growth, thereby gradually raising both 
labor and environmental standards.147 Admittedly, some business organizations like 
the National Foreign Trade Council (NFTC) or the USCC recognized that trade 
liberalization process might generate adjustment costs and were, therefore, in favor of 
increasing trade adjustment assistance for workers and industries (Kittredge, 1991; 
Workman, 1991). Yet, all corporate associations were united in their opposition to the 
incorporation of enforceable labor and environmental provisions in the core NAFTA 
texts. The fact that fair trade principles were excluded from the core agreement was 
not a mere coincidence. A close examination of the policy process reveals that the 
business community managed to make its voice heard both through institutional and 
political channels so as to control the terms of the trade agreement. 
  
NAFTA’s business-friendly design 
The business community was involved in the politics of NAFTA long before its 
congressional ratification. In fact, American multinational corporations may even 
have provided the impetus for the project, with the U.S.–Mexico Chamber of 
Commerce laying out the rationale for NAFTA at a hearing of the Senate Finance 
Committee on “North American Economic Interdependence” on June 6, 1979. 
Throughout the 1980s, U.S. and Mexican business interests pushed for the negotiation 
                                                                                                                                      
But we would not like to see them built specifically into a trade agreement (Whitmore, 1991, 156-
7).  
147 As Michael Baroody, NAM’s Senior Vice President posited at a congressional hearing,  
Almost certainly the agreement would have the effect of narrowing the gap over time by 
raising wages in Mexico (…). On the question of how the agreement will affect the environment of 
the Earth we are not inclined to be pessimistic. New investment in Mexico associated with the 
agreement is likely to be state-of-the-art, and less likely to harm the environment than existing 
facilities. Also, as Ambassador Hills has noted, a richer Mexico will be in a better position to 
enforce environmental laws (Baroody, 1991, 540). 
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of some sort of bilateral or regional trade pact. These groups included the Mexico-
U.S. Business Committee, the Mexican Business Council for International Affairs, the 
USCC, the American Chamber of Commerce of Mexico and the Council of the 
Americas (Lewis, 1993; Cox, 1995). 
From the beginning of the negotiations in 1991, American delegates pressed their 
Mexican counterparts148 to obtain an optimal package of market concessions on 
behalf of American industries. The interests of American firms in NAFTA generally 
hinged upon two visions: Mexico as consumer market or production site. 
A large segment of the U.S. business community – e.g. agribusinesses, retailing, 
banking, high-tech and service industries, pharmaceutical companies, etc. – saw in the 
North American accord myriad export and investment opportunities to enter the 91-
million-consumer Mexican market (Nishijima & Smith, 1996, 61; Cox, 1995, 367). 
To meet the private sector’s needs, NAFTA would gradually eliminate all tariff 
barriers to Washington’s “distant neighbor” (Riding, 1985) within 15 years.149 Just as 
importantly, NAFTA would also open all the economic sectors of America’s trading 
partners to foreign investment – with the exception of Mexico’s oil industry and 
Canada’s culture industry (FT, 11/17/93).  
Another segment of the private sector was less concerned by market access than 
outsourcing opportunities. A number of American industries, like the automobile, 
electronic and apparel sectors, hoped that by liberalizing investment flows, NAFTA 
would help them to transfer some of their production units to Mexico and benefit 
                                                
148 Washington and Ottawa had signed CUSFTA in 1988. 
149 Goods and services are divided into three categories whereby tariffs are eliminated: immediately in 
1994 (category A); within five years from 1998 (category B); within five years from 2003 (category C) 
(Coffey, 1999, 119-120). The agriculture, textile and auto industries are subject to specific provisions. 
For more details, see the official NAFTA text: Gouvernement du Canada (1992, part II, chapter 3, 
appendixes 300-A et 300-B and chapter 7, section A). 
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from lower labor costs.150 As explained earlier, these restructuring processes were 
deemed vital to help American firms regain international competitiveness over their 
Japanese and European rivals (Norris C. Clement et al, 1999, 3, 153; Orme 1996, 4; 
Cox, 1995, 370-4).151  
But although outsourcing promised cost-savings for American capital owners, it 
also ran directly against the interests of manufacturing workers. Neither President 
Bush’s workers’ assistance nor the transition periods to tariff elimination that he 
managed to negotiate with his North American counterparts could settle this conflict 
of interests.  
Despite the workers’ opposition, NAFTA would in fact encourage business 
restructuring processes. The agreement was all the more appealing to traditionally 
“import-competing” sectors since it established discriminatory measures against 
foreign firms. The “rules of origin” restrict preferential treatment to products 
designated as “North American” as defined by a percentage-based regional content 
(e.g. 62.5% of auto components for cars and engines, 60% for heavy trucks etc.).152 
These provisions were crucial to obtain the support of American manufacturing 
industries to the extent that they shielded them from international competition 
(Nishijima & Smith, 1996, 35; Orme, 1996, 266; Cox, 1995, 367-71). They were also 
very important for business organizations like ECAT or NAM, which hoped to unite 
their business constituencies behind NAFTA (Japan Economic Institute (JEI), 1992, 
5).  
                                                
150 In this regard, NAFTA prolonged – or exacerbated – economic processes already under way during 
the maquiladoras program. For a broader discussion of the integration of production processes in North 
America, read Eden (1994). 
151 As Sandra Masur at Eastman Kodak, and a leading figure of the soon-to-be-formed USA*NAFTA 
explained, many American industries supported NAFTA because “U.S. manufacturing must pursue 
joint production [with Mexico] to keep costs down and compete against European and Japanese 
competitors who pursue similar strategies” (cited in Shoch, 2001, fn. 39, 332). 
152 For a discussion of the political economy of the rules of origins, read Agami (1994). 
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In the light of these protectionist measures, NAFTA appears to be more of a 
compromise designed to satisfy powerful American business interests than a real 
“free” trade agreement. Yet, the fact that a trade initiative combines trade-liberalizing 
measures with protection safeguards is nothing new. As discussed in chapter two, this 
pattern of give-and-take has been a common feature of the history of American trade 
policy since the 1930s.153  
What was less common was the far-reaching scope of NAFTA “non-trade” issues. 
In fact, NAFTA’s chapter one makes clear that trade is only one of six principal 
negotiating objectives, including “fair competition,” investment, intellectual property 
rights, dispute resolution and trilateral cooperation.154 Among these goals, political 
analysts generally agree that investment was as much a priority to American 
multinational corporations as the trade of goods and services (Nishijima & Smith, 
1996, 36; Shoch, 2001, 146; Orme, 1996, 129). Accordingly, NAFTA was built with 
an ironclad investment regime that would serve as a model for future trade 
agreements over the next decade. Not only did the agreement open most economic 
sectors, including public contracts (e.g. military, construction),155 to North American 
capital-owners, but it also created strong legal provisions to protect intellectual 
property rights and investment, subjecting unfair competition to a strong dispute 
settlement mechanism (Clement et al, 1996, 263-70). 
This arsenal of business-friendly provisions had the effect of uniting both export-
oriented firms (“multilateralist” companies) and import-competing corporations 
seeking business restructuring and possibly protection through rules of origin 
(“regionalist” firms) (Chase, 2003; Cox, 1995). Of course, not all American 
                                                
153 Dryden’s (1995) study of the USTR is a good example of this bargaining process.  
154 NAFTA’s text is available at: 
 http://www.nafta-sec-alena.org/DefaultSite/index_e.aspx?DetailID=80#top  
155 A whole section of NAFTA’s text is dedicated to government procurement.  
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businesses supported NAFTA. Three categories of companies were opposed to the 
agreement: 1) labor-intensive industries with low intrafirm trade (e.g. footwear, 
glassware, luggage, brooms and ceramics); 2) a number of protected farm interests 
like the sugar, fresh fruit and vegetable sectors; 3) a number of small and medium 
businesses that feared increased competition from Mexico (represented in the 
protectionist U.S. Business and Industrial Council) (Cox, 1995, 374; Avery, 1998, 
290; Shoch, 2001, 146; JEI, 1992, 9). 
These dissenting voices, however, were lost in the fervent chorus of American 
businesses supporting NAFTA. A poll conducted after the signature of the accord 
(December 17, 1992) revealed that 72 % of business executives from corporations 
with annual revenues superior to $ 1 million supported NAFTA (JEI, 1992, 4). 
Similarly, 70 percent of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce constituencies – a very 
eclectic membership – backed the international agreement (Kollman, 1998, 135). In 
sum, the business-friendly terms of NAFTA meant that the private sector was 
generally united on behalf of “free trade” – even though the international agreement 
was neither free nor confined to trade.  
This marked a stark contrast with the almost unanimous opposition of labor 
unions against President Bush’s trade initiative. Thus, NAFTA was a clear example of 
how increased capital mobility could split sectoral coalitions along class lines. And as 
Helleiner predicted two decades ago, “At the industry level, where labor and capital 
are at odds in their approaches to the policymakers, so far, the preferences of the latter 
prevail” (1977, 42). Helleiner provided little explanation to understand the ways 
through which transnational corporations and business interests would exert their 
power on the policy process. The next subsection will seek to fill this lacuna. 
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Institutional bias 
To understand why the design of NAFTA followed the logic of American 
business interests yet ignored most of the grievances of labor or environmental 
activists, one must analyze the institutional dynamics of the trade policy process. The 
study of policy formation during the NAFTA negotiations shows that inequalities of 
power were embedded in the trade advisory committee (TAC) system, in which 
corporate actors act as “policy clienteles” to the detriment of civil society groups, 
whose voices are largely excluded from the decision-making process.  
 A close examination of trade advisory committees in the early 1990s reveals one 
simple fact: corporate advisors overwhelmingly dominated the membership of each of 
its organs. This was true during the NAFTA negotiations as it would be in the 
subsequent trade debates. In 1991, the ACTPN – the most influential advisory 
committee – was almost entirely composed of corporate advisers. Out of its 44 
members, 38 represented individual companies and 4 represented business trade 
associations.156 Perhaps even more tellingly, all 35 members of the Industry Policy 
Advisory Committee (IPAC) – the steering committee for the 16 Industry Sectoral 
Advisory Committees (ISACs) of the second tier – represented large corporations 
(USTR, 1990-1991). These private actors had a privileged access to U.S. trade 
negotiators that allowed them to exert considerable influence on the negotiations. At 
the end of the NAFTA negotiations, James Robinson, CEO of American Express 
praised the Republican White House for its close collaboration with business 
interests, noting that nearly 1,000 meetings had been held with trade negotiators and 
government officials (Avery, 1998, 285). Their dominance of the trade policy process 
                                                
156 See appendix 3. 
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allowed them to control the terms of the debates and relegate fair trade issues to 
secondary provisions.  
As the second part of this chapter will illustrate, business influence was not 
confined to the negotiating phase. Corporate interests would remain active throughout 
the entire policy process: first, by shaping the terms of the trade agreement as 
advisers, and second, by lobbying Congress to approve their progeny. The ACTPN’s 
chairman James Robinson III, also chairman of the Business Roundtable, would be a 
key actor in the business coalition-building efforts on behalf of NAFTA. Similarly, 
TAC corporate advisers, typically from large and politically active corporations often 
took the lead of the advocacy campaign on behalf of the North American accord 
(Stokes & Choate, 2001, 57; Darves & Dreiling, 2007; Dreiling, 2001, chapter 5).   
In contrast, fair traders were seriously marginalized from the negotiating phase of 
the policy process. In the influential ACTPN, only two were labor representatives and 
neither environmentalists nor consumer advocates were represented. This lack of 
political access was exacerbated by the absence of labor, environmental and consumer 
advocates in all sector-based technical advisory committees – at least until President 
Bush reached out to the environmental movement (USTR, 1990-1991; Hilliard, 1991, 
12-4).  
The fact that environmental and consumer advocates were not included in the 
trade advisory committee system was only half surprising. As explained previously, 
when the trade advisory committee system was created in 1974, American trade 
policy was primarily concerned with tariffs and quotas. As a result, environmental 
and consumer interests paid little attention to trade politics. However, the rising 
prominence of “non-tariff barriers” created new tensions between national regulation 
and international trade agreements, as illustrated by the catalytic “tuna-dolphin” case 
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at the GATT in 1991. The domination of private interests and the exclusion of civil 
society groups from the policy process constituted a clear example of “path 
dependence” (Pierson, 2000). The design of NAFTA revealed that the inequalities of 
power embedded in the institutional reforms of 1974 would have long term 
implications for the conduct of American trade policy. 
For Public Citizen and its allies, the far-reaching domestic consequences of 
NAFTA required a complete restructuring of the trade advisory committee system 
that would give public interests more input into the policy process. Ralph Nader’s 
organization was all the more alarmed by the skewed design of the corporate 
membership of the TAC system since many of the top corporate advisers had a 
controversial record when it came to environmental regulation. In a 1991 study, 
Public Citizen revealed that a large proportion of ACPTN and IPAC members were 
not only among the nation’s worst polluters, but had also been actively involved in 
anti-environmental advocacy.157 This anti-regulatory bias among private advisers 
could explain why environmental provisions were always secondary concerns in the 
design of NAFTA. 
In the light of this imbalanced membership, the reaction of President Bush to 
environmental groups’ grievances seemed to be little more than tokenism. 
Admittedly, George H. W. Bush’s nomination of environmental representatives in the 
trade advisory committee system was an unprecedented step in the trade policy 
sphere. However, without any revision of the structure of the TAC system, the 
delegation of five environmentalists – including one in the IPAC in August 1991, and 
                                                
157 For instance, 10 out of 42 companies represented on ACTPN were ranked among America’s 50 
biggest dischargers of toxic pollutants or among the top 50 dischargers of airborne water pollutants. In 
addition, 19 companies of the topc advisory committee were listed as Potentially Responsible Parties 
for hazardous waste sites by the EPA. Finally, 14 companies (or their affiliates) had participated in a 
campaign against California’s 1986 Safe Drinking Water and Toxics Enforcement Act (Hilliard, 1991, 
12-4). 
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to be appointed in ACTPN in 1992 – amidst a membership of nearly 800 corporate 
advisers appeared to be a drop in the ocean (Hilliard, 1991, 9-10).  
Under this institutional framework, labor interests hardly had a better chance to 
make their voice heard. Although workers and employers raised serious concerns over 
NAFTA’s investment provisions, the industrial advisory committees always spoke for 
one single voice: that of business. For example, neither the automotive equipment 
(ITAC 2),158 nor the textile and apparel (ITAC 13) advisory committees included any 
labor representative, despite the concrete threats that NAFTA represented for workers 
of each of these sectors.  
Admittedly, unions were slightly better represented than environmental and 
consumer organizations both in ACTPN and most notably, through the Labor 
Advisory Committee. Composed of representatives from a wide range of trade unions, 
the latter has been the only real advocate for labor interests in the TAC system. These 
isolated voices, however, were muffled by the overwhelming support of the private 
sector for NAFTA in the ACTPN and the other advisory committees. In 1992, the 
LAC judged that the NAFTA draft was a “complete rejection of the committee’s 
advice” and demanded that the agreement be renegotiated (JEI, 1992, 6; Ramey, 
1992). In contrast, the ACPTN strongly endorsed the final agreement, stating that it 
would “fulfill its threefold promise to open markets to U.S. exports, to enhance the 
worldwide competitiveness of U.S. companies, and to provide a model and incentive 
for more open trade and investment relations with other countries” (ACTPN, 1992).  
The power inequalities embedded in the institutional apparatus of trade policy 
were exacerbated by the lack of transparency of the TAC system. While the 1972 
FACA sought to open the advisory committee process to public scrutiny, the 1974 
                                                
158 Auto parts constitute to this day a major part of the goods traded in North America (Goodie, 2007). 
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Trade Act invoked practical concerns to constrict this “sunshine” policy, arguing that 
public disclosure would “seriously compromise the development by the United States 
Government of trade policy, priorities, negotiating objectives or bargaining positions” 
(Trade Act 1974 § 2155(f)). Under this logic, trade advisory committees meet behind 
close doors and prepare policy recommendations that can determine the fate of 
workers who have little or no input in these decisions (Stokes & Choate, 2001, 57). In 
the case of NAFTA, the complete text of the agreement, although completed in 
August 1992 was – at least not officially159 – not available to the public until 1993 
(Lewis, 1993).  
 
Conclusion 
In sum, the institutional design of the trade advisory committee system was ill-
adapted to the new social and environmental questions that NAFTA would raise. 
First, its sectoral structure failed to take into consideration the increasing class 
conflicts corollary to increased capital mobility, excluding labor stakeholders from the 
policy process. Second, it ignored the tensions between national regulation and 
international trade laws that had awakened environmentalists and consumer advocates 
from their political apathy. Through a process of “path-dependence,” the TAC system 
institutionalized inequalities of power, whereby corporate interests were granted 
privileged access to the decision-makers of the executive branch while civil society 
groups were excluded from the trade policy process.   
This special relationship between the executive branch and the private sector 
allowed the business community to shape NAFTA according to its preferences. This 
                                                
159 Public Citizen’s leak of the draft of the NAFTA text months before its official release (Center for 
Public Integrity 1993, 40). 
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explains why NAFTA included, for instance, chapters on intellectual property rights 
and  government procurement and, most importantly, why it was designed with such 
strong investment provisions while it relegated labor and environmental provisions to 
a “parallel track” of negotiations. The skewed design of the policy process would 
have consequences beyond the scope of the NAFTA trade bill. As Charles Lewis, 
executive director of the Center for Public Integrity noted in this analysis of the 
NAFTA negotiations:  
The trade game illustrates well what William Greider calls “deep lobbying.” 
The purpose of this sophisticated form of political planning is not so much to 
affect any specific legislation as to define public argument and debate. By 
controlling the terms of debate, deep lobbying controls the outcome. (Lewis, 
1993, 1) 
 
Of course, not all advisory committees exert influence on the White House; nor is 
the latter ever captive to the diktat of the private sector.160 Different presidents and 
USTRs have relied on these advisers to pursue their own agenda: some have sought 
active participation of advisers; others have used appointments to reward corporate 
allies and build political support for lobbying Congress (Stokes & Choate, 2001, 56; 
Lewis, 1993). However, to the extent that the executive branch relies almost 
exclusively on business for technical information, American firms do exert 
considerable influence on the terms of the negotiations, acting as – in the words of 
Clinton’s undersecretary of commerce Jeffrey Garten – as “de facto agents of foreign 
policy” (cited in Faux, 2006, p. 16). Thus, far from being above domestic interests in 
the pursuit of the “national interest,” the executive branch closely collaborates with 
them in the decision-making process, pursuing a “free trade” or, more appropriately, 
business-friendly trade policy that relegates labor, environmental and consumer issues 
                                                
160 Under the law, USTR does not have to adhere to the committees’ recommendations, but must 
inform them of “significant departures” from their advice (JEI, 1992, 3).  
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to the margin of the policy process. This close collaboration is, however, only one 
facet of the special relationship between the executive branch and the private sector. 
As the next part will illustrate, the president also made ample use of his institutional 
powers to ensure the congressional ratification of NAFTA. 
 
II) MOBILIZATION & COUNTERMOBILIZATION 
The fact that President Bush had succeeded in completing the international 
negotiations did not mean that NAFTA would vanish from the headlines. To the 
contrary, the accord would become the subject of fierce debates in the context of the 
1992 presidential election, owing largely to the fiery declarations of independent 
candidate Ross Perot.  
The Texas billionaire became a powerful challenger to the traditional parties161 
and a leading opponent of the North American accord. Although the involvement of 
the populist right in contemporary trade debates is beyond the scope of this 
dissertation, it must be acknowledged that Ross Perot played an important role in 
raising the prominence of the NAFTA debates. In a famous presidential debate on 
PBS, Perot evoked the trade agreement in sharp terms: 
 
Let’s go to the center of the bull’s eye – the core problem. And believe me, 
everybody on the factory floor all over this country knows it. You implement 
that NAFTA – the Mexican trade agreement where they pay people $ 1 an 
hour, have no health care, no retirement, no pollution controls, etc., etc., etc. – 
and you are going to hear a giant sucking sound of jobs being pulled out of 
this country  (Perot, 1992).162 
 
 The vivid expression “giant sucking sound” became a common symbol for the 
threat of outsourcing and brought labor issues to the center of the NAFTA debates. 
                                                
161 In June 1992, Perot led the polls with 39 % of intended votes (McCann, Rapoport & Stone, 1999, 
1). 
162 For a more detailed account of Perot’s perspectives, read Perot, Choate & Perot (1993). 
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Never before had trade policy become subject to such controversies.163 According to 
Phyllis Jones (2000, 275), Perot and organized labor both “brought NAFTA to the 
public.” 
So controversial was NAFTA in the 1992 presidential campaign, that Bill Clinton 
was torn between his ideological belief in free trade and his willingness to portray 
himself as a business-friendly “New Democrat,” and his fear of alienating his labor 
and environmental constituencies. His eyes on the polls, the Democratic candidate 
postponed his endorsement of the accord until early October 1992. In a first instance 
of Clintonian “triangulation,” the Arkansan governor and his advisers chose a middle 
course: he would condition his support for NAFTA upon the successful negotiation of 
side agreements that would promote international labor standards, protect the 
environment, and establish safeguards against import surges. (Shoch, 2001, 159). 
Like Bush’s Action Plan, Clinton’s side agreements were minor policy 
concessions designed to rally support for NAFTA among liberal Democrats. They 
were also part of a broader strategy devised to stop the anti-NAFTA advocacy 
campaign.  
If President Clinton’s promises would succeed in dividing the nascent “fair trade” 
alliance, a group of labor, environmental and consumer organizations continued to 
press Congress to reject NAFTA. Through intense lobbying efforts both inside and 
outside Washington, NAFTA opponents managed to push the trade bill to the brink of 
collapse. 
In this new contentious era of trade politics, congressional support for free trade 
could no longer be taken for granted and required presidential leadership. Only by 
joining forces did the president and the business community manage to save the day. 
                                                
163 As Cohen, Paul and Blecker (1996, 245) noted, “so public and pervasive was the NAFTA debate 
that it was the first trade policy issue to become grist for network talk shows, comedy monologues of 
late night comedians on television, and even comic strips.” 
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In a classic archetypical example of “countermobilization,” the White House and its 
corporate allies coordinated a multi-faceted advocacy campaign, the hallmarks of 
which were a sophisticated public relations campaign and an aggressive lobbying 
counteroffensive inside the Beltway. These efforts paid off, as “free traders” manage 
to rally support in both parties, to the great displeasure of the fair trade alliance. 
Before lobbying side-by-side with business for NAFTA’s ratification, however, the 
White House had to build trust with the private sector by committing to weak labor 
and side agreements.  
The second half of this chapter will begin by examining the politics behind 
President Clinton’s negotiations of the side agreements before turning to an analysis 
of the dynamics of mobilization and countermobilization that preceded the NAFTA 
vote. It will focus, first, on the advocacy efforts of the “fair trade” alliance and its 
impact in Congress and, second, on the counteroffensive launched by the “free trade” 
coalition between the White House and the private sector.  
 
President Clinton and the side agreements 
The election of President Clinton brought considerable hope to both 
environmentalists and labor organizations, which had been essentially put on the 
defensive under Republican presidencies. In the environmental realm, the Democratic 
administration announced an ambitious set of political reforms that promised to limit 
carbon emissions, strengthen federal regulation and promote renewable energy 
research. Beyond their long list of commitments, Bill Clinton and his Vice President 
Al Gore also departed from traditional rhetoric about the relationship between 
environmental protection and economic growth by arguing that environmental 
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progress could both create jobs and improve energy efficiency and, therefore, the 
competitiveness of the U.S. economy. 
The Democratic administration’s early actions – before the Democrats lost their 
majority in Congress in 1994 – seemed to indicate that it would keep his electoral 
promises. To begin with, the environmental community largely applauded President 
Clinton’s pro-environmental appointments. In addition, the chief executive put his 
“environmental vice-president” in charge of formulating and coordinating 
environmental policy. Last, the White House quickly eliminated George Bush’s 
controversial Council on Competitiveness – whose role mirrored that of Ronald 
Reagan’s Task Force on Regulatory Relief – and replaced it with a new Office on 
Environmental Policy intended to coordinate departmental policies on environmental 
protection (Vig 2006, 108-11; Hays, 2000, 97, 118).  
Similarly, organized labor welcomed President Clinton with open arms. The 
Democratic president partly owed his election to the AFL-CIO and national unions, 
which had given him crucial electoral, financial and organizational support during the 
1992 campaign. Initially at least, the relationship between the new administration and 
organized labor seemed promising. First, the White House opened its door to labor 
representatives, who were enthused by their new access to policymakers.164 Union 
leaders were also largely satisfied by the administration’s political appointments, 
many of whom had ties with organized labor. In addition, President Clinton’s agenda 
also seemed largely congruent with labor interests: from the Davis-Bacon Act (setting 
prevailing wage standards for federal construction projects) to the issuance of an 
executive order banning the permanent replacement of strikers by federal contractors; 
and, from a broader social standpoint, the Family and Medical Leave Act, Clinton’s 
                                                
164 AFL-CIO chief lobbyist Robert McGlotten remarked: “I’ve been to the White House about 40 times 
in the last nine months. Before I was there about twice in 12 years” (cited in Dark, 1999, 163).  
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1993 economic package (which promised new investments in public infrastructure, 
job training etc.) and healthcare reform (Dark, 1999, 162-8). 
More troubling for labor were President Clinton’s ambitions as a “New 
Democrat.” Bill Clinton’s political thinking was influenced by his involvement with 
the Democratic Leadership Council (DLC), which he had chaired in 1990-1991. 
Created in 1985, the DLC was formed to move the Democratic Party to the center of 
the political spectrum and regain support from the private sector. To do so, the DLC 
sought to insulate the Democratic Party from “special interests” – primarily organized 
labor – and advocated a more restrained and market-oriented role for the government 
in the U.S. economy. Although President Clinton’s first set of policies (e.g. tax hikes 
for the wealthy, healthcare reform) generally tilted toward the left wing of the 
Democratic Party, it is generally acknowledged that his “New Democrat” persona 
fully bloomed in the aftermath of the Republican takeover of Congress in 1994 
(Shoch, 2001, 163-4).  
During the NAFTA debates, however, larger forces than party politics were at 
play. Like most of his postwar predecessors, President Clinton embraced the “free 
trade” orthodoxy that had guided policymakers for more than 50 years. Although 
NAFTA was neither “free” nor solely about trade, the Democratic chief executive 
endorsed the agreement under the pretext that it would serve America’s national 
interest. Yet, the notion of “national interest” was more than the ideological substrate 
of “some defunct economist” – to borrow the words of one of the most illustrious 
practitioners in that field (Keynes, 1936, chapter 24, §V). As the first part of this 
chapter has shown, it was the product of an institutional structure that privileges 
business interests over those of civil society groups like labor, environmental and 
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consumer advocates.165 Thus, by endorsing NAFTA, President Clinton did not elevate 
himself above domestic politics, as political analysts would argue, but rather joined 
one side of the political struggle pitting corporate interests against civil society 
groups.  
This is not to suggest that the chief executive was fooled by his own ideological 
aspirations. Indeed, the administration’s policymaking during the NAFTA debates 
incarnated the political logic of the DLC: standing against the Democrats’ traditional 
constituencies (organized labor and environmentalists) while drawing support from 
business interests.166 Rather, the political calculations of the Democrats dovetailed 
with the institutional logic of the trade policy process.  
 It was this mix of strategic, ideological and institutional factors that prompted the 
White House to throw its full weight behind NAFTA. As this part will show, the 
joined countermobilization of the executive branch and the private sector succeeded 
in countering the powerful lobbying campaign of the anti-NAFTA coalition thereby 
ensuring the congressional ratification of what is commonly viewed as one of the 
most controversial bills in the history of American trade politics. To fully mobilize 
the business community behind NAFTA, the administration had to eliminate a 
persistent bone of contention between the two “free trade” allies: the negotiation of 
labor and environmental side agreements.  
 
                                                
165 In this sense, Keynes is wrong. In the trade policy sphere, the power of vested interests is not 
exaggerated but underestimated.  
166 President Clinton’s close advisers pushed him to adopt the DLC’s political line. On the one hand, 
Treasury Secretary Lloyd Bentsen and USTR Mickey Kantor told him that he could demonstrate 
political courage by battling the AFL-CIO. On the other, White House Congressional Liaison Howard 
Paster confided: “If you abandon NAFTA, Mr. President, there goes New Democrat” (cited in Shoch, 
2001, 177-8; and fn. 60, 342). 
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Negotiating the side agreements 
President Clinton’s conditional endorsement of NAFTA prompted contrasting 
reactions on both sides of the trade divide. Both blue and green constituencies 
responded positively to the White House’s promises to renegotiate NAFTA, hoping 
that new concessions might help establish environmental and labor standards on a 
continental scale. In contrast, corporate interests were uncertain about the new 
president’s political intentions and feared that the NAFTA’s side agreements might 
impose new regulatory constraints on American businesses.167 Yet, if the 
administration had a chance to break with the business-oriented logic of the trade 
advisory committee system, it decided, instead, to follow the script of the DLC. 
President Clinton’s side agreements, like that of President Bush’s Action Plan, were 
tailored to win congressional votes and accommodate the business community – not 
to accomplish substantive progress in the environmental and labor realms.  
At first sight, the creation of NAFTA’s environmental side agreement – formally 
known as the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation (NAAEC) – 
seemed groundbreaking. The NAAEC was designed to foster transnational 
collaboration and data collection through the creation of the Commission on 
Environmental Cooperation (CEC). Two additional institutions were created to 
address pollution problems along the US-Mexican border: the Border Environmental 
Cooperation Commission (BECC), and the North American Development Bank 
(NADBank), designed to fund ecological projects (Hufbauer et al, 2000, 17). These 
environmental institutions were unprecedented in the trade policy sphere, leading 
EPA administrator William Reilly to praise NAFTA as the “greenest trade treaty 
ever” (cited in Esty, 1998, 205). 
                                                
167 In contrast, President Bush’s Action Plan had raised little concerns within the private sector, as the 
latter assumed that a Republican president would look after their interests. 
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For the environmental organizations that had offered support to NAFTA under 
George H. W. Bush’s presidency, setting a precedent for the trade-environment 
linkage was a political priority that required cooperating with the new Democratic 
administration. In May 1993, the “Group of Seven” sent a letter to the White House 
giving enough leeway to U.S. negotiators to accept the latter’s final settlement with 
other NAFTA signatories (Mayer 1998, 174-7).168 However, for many other 
environmentalists, the negotiation of the environmental side agreement was hardly 
seen as a victory. This was due to three factors. First, the NAAEC admittedly felt 
short of addressing the dramatic air pollution problem of the US-Mexican border.169 
Today, it is common wisdom that the efficiency of the NADBank and the BECC has 
been largely compromised by their lack of resources and their bureaucratic structure. 
Second, while neither the threat of pollution haven nor the prospect of a “race to the 
bottom” ever materialized,170 the frictions between NAFTA’s supranational 
investment provisions and national regulations have raised considerable alarm among 
environmentalists. Since 1994, these conflicts have, indeed, played a large role in 
converting mainstream organizations to join the ranks of the “fair trade” choir (Deere, 
2002, 335; Esty, 1998, 204; Destler & Balint, 1999, 31).171 Finally, NAFTA’s 
environmental provisions also failed to meet the hopes of mainstream 
                                                
168 This letter was signed by the WWF, NWF, NRDC, EDF, Defenders of Wildlife, TNC and NAS. 
169 Despite the measures adopted by certain industries and the increased attention of the Mexican 
government, the overall picture reveals that neither NAFTA’s environmental package nor the Mexican 
regulatory system is commensurate to the border’s ecological challenge. (Gallagher, 2002; Torres, 
2002; Hufbauer et al, 2000, 46). In addition to industrial pollution, trade liberalization in the 
agricultural sector has put Mexico’s diverse ecosystem at great risk (Audley, 2004, 7; Vaughan, 2004, 
61-87 ; Nadal, 2002: 143-62).  
170 For economic arguments against the “myth” of pollution havens, see Mayer (1998, 22) and Coffey 
(1999, 146).  
171 In a series of cases, corporations have invoked NAFTA’s investment provisions to challenge 
domestic laws protecting human health and the environment and managed to obtain financial 
compensation from national governments. For more details on this topic, see Mann and von Moltke 
(1999); Mann and Araya (2002, 163-80); Hufbauer et al (2000, 8-16); and Rugman, Kirton & Soloway 
(1999). 
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environmentalists with regard to their consultation in the implementation of the 
accord.172  
NAFTA’s labor side agreement fell further from addressing unions’ grievances. 
On paper, the North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation (NAALC) sets forth 
a long list of “labor principles” that NAFTA member countries must promote.173 It 
also provides a forum for trade unions and human rights NGOs to discuss labor law 
and practice in North American countries. In addition, the NAALC establishes an 
arbitration panel that can impose sanctions for a persistent pattern of violation of 
national labor laws related to three of the “labor principles” (child labor, minimum 
wage, and safety and health) (Compa, 2001a, 324-5).  
While political analysts commonly regard NAFTA’s labor side agreement as an 
important institutional precedent for the linkage between trade and labor issues, they 
also agree on its inherent weaknesses (see e.g. Shoch, 2001, 176; Destler, 2005, 261; 
Mayer, 1998, 341; Ross, 2000, 87).174 First, the Clinton administration squashed the 
hopes of labor unions – and those of environmentalists – that the side agreements 
might lead to an upward harmonization of labor (and environmental) regulations, 
favoring instead the enforcement of national laws in all NAFTA countries (Mayer 
1998, 169; Coffey, 123). Second, the power of the arbitration panel has, in effect, 
proved to be deliberately more limited than that of the environmental side agreement. 
Not only was the dispute settlement mechanism designed as a slow and cumbersome 
process, (Hufbauer, Jones, & Schott, 2005, 29; Nishijima & Smith, 37) but its 
                                                
172 This was primarily due to the elusiveness of the CEC’s language dealing with citizens submission, 
as well as the cost and complexity of these participative procedures (Torres, 2002, 208-9; Vogel, 2000, 
90). 
173 This list includes: 1) Freedom of association and protection of the right to organize; 2) The right to 
bargain collectively; 3) The right to strike; 4) Abolition of forced labor; 5) Prohibition of child labor; 6) 
Minimum wage, hours of work and other labor standards; 7) Nondiscrimination; 8) Equal pay for equal 
work; 9) Occupational safety and health; 10) Workers’ compensation; 11) Migrant worker protection.  
174 A 2001 CRS report reaches similar conclusions: “The ‘weakness’ of NAALC is in the enforceability 
of those labor principles” (Bolle, 2001, 3-5). 
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remedies are, despite a “sunshine effect,” largely inconsequential (Compa, 2001; Delp 
et al, 2004).175 When compared with the strong dispute settlement mechanism 
established to enforce investment provisions, it is clear that both labor and 
environmental provisions were designed as symbolic side payments rather than 
substantive political reforms.  
In fact, the administration backpedaled from its promises on repeated occasions. 
First, the White House proposed to renegotiate NAFTA, then refused. Second, it 
promised to design a third side agreement on import surge before abandoning its 
proposal.176 Third, the chief executive proposed to give subpoena powers to the 
trilateral commissions on environment and labor, as well as the ability to use 
sanctions to enforce regulatory standards, before dropping the idea of sanctions 
altogether. Finally, the White House proposed a tax for funding worker retraining, 
before renouncing this idea again in the face of opposition among both Republicans 
and business interests (Brady and Volden 1998, 114).  
Like NAFTA’s core text and Bush’s Action Plan, the side agreements were 
designed in accordance with business interests. The private sector sustained its 
pressure on the Clinton administration throughout the process of negotiations. 
Through correspondence with the USTR or via Republican representatives, corporate 
interests warned Democratic leaders that strong provisions might jeopardize the 
passage of NAFTA. To adopt a united stance on labor and environmental issues, the 
business community established “blue” and “green” taskforces seeking to influence 
the negotiations of each side agreement. Coordinated by the Business Roundtable, 
                                                
175 A 2004 study by the UCLA Center for Labor Research and Education revealed that none of the 
cases of labor disputes to date had proceeded further than the first, “Cooperative Consultations” phase 
of the NAALC process – the other three phases being: 2) Evaluation by a Committee of Experts; 3) 
Resolution of Disputes through consultations and an arbitral panel, and 4) Fines backed by a 
suspension of trade benefits (Delp et al, 2004, vi). 
176 I am grateful to Mark Anderson (former AFL-CIO Director for International Affairs) for raising this 
point to me.  
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these teams included representatives from most major business associations including 
the USCC, NAM, ECAT, the Council of the Americas etc. The private sector was 
concerned by the idea of supranational regulatory institutions with power of 
investigation and enforcement over labor and environmental standards. In a letter sent 
on June 3rd, 1993, a coalition of business associations warned USTR Mickey Kantor 
against adopting strong side agreements: 
We are concerned that the U.S. draft negotiating texts for the supplemental 
agreements have flaws that could undermine the agreements’ potential to improve 
environmental and labor conditions… [The proposal] threatens to create a new, 
politically unaccountable bureaucracy… [Trade sanctions are] unnecessary [and] 
counterproductive [and would] set a perilous precedent for imposition of trade 
sanctions by or against the United States to address such issues as human rights, 
civil rights, and any other type of disfavored noncommercial behavior (cited in 
Mayer, 1998, 193).177 
 
Business organizations were particularly wary of adding strong labor clauses to 
NAFTA, fearing it might impose new obligations on U.S. business. As Abraham 
Katz, president of the U.S. Council for International Business declared,  
The AFL-CIO has also advocated that a social clause be added to the social 
charter. That means to enforce standards through trade sanctions. This is part of 
the AFL-CIO’s so far unsuccessful push in the ILO and in the GATT to introduce 
its modern version of what I call Bismarkian protectionism, because this idea goes 
all the way back to Bismark and has been unsuccessful. But for the U.S. 
Government to argue for the incorporation in NAFTA of trade sanctions to 
enforce labor standards would not only mean opening up the agreement, but if it 
were successful would generate endless litigation and arguments between Mexico 
and the United States, creating the very uncertainty for business that NAFTA was 
intended to eliminate (Katz, 1993, 273). 
 
The fact that the labor side agreement ended up being weaker than the 
environmental one was not a mere coincidence: it was another clear sign of the 
administration’s deference to the preferences of the private sector.  
Of course, trade policymaking does not only depend on domestic politics. 
Rather, it is a “two-level bargaining” process, whose outcomes are also constrained 
                                                
177 This letter was signed by the Business Roundtable, Council of the Americas, ECAT, NAM, U.S. 
Chamber of Commerce, U.S. Council of the Mexico-U.S. Business Committee, U.S. Council for 
International Business, and USA*NAFTA.  
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by international negotiations. Along those lines, U.S. Trade Representative Mickey 
Kantor invoked the narrow leeway of international negotiations to explain the 
weakness of the side agreements. As Shoch notes, this may have played a role in the 
administration’s decision to settle for weaker side agreements (2001, 176).  
However, the repeated concessions granted by President Salinas to U.S. domestic 
interests – whether rules of origins for the textile and auto sectors or protection to the 
U.S. sugar and citrus industries – reveal that Mexico was ready to do its utmost to 
save NAFTA from its opponents. In contrast, corporate organizations and their 
Republican allies were particularly wary of giving too much scope to labor and 
environmental provisions. If one takes into consideration the New Democrats’ 
ambition to shift the party line to the center and the influence of business interests on 
Republican lawmakers, it seems clear that the Clinton administration’s weak side 
agreements were largely shaped by the demands of the business community. Ira 
Shapiro, General Counsel for the U.S. Trade Representative made this explicit when 
he told an audience of business representatives at an American Enterprise Institute 
that “We made it difficult to get to sanctions” (cited in AFL-CIO, 1997, 9). Thus, as 
Jeff Faux notes,  
We can only conclude that the central obstacle to having worker and 
environmental protections in NAFTA was not the resistance of the Mexican 
and Canadian negotiators, but the resistance of American multinational 
business (2006, 28). 
  
Mark Anderson, who represented unions’ interests in the negotiations on the side 
agreement with the White House, draws the same conclusion: “The Clinton 
administration essentially bowed to the wishes of business in structuring the side 
agreements.” According to him, the Clinton administration’s reluctance to push for 
international labor standards in the subsequent bilateral FTA negotiations with Chile 
confirmed its lack of commitment to the labor cause (Anderson, 2007*).  
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This means that, once again, the special relationship between the executive branch 
and the business community was a key obstacle to the progress of the fair trade cause 
in two regards. First, the weakness of NAFTA’s side agreements gave fair trade 
advocates few opportunities to address the social and environmental effects of trade 
liberalization. Second, the negotiations of symbolic side agreements proved to be 
crucial to the passage of NAFTA. To begin with, they succeeded in dividing the 
opposition to NAFTA by rallying the support of mainstream environmentalists. In 
addition, these addenda were crucial to boost support for NAFTA among Democrats. 
Thus, despite his attempts to distance himself from President Bush, the new 
Democratic president relied on similar strategic side payments to win this new trade 
battle (Valladão, 1995, 22; Gauthier & Raffaelli, 2000, 223). Finally, the limited 
scope of the labor and environmental provisions reassured the business community 
and enabled the “free trade” front to regroup with the aim of countering the powerful 
mobilization of the anti-NAFTA coalition, to which the next subsection turns.  
 
Coalition-building on the fair trade front 
As chapters 1 and 2 have shown, the emergence of a fair trade alliance in the early 
days of the NAFTA debates was the result of coalition-building efforts in the 1980s. 
This alliance operated through two advocacy networks: the Alliance for Responsible 
Trade (ART) and the Citizens Trade Campaign (CTC). Appendix 4 provides a clear 
picture of the structure of each coalition. This diagram presents the main actors of 
each coalition, among them Public Citizen, the Sierra Club, Friends of the Earth and 
the Service Employees International Union (SEIU) for the Citizens Trade Campaign, 
and the International Labor Rights Education and Research Fund (ILRERF), 
Greenpeace, United Electrical, Radio, and Machine Workers of America (UE) and the 
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Development Gap for the Alliance for Responsible Trade. It also reveals that certain 
organizations, such as the Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers Union 
(ACTWU), the United Auto Workers (UAW) and the Teamsters on the labor side, as 
well as Friends of the Earth in the environmental field, were active participants in 
both alliances.  
Despite the unprecedented breadth of the anti-NAFTA front, it is important to re-
emphasize that these coalition-building efforts involved only certain segments of 
organized labor and the environmental movements (Dreiling, 2001, 29, 40). For 
instance, several of the mainstream ecological organizations such as the World 
Wildlife Fund and the Environmental Defense Fund that came to support the North 
American agreement distanced themselves from these coalitions. In addition, out of 
the 81 affiliates of the AFL-CIO, only 18 formally joined the Citizens Trade 
Campaign (CTC), the most powerful anti-NAFTA coalition, while a few unions 
participated in both the CTC and its sibling, the Alliance for Responsible Trade 
(ART).  
Each of the two main fair trade networks had a distinct modus operandi. First, the 
ART focused on fostering cross-border cooperation with Canadian and Mexican 
activists, forming, according to Susan Aaronson (2001, 115), “the first multinational 
nongovernmental organizational challenge to a trade agreement.” This international 
framework facilitated cross-border exchanges between labor, human rights and 
environmental interests and would lay the groundwork for future mobilizing efforts 
on a continental scale, particularly in connection with the project of a Free Trade Area 
of the Americas (FTAA) and during the campaign against the Multilateral Agreement 
on Investment. The ART also gathered more charitable organizations and adopted a 
more bottom-up, consensual approach to trade policy debates than the CTC. 
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According to John Cavanagh, the ART helped civil society groups to find 
commonalities and develop an internationalist alternative to NAFTA’s model of 
regional integration. Overall, however, the ART was only indirectly involved in the 
lobbying campaign against NAFTA  (Dreiling, 2001, 57-8, 75).  
Second, the Citizens Trade Campaign was composed of larger environmental and 
labor organizations and enjoyed much greater financial and human resources than the 
ART. Thus, it largely dominated the lobbying campaigns against fast track authority 
and NAFTA both inside and outside the Beltway (Cavanagh, Anderson & Hansen-
Kuhn, 2002, 189, 202-3).178 Adopting a more confrontational approach to free trade 
issues, the CTC was skeptical about the type of alternative model of integration 
advocated by the ART, lest any compromise result in cosmetic concessions.  
What is important for the purpose of this study is that the formation of both of 
these networks marked a departure from conventional trade politics. The far-reaching 
scope of NAFTA provided common ground for these coalition-building efforts. In 
turn, both the ART and the CTC’s education efforts prompted a variety of 
stakeholders to realize the larger implications of free trade agreements. For instance, 
the CTC incited environmental organizations (e.g. the Sierra Club) or labor unions to 
broaden their political horizons and get more involved in trade politics. As CTC 
founder Lori Wallach remarked, 
Labor unions used to pay attention to tariffs to the extent that it wouldn’t 
create competition for their sectors. But what we developed as a coalition was 
really a worldview about the agreements as structures to implement a much 
broader set of policies and a contrary worldview to ours (Wallach, 2007*). 
 
                                                
178 To the extent that this dissertation focuses on interest groups lobbying, it will put more emphasis on 
the role played by the CTC than the ART.  
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The worldview to which Wallach refers was the notion of “fair trade,” a socially 
and environmentally responsible trade policy defined in contradistinction to the 
corporate-driven NAFTA model that had prevailed during the negotiating phase.  
 
The anti-NAFTA campaign begins 
The first objective of the anti-NAFTA alliance consisted of barring the renewal of 
President Bush’s trade-negotiating authority. Although the analysis of this specific 
legislative battle is excluded from this dissertation for space concerns, the fast track 
debates of 1991 were in many ways a prelude to the NAFTA battle. On the one hand, 
labor, environmental and consumer advocates combined grassroots efforts and inside-
the-Beltway tactics to rally enough support in Congress to defeat the fast track bill.179 
On the other, the Republican president divided the opposition by offering symbolic 
concessions (the Action Plan) and relying on the lobbying efforts of the business 
community.  
Eventually, the nascent blue-green alliance did not manage to prevent the renewal 
of fast track authority. Neither this first defeat, however, nor the election of a 
Democratic president deterred NAFTA opponents from their advocacy efforts. Until 
the very last months before the vote, the opponents of the trade bill were much more 
mobilized than its supporters. And despite internal divisions within the fair trade 
coalition, labor unions and their allies came within inches of defeating the NAFTA 
bill.  
                                                
179 The first major lobbying effort launched by the Citizens Trade Campaign took place between mid-
1991 and the fall of 1992. Designed by Public Citizen, the Sierra Club and several unions, and 
endorsed by 50 organizations including the AFL-CIO, the Waxman-Gephardt Resolution (HR 246) 
stipulated that “Congress will not approve legislation to implement any trade agreement if such 
agreement jeopardizes United States health, safety, labor or environment laws...” After intense 
lobbying efforts from the CTC, the bill finally managed to acquire the necessary 218 supporters and 
had the effect of reinvigorating the anti-NAFTA coalition (Dreiling, 2001, 63). 
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Organized labor was arguably the most politically influential actor engaged in the 
anti-NAFTA campaign (Center for Public Integrity, 1993, 37). The unions’ 
mobilizing efforts intensified once it became clear that the “toothless” labor side 
agreement would do little to protect workers rights on either side of the U.S.-Mexican 
border (Compa 1998b, 63-9; Shoch, 2001, 283). Their political strategy relied on both 
“inside” and “outside” tactics (Avery, 1998, 288; Shoch, 2001, 281).  
On Capitol Hill, unions warned legislators that they would withhold campaign 
contributions from any congressman who chose to back the North American 
agreement. They also threatened to defeat any NAFTA supporter in 1994 (Steagall & 
Jennings, 1996, 515). In a remake of the fast track tactics, the AFL-CIO also invited 
members of the press and legislators to witness the working conditions in the 
maquiladoras by organizing trips to the Mexican border region (Mayer, 1998, 42). In 
a testament to labor’s new political emphasis on “fair trade” issues, these trips often 
included sensitizing lawmakers about the environmental hazards of the border region 
(Anderson, 2007*).  This type of initiative was facilitated by the increased 
transnational collaboration of Mexican and American labor unions that had started at 
the end of the 1980s. 
The real strength of labor’s anti-NAFTA campaign resided in its grassroots 
power, a key asset from which its green allies indirectly benefited. Perhaps more than 
any trade legislation, NAFTA had considerable resonance among the rank-and-file. 
For many union members, the North American agreement represented a concrete 
threat to U.S. manufacturing jobs. Former AFL-CIO Director of International 
Economic Affairs Mark Anderson explains,  
“For my folks, there is nothing theoretical about this, since they had already 
being going through a fairly intensive period of either plant closures or lay-offs, 
let’s say in the previous five years… moving to the maquiladora program in 
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Mexico… and with the downward pressure it had on bargaining and wages…” 
(Anderson, 2007*). 
 
At the local and regional levels, unions organized rallies and encouraged their 
members to call or personally meet their representative. Workers also inundated 
Congress with a tsunami of anti-NAFTA letters (Shoch, 2001, 283). In addition, 
unions funded a television, radio and print media blitz against NAFTA. 
Overall, the mobilizing efforts undertaken by the AFL-CIO and its affiliates were, 
according to Anderson, the fiercest public policy battle fought by the Federation in 
decades (Anderson, 2007*). Despite the strong mobilization of the labor rank-and-
file, however, it is important to note that the anti-NAFTA campaign remained 
controversial among leaders of the AFL-CIO. Indeed, union leaders were divided 
about whether they should so fiercely attack the first Democratic president in twelve 
years (ibid). Thus, until the side agreements were completed in August 1993, the 
official line of the labor federation was “Not this NAFTA.” On the other hand, 
individual unions such as the Teamsters, the textile and garment unions, UE and the 
glass union adopted a much more aggressive stance in their opposition to NAFTA 
(Mayer, 1998, 224-6).  
As mentioned before, the environmental front was even more divided, with 
mainstream pro-NAFTA green organizations pitted against grassroots anti-NAFTA 
groups. In September, two months before the vote, the White House invited five pro-
NAFTA ecological organizations180 to celebrate the completion of the side agreement 
negotiations (Audley, 1997, 88-98).181 For the rest of the fair trade alliance, however, 
the Group of Seven’s endorsement of NAFTA was more than a betrayal of the 
environmental cause. In effect, it seriously undermined the entire lobbying campaign 
                                                
180 In the end, the Nature Conservancy and the Defenders of Wildlife took no formal position on 
NAFTA. For more details, read Audley (1997, 104-5). 
181 For more details on NAFTA’s environmental regime, see section 4.3. 
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against the North American agreement. In so far as pro-NAFTA organizations 
represented 80 % of the membership of the green community, their willingness to 
compromise discredited any opposition to the pact on environmental grounds – 
whether in Congress or in the coalitions (Audley, 1997, 100).  
Nevertheless, these serious obstacles did not discourage other environmentalists – 
among them Friends of the Earth, the Sierra Club and Greenpeace – from continuing 
their lobbying efforts against the ratification of the free trade agreement. They 
launched their own grassroots campaign, whether independently – this was the case 
with the Student Environmental Action Coalition – or in conjunction with other 
groups (the Citizens Trade Campaign). Like labor unions, they produced thousands of 
phone calls and letters to congressional offices. In May 1993, the CTC organized a 
“National Week of Action for Fair Trade” which included a variety of blue-green 
events from New York to Seattle. In Washington, environmentalists and their labor 
allies worked closely with a core of liberal Democrats, among whom was House 
Whip David Bonior, to target forty undecided voters  (Dreiling, 2001, 53-6, 74; 
Audley, 1997, 97-8; Mayer, 1998, 228-9).  
Finally, fair traders benefited from the support of United We Stand America, 
Perot’s powerful movement of nearly two million activists (Mayer, 1998, 295) and 
from the Texan’s vast financial resources, which helped to offset the resources gap 
between NAFTA-opponents and free traders (Center for Public Integrity, 1993, 37).  
If Ross Perot certainly helped to raise the prominence of the NAFTA debates, the 
contribution of the populist conservative wing, of which Patrick Buchanan was 
another prominent voice, may also have hurt the advocacy efforts of “fair traders”. As 
Dreiling (2001, 70) notes, Perot’s anti-NAFTA campaign elevated the status of nation 
and race at the expense of the progressive agenda that “fair trade” alliances sought to 
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promote. The fact that the AFL-CIO and the Citizens Trade Campaign did not clearly 
distance themselves from right-wing nationalist made them more vulnerable to the 
critics of the “free trade” forces.182  
 
Impact of fair trade mobilization 
The impact of the fair trade coalition on the NAFTA debates was two-fold. First, 
labor, environmentalists and consumer advocates succeeded in broadening the scope 
of American trade policy by raising the prominence of non-traditional trade issues 
such as environmental protection, international labor standards and consumer safety. 
Second, they exerted considerable pressure on lawmakers from both parties 
(especially Democrats), coming close to defeating the NAFTA bill. 
Perhaps the most significant achievement of the blue-green alliance was its ability 
to redefine the terms of trade debates in America. This was a defining element of the 
“new politics of American trade” (Destler & Balint, 1999). As one activist noted, 
NAFTA opened the closed door of international trade negotiations to civil society 
actors (Hansen-Huhn, 2000). By threatening the passage of NAFTA, these new 
stakeholders compelled decision-makers to design policy concessions. While the 
latter were more symbolic side payments than substantive reforms, they also set a 
precedent in the conduct of American trade policy.  
President Bush’s Action Plan, like Clinton’s side agreements, legitimized the 
linkage between trade liberalization and environmental protection and, for the first 
time, granted environmentalists with a seat – however remote from the decision center 
– at the bargaining table. As John Audley notes, “NAFTA marks the first step toward 
                                                
182 For example, Perot was a special guest at an AFL-CIO mass rally. Also, Public Citizen collaborated 
with the Texan billionaire to help him prepare his televised debate with Al Gore (Dreiling, 2001, 78 , 
Audley, 1997, 101, fn. 15, 111). 
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reconciling trade and environmental policies” (Audley, 1997, 136). Whether 
environmentalists – and, to a broader extent, fair traders – would have achieved 
greater political progress had the green movement remained united is an open 
question.183 Yet, regardless of what could have happened, environmentalist outsiders 
did manage to play an unexpected role in the trade policy sphere.  
Similarly, the Action Plan and the labor side agreement, for all their limitations, 
had the effect of raising the prominence of the trade-labor nexus, bringing questions 
on workers’ rights and outsourcing to the center of trade debates. During the 
following decade, the inclusion of labor provisions in free trade agreements would be 
discussed on the basis of the NAFTA formula. To a broader extent, the mobilization 
of the blue-green alliance marked the emergence of “fair trade” as a new policy 
framework that would remain at the center of trade debates long after the NAFTA 
battle.  
The second and corollary consequence of fair trade advocacy was the significant 
threat that it posed to the agreement’s ratification. First, through its powerful 
grassroots campaign, the blue-green alliance and its populist allies managed to turn 
public opinion against NAFTA. An NBC-Wall Street Journal poll taken in early 
September revealed that support for NAFTA among Americans had fallen from 31 
percent in July 1992 to 25 percent in June 1993, while opposition to the accord had 
risen from 29 to 36 percent (Shoch, 2001, fn. 56, 341). Other polls confirm this 
downward trend (see Shoch, ibid.; Mayer 1998, 255; Destler 2005, fn 16, 200). While 
it is empirically difficult to trace the roots of this growing discontent, the declining 
                                                
183 Some analysts regard the environmental split as a good cop/bad cop configuration that translated 
into a crucial source of political leverage (Audley, 1997, 142; Esty, 1994, 203). In retrospect, NAFTA 
opponents regard the compromise of mainstream environmentalists as a tactical mistake (Strand, 
2007*; Wallach, 2007*).  
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popularity of NAFTA was most likely due to the vigor of the anti-NAFTA campaign 
(Mayer, 1998, 271-2).  
More threatening for the survival of the NAFTA trade bill were the sharp 
divisions that fair traders fomented in Congress, and particularly among Democratic 
legislators. This was not only the case when President Bush sought fast track renewal 
in 1991, but also under a Democratic President who, barely one year after his election, 
was confronted by the leadership of his own party. Democratic Whip David Bonior 
(D-MI) was a key ally of the fair trade coalition, leading the opposition to NAFTA in 
Congress. His opposition constituted a serious challenge for the White House, who 
could not rely on the usual Democratic whip organization to rally the party behind 
NAFTA (Avery, 1998, 303). Equally problematic was the mutiny of Majority Leader 
Dick Gephardt (D-MO), an influential voice on trade policy who, four months after 
voting for fast track renewal, declared his opposition to NAFTA.184 With the House of 
Representatives under constant pressure from union members and their allies, this 
mutinous fervor pervaded the ranks of the Democratic Party. At the end of August 
1993, only a few months before the NAFTA vote, David Bonior announced that two 
thirds of House Democrats opposed the trade agreement (Mayer, 1998, 256).  
Until the last few months before the vote, organized labor and its allies were much 
more mobilized than NAFTA supporters. Given the scale of the opposition to NAFTA 
among both American citizens and their House representatives, fair traders seemed to 
be poised for a legislative victory. Recognizing these political trends, most senior 
White House advisers privately agreed that the president should abandon the 
                                                
184 Rep. Gephardt’s endorsement of President Bush’s fast track bill in 1991 was all the more puzzling 
given his protectionist record and the prominent role he had played in pressing the Bush administration 
to adopt labor-friendly measures. Mayer (1998, 91) credits the Bush administration’s bipartisan tactics 
with the conversion of the Missourian Representative. Shoch (2001, 148) highlights Gephardt’s 
presidential aspirations and his willingness to shed his protectionist reputation. For a more thorough 
discussion that includes insights from Gephardt and his advisor Michael Wessel, read McArthur (2000, 
112-7). 
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agreement (Livingston & Wink, 1997). In fact, the pro-NAFTA forces were so 
overwhelmed by the scale of the NAFTA opposition at the beginning of Clinton’s 
term that the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Director Leon Panetta 
declared it “dead in the water” at the end of April 1993 (Destler, 2005, 201; Dryden 
1995, 381).  
 
Impact on the NAFTA vote 
The NAFTA vote, however, defied the pessimistic previsions of President 
Clinton’s advisers. On November 20, 1993, the House of Representatives ratified the 
NAFTA bill by an unexpected margin of 234 to 200. 102 Democrats (60% of party 
members) joined 132 Republicans (75%) in support of the controversial free trade 
agreement. The Senate’s approval of the bill would follow a few days later with 
another comfortable margin (61-38). What explains this unexpected defeat for fair 
trade forces? How did free traders manage to prevail?  
Before turning to these questions, it is important to finish assessing the impact of 
fair traders by examining the influence that they exerted on the vote in the House of 
Representatives, where trade battles are the most contested. As explained in chapter 
one, regression analyses only provide partial answers to these questions as they often 
lack adequate data to measure such complex phenomena. As a result, they ignore the 
role of environmental and consumer advocates in trade debates. In addition, they 
cannot capture the full impact of advocacy campaigns, and particularly the elusive 
effects that grassroots or communication campaigns might have on legislators. These 
limitations notwithstanding, regression analyses provide partial answers to assess the 
influence of interest groups mobilization on congressional votes.  
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As a famous trade economist once wrote, lawmakers’ preferences on trade are 
generally determined by “a mix of ideological factors (in the form of ideas and 
examples), interests (as defined by politics and economics), and institutions (as they 
shape constraints and opportunities)” (Bhagwati, 1988, 17). The numerous analyses of 
the NAFTA vote confirm the validity of Jagdish Bhagwati’s assumptions.185 From an 
ideological standpoint, liberal lawmakers were more likely to oppose NAFTA than 
were their conservative counterparts. Constituency factors were also a significant part 
of the NAFTA equation: while representatives from districts with high concentration 
of import-competing industries often voted against NAFTA, those with constituencies 
employed in the agricultural, high-tech or export-oriented industries generally 
supported it. 
For the purpose of this chapter, it must be noted that the advocacy efforts of labor 
unions did seem to exert influence on legislators. Several studies have shown that 
representatives who depended largely on labor political action committee (PAC) 
donations generally opposed NAFTA, while those who depended on business 
contributions were more likely to back the trade initiative (Baldwin & Magee, 2000; 
Uslaner, 1998; Steagall and Jennings, 1996). According to Uslaner (1998), a labor 
financial contribution of $200,000 would increase a lawmaker’s likelihood to vote 
against NAFTA by almost 50%. The effect of unions’ inside lobbying was not 
confined to Democrats. Not incidentally, 7 of the 16 Republicans who received more 
than $30,000 from labor voted against NAFTA (Uslaner, 1998, 359-61).  
Of course, one could question the causal logic of these analyses by emphasizing 
the influence of sectoral or constituency factors. Here, one could point to the effect of 
unionization rate as a significant factor of opposition to NAFTA. According to 
                                                
185 For a review of the literature, see Shoch (2001, fn. 86, 344-5).  
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Uslaner, a member from a district that is 37% unionized was 15% less likely to vote 
for NAFTA than one with just 3% of the work force unionized (Uslaner, 1998, 359-
60). Thus, one could argue that organized labor may have targeted members more 
receptive to unions’ grievances, who may have voted against NAFTA without 
financial incentives.  
The fact that labor – like other interest groups – is more likely to lobby friends 
than foes186 does not mean, however, that its advocacy efforts do not affect 
congressional behavior. Reducing congressional votes to a mere reflection of a 
district’s population or economy not only ignores the indeterminacy that pervades all 
trade debates; it also puts under question the whole logic of interest groups 
mobilization. As numerous interviews revealed, congressional votes do not depend as 
much upon what constituencies a legislator represents as much as how vocal these 
constituencies prove to be during fair trade or free trade campaigns. In addition, the 
significance of unionization rates and the influence of labor PAC donations are by no 
means mutually exclusive. In fact, union membership is likely to be correlated with 
the mobilization of the rank-and-file and could provide an indirect insight into the 
importance of grassroots mobilization, a tactic often complementary to financial 
contributions.  
In sum, the advocacy efforts launched by labor unions and their allies did have a 
significant impact on the NAFTA debates. Not only did the fair trade coalition 
manage to expand the “scope of conflict” of American trade politics, but it also 
convinced American citizens and a large number of lawmakers that the agreement had 
serious limitations when it came to social and environmental concerns. In the summer 
before the vote, the White House faced a skeptical public and a mutinous Congress 
                                                
186 On this point, see Hojnacki & Kimball (1998). 
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that threatened the passage of NAFTA. How did the president and its business allies 
manage to win the NAFTA battle in such inhospitable circumstances?   
 
Corporate countermobilization and its impact 
The private sector’s advocacy efforts on behalf of NAFTA took shape during the 
fast track debates in April 1991. To counter the mobilization of the blue-green 
alliance, corporate America assembled the “Coalition for Trade Expansion,” a 
consortium of business interests that included more than 500 corporations and 
lobbyists. This network included key business associations like the Business 
Roundtable, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, the Emergency Committee for 
American Trade, the National Association of Manufacturers and the National Foreign 
Trade Council. These groups collaborated with the Multilateral Trade Negotiations 
(MTN) Coalition, another powerful business network that focused on Uruguay Round 
negotiations (Avery, 1998, 284; Mayer, 1998, 87; Dreiling, 2001, 93). This 
cooperation among cross-sector corporate organizations not only confirmed the 
business unity surrounding the passage NAFTA, but also showed an unprecedented 
level of politicization in the trade policy sphere.    
In August 1992, a congregation of powerful American and Mexican trade 
players187  
announced the creation of USA*NAFTA, a “coalition of coalitions” whose stated 
goal was to “identify and demonstrate support for the NAFTA to members of 
Congress, the media, and the public generally” (cited in Center for Public Integrity, 
1993, 31). The new organization was endowed with a $2 million budget, which 
initially appeared modest in the face of the fierce grassroots mobilization of anti-
                                                
187 The meeting included leaders of NAM, the BRT, the U.S.-Mexican Business Council, the Mexican 
Business Lobby and Mexican president Carlos Salinas himself. 
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NAFTA forces. Within a year, the coalition would encompass an enormous breadth of 
U.S. business interests with over 2300 corporate members, 46 trade associations and 
numerous law firms.188 
With the help of lobbyists and public relations firms, the “free trade” coalition 
launched a multi-faceted campaign to save the NAFTA bill. These countermobilizing 
efforts included traditional lobbying as well as broader public relations efforts, e.g. 
via pro-NAFTA editorials (Mayer, 1998, 234-5). What distinguished the NAFTA 
campaign from previous trade debates was the launching of “grassroots” – or given 
the predominance of employers and managers taking part in these efforts, “grass tops” 
(Edsall, 2006, 108) – lobbying operations. This strategy consisted of designating 
“state captains” corporations to carry out state level, quasi-independent campaigns.189 
State captains would mobilize governors, mayors, state legislators, as well as small 
businesses, local Chambers of Commerce and any free-trade sympathizer, on behalf 
of NAFTA. Their aim was to convince the people and their representatives of the 
economic benefits of regional integration (Center for Public Integrity, 1993, 32).  
What kind of corporations took part in these counter-mobilizing efforts? As far as 
size is concerned, all state captains were large firms by national standards, though not 
all of them fell within the Fortune 500. Another common feature of these corporate 
actors resides in their ties with Mexican subsidiaries, and their proclivities toward 
multinational investment. Finally, companies tended to be well-involved in political 
action, with nearly all of them having their own Political Action Committees and 
being represented in a Trade Advisory Committee (Dreiling, 2001, 95).190 Thus, as 
mentioned in the first part of this chapter, many large companies were involved in the 
                                                
188 As with fair trade advocates, the level of mobilization of corporate actors varied from one to 
another. According to Kollman, only a few several hundred of these firms actually contributed 
resources to the coalition (1998, 134).  
189 Larger companies such as AT&T, IBM or General Electric were assigned several states. 
190 See appendix 5. 
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trade policy process both at the negotiating phase and the lobbying phase, playing a 
dual role of agenda-setter and policy advocate.  
Although, or perhaps because, the “grassroots” efforts of the business community 
were unprecedented for trade legislation, their efficiency on the ground seemed, at 
least initially, questionable. Despite their experience with inside lobbying, most state 
captains had never run a grassroots campaign (Mayer, 1998, 235). The problems of 
the corporate coalition, however, ran deeper than their political savoir-faire. In fact, 
until September 1993, the counter-mobilizing efforts of the business community paled 
in comparison with the vigorous campaign of anti-NAFTA opponents.  
Two main factors contributed to the lethargy of the USA*NAFTA alliance. First 
and foremost, corporations remained wary of the negotiation of side agreements. 
Before knowing what these regulatory provisions would entail, the business 
community hesitated to throw its full weight behind NAFTA. To a broader extent, the 
private sector remained uncertain about the real political intentions of the first 
Democratic president in more than a decade. Second, the legislative agenda in 1993 
was so dense that NAFTA did not always rise to the top of CEOs’ political priorities. 
Other issues such as tax policy or healthcare reform would have a more direct effect 
on companies’ revenues and, therefore, often diverted their attention from trade 
politics (Mayer, 1998, 234-5; Cameron and Tomlin, 2000, 201).  
The completion of the negotiations of side agreements and the weakness of 
NAFTA’s environmental and labor provisions reassured the business community 
(Shoch 2001, 176). The urgency of the situation also prompted pro-NAFTA forces to 
react. As “fair traders” came close to burying NAFTA under a mountain of popular 
discontent, President Clinton went to the rescue of the controversial trade bill. Yet, 
before corporate interests would commit to throw their full weight behind a final 
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lobbying campaign, they needed reassurance that the administration was on the same 
wavelength. In August 1993, a meeting organized by David Rockefeller gathered 
leaders of the business community (particularly from the Business Roundtable) and 
key players of the Clinton administration (among them National Economic Advisor 
Robert Rubin, Treasury Secretary Lloyd Bentsen, Commerce Secretary Ron Brown 
and USTR Mickey Kantor). Both sides agreed that only a full-scale lobbying 
offensive would save NAFTA (Mayer, 1998, 273). A high point in corporate-
presidential countermobilization, this meeting epitomized the mutual dependence of 
the private sector and the executive.191 
The final campaign of USA*NAFTA principally involved the Business 
Roundtable, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, the National Association of 
Manufacturers, and the Emergency Committee for Action on Trade (Dreiling, 2001, 
96-7; Mayer, 1998, 275-6). Their efforts to save NAFTA were unique not only in 
regard to the scale and the unity of the business community’s mobilizing efforts – 
trade politics being traditionally fought on a more fragmented sectional basis –, but 
also in the high level of coordination between a Democratic White House and 
corporate interests.  
The strategy of the business community in the final months preceding the vote 
was three-pronged. First, the corporate alliance re-energized its lobbying offensive to 
convince undecided lawmakers that NAFTA was a political priority for American 
businesses. The private sector flexed its financial muscle to press representatives from 
both parties to vote for the trade agreement. Business interests had particular leverage 
                                                
191 A month later, White House officials, business representatives and an armada of influential 
lobbyists renewed their commitment to NAFTA at the offices of the Allied Signal Corporation. Ken 
Cole, chief lobbyist for Allied Signal, and new coordinator of USA*NAFTA described the lobbying 
team in exultant fashion: “We had literally millions of dollars’ worth of lobbying talent in a single 
room. They were the best of the best… the ones that have the biggest retainers from the biggest 
companies.” (cited in McArthur, 2000, 169, 167-71).  
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over Republican members, whose campaigns received the highest rate of business 
PAC money (Mishel & Teixeira, 1993, 3). Democratic congressmen were not 
immune to these pressures, especially if one considers that the share of business 
contributions to Democratic congressmen had risen from 41 to 54 percent between 
1982 and 1992, while that of labor PACs fell from 43 to 33 percent over the same 
period (Shoch, 2001, fn. 85, 357). 
The second pillar of the business community’s final efforts to save NAFTA 
consisted of the media campaign. To the extent that Ross Perot and the blue-green 
alliance had managed to convince the public that NAFTA rhymed with job losses and 
environmental pollution, the pro-NAFTA forces needed to diffuse positive images of 
the trade liberalizing accord (Jacek, 1994, 7). The business media campaign included 
half-page newspaper ads, touting the agreement as “Good for jobs. Good for U.S.”, 
newspaper editorials, and radio ads (Weisskopf, 1993). In this regard, it must be noted 
that the pro-NAFTA coalition benefited from strong support from elite newspapers 
and the academic community.  
Key to the pro-NAFTA strategy was the broadcast of television commercials, an 
unprecedented step for a trade policy. Among the eight commercials aired by 
USA*NAFTA, the most prominent featured Bill Gates and Lee Iacocca, the former 
CEO of Chrysler and a popular cultural icon. Here as often, the White House lent 
crucial support to the efforts of the business community. In fact, according to 
McArthur (2000, 202), the idea of mobilizing Lee Iacocca originated in the White 
House, which gave USA*NAFTA its own polling data about who would make the 
best television spokesman for the pro-NAFTA campaign.192 In addition, President 
                                                
192 Particularly ironic was the fact that the pollster used by the White House had been funded by the 
Democratic National Committee, which was partly financed by organized labor (McArthur, ibid). In 
other words, labor unions not only helped elect a president that would turn against it during the 
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Clinton conversed twice with the hesitant former Chrysler CEO to convince him to 
become a spokesman for NAFTA (McArthur 2000, 206, 221). 
The third pillar of the corporate campaign to save NAFTA consisted of a large-
scale grassroots counteroffensive. Here again, USA*NAFTA sought to 
counterbalance the intensive grassroots efforts undertaken by unions, 
environmentalists and United We Stand. In late September, the business alliance 
distributed 1.2 million four-part postcards, one part for the Representative, two for the 
Senators, and one to return to USA*NAFTA. For active NAFTA advocates, a P.R. 
firm hired by USA*NAFTA, produced 35,000 “action kits” that included info 
materials, sample letters to executives and managers (McArthur, 2000, 220). State 
captains and their allies also exhorted stockholders and employees to call their 
representatives to communicate their support for NAFTA. CEOs were asked to call 
undecided representatives personally (Mayer, 1998, 288; Kollman, 1998, 144).  
Until October 1993, however, the grassroots efforts of the business community 
were not taken seriously. Even after the vote, some White House officials and 
lawmakers referred to the business efforts as a “joke,” noting, once again, the lack of 
experience of corporations in grassroots organizing and their inability to mobilize 
their employees on behalf of NAFTA (Kollman, 1998, 145).193 Many undecided 
congressmen argued that pro-NAFTA groups had yet to match the deluge of letters 
that unions and other NAFTA opponents had produced (Lee, 2007*; Behr, 1993).  
Yet, in the last few weeks of their campaign, business advocates would finally 
manage to counterbalance the grassroots efforts of the blue-green alliance, producing 
half a million pieces of mail, faxes and tens of thousands of phone calls to 
                                                                                                                                      
NAFTA debates, but also indirectly contributed to financing the White House’s counteractive lobbying 
efforts.   
193 Jim Kolbe (R, Arizona), a leading defender of NAFTA in Congress similarly stressed the limitations 
of the business community’s grassroots efforts, noting, as an exception,  the U.S. Chamber of 
Commerce’s decentralized campaign (Stokes, 1993, 2475). 
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Congressmen. Thus, eventually, as one campaign participant noted, by November, 
“the mail bags were balanced” (cited in Destler 2005, 203). With public opinion 
becoming more receptive to pro-NAFTA arguments, USA*NAFTA finally provided 
many lawmakers with the political cover that they needed to back the trade 
liberalizing measure (Kollman 1998, 145). In the end, the business community spent 
between $10 and 17 million on behalf of NAFTA – as opposed to $6 million for anti-
NAFTA forces.194 Far from being a “joke,” this represented the most expensive 
campaign ever launched for a trade bill, or according to the leader of USA*NAFTA, 
any bill in U.S. history.195  
What impact did corporate countermobilization have on the NAFTA debates? 
First, the public relations campaign launched by the “free trade” alliance seemed to 
pay off. A look at opinion polls before and after the fall PR offensive seems to show 
that the free trade coalition positively affected public perceptions on NAFTA. 
According to NBC-Wall Street Journal polls, between September and November, 
Americans’ support for NAFTA increased from 25 percent to 36 percent, while 
opposition declined from 36 percent to 31 percent. In mid-November, 49 percent of 
U.S. citizens still associated NAFTA with job losses to Mexico, but this was down 
from 74% in September (Mayer, 1998, 315; see also McArthur, 2000, 216; Destler, 
2005, 203).196 Arguably, measuring the exact impact of media campaigns is a perilous 
exercise. In addition, the president may have played a greater role in this 
communication campaign than the private sector itself. Yet, given the close 
                                                
194 $10 million is the estimation of Ken Cole, a leader of USA*NAFTA (McArthur, 2000, 222). Steve 
Dryden puts this number to $17 million and provides the estimate of the anti-NAFTA operations (1995, 
386). 
195 “I think we’ve done more on NAFTA than on any legislative issue in history” (cited in Mills, 1993, 
1).  
196 Though analyses of NAFTA generally agree on the impact of the free trade campaign on public 
opinion,  
Kollman relies on different data polls and concludes that public opinion remained unchanged between 
September and November (Kollman, 1998, 150-2). 
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collaboration of the White House and the business community, it is neither possible 
nor essential to distinguish their respective effect on public opinion. What matters is 
that presidential-corporate countermobilization seems to have altered the perceptions 
of American citizens.  
Second, the financial lobbying tactics of the business community affected the final 
vote. Several congressional analyses have shown that representatives whose financing 
derived mainly from business donations were predisposed to vote in favor of NAFTA 
(Steagall & Jennings, 1996; Mishel & Teixeira, 1993; Uslaner, 1998). Predictably, 
business funds had a greater impact on Republicans than Democrats (Uslaner, 1998, 
361). However, the effects of corporate money were also noticeable among 
Democrats. Among pro-NAFTA Democrats, the dominance of business PAC 
donations was striking, amounting to 33.2 percent of total campaign receipts versus 
12.1% from labor PACs (Mishel & Teixeira, 1993, 3).197 
Finally, the effect of corporate countermobilization came not only during the 
NAFTA vote, but also earlier, by shaping the pattern of presidential lobbying, 
especially among Democrats. As the next section will show, the White House partly 
concentrated its lobbying efforts on undecided Democratic lawmakers with higher 
business contributions, anticipating that these dual pressures would sway them 
(Uslaner, 1998, 348, 360).  
In this sense, the lobbying operations of the private sector and the executive 
branch were complementary. Kollman assesses the overall impact of corporate 
countermobilization in those terms: “The business effort, while not decisive, brought 
the treaty from a point of certain defeat to a point where the president could win the 
                                                
197 It must be noted, however, that, among anti-NAFTA Democrats, the share of business donations 
(25.7%) was also superior to that of labor donations (20.7%) (Mishel & Teixeira, 1993, 5). However, 
the ratio of corporate money to labor funds was significantly greater among pro-NAFTA Democrats.  
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remaining congressional votes” (1998, 152). The next subsection turns to presidential 
lobbying.  
 
“The best lobbyist in town” 
Tied down by an ambitious domestic agenda, President Clinton long delayed his 
involvement in the NAFTA debates. Fearing that divisions within the Democratic 
party might hamper the passage of his economic package or healthcare reform, the 
administration decided that it would delay its lobbying offensive on behalf of the 
trade bill until the fall of 1993 (Mayer, 1998, 250-1; Shoch, 2001, 177; Destler, 2005, 
199-200). By that time, the strong mobilizing efforts of the fair trade coalition had put 
the ratification of NAFTA in jeopardy. How did the Clinton administration and its 
business allies manage to secure a comfortable vote margin for NAFTA (234-200), 
when the agreement seemed “dead” only a few months before the vote? 
If the counter-mobilizing efforts of USA*NAFTA contributed to save the trade 
bill, the president was the architect of this legislative victory. In spite of his belated 
involvement in the pro-NAFTA campaign, President Clinton threw his full weight 
behind the trade bill, proving to be the “best lobbyist in town,” that his adviser 
Howard Paster had envisioned.198 The process of presidential countermobilization 
was characterized by a sophisticated communications campaign, a close collaboration 
with the lobbying efforts of the business community and a wide range of arm-twisting 
and deal-making tactics.  
Clinton’s decisive campaign for NAFTA started in a theatric manner. On 
September 14, the White House invited former presidents George Bush, Jimmy Carter 
                                                
198 Paster wanted to make sure that the president would be in Washington on the day of the vote as he 
anticipated that the chief executive could extort last-minute votes on behalf of NAFTA (Mayer, 1998, 
279).  
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and Gerald Ford to declare their support for the North American agreement. This 
symbolic bipartisan event was only the debut of a vast communications campaign. 
Through appearances on Sunday talk shows and opinion articles in leading 
newspapers, administration officials praised the economic benefits of NAFTA, among 
them the creation of high-skilled and high-wage jobs and a gain in America’s 
international competitiveness (Livingston & Wink, 1997). President Clinton also 
invoked security arguments to defend the logic of NAFTA, claming that the 
agreement was an opportunity to consolidate democracy and freedom in the world 
(Rankin, 2006, 639). According to Rankin (2006), author of a study of television 
news coverage of contemporary trade debates, the chief executive capitalized on the 
media’s positive bias toward presidential trade leadership and its tendency to ignore 
grassroots mobilization. Although NAFTA was never a truly “free” trade agreement, 
the president was systematically presented as a symbol of free trade (ibid, 646, 652). 
As mentioned in the first part of this chapter, this image of a “free-trader-in-chief” 
detached from local politics is misleading. Far from impartially defending the “free 
trade” cause and the “nation’s interest,” the chief executive actually favors the policy 
agenda of one set of constituencies (the private sector) over another (labor and other 
civil society groups). As Ronald Cox (1995) notes,  
[O]ne of the primary roles of the U.S. executive branch in foreign economic 
policy has been to facilitate the accumulation of capital on a global scale by 
working to promote the conditions for profitable trade and investment for U.S.-
based transnational corporations. In the area of U.S. trade policy, the degree to 
which the state performs this task is dependent in part on the political mobilization 
of sectors of business that articulate their demands to influential state actors (Cox, 
1995, 366). 
 
In addition, the president needs business support to obtain congressional support 
for his trade agenda. The administration can invite or help organize interest groups to 
rally support for its trade policy (Destler & Odell, 1987, 119). Thus, the special 
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relationship between the private sector and the executive branch functions as a two-
way street, whereby business influence and state power are truly interactive processes. 
And just as this type of collaboration was conspicuous at the negotiating phase 
through the system of trade advisory committees, it was also clear during the final 
lobbying stage of the NAFTA debates.   
Both the completion of side agreements and the belated yet energetic involvement 
of the White House signaled to the private sector that it could trust the Democratic 
administration. During the final weeks before the NAFTA vote, a high level of 
coordination was maintained between the White House and the business community. 
Monday meetings at the offices of Allied Signals gathered lobbyists and 
administration officials, while the Chamber of Commerce was the host of another 
weekly meeting gathering other groups of “free trade” advocates (Stone, 1993).  
On numerous occasions, the White House played the “cheerleader for NAFTA’s 
troops” (Mayer, 1998, 308). According to Kollman (1998, 146), in October 1993 (the 
month preceding the vote) the president spoke no fewer than 18 times on NAFTA to 
groups of business leaders. In a speech in New York in October 1993, the chief 
executive asked the business community to address the weaknesses of its “grassroots” 
efforts:  
Ask your employees who support this to contact their members of Congress. 
I’ve had as many Republican as Democratic members of Congress that I am 
lobbying say to me, ‘I want to hear from the people who work for the 
employers, not just from the employers (cited in Mills, 1993, 1). 
 
 
The administration also exhorted CEOs to become “missionaries” for the free 
trade cause.199 In this regard, the president seemed particularly effective, as noted by 
USA*NAFTA coordinator Ken Cole: “President Clinton was persuasive. Do not 
                                                
199 At an event organized by the Chamber of Commerce, the president declared: “I know I am 
preaching to the saved… but you all have to be missionaries” (Mayer, 1998, 308, 309). 
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underestimate the importance of the President of the United States asking CEOs for 
their help” (cited in Mayer, 1998, 285-6). The administration also assisted the 
lobbying efforts of corporate actors inside the Beltway. For instance, Bill Daley’s 
office worked with USA*NAFTA to organize trips to Washington for groups of 
business leaders. The latter would typically meet with administration officials at the 
White House before seeing congress members on Capitol Hill (Mayer, 1998, 289). 
Although many administration officials – including U.S. Trade Representative 
Mickey Kantor or “NAFTA czar” Bill Daley200 – were directly involved in these 
collaborating efforts, their participation was tightly controlled. Under U.S. federal 
law, the executive branch cannot use appropriated funds to lobby the legislative 
branch, whether directly or indirectly (Stone, 1993, 2595).201 What it is entitled to do, 
however, is to share information with private groups. And according to Kollman 
(1998, 146), “On NAFTA, Clinton broadened the scope of what it means to ‘share 
information.’” In practice, administration members divulged the schedules of official 
appearances, upcoming major endorsements etc. Most importantly, the White House 
used leading congressional supporters of NAFTA as intermediaries to convey key 
lobbying information to the business community (Stone, 1993, 2595). Thus, the pro-
NAFTA lobbying efforts witnessed a peculiar form of collaboration between the 
White House and the business community that would prove to be a decisive factor for 
the ratification of the trade bill.  
The final, and perhaps most effective, element of presidential countermobilization 
was the series of arm-twisting and horse-trading tactics that the president used in the 
final weeks preceding the vote. To stem the anti-NAFTA wave that had swept the 
                                                
200 Other cabinet members like Secretary of the Interior Bruce Babbitt spoke regularly at pro-NAFTA 
rallies (Kollman 1998, 146). 
201 This issue would constitute the focus of investigations after the lobbying efforts undertaken by the 
White House on behalf of the Permanent Normalization of Trade Relations with China.  
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House before the fall of 1993, the White House carefully devised a lobbying strategy 
to tip the congressional balance in favor of NAFTA. According to Uslaner (1998), 
author of a study of “presidential contacting” during the NAFTA debates, the 
president targeted two blocs of voters: first, undecided voters who fit the profile of 
NAFTA supporters, e.g. with high levels of business contributions and lower 
unionization rates; and second, Democrats from districts where the president had 
obtained high electoral support during the 1992 election and where the members’ 
seats were not secure (Uslaner, 1998, 348, 355).  
The president used his institutional capabilities as policymaker and party leader to 
design a variety of vote-buying tactics. The latter can be classified in three 
overlapping categories. First, President Clinton promised a large number of policy 
concessions, designed to mitigate or study the impact of a trade agreement.202 The 
side agreements were assuredly the most prominent of these side payments. Although 
the negotiations of the labor and environmental provisions began long before the fall 
of 1993 and were completed in September 1993 – as opposed to many other deals, 
made only weeks or days before the vote, and often never implemented – they served 
the same vote-buying function. Other promises of policy concessions included: 
protection for a wide range of industries, especially in the agriculture sector (fruit and 
vegetables from Florida, flowers from California, asparagus from Michigan, textile 
and apparel in several Southern states);203 the creation of the North American 
Development Bank to help finance environmental clean-up in the U.S.-Mexican 
border region and the funding of a “Community Adjustment and Investment 
Program” to help cushion the social shocks that might be generated.  
                                                
202 Public Citizen uses the expression “policy fix” (Public Citizen, 2005, appendix). 
203 One reporter compared the deal making on the eve of the House vote to “a shopping list: beef, 
peanut butter, bread, sugar, orange juice, cucumbers, lettuce and celery” (cited in Livingston & Wing, 
1997, 56). 
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The second category of presidential lobbying tactics was a cruder type of vote-
buying: pork-barrel, here defined as a promise to fund local programs unrelated to 
trade.204 Thus, President Clinton bought congressional votes with a hodge-podge of 
promises, including military contracts, funds for highways, research facilities, a 
shipyard, levees in various districts and, more egregiously, the extradition of a rapist. 
What is important to note is that both policy concessions and pork barrel promises 
were in fact political promises whose implementation would depend on financial 
allocations, additional legislation or even renegotiation of the terms of NAFTA. In 
fact, studies of President Clinton’s record have shown that he did not keep most of his 
promises (Public Citizen, 2000; Public Citizen, 2005). 
Third, the party leader provided campaign support by assisting or promising to 
assist members in their electoral campaign e.g. by calling local campaign donors or 
scheduling public events with representatives. This tactic was logically more frequent 
with the bloc of Democratic members from unsafe districts where the president had 
obtained strong electoral support in 1992 (Public Citizen, 2005; Kollman, 1998, 136, 
147; Destler, 2005, 204-5). 
This series of last-minute deal-makings would become a common feature of the 
fierce legislative trade battles of the post-NAFTA era. Though also witnessed in other 
policy spheres,205 this type of arm-twisting methods is characteristic of contemporary 
trade debates. According to the National Journal congressional correspondent, this is 
due to two factors: 1) the intensity of the conflicts between free traders and fair 
traders; 2) the potential high economic stakes for a member’s district. To the extent 
that NAFTA largely met both criteria, the number of vote-buying deals was 
exceptional. Relying on a series of interviews and public records, Grayson (1995, 
                                                
204 This distinction borrows from Public Citizen (2005, 57-75). 
205 One recent example was the 2003 vote on Medicare (Cohen, 2008*). 
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chapter 9) provides a list of 47 representatives who allegedly obtained special benefits 
from the administration in exchange for their support for NAFTA. Based on press 
accounts, a later study by Public Citizen (2005) reports that at least 58 representatives 
took part in deal-makings with the White House. Regardless of the exact number of 
these deals, it is clear that the administration devoted tremendous time to lobbying on 
behalf of NAFTA, from smoother tactics (e.g. visits in districts, White House dinners) 
to more aggressive efforts.206 The speaker of the House Tom Foley remarked that in 
thirty years he had been in the House he had never seen a president work harder to 
win a vote than Clinton did to secure NAFTA’s passage (Livingston & Wink, 1997).  
Presidential countermobilization proved crucial in several regards. First, as 
mentioned earlier, the free trade campaign seemed to have had positive effects on 
public opinion. In this regard, the White House’s high-profile communication tactics 
– e.g. the gathering of three former U.S. presidents – is likely to have been a key 
factor in the public’s changing mood. Second, the president’s vote-buying tactics also 
played a crucial role in swaying undecided members. Of course, it is clear that the 
deals the administration negotiated with about fifty representatives were not all 
prerequisites for support for NAFTA. The late positions taken by congressmen for 
controversial votes like NAFTA are often motivated by the prospect of obtaining such 
deals. Thus, supporters of the agreement may feign indecision to obtain additional 
benefits for their votes.207 Yet, as numerous interviews with trade insiders have 
revealed, one should not underestimate the real degree of uncertainty that is corollary 
to intense lobbying cross-pressures (Wenk, 2008*; Cohen, 2008*).  
Although it is always difficult to identify the exact number of votes that President 
Clinton gained through his lobbying efforts, both insiders’ accounts and regression 
                                                
206 Some undecided members of the House received as many as 30 calls a day from Clinton and his 
cabinet officials (Wink & Livingston, 1997). 
207 For a discussion, see Box-Steffensmeier, Arnold & Zorn (1997).  
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analyses of the NAFTA vote reveal that presidential countermobilization mattered. 
Government officials’ accounts of the NAFTA debates reveal that policy concessions 
– especially fruit, vegetables and sugar deals with the Florida delegation – were 
instrumental to NAFTA’s passage. According to USTR Mickey Kantor, “we picked 
up probably 26 votes out of [the changes on the sugar and vegetable issues]” (cited in 
Mayer, 1998, 317, 318). 
Congressional studies of the NAFTA vote tend to corroborate these accounts. 
Based on reports of meetings between House members and the chief executive, 
Uslaner’s (1998) study reveals that “presidential contacting” was a strong predictor of 
support for NAFTA. Thus, a legislator lobbied by the President was 44% more likely 
to back NAFTA than one not contacted by the Chief Executive. The effect of 
Presidential Support scores as measured by Congressional Quarterly proved to be 
even more significant (.512), vindicating Bill Clinton’s appeal to lawmakers’ loyalty 
(Uslaner, 1998, 358; see also Magee, forthcoming). Similarly, Baldwin and Magee 
(2000) find that President Clinton’s last-minute deals had an impact on the final vote. 
When other factors are isolated, the chief executive’s deal-makings is said to have 
garnered 11 extra votes (Baldwin and Magee, 2000, 28). If one considers the 
importance of the side agreements in securing support for NAFTA, the president’s 
role in the passage of the trade bill becomes even clearer.  
The inclusion of environmental and labor provisions, like the campaign support 
provided by President Clinton, were, however, more persuasive with Democratic than 
Republican lawmakers. In this sense, the partisan dimension of presidential 
countermobilization should not be underestimated. In fact, most political analysts and 
trade insiders agree that a Republican president could not have won the NAFTA vote, 
since he would have been unable to rally enough Democratic representatives behind 
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him (Shoch, 2001, 185; Brooks, 2007; Anderson, 2007*; Lee, 2007*). In a recent 
analysis of determinants of trade votes, Magee provides statistical evidence for this 
claim by simulating a vote on NAFTA under a Republican presidency (Magee, 
forthcoming). 
Yet, if partisan effects are key dynamics of the NAFTA vote, they do not always 
guarantee legislative victory – as the next chapter will show. President Clinton did not 
single-handedly win the NAFTA vote. As this chapter has shown, the White House 
closely coordinated its lobbying campaign with the business community. The 
lobbying efforts of the executive branch and the private sector proved complementary 
in two regards. First, high levels of corporate donations made undecided Democratic 
representatives more vulnerable to the pressures of the chief executive. Second, the 
traditional influence of the private sector on the Republican Party complemented the 
president’s appeal to party loyalty among Democrats. This means that corporate-
presidential countermobilization was crucial to thwart the lobbying offensive of the 
blue-green alliance.  
 
Conclusion 
The NAFTA debates of 1991-1993 marked the beginning of the “new politics of 
American trade.” Alarmed by the far-reaching scope of international trade 
agreements, a new coalition of labor, environmental and consumer advocates 
demanded that policymakers prescribe remedies to the social and environmental side 
effects of trade liberalization. Hoping to redefine the rules of American trade policy 
under “fair trade” principles, they launched a vigorous lobbying campaign against 
NAFTA. Rallying public opinion and influential lawmakers behind their cause, the 
alliance of civil society groups came close to defeating the trade bill.  
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This new and fragile coalition of labor, environmental and consumer advocates 
faced a strong alliance of business interests – including both import-competing and 
export-oriented sectors – united by the wide array of investment and trade 
opportunities offered under NAFTA. What empowered the internationally-oriented 
business community, however, was not only its degree of unity and its pronounced 
politicization, but also, and importantly, the privileged access to the executive branch 
that it enjoyed. The special relationship between the executive branch and the private 
sector proved to be a key obstacle to the advocacy efforts of the fair trade coalition 
throughout the whole trade policy process. During the negotiating phase, the business 
community used its privileged access to the trade advisory committee system to 
control the terms of the debate and exclude labor and environmental provisions from 
the core text of the agreement negotiated by George H. W. Bush. The institutional 
apparatus was ill-adapted to the concerns of both labor unions and their allies for two 
reasons. First, the sectoral structure and membership of the trade advisory committee 
system was ill-suited to respond to the new class conflicts created by investment 
liberalization: while employers dominated the policy process, labor representatives 
were largely absent from it. Second, the Trade Act of 1974 did not anticipate the 
political implications from the negotiations of non-tariff barriers and the ever-
expanding scope of free trade agreements. Here again, the voice of business prevailed, 
leaving consumer and environmental advocates few opportunities to defend their 
views of the public interest.  
The influence of corporate interests during the negotiating phase was not the mere 
product of structural constraints, but also resulted from deliberate political decisions. 
The importance of political will was most visible during the negotiation of the labor 
and environmental side agreements, when President Clinton missed an opportunity to 
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transcend institutional constraints for fear he might lose the support of the business 
community. This revealed the mutual dependence of the executive branch and the 
private sector. As explained earlier, business influence and state power are truly 
interactive processes. 
The interactive nature of this special relationship also came into play during the 
lobbying phase of trade policymaking, under the process of presidential-corporate 
countermobilization. Here again, the joined efforts of the executive branch and the 
business community played a crucial role in stemming the mobilizing efforts of labor 
and environmental groups. A coalition of business organizations, the USA*NAFTA 
organized a sophisticated campaign to save NAFTA from its opponents. Although the 
private sector’s state-by-state efforts paled in comparison with the grassroots 
mobilization of labor and its allies, the former’s communications and inside lobbying 
tactics were more effective. In conjunction with the public relations strategy of the 
White House, corporate interests managed to brighten NAFTA’s image among 
American citizens. More importantly, business groups closely collaborated inside the 
Beltway, sharing information to convince undecided members of the economic 
benefits of the North American accord. And if the lobbying efforts of the business 
community redressed the congressional balance in favor of NAFTA, the vote-buying 
tactics of the White House won the decisive votes that allowed the ratification of the 
trade bill. In the words of Kollman (1998, 140), the President behaved like an 
“outside lobbyist” acting “somewhat like a hugely wealthy interest group,” while at 
the same time delivering policy concessions, campaign support and pork barrel deals 
to undecided congress members. In the end, presidential activism, like corporate 
lobbying proved to be crucial to ensure legislative support among both Democrats and 
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Republicans. Thus, in the end, it was not only partisanship that carried the day but 
presidential-corporate countermobilization.  
What was all the more remarkable during the final NAFTA battle was the fact that 
a Democratic president stood so close to business interests in opposition to two of its 
traditional constituencies. Thus, although partisanship was a key element of the 
congressional debates surrounding NAFTA, the special relationship between the 
executive branch and the private sector had a structural dimension that transcended 
party politics. In fact, throughout the NAFTA debates, the business community 
collaborated closely with both parties. Whereas George Bush and the private sector 
worked together to design the North American accord, Bill Clinton played a crucial 
role in coordinating the counter-mobilizing efforts of the pro-NAFTA coalition. This 
form of executive-corporate collaboration was also a distinctive element of the new 
politics of American trade, a phenomenon that ran counter the interests of the new fair 
trade alliance. 
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CHAPTER 4: Fast track authority  
 
The second major legislative battle that pitted fair traders against free traders after 
NAFTA was the fight over the renewal of fast track authority. After the ratification of 
NAFTA and the uncontroversial passage of the Uruguay Round Act in 1994,208 
President Clinton sought to obtain trade-negotiating authority from Congress to 
pursue his trade agenda, at the top of which ranked the expansion of NAFTA to Chile, 
the conclusion of a continental Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), and the 
pursuit of economic negotiations both at the WTO and within the Asia-Pacific 
Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum. Long delayed by the Clinton administration, 
the fast track battle of 1997 – despite its different outcome – witnessed political 
dynamics similar to those at play in the early 1990s. Clinton’s plan to reenergize the 
trade liberalization agenda would face a very similar coalition of labor, consumer and 
environmental advocates pitted against corporate interests set to benefit from new 
trade agreements.  
Before focusing on these similarities, however, it is important to evoke the 
distinctive political context in which the showdown of 1997 occurred. In the mid-term 
elections of 1994, the Democratic Party suffered a serious blow by losing majority in 
both houses. Under the leadership of the assertive Newt Gingrich, the new Republican 
Congress would not only considerably constrain President Clinton’s political agenda, 
                                                
208 As explained in chapter one, the debates surrounding the passage of the Uruguay Round Act have 
been excluded from this dissertation to the extent that they did not trigger a strong mobilization by fair 
trade advocates. Although consumer and environmental advocates did raise objections against the 
conclusion of this multilateral agreement, organized labor, exhausted by the NAFTA fight and 
consumed by other policy and electoral objectives, largely sat out of the debate. This does not mean 
that labor and environmental issues were excluded from the debates on the Uruguay Round. Bill 
Clinton and Al Gore pressed GATT members to establish fora to study the relation between trade 
liberalization and labor and environmental issues. Their efforts – whether symbolic or genuine – faced 
the opposition of several GATT delegates who saw these new issues as a new genre of non-tariff 
barriers. Thus, GATT and the soon-to-be World Trade Organization proved impervious to the fair 
traders’ cause. For more information on the debates on the social clause at the WTO, read French 
(2002); O’Brien et al. (2000); Alben (2001); Howse and Langille (2006); Charnovitz (2006); Compa 
(2001); Samet (2003). 
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but also redefined the relationship of Congress with pressure groups, and more 
importantly, with trade stakeholders on both free trade and fair trade fronts.  
The most important change in the realm of interest groups politics was the 
changing relationship between the business community and the Republican Party. The 
Republican takeover of the House and Senate in 1994 was a turning point for the 
structure of corporate donations. The end of the Democratic dominance in Congress 
triggered a dramatic transfer of money from Democrats to Republicans, particularly 
contributions by the defense and energy industries (Edsall, 2006, 116; Hamburger & 
Wallsten, 2006, 175).209 The growing allegiance of the business community to the 
Republican Party was an integral part of the “K Street Project,” a concerted effort by 
GOP strategists to consolidate the Republican-corporate alliance through various 
channels, including financial contributions, lobbyists, regular communications with 
trade associations, etc. In line with these objectives, Newt Gingrich’s “Contract with 
America” promised a set of business friendly policy initiatives – from deregulation to 
tax cuts and a reduction of government activities – designed to lure corporate interests 
away from the Democratic Party (Hamburger & Wallsten, 2006, 172-5). Despite the 
rapprochement of the business community and the Republican Party, the Clinton 
administration continued to cultivate ties with segments of the private sector, as the 
fast track debates would illustrate.  
In the environmental realm, the ambitious agenda of the Clinton-Gore duo 
collided with the “revolutionary fervor” of the 104th Congress, putting green 
advocates in both the non-profit and government spheres on the defensive (Hays, 
2000, 97, 118). Despite environmentalists’ efforts to woo some GOP members by 
forming the “Republicans for Environmental Protection” caucus, the Republican 
                                                
209 As a result, contributions from labor’s PACs to Democratic representatives jumped from 33% in 
1992 to 48% in 1996 (Abrahamson, 1997). 
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leadership and its business allies went after all its members to unite the party against 
environmental regulation (Hays, 2000, 97, 118). The efforts of the GOP-business 
alliance bore fruit, as the partisan gap over environmental policy gradually 
widened.210 Relying on his powers of appointment, budgeting, reorganization and 
regulatory oversight, the president managed to resist the deregulatory assault of the 
Gingrich Congress and partly reform and strengthen environmental protection. On the 
other hand, given these bitter intra-branch conflicts, Democrats could claim few 
environmental achievements by the end of Bill Clinton’s mandate (Rosenbaum, 2002, 
39; see also Bosso, 2005, 1-15).211  
For organized labor, the picture was even grimmer. First, the Republican 
Congress precluded any chance of adopting the watered down recommendations of 
the Commission on the Future of Labor-Management Relations (Dunlop 
Commission) – appointed by the Clinton administration to guide a long-gestated labor 
law reform. It also unsuccessfully challenged President Clinton’s efforts to raise the 
federal minimum wage in 1996 (Turner & Hurd, 2001, 19).212 To a larger extent, the 
Gingrich revolution ran directly against labor interests to the extent that it sought to 
empower both corporate interests and their Republican allies. Given the centrist 
proclivities of the “New” Democratic president and his penchant for triangulation, 
organized labor would have difficulties confronting this hostile legislative climate.  
It was in this new political context that President Clinton sought to obtain fast 
track authority. Starting in 1994, business-backed Republicans213 opposed President 
                                                
210 If partisan cleavages over environmental policy accelerated in the 1990s, this gradual polarization 
can be traced to the early 1980s. For greater details, read Shipan and Lowry (2001). 
211 For more details on the impact of the Newt Gingrich Congress on environmental policy, read Kraft 
(2006).  
212 For more details, read Dark (1999, chapter 8).  
213 Once again, the business community proved hostile to the promotion of environmental and labor 
issues. In 1994, the Emergency Committee for American Trade (ECAT), the US Chamber of 
Commerce, the National Association of Manufacturers (NAM) and the National Foreign Trade Council 
(NFTC) sent a letter to US Trade Representative Mickey Kantor to oppose the inclusion of labor and 
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Clinton’s attempts – whether genuine or symbolic – to give more scope to 
environmental and labor issues. This was the case in 1994, when a failure to find a 
bipartisan compromise forced the Democratic leadership to exclude fast track renewal 
from the Uruguay Round Act (Shoch, 2001, 190-1). Similarly, in the fall of 1995, the 
White House and the Republican leadership fell short of reaching a consensus on the 
“clean” fast track – i.e. without labor and environmental provisions – designed in the 
House Ways and Means Committee. Finally, President Clinton postponed the renewal 
of his trade negotiating powers until 1997 to avoid jeopardizing the support of labor 
and environmentalists for the 1996 presidential elections (Shoch, 2001, 206-7; 
Destler, 1997, 16-19).  
The 1997 fast track bill was partly shaped by these partisan conflicts. Paying lip 
service to the recommendations of both fair traders and liberal Democrats, the Clinton 
administration opted instead for a business-friendly proposal that would be palatable 
to the Republican leadership. As a result, the fast track bill gave little scope to the 
consideration of labor and environmental issues. The final version of the House Ways 
and Means Committee allowed even less room for the consideration of “trade and…” 
issues (Destler & Balint, 1999, 11; Destler, 2005, 266; Lewis, 1997; Mitchell, 1997). 
Environmental and labor standards were to be included in trade agreements only if 
they were “directly related to trade.”214 Broader goals such as “seeking to protect and 
preserve the environment” or “promoting respect for worker rights” were relegated to 
a separate section labeled “international economic policy objectives” which 
concluded in the words: “Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to authorize 
                                                                                                                                      
environmental objectives in the fast track bill. For more details on the fast track debates of 1994, read 
Destler (1997, 17-9).  
214 This elusive expression was included in the Clinton fast-track bill. Assistant to the President for 
International Economic Policy Dan Tarullo refused to define the meaning of this expression but 
confessed that this language would unquestionably restrict what can be included in agreements covered 
by fast track (IUST, 09/17/97).  
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the use of the trade authorities procedures described in section 103 to modify United 
States law” (cited in Destler, 2005, 266). As a later report by the Congressional 
Research Service showed, the proposal fell short of the language adopted in the fast 
track bill of 1988, which placed the promotion of “respect for worker rights” as one of 
its principal negotiating objectives (Bolle, 2001, 17).215 As one administration aide 
confided to the New York Times, “we guarantee nothing other than to talk about these 
issues” (cited in Sanger, 1997b). This conscious dismissal of environmental and labor 
standards contrasted with the treatment of intellectual property rights that would be 
addressed in core agreements and enforceable through the use of sanctions (Shoch, 
2001, 214). Finally, the bill encourages trade negotiators to renew a dialogue on trade 
liberalization, worker rights and environmental protection at the WTO, despite the 
latter’s general reticence to address blue and green issues (for more details, read 
IUST, 09/17/97).  
In sum, far from building on the institutional innovations of NAFTA, the fast 
track bill of 1997 was simply designed to appease business interests and their allies in 
Congress. Admittedly, President Clinton’s ability to address the concerns of fair 
traders was constrained by the reality of partisan politics. However, the limited scope 
granted to blue and green provisions in the fast track bill cannot be solely attributed to 
the Republican leadership. First, the administration’s original bill was already devoid 
of enforceable commitment in the environmental and labor spheres. Second, and most 
importantly, partisan polarization does not provide a full picture of the conflicts that 
occurred during the fast track debates. Reducing the outcomes of the fast track battle 
to a partisan battle between labor- and environment-friendly Democrats and business-
backed Republicans downplays the institutional dynamics at play in the trade policy 
                                                
215 AFL-CIO Secretary-Treasurer Richard Trumka described the proposal as “a giant step backwards” 
(Trumka, 1997, 1). 
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process. As the previous case study has shown, the executive branch, by setting the 
trade policy agenda and lobbying Congress to validate its policies, cultivates a de 
facto special relationship with the business community. This institutional pattern 
transcends partisan politics and is a central structural obstacle to the advocacy efforts 
of fair traders.  
However, as this chapter (and chapter six) will illustrate, the co-determinant role 
played by the executive branch in the design of fast track authority bills – i.e. its 
obligation to negotiate with Congress, especially under a divided government – 
differs from its preeminence in the elaboration of trade agreements like NAFTA, 
PNTR or CAFTA. In the case of fast track, the special relationship does not manifest 
itself via the same path dependence process that applies to the functions of the trade 
advisory committees to the extent that the latter are not involved in the decision-
making process. Here, the special relationship operates only at the lobbying phase. In 
an increasingly contentious policy arena, the joint countermobilization of the White 
House and the private sector are albeit crucial to win legislative victories.  
Alternatively, a failure to counter the lobbying offensive of fair traders can 
deprive free trade advocates of legislative victory. This means that the mobilization of 
unions and their allies does have an impact on trade debates. In 1997 as in 1993, fair 
traders managed to raise the prominence of labor and environmental issues in the 
trade policy sphere. Once again, they also succeeded in swaying public opinion in 
favor of fair trade and in dividing Congress on the merits of trade liberalization. What 
differed in 1997 was the response of the executive branch and the private sector, 
whose joint countermobilization proved too late and too restrained to carry the day.  
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 I) MOBILIZATION AGAINST FAST TRACK 
For the new “fair trade” coalition, the renewal of fast track authority constituted a 
referendum on the NAFTA model for two reasons. First, three years after NAFTA’s 
implementation, unions and environmentalists could evaluate the social and 
environmental impact of North American economic integration and the effectiveness 
of NAFTA’s side agreements. Second, and in conjunction, President Clinton’s 
ambition to expand NAFTA to Chile and the whole continent (FTAA) incited fair 
traders to challenge a model of economic integration with which they were deeply 
dissatisfied. Once again, unions were the powerful engine of this mobilization, 
showing considerable strength in both their outside and inside campaigns (Shoch, 
2001, 293). On the environmental side, green organizations presented a united front 
that contrasted with the internecine fracture of the NAFTA debates. The mobilizing 
efforts of the blue-green alliance were energized by the creation of Global Trade 
Watch – a new division of Public Citizen created in 1995 (Destler, 2005, 265; Vogel, 
2000, 91-2 ; Wallach, 2007*). As during the NAFTA debates, fair traders managed to 
affect the course of the trade debates: first, by bringing environmental and labor 
issues to the center of the political stage; second, by winning the sympathy of the 
public; and third, by dividing Congress over the terms of American trade policy and 
threatening the passage of the trade bill.  
 
Labor and fast track  
In October 1995, John Sweeney was sworn in as the new president of the AFL-
CIO,216 injecting fresh blood into an organization that seemed to have fallen into 
”Brezhnevian torpor” (Meyerson, 1999, 6). The new leadership called for a shift to 
                                                
216 John Sweeney was the former president of the Service Employees International Union, which made 
rapid membership gains under his tenure.  
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what Sweeney called a “seamless garment of activism”, a triple strategy that consisted 
in renewing efforts for organizing new union members, bargaining for contracts and 
mobilizing existing unionists through more aggressive, grassroots-oriented political 
tactics (Asher, 2001, 104, 129-131). Within the U.S. workforce, trade remained a 
potent vehicle in the membership campaigns on which the new AFL-CIO placed 
increased emphasis (Destler & Balint, 1999, 23). While Sweeney’s agenda would fall 
short of reversing the decline of the U.S. labor movement, the fast track battle of 1997 
counted as one of the early successes of the new leadership.  
As soon as the Clinton administration declared its intention to obtain trade-
negotiating authority to conclude FTAs in Latin America, NAFTA occupied the 
center of the fast track debates. Of utmost concern to the AFL-CIO was NAFTA’s 
impact on American jobs. With the release of the first studies of NAFTA’s economic 
impact, organized labor confronted the optimistic employment forecasts of the 
Clinton administration during the NAFTA debates with a grimmer picture of regional 
economic integration. Citing a report published by the Economic Policy Institute – 
one of the first assessments of NAFTA’s economic impact (EPI et al, 1997), the AFL-
CIO declared that, three years after its implementation, the trade agreement had 
increased the U.S. bilateral trade deficit with Canada and Mexico, allegedly costing 
America 420,000 net job losses (AFL-CIO, 1997a).217 Job dislocation was particularly 
alarming to auto workers, to the extent that three-fourths of the growing trade deficits 
between the United States and its North American partners had occurred in the 
increasingly integrated automotive sector (UAW, 1997).  
                                                
217 Assessing the consequences of a trade agreement on the U.S. job market is a very challenging 
exercise considering the size and the complexity of the U.S. economy. It is particularly difficult to 
distinguish between the effects of the multiple factors affecting job creation and destruction. Certain 
economists have shown the limitations of the “job multiplier” that makes job creation or destruction a 
function of export or import increase, respectively. Despite the alleged limitations of this method, these 
economic equations were common among both NAFTA critics and advocates. For a discussion, see 
Azuelos (2004, 126-30) and Hinojosa (2000). 
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The widening of the U.S. trade deficit was closely linked with NAFTA’s impact 
on transnational investment or business restructuring on a regional scale.218 If 
NAFTA never generated the “giant sucking sound” that its critics had anticipated, 
some industries did outsource some of their production operations to Mexico after the 
implementation of the agreement.219 Thus, investment liberalization continued to split 
major manufacturing sectors such as the auto and textile industries along class lines. 
For unions, increased capital mobility was all the more problematic since it increased 
business’s bargaining power. An oft-cited study by Cornell scholar Kate 
Bronfenbrenner (1997) revealed that after the implementation of NAFTA, the 
offshoring menace had become an efficient way to discourage unions’ organizing 
efforts (AFL-CIO, 1997, 7).220 What unions omitted to mention, however, was the 
fact that NAFTA also created jobs in export-oriented sectors. According to a study by 
the North American Integration and Development Center at UCLA, NAFTA had 
helped to create between 250,000 and 700,000 jobs between 1994 and 1997 
(Hinojosa-Ojeda, 2000, 42). 
Beyond its focus on employment, organized labor also condemned NAFTA’s 
failure to improve the living conditions of Mexican workers. Unions drew a sharp 
contrast between the increase in investment and trade flows, and declining living 
wages in Mexico, as evidenced by rising debts and plummeting real wages.221 For 
                                                
218 According to UAW Legislative Director Alan Reuther, companies like General Motors, Chrysler 
and Caterpillar were among the ones that moved some of their production facilities to Mexico after 
NAFTA’s implementation (UAW, 1997, 3). 
219 In its first three years, the Labor Department’s NAFTA Trade Adjustment Assistance Program 
certified 132,000 job losses (Bonior, 1997), arguably a conservative measure considering the restrictive 
conditions for NAFTA-TAA eligibility. On this point, read Kletzer & Rosen (2005).  
220 A later study by Bronfenbrenner found that these threats were still common. In 1998-9, 51 percent 
of all employers made threats to close all or part of the facility if the union was to win the certification 
election (Brofenbrenner, 2000, 25). 
221 The devaluation of the peso during the monetary crisis of 1995 seriously obscured NAFTA’s real 
impact on Mexican wages. If free trade advocates often used this argument to downplay the social 
effects of NAFTA, their critics replaced NAFTA as part in a broader process of economic liberalization 
that they deemed detrimental to workers (AFL-CIO, 1997b; UAW, 1997). 
182 
   
 
labor, another broken promise of Clinton’s trade policies was the “toothless” 
character of NAFTA’s side agreements. Unions denounced the lack of enforcement of 
labor standard provisions included in the agreement. Admittedly unions, unlike 
mainstream environmentalists, had rejected Clinton’s side agreement as the wrong 
approach to solve trade-labor issues. In this sense, the relative ineffectiveness of the 
NAALC did not elicit disillusionment comparable to the feeling of betrayal felt by 
most of the environmental community in regard to the NAAEC. Yet, the limited 
results of each of NAFTA’s side agreements gave labor further ammunitions to 
accuse the NAFTA model of falling short of its early promises (AFL-CIO, 1997b, 2; 
UAW, 1997). As in the early 1990s, the AFL-CIO declared that any omission of 
strong labor and environmental provisions in the legal text would face vigorous 
opposition (AFL-CIO, 1997a).222 Once it became clear that the fast track bill adopted 
a low-enforcement approach to social and environmental issues, unions lived up to 
their pledge. 
Thus, once again, labor’s critique of the NAFTA model went beyond employment 
and worker rights. Building on the coalition tactics that emerged in the NAFTA 
debates and were encouraged by the new AFL-CIO leadership, trade unions placed 
considerable emphasis on the need to safeguard consumer safety and environmental 
protection. For the AFL-CIO, air and water pollution along the U.S.-Mexican border 
also remained a vivid illustration of the limitations of what had been referred to as the 
“greenest trade treaty ever” (AFL-CIO, 1997a). Another frequent argument raised by 
union representatives pertained to the growing import of food items from Mexico and 
the “unsafe produce” reaching American markets. In an evocative example of the 
                                                
222 John Sweeney declared,  
The labor movement’s strongest disagreement with the Clinton administration in the first term was 
over NAFTA. Our position has not changed in terms of what we are fighting for in the NAFTA 
agreement. We will continue to fight over labor standards, human rights and environmental 
protection (cited in Greenhouse, 1997). 
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AFL-CIO’s broadening horizons – or framing tactics223 – the first argument against 
NAFTA raised by an AFL-CIO official in a congressional hearing on fast track 
pertained not to job losses, but food safety, a central grievance of environmental and 
consumer advocates (Trumka, 1997, 1). 
Labor’s framing tactics aimed to deflect accusations of “special interests” by 
situating its mobilization within a greater struggle for fair trade. They demanded that 
workers’ interests be taken into consideration in the conduct of American trade 
policy. The AFL-CIO presented the fast track battle as a fight to design the rules of 
globalization. For John Sweeney,  
 We must ensure that the benefits of global growth are broadly shared – by 
working people, family farmers, small businesses, and consumers. The 
alternative – to continue with business as usual…to replicate failed trade 
policies of the past that protect intellectual property rights but do nothing to 
protect ordinary citizens, to write more rules into agreements to advance 
corporate interests at the expense of everyone else, is simply unacceptable. 
(Sweeney, 1997). 
 
Unions, like other fair trade advocates, recognized that the structural design of 
the trade policy process constrained their ability to shape the rules of globalization. 
For the AFL-CIO, fast track authority prevents Congress from providing input, 
thereby silencing the voice of workers and consumers in the decision-making process. 
Thus, by opposing the restoration of trade negotiating powers to the executive branch, 
labor and their allies hoped to preserve a greater influence over the conduct of U.S. 
trade policy.  
 
                                                
223 Framing tactics can be defined as the signifying efforts undertaken by a political actor to make its 
cause resonate in what McCarthy, Smith and Zald have designated as the four targets of agenda-setting, 
namely the public, media, electoral and governmental arenas (1996, 292-3). See Snow et al (1986). 
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Environmental and consumer advocates’ opposition to fast track  
 Unlike labor unions, whose positions on fast track largely mirrored the 
arguments they had evoked during the NAFTA debates, the structure of the 
environmental opposition to free trade experienced changed between from 1993 to 
1997. This was due to two factors. On the one hand, the anti-environmental activism 
of the Republican Congress prompted some moderate environmental groups like 
Nature Conservancy and Environmental Defense Fund (EDF) to withdraw from trade 
politics and focus instead on defending environmental regulations or raising 
awareness about global warming. On the other, the growing controversies 
surrounding NAFTA’s environmental and social record helped anti-free trade 
organizations make a stronger case that the North American accord had failed to 
deliver on its promises. Hence, a number of former pro-NAFTA organizations 
committed themselves to oppose any trade initiatives devoid of strong environmental 
provisions (Vogel, 2000, 89-92; Destler & Balint, 31-2; Destler, 2005, 262; Barfield, 
1998; McDonald, 2005).224 
Thus, on the environmental as on the labor side, the ghost of NAFTA haunted the 
fast track debates from the start. For the Sierra Club, NAFTA had exacerbated the 
pressures exerted by economic globalization on environmental laws. Citing examples 
of lax enforcement of environmental regulation in Mexico and Canada, Sierra Club 
president Carl Pope argued that NAFTA’s weak side agreement had failed to deliver 
on its intended purpose. For Pope, NAFTA had also fallen short of solving the dismal 
pollution problems of the U.S.-Mexican border region, where the number of 
maquiladoras had increased by 15 to 20 % between 1994 and 1997 (Pope, 1997). To 
                                                
224 In particular, the National Wildlife Federation became a vocal critic of free trade agreements and 
fast track authority after the NAFTA debates. Other, less active organizations included the National 
Audubon Society.  
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the extent that fast track authority did not set explicit goals for environmental 
protection,225 environmentalists feared that future trade agreements might set 
standards even lower than NAFTA’s side agreements.226  
If NAFTA and its expansion held a prominent place in the fast track debates, the 
latter also elicited a broader discussion on American trade and investment policies, 
which the president hoped to re-energize by renewing his trade-negotiating authority. 
Besides NAFTA, environmentalists raised concerns about two other international 
economic fora: the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the Multilateral Agreement 
on Investment (MAI). A serious point of contention between the administration and 
fair trade advocates pertained to the frictions between trade liberalization and 
environment/consumer protection at the WTO. Admittedly, the new multilateral trade 
organization had proven more inclined to discuss these issues than the trade-labor 
linkage, as witnessed by the creation of the Committee on Trade and Environment 
(CTE) in 1994. Nevertheless, as a few scholars have noted, the CTE has proved to be 
not only weak, but also more likely to question the merits of ecological regulation 
(e.g. “eco-labeling”) than to ensure that trade liberalization does not undermine 
environmental protection (Vogel, 2000, 82-3; Rugman & Soloway, 1999, 75). Equally 
alarming as the CTE’s institutional limitations was the series of GATT/WTO rulings 
                                                
225 The only negotiating objectives for the environment were “to promote sustainable development” 
and “to seek to ensure that trade and environmental protection are mutually supportive, including 
through further clarification of the relationship between them” (cited in Shimberg, 1997, 1-3).  
226 Steven J. Shimberg, from the National Wildlife Federation, stated: 
[I]t is critical to note that NWF supported NAFTA in 1993 and fast track re-authorization in 
1991. We made those decisions because we recognized the potential of trade as an instrument to 
enhance environmental protection, and believed that NAFTA was a good first step toward the 
integration of trade and environment. We knew that NAFTA’s environmental provisions were not 
perfect, but we believed we would continue our work with the Administration and with Congress 
to improve upon them. Based on our experience with NAFTA, and with other trade and investment 
agreements, we now know we can no longer rely solely on side agreements to achieve our 
environmental objectives, or fast track rules which do not state explicit goals for environmental 
protection (Shimberg, 1997, 1). 
Echoing the AFL-CIO’s verbiage, Carl Pope described the Archer-Barshevsky compromise as “a huge 
step backward for American trade policy” (Sierra Club, 1997).  
186 
   
 
challenging environmental regulation.227 Beyond the contentious tuna-dolphin case, 
environmental and consumer NGOs were particularly concerned by a 1996 ruling of 
the WTO dispute settlement body that ordered that Washington reform some 
provisions of the U.S. Clean Air Act to comply with international trade rules.228 Thus, 
for environmentalists, the WTO remained “hostile for environmental dialogue” 
(Shimberg, 1997, 3). The fact that the fast track bill had put this multilateral 
organization in charge of “further clarification of the relationship” meant that 
environmental protection would rank low on the trade policy agenda (IUST, 
09/17/97).  
A second key source of concern for environmentalists was the potential signing of 
the Multilateral Agreement on Investment. As explained in chapter one, the 
negotiations of the MAI produced a wave of discontent among the new stakeholders 
of American foreign economic policy. For environmentalists, the MAI’s international 
tribunals and its provisions to roll back existing laws conflicting with the accord went 
beyond NAFTA’s threat to environmental regulations. The MAI allegedly threatened 
the industrialized world with a “race to the bottom” whereby investors would play 
countries off against one another for tax breaks, low wages and concessions on their 
environmental obligations (Pope, 1997, 9-10). Although the Clinton administration 
had declared that fast track would not be used to negotiate MAI, Public Citizen 
stressed that no provision guaranteed its exclusion in the fast track proposal (Wallach, 
1997b).  
                                                
227 Carl Pope summarized the environmentalists’ discontent with the WTO in scathing terms: “In plain 
English, new international trade rules and institutions throw a wet blanket over the ability of federal 
and state government to protect the environment and public health” (Pope, 1997, 6). 
228 For more details on trade-environment debates at the WTO, read Esty (1994; 2000a; 2000b; 2002); 
Vogel (2000); Schultz (1995); Jha (2002); Rugman and Soloway (1999); Shahin (2002); Sampson 
(2002); Charnovitz (2002); Conca (2000). 
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The dissatisfaction of the environmental movement vis-à-vis trade initiatives like 
NAFTA, the MAI and the WTO was merely a piece of a larger campaign. Like 
unions, environmental and consumer organizations denounced the corporate bias of 
the trade policy process at both national and international levels. At the international 
level, both the WTO and the MAI negotiations remained “unacceptably closed to 
public scrutiny and participation” and failed to define environmental responsibilities 
commensurate with new economic rights (CIEL et al, 1997, 1). At the domestic level, 
the U.S. trade policy process similarly operated to the disadvantage of fair trade 
advocates. As Lori Wallach, Global Trade Watch director noted in March 1997,  
Under the current trade advisory committee, the handful of environmental and 
labor representatives sprinkled into the 800 security-cleared industry advisors are 
the only non-business interest representatives allowed official access to draft texts 
of the agreement (Wallach, 1997a, 1).  
 
For fair traders, fast track authority epitomized these institutional impediments to 
the extent that it constrained the opportunity enjoyed by Congress and “the public” – 
which blue and green advocates claim to represent – to debate new trade and 
investment agreements (CIEL et al, 1997, 2). Dan Seligman of the Sierra Club’s 
Responsible Trade Campaign described fast track in colorful terms:  
 This fast track is based on the outdated notion that only corporate interests 
matter as we write the rules for the global economy. It shuts Congress out of trade 
negotiations that are taking a profound toll on constitutionally enacted laws. Yet it 
preserves the right of 500 corporate lobbyists to huddle with the U.S. Trade 
Representative behind the closed doors of the trade advisory system. With the 
corporate foxes in charge of the trade chicken coop, the environmental eggs are 
getting gobbled up. (Sierra Club, 1997, 1). 
 
Thus, like organized labor, environmental and consumer organizations placed 
their battle in a larger struggle over the ability to design the rules of globalization.229 
                                                
229 According to Lori Wallach,  
 
The real question is not whether today’s trade agreements include labor or environmental rules. The 
question is about what sort of rules they contain. Indeed, a closer review of the voluminous rules 
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Like unions, they contested any protectionist motive, demanding instead a 
“responsible” or “forward-looking” trade policy that would break with the “status 
quo” (Sierra Club, 1997; Wallach, 1997, 5-6).230 Through their mobilization efforts, 
environmental and consumer groups showed solidarity for the labor cause, which they 
also also considered excluded from the scope of U.S. trade policy (Pope, 1997; 
Wallach, 1997, 2). These coalition tactics were, however, not as frequent as labor’s 
references to environmental concerns, being mostly confined to “bridge-builders” like 
Public Citizen or the Sierra Club.231 Yet, as this section has illustrated, green 
organizations shared larger goals with their blue counterparts and allied their framing 
tactics accordingly, contributing to the consolidation of “fair trade” as a political 
framework. Although their framing alignments might not have been as deliberate as 
the communication strategies of the labor leadership, environmentalists, like 
consumer advocates, clearly benefited from labor’s organizing resources and, 
therefore, built tactical ties with unions, who led the lobbying offensive against fast 
track renewal. 
 
Fair trade mobilization  
Fair traders began to mobilize against fast track renewal months before the 
business community (Neal, 1997). As during the NAFTA battle, they employed a mix 
of inside and outside tactics, highlighting the social and environmental costs of trade 
liberalization. As in 1992-1993, organized labor and its allies also succeeded in 
                                                                                                                                      
contained in those 700-page long agreements show that the rules taken as a sum elevate 
maximization of trade and international investment flows above other potentially competing social, 
political and economic goals (Wallach, 1997, 3). 
 
230 The idea of “responsible trade policy” is a leitmotiv of the Sierra Club’s Responsible Trade 
Program. Global Trade Watch repeatedly presented the fast track debates as a choice between progress 
and status quo. 
231 Chapter 6 examines this argument in greater details. 
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rallying public opinion and a majority of Democratic congressmen behind the fair 
trade cause. 
To mobilize the rank-and-file, organized labor tapped on their members’ 
resentment toward NAFTA by framing fast track renewal as a referendum on the 
NAFTA-model of trade liberalization. This framing tactic was particularly clear in the 
educational and lobbying materials used in the AFL-CIO’s grassroots campaign.232 
Labor’s “outside” offensive began in the summer of 1997 and intensified until the last 
weeks before the intended fast track vote. The AFL-CIO’s first mobilizing efforts 
consisted in targeting 40 to 50 districts with undecided representatives and holding 
events in four big cities with a critical mass of “swing voters”: Los Angeles, New 
York City, San Diego and Long Island City (Smith, 1997). The Federation’s 
campaign was reinforced by independent anti-fast track activities mounted by a 
number of affiliates, including the Teamsters, the Steelworkers and UNITE (Shoch, 
2001, 217). Similarly, Public Citizen’s activists began to target local representatives 
in the middle of the summer  (Dolan & Wallach, 1997). In September, as free traders 
began to defend Clinton’s fast track proposal, fair trade advocates intensified their 
grassroots operations.   
Union members sent 160,000 handwritten letters to legislators,233 who also 
received 10,000 calls from union members through the toll-free phone established for 
this purpose. This added to the hundreds of visits to congressional offices and to the 
large distribution of anti-fast track videotapes and booklets (40,000 copies). To 
coordinate these efforts, the AFL-CIO set up a “Stop Fast Track” website that would 
keep its members informed about the evolution of the campaign (Glenn, 1999, 191-4; 
                                                
232 For instance, the headline of an anti-fast track poster designed to encourage union members to call 
their local representatives read: “The ‘fast track’ brought us NAFTA, and look where that got us” (see 
appendix 6).  
233 The postcards included a tear-off to come back to the AFL-CIO so that the Federation could keep 
track of the activists’ names for future campaigns (Smith, 1997). 
190 
   
 
Shoch, 2001b, 295). Unions and environmentalists like the Sierra Club or the Friends 
of the Earth also held demonstrations in dozens of cities to oppose the renewal of fast 
track (Broder, 1997; Abrahamson, 1997). Remembering the powerful 
countermobilization launched by the president and his allies during the NAFTA 
debates, fair traders sustained their grassroots operations until the final weeks before 
the intended vote. In a letter to organizers and activists in late October 1997, Public 
Citizen Global Trade Watch’s field director Michael Dolan stated:  
 If the vote were held today in the House, fast track would be defeated. The 
President and Speaker know that and they know we know it. But this time in ’93 
we thought we had NAFTA beat and still yet the First Free Trader did his 
“comeback kid” shriek and… well, you remember (Dolan, 1997).  
 
Thus, Public Citizen was clearly aware of the decisive role that the president – 
“the First Free Trader” – had played during the NAFTA debates and asked its 
coalition members to “lock in” support of Democrats in the House by organizing 
public events to celebrate the lawmakers’ opposition to fast track while continuing to 
target undecided members (Dolan, 1997).  
These intensive grassroots efforts were paired with a targeted media campaign. 
The AFL-CIO drew up a list of undecided members from both parties, once again 
showing that the trade battle went beyond partisan politics. The Federation launched a 
$1 million campaign featuring 30-second commercials in 14 congressional districts 
(Berke, 1997). Labor also attempted to raise awareness of fast track among black and 
Latino workers through radio ads, in addition to its 1-800 posters (Smith, 1997, 2; 
Abramson, 1997). Finally, both the AFL-CIO and Public Citizen supplied anti-fast 
track organizers with op-ed samples for local newspapers, sample scripts to contact 
local radios and instructions on how to organize local press conferences (Dolan & 
Wallach, 1997).  
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These vigorous “outside” tactics were complemented by an offensive on the 
Capitol, whereby unions and their environmental allies pressured Democratic 
congressmen to reject the trade bill (Mitchell, 1997e). The legislation stood at the 
center of internal feuds aimed to determine the political orientation of the Democratic 
Party – and its future candidate for the next presidential elections. This contest pitted 
“old” Democrat Dick Gephardt, who boasted large support among union members, 
against “new” Democrat Vice-President Al Gore, whose fervent belief in free trade 
was at odds with both labor leaders and environmentalists (Shoch, 2001, 286-7; Judis, 
2000, 20).  House Democrats were split between siding with labor in anticipation of 
the next congressional elections and following the lead of their popular president. In 
other words, the foundations of the Democratic Party seemed to give way to the 
antagonistic pressures of mobilization and countermobilization. 
Organized labor exploited the intra-party divisions by heavily lobbying House 
Democrats and threatening to withhold campaign contributions in the mid-term 
elections. This political tactic bred its own dissension with the labor movement. 
While John Sweeney remained ambivalent about the prospect of withdrawing support 
from the Democratic Party, individual unions like UNITE were less reluctant to do so 
(Greenhouse, 1997; Anderson, 2007*).  
 
Impact of mobilization 
The mobilization of fair traders affected the course of the fast track battle in 
several regards. First, as during the NAFTA debates, unions and their allies managed 
to bring environmental and labor standards to the center of the debates. This simple 
fact was a tribute to the mobilizing efforts of fair trade advocates and an illustration of 
the political legacy of the NAFTA debates. In 1997, the blue-green alliance seemed 
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more unified than it had been in 1993, conferring more legitimacy upon the fair trade 
cause. The unity of the fair trade movement made it difficult for the administration to 
use divide-and-conquer  tactics against its opponents, thereby depriving lawmakers of 
the political cover they would have needed to support fast track renewal. Perhaps 
even more importantly, blue and green advocates managed to rally public opinion 
behind the fair trade cause (Shoch, 2001b, 289; Sanger, 1997b). According to a poll 
conducted by the Bank of Boston, 73% of Americans believed that labor and 
environmental issues should be negotiated as part of trade agreements (Glenn, 1999, 
191). Similarly, a July Wall Street Journal/NBC poll showed that 62% of respondents 
opposed the renewal of fast track, while 32% approved it (Shoch, 2001, fn. 81, 
357).234 By framing its advocacy efforts within a broader fight for “fair trade,” 
organized labor also capitalized on the large public support of the environmental 
cause (Glenn, 1999, 195). There lay the ultimate objective of labor’s coalition tactics: 
providing enough political cover to Congress members so that they could claim to be 
on the progressive side of the debate by opposing fast track. As New York Times 
columnist Peter Passell wrote, “by shifting the focus from old-fashioned 
protectionism to new-fashioned concern with human rights and the environment, 
unions have sown dissension among the free traders” (Passell, 1997).  
These divisions were particularly pronounced in Congress. As during the NAFTA 
debates, prominent figures of the Democratic Party like Dick Gephardt or minority 
whip David Bonior directly stood against President Clinton’s efforts to renew fast 
track (see Bonior, 1997). This time, however, most Democrats were unwilling to 
support the president’s initiative unless he was granted the authority to negotiate 
strong environmental and labor provisions in free trade agreements. These legislators 
                                                
234 Similarly, the AFL-CIO cited a NDB/Wall Street Journal poll that found that 61% of Americans 
opposed fast track (AFL-CIO, 1997b). 
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felt that the bill’s provisions did not adequately deal with the dislocating effects of 
trade liberalization on less-skilled workers, an argument that unions had emphasized 
in their lobbying efforts (Baldwin & Magee, 2000, 12). 
In the end, the final vote on fast track was postponed, as the President realized he 
lacked congressional support to win a legislative victory. Using a poll of House 
members conducted by the National Journal, Barfield (1998) reveals that between 
222 and 232 representatives would have voted against fast track, while only between 
203 and 213 would have defended trade liberalization. While Republicans’ faith in the 
virtues of “free trade” remained more or less constant (75% for the NAFTA vote, 
versus 70-75% for fast track renewal), Democrats’ support for trade liberalization 
dropped from 40% in 1993 to 21% in 1997. Were unions and their allies responsible 
for this sharp change in the attitudes of the president’s party followers? 
As the next section will explain, the answer to this question mainly lies in the 
dynamics of countermobilization. This does not mean, however, that fair trade 
mobilization was irrelevant. Analyses of the fast track roll call vote of 1997 reveal 
that anti-fast track opponents affected the vote in three ways. First, as for the NAFTA 
vote, organized labor used its financial leverage to pressure congressmen to oppose 
renewal of trade-negotiating authority and rewarded those that followed its 
prescriptions. In 1997 as in 1993, recipients of labor PAC donations were more likely 
to side with unions. This was true in both parties. Democrats receiving higher-than-
average labor PACs ($199,000) were 42% more likely to support fast track than the 
average Democrat. Republicans supported by labor PACs were 39% more inclined to 
oppose fast track than other Republicans (Biglaiser, Jackson & Peake, 2004, 686-7; 
see also Bardwell, 2000, 600-2).  
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In both parties, members who saw their campaign coffers swell with union money 
between 1992 and 1996 were more likely to switch from NAFTA support to fast track 
opposition (Bardwell, 2000, 605-6). Since the 1996 elections, Democrats had become 
more dependent on labor PAC contributions. This was due both to the increase in 
unions’ donations to their party and the disdain of corporate interests, which had 
shifted the lion’s share of their campaign contributions to the Republican Party (see 
below). Thus, many Democrats preferred to stand with organized labor instead of 
following the belated call of their president (Abrahamson, 1997; see also Baldwin & 
Magee, 2000, 38).  
Organized labor used not only “carrots,” but also “sticks” to persuade House 
representatives to oppose trade liberalization (Engel & Jackson, 1998). Many 
congressional Democrats recalled that labor groups had made good on their threats to 
“punish” NAFTA supporters who, between 1993 and 1997, were less likely to 
withstand electoral challenges by populist Republicans (Conley, 1999, 793; Shoch, 
2001, 218; Barfield, 1998). Thus, while support for free trade declined by one third 
among pro-NAFTA Democrats (from 30% in 1993 to 20% in 1997), newly elected 
Democrats (Democrats were members in 1997 but not in 1993) proved hardly more 
inclined (23%) to back President Clinton’s trade liberalizing agenda (Barfield, 1998).  
Of course, labor’s reliance on “carrots and sticks” cannot fully explain the erosion 
of support for trade liberalization among Democrats. As explained in the previous 
chapter, constituency factors also play a key role in determining congressional votes. 
In 1997 as in 1993, the blue-collar composition of congressional districts influenced 
members’ votes regardless of partisan affiliation (Conley, 1999, 786, 795-6).235 What 
changed in 1997 was the impact of NAFTA-related job losses on lawmakers’ attitudes 
                                                
235 In their analysis of the 1998 fast track vote, Baldwin and Magee (2000, 38-9) draw similar 
conclusions.  
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toward free trade. This factor was particularly significant among Republican 
members. According to Biglaiser, Jackson & Peake (2004, 686), a Republican from a 
district harmed significantly by NAFTA (886 job losses as opposed to the mean of 
359) was 21% less likely to support fast track. In the end, between 25 and 30% of 
Republican lawmakers – often “Buchanan-style Republicans” – would have voted 
against the trade bill had it been submitted to a vote (Glenn, 1999, 198). While fair 
traders may not have had as much direct influence on Republican lawmakers as on 
their Democratic counterparts, the unions’ dynamic grassroots and media campaigns 
certainly raised the salience of employment issues in the trade debates and may have 
amplified the effect of constituency factors.  
In sum, the mobilization of unions and their allies had a significant impact on the 
fast track debates. Not only did fair traders bring environmental and labor issues to 
the center of the political scene, but they also managed to win the favor of the 
American public and convince members in both parties to stand against trade 
liberalization. This picture, however, was, by itself, not fundamentally different from 
the dynamics at play during the NAFTA battle. If free trade forces had managed to 
surmount the powerful offensive of unions and their allies in 1993, why didn’t they 
repeat their victory in 1997? The answer to this question lies in the dynamics of 
presidential-corporate countermobilization.   
 
II) A FAILED COUNTERMOBILIZATION  
In many regards, the countermobilization of free trade interests mirrored the 
rescue mission undertaken by President Clinton and the business community on the 
eve of the NAFTA vote. In both cases, free traders were taken aback by the powerful 
offensive of fair traders that threatened the passage of the trade legislation. They 
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reacted by launching a multi-faceted lobbying counteroffensive that included 
grassroots or “astroturf” efforts,236 media communication and inside-the-beltway 
tactics. Once again, environmental and labor standards stood as a bone of contention 
between the administration and the private sector. Not until the business community 
was sure that these issues would not be subject to strong enforcement provisions – 
e.g. by means of trade sanctions – did it throw its full weight behind the trade bill. As 
during the NAFTA debates, its grassroots campaign paled by comparison with the 
large human resources deployed by unions and their allies. This time, however, the 
financial power of corporate interests and its direct lobbying efforts proved less 
effective than in 1993. In fact, the skewed distribution of corporate donations to the 
Republican Party limited the influence of the private sector on House Democrats, a 
majority of whom opposed fast track.  
Another key difference between the NAFTA and fast track battles pertains to the 
role played by the executive branch. If President Clinton had been a key architect of 
the ratification of NAFTA, he also shared considerable responsibility for the fast track 
fiasco. In particular, his failure to deliver side payments to fast track opponents and 
their Democratic allies, along with his belated involvement in the legislative debate 
considerably reduced his ability to win over dissenting lawmakers. In sum, the pitfalls 
of the corporate-presidential countermobilization proved fatal to President Clinton’s 
fast track bill.  
 
Business perspectives on fast track 
While the fast track debates were sometimes presented as a referendum on 
NAFTA, the free trade business sector had a much broader interest in the renewal of 
                                                
236 The term “astroturf” refers to the artificial production of local support for legislation, often with the 
help of Public Relations firms. 
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presidential trade negotiating powers. Many trade associations presented fast track as 
a crucial tool to achieve a series of  “critical national objectives” on the bilateral, 
regional and multilateral fronts (Donohue, 1997, 4; Cohen, 1997, 2). On the bilateral 
level, a U.S.-Chile Free Trade Agreement was seen as a first step toward the 
negotiations of the Free Trade Agreement of the Americas, the ultimate goal of 
regional trade liberalization. Another regional initiative dear to the business 
community was the prospect of closer commercial integration with Asia, especially 
via the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum. At the multilateral level, corporate 
interests pushed for further WTO negotiations in the realm of agriculture, services, 
and intellectual property rights. Investment and government procurement were also on 
their agenda, whether through the WTO or the MAI (Cohen, 1997; Donohue, 1997; 
Pepper, 1997).  
At the center of the free traders’ rationale –both in the private sector and the 
Clinton administration – was the idea that the absence of fast track authority 
prevented the United States from exerting trade leadership in a globalized world 
(Business Roundtable, 1997). According to John Pepper, chairman of Procter & 
Gamble and a key member of the National Foreign Trade Council,  
Our negotiating ability and credibility is limited without fast-track authority 
(…) [O]ur trading partners are aggressively reaching agreements among 
themselves, while the United States is forced to sit on the sidelines (Pepper, 1997, 
2). 
 
The testimonies of free trade advocates often drew lists of trade agreements 
negotiated without the United States over the past years, stressing the incursion of 
Asian and European competitors in the Western Hemisphere and the accelerating 
economic integration of the Latin American continent without American assistance – 
e.g. through Mercosur, the Andean Pact and various bilateral agreements (Donohue, 
1997, 3-4; Pepper, 1997, 2; Stevenson, 1997).  
198 
   
 
For business associations, not only would these agreements leave American 
businesses at a disadvantage vis-à-vis their foreign competitors, but they would also, 
according to Chrysler CEO Robert J. Eaton, “[allow ] the rest of the world to set the 
trading rules” (cited in Borrus, 1997; see also Donohue, 1997, 4). In this sense, both 
free traders and fair traders fought for the rules of globalization, yet had a completely 
different understanding of what these rules should be. The former sought to ensure 
that U.S. trade policy would continue to serve the interests of the business 
community, while the latter demanded that it broadened its focus to include 
environmental and social objectives. And while fair traders understood that 
empowering the executive branch reduced their chances of influencing the policy 
process, corporate interests were equally cognizant of the fact that fast track renewal 
would play to their advantage. Speaking at a congressional hearing on fast track, Tom 
Donohue declared: “It is time for our government – with the combined support of the 
legislative and executive branches – to make sure that business has the freedom to do 
what it does best” (Donohue, 1997, 5). 
If business insisted that the rules of the trading game apply to intellectual property 
rights and investment, it opposed the inclusion of environmental and labor standards 
in the U.S. trade policy agenda. With the support of the Republican Party in 1994, it 
had already managed to thwart such policy innovation during the fast track debates 
surrounding the passage of the Uruguay Round Act in 1994 (Destler & Balint, 1999, 
10; Shoch, 2001, 189; Bradsher, 1994b). Three years later, business leaders presented 
environmental and labor standards as obstacles to trade and investment liberalization. 
As John Pepper stated in March,  
 
The issue of linking labor and environment to fast track is highly 
controversial. These non-trade objectives are worthy of pursuit in and of 
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themselves, but should not impede the progress of trade expansion (Pepper, 1997, 
4). 
 
 
ECAT, like the NFTC demanded that labor and environmental objectives be 
pursued “in the appropriate international fora” – i.e. outside the trade policy sphere 
(Cohen, 1997, 3).  
Business leaders defended trade and investment liberalization as a source of 
economic growth that would ultimately secure high standards overseas (Cohen, 1997; 
Pepper, 1997). They put considerable emphasis on the growing dependence of the 
U.S. economy on international trade, whose share of the U.S. GDP had grown from 
13% in 1970 to 30% by 1995 (Donohue, 1997, 2; Pepper, 1997, 3).  
Many of their arguments were direct responses to the criticisms of fair trade 
advocates.237 While unions frequently stressed declining wages and job outsourcing, 
employers highlighted high salaries and job creation. A frequent argument among 
members of the business community and the Clinton administration was the idea that 
export-oriented companies provided higher wages for the U.S. workforce – by a 
margin of15% according to the Chamber of Commerce – while being a greater source 
of employment creation than other businesses.  
Corporate interests also praised the WTO and NAFTA as “resounding successes” 
of American trade policy (Pepper, 1997, 1). They defended NAFTA’s economic 
legacy, celebrating the increase of exports to Mexico (by 60% in three years) and 
dismissing the growing bilateral trade deficit with America’s southern neighbor as a 
misleading outcome of the peso crisis (Donohue, 1997, 3). According to John Pepper, 
NAFTA had not only allowed Mexico to surmount one of its worst recessions in 
recent history but also kept it on the path of economic reform  (Pepper, 1997, 3). 
                                                
237 This is particularly clear in the series of “Trade Myths and Realities” posted on the Business 
Roundtable’s website. See Business Roundtable (1997b). 
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Business leaders frequently attacked the myth of the “giant sucking sound” to 
Mexico, claiming that NAFTA had created more than 300,000 jobs, on top of the 2 
million U.S. jobs depending on trade with Canada and Mexico (Pepper, 1997, 3). 
They also frequently exploited the strength of the U.S. economy in the 1990s, and 
particularly its low unemployment level, to dismiss fears pertaining to job losses. 
Finally, they contested the argument that international trade institutions undermine 
America’s ability to enforce its national regulatory laws. For Calman Cohen, “health 
food safety measures are consistent with WTO rules as long as they are based on 
scientific principles and do not arbitrarily or unjustifiably discriminate against 
imports” (Cohen, 1997, 3).  
In sum, free traders and fair traders often fought political battles with competing 
economic data. More often than not, their “facts” provided only skewed pictures of 
the real impact of trade initiatives. On the one hand, corporate interests exaggerated 
the benefits of trade expansion, often downplaying or simply ignoring the negative 
effects of rising imports and outsourcing on American workers or the conflict 
between national regulations and international obligations under trade agreements. On 
the other hand, unions and their allies often dramatized the employment and 
environmental impact of trade initiatives and obscured the economic benefits accruing 
from trade expansion.  
  
Business countermobilization and its impact 
In the summer of 1997, the business community became alarmed by the political 
challenges facing the renewal of fast track. In a letter to its members, the Business 
Roundtable acknowledged that the mobilization of labor and environmentalists had 
taken its toll, noting that “the prospects for enactment of fast track authority this year 
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[were] uncertain” (Business Roundtable, 1997, 5). Despite their sense of urgency, 
however, corporate interests held back until president Clinton released his fast track 
proposal. As with the negotiations of NAFTA’s side agreements, the business 
community was worried that Clinton’s trade bill might include unacceptable 
environmental and labor provisions. Hence, although it had constantly expressed its 
support for fast track renewal, the private sector did not mobilize on its behalf until 
September 1997 (Borrus, 1997; Shoch, 2001, 214; Neal, 1997; Destler & Balint, 
1999, 11). 
The shape of the countermobilization of free trade forces during the fast track 
debates mirrored their pro-NAFTA lobbying campaign.238 Under the leadership of 
James Christy and Joseph Gorman,239 internationally-oriented business interests 
formed a “coalition of coalitions” called “American Lead on Trade” (ALOT). They 
launched a campaign of “a minimum of $3 million” to save fast track from a 
legislative defeat. One coalition official stated that “the philosophy of America Leads 
on Trade is, we’re going to match dollar for dollar what the opposition spends” (cited 
in Neal, 1997). Large multinational companies and members of the Business 
Roundtable like Caterpillar, TRW, Boeing, Chrysler, Proctor & Gamble and General 
Motors each pledged $100,000 to lead the free trade campaign (IUST, 08/08/97). 
Noting the vigor of labor’s mobilizing efforts, Tom Donohue promised “one hell of a 
fight” (ibid). ALOT targeted 48 Democrats. Devised by the Business Roundtable, the 
lobbying campaign of the business coalition included: 
 “aggressive use of 1-800 number to generate congressional 
communications from employees, suppliers and constituents; 
                                                
238 While Shoch (2001, 290-2) and Broder (1997) regard the fast-track campaign of the business 
community as weak, a representative of the National Association of Manufactures judged their 
lobbying efforts comparable to other trade campaigns (Goudie, 2007*).  
239 Both worked for TRW, a Cleveland-based manufacturing and service company in the auto, space 
and defense sectors. See Mokhiber & Weissman (1997). 
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 recruiting opinion leaders in congressional districts to support fast track; 
 distributing fast track lobbying kits to companies for use in Congressional 
visits; 
 grassroots lobbying by BRT-member companies and other business trade 
associations; 
 expanding the breadth of support through interaction with other business 
organizations” (BRT, 1997).  
These efforts were complemented by a vast media campaign, consisting of the 
production of TV ads targeted at 103 congressional districts (35 Democrats and 68 
Republicans). Finally, inside lobbying was also an important part of the private 
sector’s countermobilization efforts. In this regard, the Business Roundtable sent two 
dozen CEOs to the Hill, in addition to the numerous congressional testimonies of 
business representatives (Neal, 1997; Shoch, 2001, 214). 
For all the weight that the business community threw into the campaign during the 
last few months preceding the intended vote on fast track renewal, its campaign 
suffered from several pitfalls. First, as during the NAFTA debates, business was slow 
to counter the lobbying efforts of anti-fast track forces. Even the leaders of the 
coalition acknowledged, as their advertising campaign began on September 18, that 
they were playing catch-up to fast track opponents. As Robert Matsui (D-CA) noted, 
“most of the [congress] members are saying they haven’t heard anything from 
business” (cited in Neal, 1997; Broder, 1997). As a result, the business’ grassroots 
campaign paled in comparison to the organizing efforts of unions and their allies. 
Once lawmakers started to hear from business groups, it was through lobbyists and 
senior business executives, not workers and votes in their districts (Stevenson, 1997). 
Neither Republican nor Democratic congressmen could ignore the discontent of their 
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constituencies vis-à-vis the conduct of U.S. trade policy. As a Republican aide in 
Congress noted,  
 When big business goes head to head with unions, the unions clean their 
clock. It’s nice for a CEO to come and sit on a sofa across from a Congressman 
and support free trade. But the other side is generating hundreds of phone calls, 
thousands of postcards and picketing outside the member’s district office (cited in 
Stevenson, 1997). 
 
It goes without saying that this GOP staff member seriously exaggerated unions’ 
ability to prevail over the business community. In fact, this dissertation attempts to 
explain why organized labor and their allies, despite their grassroots power and their 
influence on public opinion, rarely managed to win legislative battles. To truly 
comprehend the dynamics of corporate power, one must also analyze the weaknesses 
of business countermobilization. In retrospect, even business executives 
acknowledged their failure to mobilize their employees on behalf of trade 
liberalization. Without belittling the vigor of the business grassroots campaign, some 
reckoned that, in future legislative battles, companies would have to strive to 
convince their own workers of the benefits of free trade (Stevenson, 1997). The 
failure of corporate America’s grassroots campaign also revealed the limitations of its 
belated advertising campaign. If free trade forces had managed to make Americans 
more amicable to NAFTA by (over)selling its economic merits in 1993, they had 
more difficulty in convincing them four years later that the North American accord 
had had such a positive impact on either Mexico or the United States. This made the 
mobilization of employees on behalf of free trade all the more difficult.  
Finally, the effectiveness of the free trade coalition’s inside lobbying efforts was 
also undermined by the serious imbalance of corporate contributions. Under the 
pressure of the new Republican leadership, business PACs had reduced their 
contributions to Democratic lawmakers. At the same time, labor had increased its 
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financial donations to the Democratic Party, thereby making the latter more 
dependent on unions’ money. Hence, the skewed distribution of the private sector’s 
campaign contributions reduced its ability to obtain the crucial support of moderate 
Democrats. This marked a sharp contrast with the NAFTA debates, during which 
corporate donations had made Democrats more vulnerable to the lobbying efforts to 
the president. After the demise of the fast track bill, business recognized that its 
financial rapprochement with the Republican Party had had negative side-effects. In 
fact, corporate groups like the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the Business-Industry 
PAC (BIPAC) saw their growing dependence on the GOP as problematic and implied 
that business might consider supporting pro-business Democrats (Shoch, 2001, 220-3; 
Abrahamson, 1997).  
Although the skewed distribution of corporate donations likely prevented the 
corporate coalition from achieving its lobbying objectives, business advocates did 
exert influence on members from both political parties. Biglaiser, Jackson and 
Peake’s analysis of the fast track vote reveals that Republicans receiving higher 
corporate donations were 32 % more likely to back fast track. Democrats with the 
greatest support from business PACs ($281,000) were 26% more likely to support fast 
track than those receiving average contributions (Biglaiser, Jackson & Peake, 2004, 
687-8). Bardwell (2000, 601-2) also concludes that corporate money was a factor of 
support for fast track among Democrats, although he finds no significant effect for 
Republicans.240  
In sum, corporate countermobilization did have a positive effect on the fast track 
vote. Despite the time constraint imposed by President Clinton’s tight policy agenda, 
                                                
240 These different findings are most likely due to different data. Biglaiser, Jackson & Peake (2004) use 
head counts provided by Conley (1999) for their dependent variable, whereas Bardwell relies on a 
combination of “whip counts” from Public Citizen and the AFL-CIO. To estimate business donations, 
the former draws from information from the Center for Responsive Politics, while the latter uses data 
from Federal Election Commission.  
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business advocates did manage to influence lawmakers to support the fast track vote. 
According to USCC President Tom Donohue, “It is clear that the business community 
did a very good job in a short period of time. It’s also clear that if the President had 
come out with the bill sooner, we would have had a better chance of getting more 
supporters.” (cited in Stevenson, 1997). However, the impact of the corporate free 
trade campaign was constrained not only by its belated involvement in the legislative 
battle, but also by the lack of dynamism of its grassroots campaign and the skewed 
distribution of its financial contributions. Despite these pitfalls, it would be unfair to 
blame corporate free traders for the defeat of fast track renewal or to dismiss their 
lobbying efforts as lethargic. On the countermobilization front, the president held a 
large share of responsibility for the misfortunes of the business community.  
 
The White House rolls the drums  
President Clinton declared his intention to renew fast track authority at the end of 
1996 (Oxley & Schnietz, 2001, 485). In his State of the Union address of 1997, he 
renewed his commitment to create new trade agreements in both Latin America and 
Asia and stressed the need to obtain trade-negotiating powers.241 Yet, not until the fall 
of 1997 did trade policy reach the top of the White House’s agenda. Distracted by 
other political battles, including the negotiations of a bipartisan budget agreement, 
and hampered by disorganization within his own administration, President Clinton 
repeatedly postponed sending fast track legislation, pushing his timeline from April to 
June and finally to September 1997 (Destler, 1997, 24; Barfield, 1998; Bennet, 1997; 
                                                
241 “Now we must act to expand our exports, especially to Asia and Latin America -- two of the fastest 
growing regions on Earth -- or be left behind as these emerging economies forge new ties with other 
nations. That is why we need the authority now to conclude new trade agreements that open markets to 
our goods and services even as we preserve our values” (Clinton, 1997). 
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Shoch, 2001, 213).242 Although Clinton had begun to reach out to Democratic and 
Republican congressmen in early 1997, his campaign on behalf of fast track did not 
start until mid-September.243  
If the free traders’ media campaign had arguably raised NAFTA’s profile in 1993, 
their efforts four years later proved more daunting. This was partly due to NAFTA’s 
mixed record in both environmental and labor spheres. In fact, as the first studies of 
NAFTA’s impact contradicted the optimistic forecasts of the administration, President 
Clinton decided to downplay its pro-NAFTA rhetoric and shift its attention toward the 
new promises of its trade liberalizing agenda. According to Anderson and Cavanagh, 
the White House changed its message as polls revealed that Americans remained 
skeptical of the administration’s “NAFTAmath,” i.e. the flurry of economic data it 
deployed to boost NAFTA’s case (Cavanagh & Anderson, 1997, 2). Thus, in March 
1997, the new U.S. Trade Representative Charlene Barshefsky – who replaced 
Mickey Kantor at the beginning of the year – declared:  
 
To say it’s about NAFTA belies the global agenda and reduces the debate 
about where America is headed on trade policy to its relations with Mexico, a 
developing country with which we share a 2,000-mile border. (cited in Rubin, 
1997). 
 
Despite President Clinton’s intention to expand NAFTA with Chile and re-
energize the FTAA negotiations, the USTR claimed that “the fast track debate is 
something entirely different [from NAFTA]” (cited in IUST, 03/21/97). “Global 
leadership” became the new leitmotiv of fast track advocates Clinton’s (Sanger, 
1997c; see also IUST, 03/21/97).  Like the business community, the administration 
reframed fast track authority as a prerequisite for a variety of trade initiatives: 
                                                
242 The Republican Chair of the House Ways and Means Committee heavily criticized Clinton’s lack of 
focus on fast track renewal. For more details on Clinton’s hesitant posture, read Destler (1997, 23-6).  
243 In July 1997, Clinton invited two dozen Democratic lawmakers to the White House to discuss 
upcoming trade debate (Rubin, 1997).  
207 
   
 
bilateral free trade agreements (especially with Chile), some of which allegedly stood 
as a gateway for the FTAA, negotiations with APEC in high-tech sectors, multilateral 
trade agreements on agriculture, investment and services at the WTO, etc. (Rubin, 
1997). The White House also echoed the concerns of the private sector about the risks 
that European and Asian competitors might seize business opportunities that the 
United States would neglect (Bennet, 1997). 
In many ways, the theatrics of Clinton’s fast track campaign mirrored those of the 
NAFTA battle. The Democratic president launched his communication offensive in 
the East Room of the White House on September 11 in front of 100 executives of 
small and large businesses (Sanger, 1997b). This revealed that, once again, the 
executive would coordinate its lobbying efforts with corporate interests to defend 
their common trade liberalizing agenda against the attacks of the blue-green alliance. 
At the center of Clinton’s free trade advocacy team were USTR Charlene Barshefsky, 
White House Chief of Staff Erskine Boles, Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin, 
Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and Commerce Secretary William Daley 
(Rubin, 1997).  
As during the NAFTA debates, the White House also used endorsements from a 
broad range of political and economic actors in the fast track battle. On a visit to the 
Bush Library in November, the President mustered support from three living 
presidents: George Bush, Gerald Ford and Jimmy Carter. The latter even became 
directly involved in the fast track campaign, calling reluctant representatives from 
Georgia worried about peanut imports to support trade liberalization (Mitchell, 
1997d). In addition, the Democratic Leadership Council gathered the signatures of 
more than one hundred state and local officials on a petition for fast track, in addition 
to its $200,000 TV ad campaign (Shoch, 2001, 215). As in 1993, “free” traders 
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enjoyed the support of elite newspapers and a great majority of economists. This gave 
more resonance to their communication efforts. According to Anderson and 
Cavanagh, the Washington Post ran 15 pro-fast track articles and only 4 anti-free 
trade pieces (1997, 2). The New York Times also published several pro-fast track 
editorials and articles244, some of which dismissed the fair traders’ arguments as old-
fashioned protectionism.245 In the academic realm, fast track advocates also mustered 
the endorsement of 50 trade specialists (Passell, 1997).  
The large appeal of free trade among economists and political figures hardly 
seemed to convince American citizens of the benefits of trade liberalization. 
NAFTA’s negative image had reduced the appeal of free trade among the public. 
Once again, fair traders had played an important role in discrediting the agreement in 
the eyes of Americans. Even more challenging for the administration, a majority of 
Democrats continued to oppose the delegation of trade-negotiating powers (Sanger, 
1997; Mitchell, 1997). And despite the administration’s efforts to decouple fast track 
from NAFTA, many lawmakers saw both initiatives as part of the same picture.246  
Such mutiny within his own party pushed Clinton’s advocacy team to renew its 
lobbying efforts on Capitol Hill. The free traders reached a first success by securing 
the support of the Senate in early November. According to the New York Times, the 
White House played a key role in this achievement, not the least by winning over the 
endorsement of minority leader Tom Daschle (Mitchell, 1997c). Yet, as usual, the 
toughest battle would occur in the House of Representatives. To win votes, the 
Clinton administration cajoled or bullied recalcitrant lawmakers. Robert Rubin, 
Charlene Barshefsky and Al Gore met with undecided lawmakers to win their 
                                                
244 (Sanger, 1997; Mitchell, 1997d; Passell, 1997). 
245 See especially Mitchell (1997d) and Passel (1997).  
246 For the leader of the fast track opposition in Congress, Minority Whip David Bonior,  “NAFTA has 
not delivered on its promises. Let’s not repeat the errors of the past. Instead of rushing to expand it and 
putting other countries on the “fast track,” let’s concentrate on fixing NAFTA first.” (Bonior, 1997). 
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approval, while the President reached out not only to Democrats, but also to 
Republicans, inviting them to the White House days before the vote (Mitchell, 
1997d). As mentioned earlier, opposition to fast track authority came not only from 
Bill Clinton’s own party but also from conservative Republicans, who feared a 
decline in national sovereignty.  
In early November, the White House deployed a full array of arm-twisting and 
deal-making tactics, reminiscent of the NAFTA endgame (Shoch, 2001, 219; 
Cavanagh & Anderson, 1997). A senior White House aide put it in colorful terms: 
We’re doing wholesale and retail and direct marketing over the next week. 
We’d be on [the shopping channel] QVC if we could find a way. We know we’ve 
got an uphill fight here (cited in Mitchell, 1997c). 
 
As in 1993, President Clinton’s “bazaar”247 offered policy concessions, pork-
barrel deals and campaign support. First, in desperate search for votes among 
Democrats, the White House promised protection for peanuts, wheat, cattle, wine, 
tomatoes and tobacco. In addition to import protection, the Clinton administration 
also committed to press America’s trading partners to open new markets for U.S. 
goods, both on a sectoral basis (wine, peaches) or in a more systemic fashion, by 
agreeing to a new Section 301 provision for agricultural exports (Public Citizen, 
2005, 50-7; IUST, 11/11/97; IUST, 11/07/97; Mitchell, 1997e). 248 Other policy 
concessions sought to address the “adjustment costs” of trade liberalization and 
included:  
                                                
247 One administration official confessed that the “bazaar is open” (cited in Mitchell, 1997b). This was 
also the expression used in Public Citizen’s analysis of the NAFTA deal-makings (Public Citizen, 
1993). 
248 Under the Trade Act of 1974, the U.S. Trade Representative is required to take all appropriate 
action, including retaliation, to obtain the removal of any policy of a foreign government that violates 
an international agreement or restricts U.S. exports in an unreasonable manner. In practice, Section 301 
has been used on behalf of American exporters fighting foreign import barriers of subsidized 
competition (Destler, 2005, 351-2). 
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 a pledge to boost funding for Trade Adjustment Assistance to $4 billion 
(including over $1 billion in new monies for TAA and NAFTA-TAA) 
aimed at Democrats, particularly members of the Hispanic Caucus;249  
 a promise to create a Presidential Commission on Workers and Economic 
Change to address the effect of technology on worker displacement – and 
rally the support for Ken Bentsen (D-TX);250  
 a commitment to create a presidential task force to monitor housing, labor 
and environmental conditions along the U.S.-Mexican border along with 
a binational border office to better coordinate NADBank activities, both 
of which were formulated to win the votes of Texan Democrats (Public 
Citizen, 2005). 
As during the NAFTA debates, President Clinton’s horse-trading maneuvers also 
included pork-barrel deals that were completely unrelated to international trade, 
including a variety of construction projects (a bridge, a freeway ramp, water treatment 
facility etc.) (IUST, 11/07/97; Public Citizen, 2005, 50-7). Puzzled by the scope of 
Clinton’s deal-making tactics, a Wisconsin Democrat asked the Chair of the 
Appropriations Committee Robert Livingston: “Does the gentleman know how many 
bridges the President has promised today for fast-track votes?” To which Mr. 
Livingston replied: “The gentleman does not have enough fingers for that” (cited in 
Mitchell, 1997e). Pork-barrel deals were not limited to construction projects but 
included a variety of political favors: additional funding for the Customs Service in 
                                                
249 According to Public Citizen, five years after the promise, TAA funding had only grown by 30% of 
the promised amount (Public Citizen, 2005, 51).  
250 Public Citizen reports that, here again, President Clinton broke his promise. In a blatant example of 
the meaning of “political cover,” Ken Bentsen belatedly accepted to support the Permanent 
Normalization of Trade Relations with China after Bill Clinton reiterated his promise (Public Citizen, 
2005, 51). 
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Florida, the financing of the Salton Sea clean-up in California, tax breaks for 
homeowners in North Carolina, etc. (Public Citizen, 2005, 50-57; IUST, 11/11/97).  
Finally, President Clinton also promised campaign support for anxious 
Democratic incumbents (in Texas and Ohio) (IUST, 11/07/97; Public Citizen, 2005). 
The President sought to offset the lobbying efforts of organized labor. Speaking at the 
AFL-CIO’s national convention, he asked union members not to punish pro-fast track 
Democrats in subsequent elections (Bennet, 1997). He promised individual 
fundraisers for Democrats who feared labor’s punishment (Mitchell, 1997e). Thus, 
acts of “counteractive lobbying”251 were undertaken not only by interest groups 
opposing the fair trade agenda (i.e. business interests), but also by the executive 
branch.  
Not all lawmakers succumbed to President Clinton’s charm offensive, however. 
Admittedly, the belated lobbying efforts of the White House did allow free traders to 
win nine additional Democratic supporters a week before the intended vote (IUST, 
11/07/97). Overall, however, President Clinton’s bazaar found fewer customers in 
1997 than it had in 1993. Some political commentators argue that Bill Clinton 
alienated liberal Democrats with his crude vote-buying methods (Anderson & 
Cavanagh, 1997, 2). According to the New York Times, the President insulted 
congressmen by openly stating that he would win the trade vote easily if it were held 
in secret, thereby suggesting that lawmakers only feared labor’s sanctions (Broder, 
1997). Others posit that Clinton’s failure to live up to the promises of his NAFTA 
deals252 had undermined the credibility of his bargaining maneuvers (Shoch, 2001, 
219). Government insiders point to the general lack of political capital that the 
administration devoted to the 1997 free trade campaign. Jay Berman, the leader of the 
                                                
251 (Austen-Smith & Wright, 1994). 
252 For a complete report on President Clinton’s broken promises, read Public Citizen (2000b) and 
Public Citizen, 2005, 50-57.  
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fast track lobbying effort inside the White House claimed that he had never been 
given the authority or the resources to line up votes: “We ran out of time, and that was 
partly because the White House didn’t get serious about trying to find out what people 
wanted and then trying to work something out. We weren’t ready to deal when we 
needed to deal” (cited in Maggs, 2000).  
This insufficient focus on deal-making was part of a broader lack of commitment 
from the White House acknowledged by both trade insiders like Secretary of 
Commerce Bill Daley253 and political analysts (Barfield, 1998; Shoch, 2001, 219; 
Destler, 2005, 264-5; Anderson & Cavanagh, 1997, 2; Broder, 1997). The President’s 
“leadership failure” resided primarily in his late submission of his fast track proposal 
and his belated involvement in the political battle. First, by postponing the release of 
his trade bill, the White House delayed the countermobilization efforts of the business 
community. Not until the business community became certain that the trade bill 
would not contain heavy labor and environmental regulatory constraints, did it decide 
to throw its full weight behind fast track. The delay of the free trade campaign was 
compounded by the skewed distribution of business donations, thereby limiting the 
impact of corporate countermobilization. Second, the belated involvement of the 
President in the fast track debates deprived free trade advocates of the crucial support 
of the “best lobbyist in town.” With fair traders striving to “lock in” the votes of 
Democrats as early as possible, the long-delayed lobbying counteroffensive proved to 
be a costly mistake.  
Other political choices complicated the White House’s efforts to win 
congressional support for fast track. The Democratic administration’s acceptance of 
the “clean” bill favored by Republicans – i.e. one devoid of substantive environmental 
                                                
253 See Maggs (2000). 
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and labor provisions – came to be another tactical mistake. The president sought to 
secure both business and Republican support for fast track before convincing his 
fellow party members to follow his lead (Shoch, 2001, 213; Glenn, 1999, 193). 
However, given the public’s ambivalence about NAFTA, and the revengeful tone of 
the labor movement, liberal Democrats saw Clinton’s compromise with the 
Republican leadership as a stab in the back.  
Of course, it would be unfair to attribute all the responsibility of the “clean” fast 
track bill to President Clinton. As mentioned earlier, the Administration’s attempts to 
include stronger blue and green provisions in 1994 and 1995 had failed primarily 
because of partisan bickering. In addition, owing to their disillusion with NAFTA’s 
side agreements, it remains to be seen whether fair trade advocates – and particularly 
unions – would have settled for further incremental changes in American trade policy. 
The fact that organized labor opposed fast track extension months before the trade bill 
was released tends to show that, absent a dramatic change in the substance of 
American trade policy, unions would have opposed any attempt to delegate trade-
negotiating authority.  
Yet, regardless of labor’s opposition, it is clear that inclusion of more substantive 
provisions than the elusive and non-enforceable “negotiating objectives” of the fast 
track bill would have improved the likelihood of wooing liberal Democrats. The fact 
that Bill Clinton caved in to the demands of House Ways and Means after making 
concessions on issues as crucial as the balanced budget and welfare reform made the 
liberal basis of the Democratic Party uneasy (Broder, 1997; Conley, 1999, 793). 
Emboldened by the success of the NAFTA and Uruguay Round bills in 1993 and 
1994, Bill Clinton took his party’s support for granted. According to one official: “We 
figured we always pull these things out in the end and we’d pull this one out, too” 
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(cited in Broder, 1997). But for many lawmakers, the administration appeared to be 
paying lip service to the anxieties and demands of local constituencies. By rolling 
back the few gains that labor and environmentalists had achieved during the NAFTA 
debates, the White House provided little political cover for Democrats to back trade 
liberalization. The “First Free Trader” ignored the fact that during the NAFTA 
debates, side payments – devised successively by George H. W. Bush and Bill 
Clinton – had been instrumental in splitting the blue-green alliance. These divide-and-
conquer tactics had also allowed legislators to justify their support for trade 
liberalization. But in 1997, the absence of symbolic, collective side payments 
compromised the administration’s ability to win the votes of its party allies.254 
This is not to say that the President did not have any influence on the fast track 
vote. In fact, Biglaiser, Jackson & Peake’s analysis reveals that although a large 
majority of Democrats opposed the 1997 fast track bill, a few of the President’s most 
ardent supporters backed the measure. Thus, in addition to constituency and 
ideological factors, presidential support scores also conditioned support for fast track 
(Biglaiser, Jackson & Peake, 2004, 691-2). This confirms the idea that partisan 
politics are an important element of contemporary trade debates. 
 However, the fast track vote reveals that even in an era of party polarization, 
party affiliation is not always a reliable predictor of congressional behavior. Indeed, 
the demise of the 1997 trade bill was not primarily due to the dissent of Republican 
voters, but to the mutiny of House Democrats. This means that in the increasingly 
contentious sphere of American trade politics, partisanship can no longer be taken for 
granted. This is why presidential-corporate mobilization is a key determinant of 
legislative outcomes. When the mobilization of fair traders threatens the passage of a 
                                                
254 The closest thing to such deal was Clinton’s proposal of a $4 billion retraining program, added at 
the request of a dozen of House Democrats (Oxley & Schnietz 2001, 486; Shoch, 2001, 214; Public 
Citizen, 2005, 51).  
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controversial trade bill, the “First Free Trader” must utilize its institutional 
capabilities and mobilize its business allies or risk losing the battle.  
 
Conclusion 
The controversies surrounding the renewal of fast track authority epitomize the 
contentious nature of the new politics of American trade. Framed as a referendum on 
NAFTA, the 1997 legislative battle bore great resemblance with that of 1993. In both 
cases, a coalition of labor, environmental and consumer advocates organized a 
sophisticated lobbying campaign that threatened the passage a trade-liberalizing bill. 
On both occasions, the fair trade coalition managed to bring environmental and social 
issues to the center of the debates, rally public opinion behind its cause and create 
bitter divisions in the House of Representatives. Although the two votes were taken in 
different congressional contexts, countermobilization played a pivotal role in 
determining political outcomes, contributing in one case to save President Clinton’s 
bill, and in the other to bury it. Indeed, where the vigorous countermobilization of free 
trade advocates – in both the private sector and the executive branch – had been 
crucial to consolidate bipartisan support for NAFTA in 1993, their delayed 
counteractive lobbying efforts and tactical mistakes did not allow them to save the 
fast track bill in 1997.  
First, corporate interests, owing to their sustained opposition to the consideration 
of environmental and labor issues, postponed their campaign on behalf of fast track. 
Beyond timing, both their inside and outside lobbying tactics paled in comparison to 
the vigorous offensive launched by fair traders. Not only did business’s grassroots 
efforts remain lethargic, but the pressure it exerted inside the Beltway was 
significantly skewed  toward Republican congressmen. The private sector’s 
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unbalanced lobbying efforts, therefore, gave undecided House Democrats few reasons 
to withstand the pressure of organized labor or follow the lead of the President. 
Second, and most importantly, the tactical mistakes of the White House proved fatal 
to fast track renewal in three respects. The administration’s greatest mistake was 
perhaps its failure to include any environmental or labor side payment in the trade bill 
– a faux pas for which the Republican leadership shares large responsibility. This 
omission only consolidated the anti-fast track front and failed to provide political 
cover for undecided lawmakers. The administration’s belated involvement in the 
legislative debates was another crucial flaw of presidential countermobilization. On 
the one hand, the chief executive’s late submission of the trade bill delayed the 
countermobilization efforts of the business community, which feared that Clinton’s 
proposal might include strong labor and environmental provisions. On the other, the 
President’s postponed campaign on behalf of fast track made it more difficult to win 
over the support of House Democrats who had already committed to reject any 
expansion of NAFTA. Both of these tactical mistakes stemmed from one same root: 
the administration’s misperceptions of the political legacy of NAFTA and the 
resentment it had bred among fair trade advocates, local constituencies, and their 
representatives. In retrospect, the multiple weaknesses of the countermobilization of 
free traders on behalf of fast track renewal in 1997 paled in comparison with the 
theatrical NAFTA campaign or the unprecedented scale of corporate-presidential 
countermobilization in support of PNTR in 2000.  
This does not mean that structural factors did not matter. Admittedly, the 
elaboration of fast track bills gives less leeway to the executive branch in the policy 
process, particularly under a divided government. As a result, the special relationship 
could not operate through the activities of the trade advisory committee as it had 
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before NAFTA was born. Yet, in this case, the “compromise” reached by President 
Clinton and the Republican majority reflected the priorities of the business 
community. Thus, the important stage at which the special relationship played a 
crucial role was not the agenda-setting phase but the lobbying phase. The fact that the 
joint countermobilization of the White House and the private sector lost the vote does 
not make the special relationship irrelevant. As this chapter has shown, the rejection 
of fast track was a defeat for free traders before being a victory for fair traders. In 
other words, Clinton’s “leadership failure” resided in his inability to activate the 
power of countermobilization.  
This is not to deny the role of the blue-green alliance in the dénouement. To 
paraphrase David Glenn (1999, 191), “defeating fast track was arguably the AFL-
CIO’s greatest public policy triumph in a generation.” It was, indeed, the first time 
since 1934 that Congress refused to delegate its authority to a president requesting it 
(Oxley & Schnietz, 2001, 480). 255 Clinton’s setback was directly linked to the 
emergence of the now indissociable environmental and labor issues in trade debates. 
In this sense, it represented an important milestone in the U.S. debates on 
globalization (Oxley & Schnietz 2001, 480-1). Optimists like David Bonior foresaw 
the advent of a new approach to commercial issues: “What we saw this week… was 
that we are ready to move the trade issue to another level, to include labor standards, 
environmental standards, and food safety standards. That is the future.” The next 
major trade battle would test the validity of this prediction, whose fulfillment hinged 
upon the political power of countermobilization.  
 
 
                                                
255 The irony was that fast track was designed as a mechanism to mitigate constituency pressures on 
legislators to alter trade legislation. The fast track battle revealed that these pressures had extended to 
the very process itself (Conley, 1999, 797).  
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CHAPTER 5: The Permanent Normalization  
of U.S. Trade Relations With China 
 
At the dusk of the twentieth century, morale was running high on the fair traders’ 
front.  The fast track debates of 1997-1998 had proved that the blue-green alliance 
was a powerful political force to be reckoned with. A year after the 1997 legislative 
battle, Newt Gingrich surprised observers by announcing a late September vote on a 
new “clean” fast track proposal. Devoid of labor or environmental provisions, the 
Speaker’s trade bill aimed to reassert the Republicans’ support for business-friendly 
policies and divide the Democratic Party. This time, however, not only did House 
Democrats rally en masse against the bill, but the White House also refused to support 
the legislation for fear of losing votes in the Congressional elections.256 Despite the 
peculiar electoral context in which the bill occurred, this second rejection of fast track 
in two years confirmed the new contentious nature of trade politics. Second, the 
collapse of the MAI negotiations came on the heels of this second political setback. 
This new victory emboldened civil society groups in their attempt to influence 
Washington’s international economic policy. Finally, the anti-WTO protests of Seattle 
in 1999 further raised the prominence of fair trade, inspiring waves of activism 
throughout the world. For free traders, trade liberalization seemed to lose momentum 
under the pressure of the new stakeholders of American trade policy. 
The fact that fair traders seemed to gather momentum when President Clinton’s 
decided to “normalize” – i.e. permanently liberalize – U.S. trade relations with China 
meant that the legislative battle of 2000 would be a litmus test for both fair and free 
traders. In this regard, the debates surrounding China’s accession to the World Trade 
                                                
256 Like the Uruguay Round Act, this bill did not generate as many controversies –and lobbying 
effervescence – as the other case studies under consideration in this dissertation. For more details on 
this trade bill, see Shoch (2001) and Destler (2005). 
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Organization constitute an ideal case study to assess the impact of 
countermobilization on trade policy outcomes.  
This chapter seeks to outline the contours of the special relationship between the 
executive branch and the private sector and examine the extent to which this 
collaboration impeded the advocacy efforts of fair trade actors. It is divided in two 
sections. The first examines the role played by the private sector during the 
negotiating process, i.e. before and during Washington’s series of trade negotiations 
with Beijing. The second focuses on the lobbying phase preceding the vote and 
attempt to assess the impact of the respective campaigns by fair trade and free trade 
advocates. Both sections lead to the same conclusion: the close coordination between 
the White House and the business community interrupted the slow ascension of fair 
traders in the trade policy arena.  
 
I) SHAPING THE TERMS OF THE DEBATES 
If the NAFTA and fast track debates went far beyond strictly commercial issues, 
the PNTR debates were also entwined with the complex tissue of U.S.-Chinese 
foreign relations. When it officially recognized the People’s Republic of China (PRC) 
in 1979, Washington subjected its trade policy to an annual review of China’s 
economic policy and human rights record. Thus, China’s ability to obtain “Most 
Favored Nation” (MFN)257 status depended on congressional approval of its overall 
behavior, a process that became particularly controversial after the Chinese 
government’s repression of the Tiananmen Square protests in 1989 (Hook & Lebo, 
2008). In the 1990s, the debates on MFN renewal became increasingly controversial 
                                                
257 This principle of non-discrimination is a pillar of the international trade system, according to which 
a nation receiving MFN status is assured that its exports are subject to no greater tariffs than those 
imposed on exports from any other country (Destler, 2005). 
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and witnessed the mobilization of numerous interest groups ranging from human 
rights advocates and religious organizations to business associations and PRC 
delegates. Thus, the dynamics of interest group mobilization predated the debates on 
the Permanent Normalization of U.S.-Chinese Trade Relations (PNTR).  
The idea behind making China’s MFN trade status permanent stemmed from 
China’s ambition to become a WTO member. From a procedural standpoint, it 
required the negotiation of a bilateral accession agreement whereby Washington 
would obtain a series of trade concessions in return for its support for Beijing’s bid, 
along with a few reforms pertaining to U.S. trade sanctions and textile quotas (Shoch, 
2001, 233). As in previous battles, the terms of these negotiations polarized fair 
traders and free traders: the former demanding the linkage of U.S. trade policy to non-
commercial issues such as human rights and labor standards, the former pressing the 
administration for a “clean bill.”  
At a more fundamental level, PNTR epitomized the intrabranch conflicts that are 
inherent to the U.S. trade policy process. Like fast track authority, the elimination of 
MFN annual reviews promised to empower the executive branch by limiting 
congressional interference with U.S.-Chinese trade relations. Among congressmen, 
there were concerns that the White House might have informally committed to the 
permanent normalization of U.S.-Chinese trade relations within the framework of the 
bilateral negotiations with China, thereby infringing upon Congress’s constitutional 
authority to regulate commerce (IUST, 12/17/99).  
This shift of power promised to constrain fair traders’ influence over a bilateral 
relation that was not only becoming essential to U.S. economic interests,258 but that 
also had important social and environmental implications, as illustrated by recent 
                                                
258 Between 1978 and 1999, China’s annual trade volume increased in absolute terms from $21 billion 
to $361 billion (Hook & Lebo, 2008). 
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debates on political repression in Tibet or China’s growing contribution to global 
warming.259 In other words, eliminating annual congressional hearings threatened to 
cut American NGOs from the policy process, preventing them from bringing attention 
to non-commercial aspects of U.S.-Chinese relations (e.g. human rights, labor 
standards, environmental damage etc.). 
The permanent normalization of U.S. trade relations might not have been so 
inimical to fair traders’ interests had the trade bill included strong safeguards for the 
protection of human rights, workers’ rights and the environment. Yet, as this chapter 
will show, the business community managed to maintain its privileged access to the 
policy process and, in conjunction with the White House, strove to exclude non-trade 
issues from the scope of the agreement.  
The following subsections illustrate how the Clinton administration betrayed its 
commitment to fair trade principles to preserve its special relationship with the 
business community. This partnership constrained the ability of labor, human rights, 
environmental and consumer organizations to influence the trade policy process, 
thereby jeopardizing the recent progress made by fair traders.  
To reveal the predominant influence of the private sector on the terms of the U.S.-
Chinese agreement, this chapter proceeds in two steps. First, it examines the origins 
of President Clinton’s China policy and more precisely his shift from a strong 
emphasis on human rights (conditionality) to a “non-conditional” pro-business stance 
(engagement). Evidence shows that the business community and more precisely the 
“new China lobby” (Destler, 1995, 235) – the increasingly organized group of 
corporations pressing for free trade with China – managed to convince the Clinton 
administration to forsake any ambition of linking trade with non-commercial issues 
                                                
259 China has now surpassed the United States as the world’s leader in carbon missions (although not 
on a per capita basis).  
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by undermining support for conditionality within the executive branch. Second, this 
chapter will examine the respective positions of trade policy actors in relation with the 
content of the PNTR bill so as to highlight the skewed design of the agreement 
negotiated by the Clinton administration. It will then attempt to explain the 
institutional factors and the political decisions that led the White House to ignore the 
grievances of its labor and environmental constituencies. Here, as during the NAFTA 
negotiations, the system of trade advisory committees considerably limited the input 
of fair trade organizations in the policy process. Thus, the skewed design of the trade 
policy process allowed the private sector to control the terms of the Chinese accession 
agreement, producing a plethora of business-friendly concessions while excluding 
provisions pertaining to labor standards, human rights or environmental protection. 
These structural impediments were exacerbated by the Democrats’ deliberate attempt 
to shift their party toward a pro-business agenda, one that gave little room to fair trade 
side payments.   
 
President Clinton’s ephemeral conditionality policy 
At first sight, it seemed that the foreign policy agenda of the Clinton 
administration would not prove as congruent with the priorities of the private sector as 
it had been during NAFTA. During the presidential election, the Arkansas governor 
had chastised President George Bush for “coddl[ing] dictators and stand[ing] aside 
from the global movement toward democracy” (cited in Dietrich, 1999, 286). The 
Democratic candidate had promised to make MFN status contingent on China’s 
improvement of its human rights record (Schaller, 2002, 211; Dietrich, 1999, 286).260 
This approach paralleled Bill Clinton’s conditional endorsement of NAFTA and his 
                                                
260 MFN was renewed every year under the presidencies of Ronald Reagan and George Bush despite 
China’s persistent violations of human rights (Hook & Lesh, 2002). 
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tactical support for labor and environmental side agreements during the 1992 
elections. In both cases, Clinton seemed ready to open the trade policy process to new 
constituencies, even though the latter’s input would not rival that of free trade 
business interests.  
Clinton’s leanings toward conditionality – as opposed to “de-linking” trade and 
human rights – were both shaped by and reflected in the positions of his top foreign 
policy advisers, among whom were Secretary of State Warren Christopher, Assistant 
Secretary of State for East Asia Winston Lord, U.N. Representative Madeleine 
Albright, and National Security Adviser Anthony Lake. Human rights advocates and 
business groups alike viewed these appointments as an indication that the White 
House’s China policy would put greater emphasis on human rights. Indeed, under the 
new Democratic White House, human rights organizations enjoyed greater access to 
government officials than they ever had under the Bush administration (Dietrich, 
1999, 286-7; Schaller, 2002, 212). 
In line with this new environment, President Clinton, in conjunction with 
Congress, designed a more conditional approach to MFN renewal. On May 28, 1993, 
he issued a flexible Executive Order that subjected China’s trade status to the 
fulfillment of two conditions: one supporting the usual Jackson-Vanik freedom of 
immigration;261 and the other requiring Chinese compliance with a 1992 bilateral 
agreement on prison labor and five other issues related to human rights, on which 
China had to achieve “overall significant progress” (Dietrich, 1999, 286-7; Schaller, 
2002, 212; Sutter, 1998, 48).  
This activist, pro-human rights trade policy, however, did not last very long. On 
May 26, 1994, barely a year after issuing his Executive Order, President Clinton 
                                                
261 The Jackson-Vanik amendment to the Trade Act of 1974 prevented presidents from granting MFN 
status to countries that restricted the emigration of their citizens and was designed to punish the Soviet 
Union’s repression of Russian Jews (Hook, 2005). 
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announced his decision to “delink” China’s MFN status from the human rights 
conditions he had attached (Dietrich, 1999, 288-9; Sutter, 1998, 50-51). He opted for 
MFN renewal despite the Secretary of State’s conclusions that “the Chinese did not 
achieve overall significant progress in all the areas outlined in the executive order” 
(cited in Destler 1995, 235). Clinton justified his new engagement policy with the 
idea that the powerful market forces transforming the Chinese economy would not 
only benefit American businesses and consumers, but also gradually lead Beijing to 
conform to international standards and encourage democratic reforms (Hook and 
Lesh, 2002, 292). The White House’s market-driven policy would shape the terms of 
the PNTR debates in 2000. What prompted this sudden shift from conditionality to 
engagement?  
 
Business interests and the U.S. trade relations with China 
Ever since the Tiananmen Square incidents, business and farm interests had 
opposed tariff sanctions advocated by human rights, students and labor organizations 
(Dietrich, 1999, 285). Clinton’s 1993 executive order changed the institutional 
dynamics of U.S.-Chinese trade relations by asserting the leadership of the executive 
branch in a policy area traditionally dominated by Congress. This initiative 
foreshadowed the White House’s later attempt to eliminate the MFN review process, 
a step that would further undermine Congress’s authority to regulate commerce.262  
As a result, Clinton’s executive order prompted outside interests to refocus their 
advocacy efforts on the executive branch – without, of course, relieving their pressure 
on the House of Representatives where the debates on MFN had always been more 
controversial. Although corporate interests had little say in the drafting of the 
                                                
262 The following three paragraphs are drawn from Dietrich (1999, 288-90) and Sutter (1998, 47-60).  
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executive order, they subsequently adopted a more assertive stance toward U.S-China 
policy, a tactical move that would soon bear fruit. From 1989 to 1994, the 
involvement of the business community shifted from a small base of companies 
paralyzed by the Tiananmen Square events to an ever-larger circle of corporate actors 
actively lobbying for a non-punitive approach to Sino-American relations. Within five 
years, they managed to obtain support from congressmen, government officials, and 
eventually President Clinton himself (Dietrich, 1999). According to trade expert I. M. 
Destler, “the new China lobby” became “perhaps the most formidable, pro-trade 
coalition ever sustained by U.S. business on its own initiative” (Destler, 1995, 234).  
Lured by the opportunities of the fabled Chinese market, American businesses 
strove to influence the administration’s trade policy toward China through both direct 
and indirect means. First, by exerting direct pressure on the Clinton administration, 
they managed to win the support from government officials from economic agencies. 
This led to internal dissonance within the administration, whereby the pro-
conditionality voices of the diplomatic choir were out of sync with the pro-business 
tunes of the National Economic Council (Robert Rubin), the Treasury (Lloyd 
Bentsen) and the Commerce Department (Ron Brown). Having been elected on an 
economic platform, President Clinton was responsive to the latter’s calls to re-
examine the importance of business opportunities in China. The former governor 
from Arkansas was also the direct target of the business lobby, which flooded the 
White House with petitions signed by corporate CEOs and congress members.263  
Second, the increasingly active stance of the business community also seemed to 
affect the White House’s early approach to China policy in an indirect way. The 
growing strength of American businesses’ advocacy on behalf of engagement (or 
                                                
263 For instance, in early May 1994 – a few weeks before Clinton’s official decision to “delink” MFN 
from human rights conditions – the business coalition sent 800 letters to the Oval Office to demand 
unconditional MFN renewal. For more details on these early lobbying efforts, see Destler (1995, 235).  
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“delinkage”) and their support among fractions of the Clinton administration 
increased the Chinese government’s leverage over the terms of the negotiations.264 
Wary of American interference in its internal affairs, Chinese negotiators were 
particularly eager to exploit U.S. domestic support for engagement as a means of 
removing non-commercial issues from the bargaining table. This tactic would be used 
to press the Clinton administration to close the bilateral accession agreement 
negotiated before the PNTR vote (Sanger, 1999).265  
In sum, the business community played both a direct and indirect role in President 
Clinton’s decision to delink human rights and other conditions from the scope of 
U.S.-China trade relations. These early political pressures differed from the formal 
institutional channels through which the private sector would monitor the negotiations 
of China’s accession agreement. Yet, both phases of the debates on Washington’s 
trade policy toward China were important to the extent that they would shape the 
terms of the debates on PNTR by giving the private sector a privileged access to the 
policy process.  
 
“Everything we asked for” 
If President Clinton’s conversion to engagement had been a victory for the 
business community, the latter had no reason to be complacent. First, economic and 
diplomatic frictions – over human rights violations, Taiwan, the growing U.S. 
bilateral trade deficit with China – remained at the center of annual MFN debates. 
Second, China’s push to join the WTO meant that the private sector still had a vested 
                                                
264 Both the potential size of the Chinese market and the strong support of the U.S. business community 
for trade liberalization with China conferred much greater bargaining power to the Chinese government 
than the Mexican government ever had during the NAFTA negotiations.  
265 For an extensive discussion of U.S.-Chinese relations under the Clinton administration, read 
Bourdin (2007). 
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interest in monitoring the course of U.S.-Chinese trade relations. Indeed, accession to 
WTO membership required the negotiations of a bilateral agreement between 
Washington and Beijing, the enforcement of which would in effect be conditioned to 
the permanent normalization of their trade relations (i.e. the elimination of the MFN 
renewal process) (Shoch, 2001, 234; Destler, 2005, 275-6).266  
The lure of the agreement resided primarily in the size of the Chinese market. 
With 1.2 billion potential consumers, it is easy to understand why American 
businesses across virtually every sector were so eager for the U.S.-China deal. In the 
farm sector, the Department of Agriculture estimated that U.S. exports of wheat, rice, 
corn, cotton and soybeans to China would increase by $1.5 billion annually if barriers 
were removed (Hook & Lesh, 2002, 298-302). Manufacturing interests, including the 
aircraft and automotive industries also saw the U.S.-Chinese agreement as a great 
opportunity to pry open the promising Chinese market (McGraw, 1999). Their 
advocacy efforts were joined by the high technology sector, which became a powerful 
voice among PNTR proponents (Shoch, 2001). In the service sector, insurance, 
financial and telecommunications companies were vigorous advocates of trade 
liberalization with China (Micek, 2000). Through the negotiation of China’s 
accession agreement, these various segments of the business community hoped that 
Washington could push Beijing to dismantle its intricate system of tariff and non-
tariff barriers (quotas, import licenses, technical standards etc.) to boost American 
exports to China (Hook & Lesh, 2002, 295).  
If the prospect of increased exports was the most common argument evoked by 
free traders, the myriad investment opportunities that the US-Chinese negotiations 
could generate were the real gains at the top of the business coalition’s agenda. In the 
                                                
266 For more details on the China’s protracted effort to join the WTO, read Panitchpakdi & Clifford 
(2002). 
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1990s, foreign investment in China had skyrocketed, as the PRC was soon to become 
the world’s foremost destination for Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). The business 
community hoped that the Middle Kingdom would agree to loosen its restrictions on 
joint ventures with Chinese firms, which had hitherto limited the access of American 
multinational corporations to the Chinese market. The PRC’s previous relaxation of 
limitations on portfolio investments had also raised considerable interests among the 
U.S. financial sector, which became one of the leading proponents of PNTR (Hook & 
Lesh, 2002, 298-303). Corporate interests also saw the negotiation of a bilateral 
agreement with China as an invaluable opportunity to push the Chinese government 
to comply with international trade rules. Among issues of considerable interest to the 
private sector was the protection of intellectual property rights, which had been a 
bone of contention between Washington and Beijing since the early 1990s 
(Devereaux, Lawrence, & Watkins, 2006, 255, 259).  
Did the terms of the bilateral agreement satisfy the demands of the private sector? 
The terms of the PNTR trade bill leave little doubt about this. Through a series of 
high-level negotiations between 1997 and 1999, Washington obtained a wealth of 
market concessions for American businesses. Of course, like any high-stake 
negotiations, the road to the agreement was a bumpy one, at times obstructed by 
American domestic politics (yearly debates on MFN renewal, the Clinton-Lewinsky 
scandal, etc.). In the end, however, “the Chinese conceded more than I thought would 
be politically possible” said Nicholas Lardy, expert on the Chinese economy at the 
Brookings Institution (cited in Devereaux, Lawrence & Watkins, 2006, 268). For 
American businesses, the core benefits of the negotiations included: full trading and 
distribution rights to U.S. firms doing business in China; substantial tariff cuts in the 
agricultural sector; a phase-out of quotas on foreign goods and a suspension of other 
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non-tariff barriers (NTBs); greater access to the Chinese market for the U.S. 
automobile industry; and an overall improvement of the treatment of foreign firms 
operating in China (Hook & Pesh, 2002, 309).267 Logically, the business community 
was elated by the terms of the bilateral agreement. In a letter asking House Speaker 
Dennis Hastert (R-IL) to set a date for the PNTR vote, the National Association of 
Manufacturers praised the administration’s accomplishments:  
 In 1998, the National Association of Manufacturers laid out the goals 
American manufacturers hoped would be achieved by China’s entry to the WTO. 
That analysis (…) shows we will get essentially everything we asked for (NAM, 
2000). 
 
The agreement not only met most of their demands in regard to market access and 
investment, but also ensured that non-commercial issues would be excluded from the 
normalization of U.S.-Chinese trade relations.    
 
Non-conditionality prevails 
As explained earlier, the business community’s push for engagement preceded the 
negotiating phase between Beijing and Washington. With the PNTR vote looming, 
corporate representatives re-emphasized their support for Clinton’s policy of 
“delinkage” and, implicitly, their opposition to binding trade liberalization to non-
commercial issues such as human rights or labor standards. In numerous 
congressional testimonies, business leaders described President Clinton’s shift to non-
conditionality as a catalyst for economic change in China. They credited engagement 
policy not only for encouraging domestic reforms and raising living standards but 
also, and perhaps more dubiously, for alleviating the Asian financial crisis (McGraw, 
1999; Bonsignore, 2000). Furthermore, corporate representatives frequently stressed 
                                                
267 For more details, read the administration’s fact sheet on the U.S-China agreement in IUST 
(11/16/99).  
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the good practices of American companies in China and their ability to improve labor, 
environmental, health and safety standards through investment (Bonsignore, 2000; 
Cohen, 2001; David, 1999). 
Although allegedly supporting democratic reform in China, they continued to 
strongly oppose linking trade with non-commercial issues, claiming paradoxically 
that trade liberalization would encourage domestic reforms in China while opposing 
conditionality on the basis that “trade is no quick fix to China’s problem.” Instead, the 
private sector recommended technical assistance and alternative initiatives to help 
China improve its labor, human rights, and environmental conditions (Bonsignore, 
2000).  
Despite the strong pressures of fair traders, the administration continued to follow 
the business community’s favored policy of engagement. Testifying at the Senate 
Finance Committee in early 2000, USTR Charlene Barshefsky declared that the 
Administration “[would] certainly always prefer a clean bill,” i.e. a legislative 
proposal devoid of labor, environmental or human rights provisions (cited in IUST, 
02/25/2000). Gene Sperling, economic adviser to the White House, echoed this 
comment by excluding the prospect of parallel legislation connecting human rights to 
trade (Public Citizen, 2000, 37).  
This blatant indifference to the fair traders’ grievances268 seems surprising given 
that the same uncompromising approach to the “new politics of American trade” had 
been partly responsible for the fast track fiasco of 1997. In addition, Clinton’s 
exclusion of non-commercial issues from the terms of the accession agreement clearly 
contradicted his promise to put a “human face” on globalization and promote 
                                                
268 Fair traders’ criticisms of the PNTR bill are examined in second half of this chapter.  
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international labor and environmental standards at the WTO.269 However, when one 
acknowledges the special relationship between the executive branch and the business 
community and its impact on trade negotiations, it is easier to understand why the 
White House decided to favor the interests of corporate interests over labor and 
environmental organizations. Of course, Beijing’s uncompromising stance toward 
Washington’s interference in China’s domestic political affairs also influenced 
President Clinton’s decision to shift from conditionality to engagement. However, the 
heavy pressures of the private sector on the White House throughout the 1990s also 
bore fruit. 
 
Explaining the skewed design of the PNTR deal 
A previous section of this chapter examined how the growing activism of the new 
business “China lobby” encouraged the Clinton administration to renege on its 
commitment to conditionality and embrace engagement as a new foreign policy 
doctrine. Emphasis was put on the political factors behind the Democratic 
leadership’s decision to kowtow to corporate interests. Yet, to fully understand why 
the terms of the PNTR deal came to be so skewed in favor of business interests, one 
also needs to analyze the institutional channels through which the business 
community managed to dominate the policy process.  
Like the terms of NAFTA, the content of the PNTR deal can be traced to the 
inequalities of power embedded in the trade policy process. A close examination of 
                                                
269 At Seattle, President Clinton declared: 
 
I believe the WTO must make sure that open trade does indeed lift living standards -- respects 
core labor standards that are essential not only to worker rights, but to human rights. That's why 
this year the United States has proposed that the WTO create a working group on trade and labor. 
To deny the importance of these issues in a global economy is to deny the dignity of work -- the 
belief that honest labor fairly compensated gives meaning and structure to our lives. I hope we can 
affirm these values at this meeting (Clinton, 1999). 
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the membership and conclusions of Trade Advisory Committees (TAC) is revealing. 
The first tier of the TAC system, the Advisory Committee for Trade Policy and 
Negotiations (ACTPN) membership continued to be largely dominated by business 
interests. Despite Clinton’s efforts to accommodate new voices, the body with the 
greatest input in trade negotiations included 27 corporate representatives, but only 
three labor delegates, one environmentalist and one member of a consumer 
organization (ACTPN, 2000). As noted by AFL-CIO Legislative Director Thea Lee, 
despite President Clinton’s rhetorical support for fair trade, the membership of the 
ACTPN remained “massively imbalanced toward corporate interests,” and more 
specifically multinational corporations (Lee, 2007*). Similarly, the 16 Industry 
Sectoral Advisory Committees (ISACs) overwhelmingly dominated by business 
representatives, as they had been during the negotiating phase preceding the signature 
of NAFTA. Through the Trade Advisory Committee system, business organizations 
like the Semiconductor Industry Association (SIA), the Pharmaceutical Research and 
Manufacturers of America (PhRMA) and the International Intellectual Property 
Alliance, as well as representatives from the agriculture and service sectors 
maintained constant communication with the USTR to ensure that the terms of the 
agreement reflected business preferences (IUST, 02/25/00; IUST, 12/24/99; IUST, 
04/02/99). Hence, the private sector’s control over the policy process operated not 
only thanks to their “overrepresentation” in the TAC system, but also through a 
routinized dialogue with the administration that paralleled the coordination of public 
and private lobbying efforts at the legislative phase of the policy process.  
As during the NAFTA debates, the leaders of the business community combined 
the functions of trade policymakers and lobbyists to make their voice prevail. In other 
words, the institutional design of American trade policy created “policy clienteles” 
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that could tightly monitor the scope of free trade agreements. The president of 
ACTPN was Procter & Gamble CEO John Pepper, a key member of the National 
Foreign Trade Council and long-time leader in free trade advocacy. The ACPTN’s 
business agenda left the handful of fair trade representatives little room for debate. In 
2000, John Pepper wrote to his membership that the only formal meeting the ACTPN 
would have in 2000 would focus on reviewing the administration’s strategy to secure 
congressional approval of PNTR (Pepper, 2000). This “single agenda” drew severe 
criticisms from labor representatives John Sweeney, Jay Mazure (UNITE) and even 
Lenore Miller (Retail, Wholesale and Department Store Union, RWDSU), whose 
sector was supposed to benefit from the U.S.-Chinese bilateral agreement. All three of 
them acknowledge the structural impediments to which fair traders were confronted: 
 The AFL-CIO and our member unions have long argued that the entire trade 
policy advisory committee structure is seriously imbalanced, with too many 
corporate representatives and too few labor, environmental, consumer, and other 
NGO representatives – both on the ACTPN and on the other industry sector 
advisory committees. This imbalance has contributed to a corresponding 
imbalance in U.S. trade policy. (Sweeney & Miller, 2000). 
 
Invoking Seattle, labor representatives called for a “deep reform of the entire 
advisory committee structure and membership to ensure a much more balanced and 
diverse input” that would reflect the prescriptions of the Trade Act of 1974, according 
to which the ACTPN must be “broadly representative of the key sectors and groups of 
the economy, particularly with respect to those sectors and groups which are affected 
by trade” (ibid). In a subsequent letter to the USTR, the AFL-CIO demanded that the 
administration not only diversify the membership of the ACTPN so as to include 
more civil society groups and academics, but also asked that labor and environmental 
representatives be included in each Industry Sector Advisory Committee (ISAC) and 
Industry Functional Advisory Committee (IFAC), arguing that “business 
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representatives cannot adequately represent the concerns of working families or the 
environment and should not be expected to” (AFL-CIO, 2000). 
During the PNTR debates, labor representatives felt so alienated by the few 
opportunities offered by the trade policy process that they decided to resign from 
ACTPN in early 2000. The fact that this happened under a Democratic president who 
had promised to address labor concerns is emblematic of the institutional constraints 
that fair traders faced. Although Bill Clinton finally began a dialogue on how to 
reform the TAC system, this only occurred after the passage of PNTR. The USTR 
asked the AFL-CIO for solutions to improve the representativeness of the TAC 
system (ibid). With only a few months left in his second term, however, the 
Democratic president never had time to fulfill his promises.  
Like labor unions, environmental and consumer advocates were cognizant of the 
institutional obstacles that they faced. Amidst the PNTR debates, several NGOs filed 
a lawsuit demanding that the trade policy advisory committee comply with the 
provisions of the Trade Act of 1974. Their attempt proved relatively successful, 
insofar as a federal court required the administration to include environmentalists on 
two industry sector advisory committees (ISACs) for the paper and lumber industries 
(IUST, 06/09/00). Issued in early November 1999, this ruling did not allow 
environmentalists to participate in the participation of the U.S.-Chinese trade 
negotiations. In addition, this judicial decision did not apply to the membership of the 
ACTPN, where the single green voice remained isolated. Thus, environmentalists, 
like union representatives continued to demand an overall reform of the trade 
advisory committee system hoping that it would allow them to better define the terms 
of commercial agreements and monitor trade policies with environmental implications 
(Joffe, 2000; Earthjustice, 1999).  
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As mentioned earlier, the special relationship between the executive branch and 
the business community also had political – as opposed to institutional – roots. 
Behind institutional arrangements, deliberate choices also promoted corporate actors’ 
privileged access to the policy process. One should not forget that despite the inherent 
bias of the TAC structure, President Clinton, like his predecessors, retained leeway 
over TAC appointments. In this regard, the former Arkansan governor became 
notorious for rewarding corporate donators and political allies with TAC 
appointments, regardless of his promises to rebalance the trade policy process in favor 
of fair traders.270  
 
Conclusion 
In sum, both institutional and political factors constrained the fair traders’ ability 
to influence the terms of U.S. trade policy toward China. On the one hand, the 
institutional design of the trade policy process was tailored to the needs of the private 
sector, shutting out labor unions and public interest NGOs from effective involvement 
in the trade negotiations. Through a process of path dependence, corporate interests 
exploited their privileged access to the trade advisory committee system to control the 
scope of the PNTR agreement. Despite the multiple social and environmental 
ramifications of trade and investment liberalization, they managed to keep the PNTR 
bill “clean” by excluding human rights, labor standards and environmental protection 
from the scope of the agreement. In contrast, they reaped the benefits of their status of 
“policy clienteles,” winning extensive concessions in the realm of intellectual 
property rights, investment and market access. Business interests owed these gains to 
                                                
270 In one particular case, President Clinton offered a seat to reward Dr. W. David Leak, the chairman 
of Pain Net Education, who had been ally of the administration during the campaign for healthcare 
reform. When he got the ACTPN call from an aide to then-U.S. Trade Representative Mickey Kantor, 
Dr. Leak asked, “What do I have to do with international trade?” (Rushford, 2003).  
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the special relationship that they maintained with the executive branch, whose trade-
negotiating powers were set to expand through the elimination of Congress’s annual 
reviews of China’s MFN status. To some extent, these institutional dynamics mirrored 
the delegation of fast track authority, which commonly empowers the executive 
branch to the detriment of the legislature. As the first section of this chapter shows, 
the President is not the impartial trade policymaker that conventional political 
analyses depict. Far from being insulated from pressure groups politics, the president 
maintains a close relationship with one key segment of the constellation of interests 
affected by trade: the private sector. In the case of PNTR, as during the negotiations 
of NAFTA, the chief executive did not pursue the so-called economic “national 
interest” by balancing the interests of the growing pool of trade policy stakeholders, 
but instead by distilling the economic priorities of the business community.  
Like NAFTA, the skewed design of PNTR was not merely the product of 
structural constraints that were established with the creation of the trade advisory 
committee system three decades earlier. Besides these effects of “path dependence,” 
the terms of the PNTR agreement were also shaped by political decisions that were 
purposefully designed to serve the interests of the private sector. This was the case 
when the Clinton administration, under the increasing pressure from the “new China 
lobby” decided to abandon its human rights policy at the beginning of its first term 
and opt for a non-conditional approach to U.S.-Chinese trade relations. This means 
that fair traders face not only institutional impediments but must also overcome 
tremendous political barriers to make their voice heard in the policy process – as the 
next section will confirm.  
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II) MOBILIZATION AND COUNTERMOBILIZATION 
The skewed design of the U.S.-Chinese agreement explains why the bill elicited 
such strong reactions among a large variety of civil society groups. A new element of 
the mobilization against PNTR was the active role played by human rights advocates 
alongside the vociferous lobbying campaign of labor unions and the much more 
sporadic efforts of environmental organizations. Fair traders incorporated the defense 
of human rights as a new plank of their political platform, according to which trade 
liberalization should be secondary to social and environmental objectives. Trade 
unions took the lead to launch a powerful lobbying offensive against the China trade 
bill. Despite a few internal divisions within each segment of the fair trade alliance, the 
vigor of the anti-PNTR campaign rivaled by most accounts the lobbying efforts 
undertaken by organized labor and its allies in previous case studies.  
What distinguished the PNTR fight from the 1997 legislative battle, when the 
voice of fair traders had prevailed, was the unprecedented campaign launched by the 
White House and the business community on behalf of PNTR. Among the case 
studies under consideration in this dissertation, these coordinated lobbying efforts 
were perhaps the clearest example of the dynamics of presidential-corporate 
countermobilization. Despite recent setbacks (fast track, MAI, Seattle) and growing 
skepticism about America’s trade policy model (see below), free traders showed that 
full-scale mobilization could tip the balance and win over reluctant representatives 
from both ends of the political spectrum. On the one hand, the business community 
drew the lessons of their previous defeat to launch a more decentralized and bipartisan 
counteroffensive on behalf of PNTR. On the other, the White House mobilized early 
on an impressive army of officials and political elites to manage a sophisticated 
campaign tightly coordinated with corporate organizations. More than a simple 
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legislative victory, the congressional passage of PNTR challenged the whole progress 
that labor advocates and their allies thought they had achieved over the decade, 
seemingly resetting the clock of American trade politics back to pre-NAFTA time.  
The second half of this chapter analyzes the dynamics of mobilization and 
countermobilization and their importance for the outcome of the PNTR battle. After 
describing the rationale behind the fair traders’ mobilization, the following sections 
will assess the intensity of the fair traders’ lobbying efforts, before examining in 
greater detail the political response of free traders, with an emphasis on the special 
relationship between the White House and the business community.  
 
Human rights advocates and PNTR 
While certainly not as politically powerful as trade insiders like labor or business 
organizations, human rights NGOs had a long record of political advocacy in the 
realm of U.S.-Chinese relations. Among the most prominent actors were Amnesty 
International USA, Human Rights Watch/Asia and Freedom House, which became 
vocal critics of the MFN renewal in the aftermath of the Tiananmen massacre.271  
The election of President Clinton had elicited hopes among human rights 
advocates. As mentioned earlier, Clinton had pledged to adopt conditionality as a core 
element of his China policy. As explained earlier, the appointment of his top policy 
advisers seemed to promise a greater emphasis on human rights in dealing with the 
PRC, insofar as NGOs enjoyed greater access to government officials than they ever 
had under the Bush administration.  
Their insider status of the NGOs, however, was precarious. The growing activism 
of the business community soon undermined human rights organizations’ influence 
                                                
271 For more details on the domestic debates surrounding MFN renewal in the aftermath of the 
Tiananmen incident, read Sutter (1998, chapter 3). 
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on the White House. After President Clinton reneged on his campaign promises and 
embraced engagement as his new foreign policy tenet, human rights organizations 
became increasingly critical of the administration’s policy. They remained involved in 
the MFN debates throughout the 1990s to finally join the chorus of PNTR opponents 
at the end of the decade.  
Through a series of critical reports, human rights organizations highlighted the 
Chinese government’s continued crackdown on free expression, religion and 
association. For Human Rights Watch and its allies, the Permanent Normalization of 
U.S.-Chinese trade relations had to be paired with “concrete, but realistic human 
rights conditions” without which the PRC would never improve its political record 
(Jendrzejczyk, 2000). Human rights activists contrasted the economic freedom 
brought by Den Xiaoping’s reform with the pervasive lack of political freedom in 
Chinese society. For them, Clinton’s “delinking” decision of 1994 had eliminated 
Washington’s leverage over China’s respect of human rights and taken the spotlight 
away the PRC’s abuses. PNTR would make this loss irreversible by emasculating 
Congress’s oversight function.  
Admittedly, not all NGOs followed the same political objectives. Like 
environmental groups, human rights organizations’ involvement in and perspectives 
on trade debates was anything but homogeneous. Although all organizations were 
united by their common concern for human rights in China, not all of them were as 
vehement in their opposition to MFN renewal and PNTR (Sutter, 1998, 53-4). For 
instance, several prominent Chinese activists supported China’s accession to WTO 
hoping that it would force China to abide by the rules of the international community 
(McGregor, 2000) – a position akin to President Clinton’s policy of engagement. In 
general, however, the most prominent human rights NGOs such as Human Rights 
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Watch or Amnesty International strongly opposed the “clean bill” promoted by free 
traders.  
 
Labor advocates 
Like human rights advocates, organized labor had been involved in the MFN 
debates since the early 1990s. As in previous trade debates, the threat of offshoring 
was at the center of this class conflict. As with NAFTA seven years earlier, PNTR 
was seen as an invitation to multinational corporations to shift production to a low-
wage country where workers’ rights violations were common. While business 
interests saw PNTR as a promising source of investment opportunities, workers 
deplored the continuing decline of U.S. manufacturing jobs and the erosion of their 
bargaining power resulting from capital liberalization. A clear example of these class 
dynamics was the auto sector. When questioned about the logic behind the UAW’s 
opposition to PNTR in the light of the new business opportunities in China and the 
unconditional support of the Big Three for trade liberalization with China, UAW 
International Economist Steve Beckman pointed to the gradual shift of production 
away from the United States and the changing nature of bilateral automotive trade in 
the 1990s: from a surplus in 1993 to a billion dollar deficit in 1999 (Beckman, 2000).  
The ever-widening U.S. bilateral trade deficit with China epitomized the swelling 
anxieties of U.S. industrial workers. Between 1990 and 2000, it had increased 
eightfold, jumping from $ 10.5 billion to $ 83.8 billion. (Destler, 2005, 274). For 
unions, this imbalance paralleled America’s mushrooming trade deficit with Mexico 
since NAFTA, whose mixed record had nurtured workers’ skepticism for free trade 
agreements (Hoffman, 2000). Particularly alarming among union members and their 
representatives was the fact that this trade deficit was not confined to traditional 
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manufacturing sectors but had also spilled to higher-value added products like 
computers and electronic components (Mack, 2000; Shailor, 1998; Beckman, 2000).  
With import competition and offshoring at the center of labor’s concerns, the 
AFL-CIO and its Democratic allies in Congress demanded strong safeguard measures 
against import surges (Sweeney, 1999). The terms of the deal concluded in November 
1999 did include measures to protect the US textile and apparel industries, as well as 
a non-market methodology for antidumping272 (Devereaux, Lawrence & Watkins, 
2006, 277). These provisions, however, had little chance of appeasing labor unions to 
the extent that they were outweighed by the great investment opportunities granted to 
American businesses that would continue to encourage capital-owners to transfer 
production units to the world’s new manufacturing center. 
Perhaps as frustrating for labor advocates was the agreement’s complete silence 
on labor standards or human rights, an omission that labor saw as a stab in the back 
after Clinton’s declarations in Seattle. John Sweeney fustigated the White House:  
It is disgustingly hypocritical of the Clinton Administration to pledge to ‘put a 
human face on the global economy’ while prostrating itself in pursuit of a trade 
deal with a rogue nation that decorates itself with human rights abuses as if they 
were medals of honor (cited in IUST, 11/16/99).  
 
Unions denounced the “abysmal” working conditions and exploitative wage levels 
in China, arguing that the latter would overtake Mexico in the “race to the bottom” 
(Mathis, 2000; Beckman, 2000). American labor activists castigated Beijing’s 
approach to collective bargaining, and most specifically, the omnipotent role played 
by the All China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU) – China’s only legal labor 
organization. According to them, the absence of independent unions was partly 
responsible for China’s low labor standards (ranging from its endemic prison labor to 
                                                
272 U.S. trade remedy laws traditionally include special procedures for dealing with products imported 
from non-market economies, under the premise that state intervention can have a distorting effect on 
prices and costs that can put American firms at a competitive disadvantage (Destler, 2005, 349).  
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its substandard hourly wages) to the extent that the ACFTU acted as a surrogate for 
“the interests of both management and the government, but not those of working 
people” (Shailor, 1998; Hoffman, 2000).  
John Sweeney set three conditions for the AFL-CIO to support PNTR: first, that 
the Chinese government adopt and effectively enforce core labor standards before 
joining the WTO; second, that Beijing release all jailed human and labor rights 
activists; and third, that it support Washington’s efforts to incorporate enforceable 
workers’ rights into WTO rule, including the creation of a working council on trade 
and labor standards (Sweeney, 1999).273  
Union officials’ criticisms went beyond the terms of the agreement to question the 
merits of the PNTR deal itself. For them, forfeiting MFN congressional reviews 
would not only deprive Washington of any political leverage on Beijing’s disregard 
for workers’ rights,274 but it would also thwart the United States’ recent efforts to 
promote international labor standards at the World Trade Organization (Hoffman, 
2000; Beckman, 2000). In sum, labor advocates opposed the PNTR bill not only 
because the agreement had given scant consideration to workers’ interests, but also 
because the very process of permanent normalization promised to eviscerate labor’s 
already minor influence on U.S.-China trade relations.   
 
Environmental and consumer organizations 
Although the PNTR debates gravitated primarily around human rights violations 
and the threat of import surges, a number of prominent environmentalists – among 
which the Sierra Club, Greenpeace, Friends of the Earth, the National Wildlife 
                                                
273 Steve Beckman at the UAW formulated criteria along the lines of Sweeney’s first and third 
condition (Beckman, 2000).  
274 With PNTR, the U.S. would  “put a seal of approval on one of the most brutally repressive regimes 
in the world” (Mack, 2000). 
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Federation and the Defenders of Wildlife – joined the fair trade front alongside the 
always vocal Public Citizen. Admittedly, PNTR was never as salient for 
environmentalists as NAFTA had been.275 However, their simple interest in the 
legislative battle surrounding such a complex bilateral market agreement was further 
testimony to the “new politics of trade” that had emerged during the NAFTA debates 
before crystallizing in Seattle in 1999.   
Like human rights and labor advocates, environmental and consumer groups 
denounced the skewed design of the PNTR deal, and more precisely the absence of 
ecological provisions. With Seattle still a fresh memory, they also criticized President 
Clinton for not living up to his pledge to “put a human face on trade”. Wary of a 
“race-to-the-bottom,” they demanded that U.S. companies in China respect a 
minimum set of environmental standards. For them, the failure of U.S. negotiators to 
bring green issues to the negotiating table was all the more regrettable since the 
“U.S.-China trade and investment relationship raise[d] many environmental 
implications” (American Lands Alliance et al, 2000) – implications that would only 
become more salient with rising debates on global warming.  
Environmental and consumer organizations also questioned the very logic of 
PNTR. Like their allies, they were particularly concerned with the loss of political 
leverage that would result from eliminating the MFN renewal process (IUST, 
04/14/00). They called for a more transparent and democratic trade policy process that 
would give environmentalists greater input in international negotiations, as illustrated 
by their efforts to obtain additional seats in the trade advisory committees (American 
Lands Alliance et al, 2000; Joffe, 2000). 
                                                
275 Although it actively opposed PNTR, the Sierra Club did not see the trade bill as a litmus test for 
congressional endorsements (IUST, 04/14/00).  
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The absence of environmental provisions in the trade bill was particularly 
alarming to green groups to the extent that the Chinese government had decided to 
turn a blind eye to environmental degradation to sustain its strong economic growth 
rate.276 Thus, environmentalists viewed the PNTR deal as a Faustian bargain with 
dramatic consequences for air and water pollution in the Middle Kingdom (Hook & 
Lebo, 2008, 319). Finally, and like labor, they also worried that China’s entry at the 
WTO would complicate their efforts to make the intergovernmental organization 
more responsive to environmental concerns.  
In sum, all segments of the fair trade coalition opposed the PNTR deal on two 
principal grounds. First, they denounced the terms of the agreement and the 
administration’s decision to ignore the social and environmental implications of trade 
liberalization with China. They traced these shortcomings to the skewed design of the 
trade policy process, which was related to their second grievance. At a more 
fundamental level, PNTR would reduce their already limited ability to influence the 
policy process by eliminating congressional debates on MFN renewal and transferring 
the oversight of U.S.-Chinese trade relations to the fair-trade-unfriendly WTO.  
 
Fair trade mobilization against PNTR 
Emboldened by their recent political victories – the defeat of fast track and MAI 
and the symbolism of the Seattle protests – fair trade advocates launched a powerful 
lobbying offensive against PNTR. Once again, organized labor took the lead of the 
heterogeneous fair trade opposition, launching “perhaps the most intense effort of its 
kind ever undertaken by unions.”277  
                                                
276 For instance, China has hitherto relied on highly-polluting coal-burning power as its primary source 
of electricity.  
277 Shoch (2001b, 305); see also Greenhouse (2000). 
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Both the AFL-CIO and individual unions – especially the Teamsters, the UAW 
and the U.S. Steelworkers – launched a vigorous grassroots campaign. The threat of 
Chinese competition was of utmost concern to many union members, who rallied en 
masse against the trade bill. In the districts of 32 undecided (mostly Democratic) 
legislators, the AFL-CIO held teach-ins, town hall meetings and rallies. Workers 
distributed anti-PNTR literature at plant gates, went door to door and encouraged their 
members to assault House offices with phone calls and letters. The AFL-CIO 
managed these grassroots efforts by devising “district plans” with specific weekly 
objectives – 250 phone calls, one lobby visit, one coalition meeting, one petition, 
leaflets in 10 key worksites etc. – which were supervised by full-time coordinators 
across the country.278  
In certain cases, union locals representing machine tool, steel, auto, engineering 
and aerospace workers dissented from the leadership’s position and decided to back 
PNTR in defense of the business opportunities it created (Bedard et al, 2000; 
Swoboda, 2000). This small mutiny, however, paled when compared with the 
intensive lobbying campaign that labor advocates launched. Despite the strong pro-
PNTR lobbying efforts of producers in both agriculture and manufacturing sectors, 
the National Farmers Union (NFU)279 and a strong group of industrial unions (UAW, 
IMAW, UNITE, Teamsters) opposed the China deal (Shoch, 2001, 241; Public 
Citizen, 2000).  
Like the NAFTA debates, the PNTR battle also featured coalition-building. Once 
again, the Citizens Trade Campaign (CTC) was at the center of these efforts, 
                                                
278 See Sweeney (2000). See also Greenhouse (2000), Swoboda (2000), Shoch (2001b, 305), and 
Peterson (2000). 
279 Read National Farmers Union (2000). The National Farmers Union narrowly voted to oppose PNTR 
but this did not prevent state chapters of the federation to press for the legislation. The NFU’s main 
concerns about PNTR were Washington’s inability to enforce trade agreements and China’s record of 
non-compliance (IUST, 03/10/00).  
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coordinating grassroots campaigns between environmental, consumer and labor 
organizations like the Steelworkers and UNITE! (IUST, 11/16/99). Similarly, the 
AFL-CIO often lobbied in conjunction with other allies including human rights and 
religious organizations, exiled Chinese dissidents etc. However, coalition-building 
efforts remain uneven. If labor unions and Public Citizen embraced coalition-building 
tactics, environmentalists and human rights organizations were less prone to “frame 
extension.”280 Furthermore, while the incorporation of human rights advocates in the 
fair trade coalition might have bolstered the latter’s legitimacy, the benefits of this 
alliance in terms of human or financial resources were less clear. Indeed, human 
rights organizations typically rely on smaller financial resources than labor or 
environmental organizations and more rarely mobilize their membership for 
grassroots campaigns (Sutter, 1998, 53).  
Nevertheless, human rights organizations still played an important role in the 
communications campaign launched by PNTR opponents. Organizations like Human 
Rights Watch, the Freedom House and Amnesty International published regular 
studies exposing the Chinese government’s human rights abuses. Given the PRC’s 
strict restriction on media news, these reports constituted rare sources of information 
on the on-the-ground political situation in China and were, as such, closely monitored 
by government officials. These studies also served as ammunition for activists in both 
the United States and China. For instance, in 1999, Amnesty International launched a 
media campaign commemorating the 10-year anniversary of the Tiananmen massacre 
and sponsored demonstrations against human rights abuses in the PRC (Hook & 
Lebo, 2008, 318-9).  
                                                
280 David Snow and his colleagues define frame extension as the process of “extend[ing] the boundaries 
of a primary framework of collective action so as to encompass interests of considerable salience to 
potential adherents” (Snow et al, 1986, 472). 
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Unions also launched a costly communications campaign. In total, the AFL-CIO 
spent $2.2 million on anti-PNTR television and broadcast ads, admittedly only a 
fraction of the media expenses of the free trade alliance.281 This complemented the 
million pieces of anti-PNTR literature that unions distributed in 60 districts 
(Swoboda, 2000). As part of their communication tactics, union officials denied 
accusations of protectionism – despite their support for import safeguards – and 
stressed the need for a new fair trade policy that would give greater importance to 
workers and human rights.282 Since the Tiananmen massacres, organized labor had 
sided with human rights advocates to denounce Beijing’s repressive record and 
repeatedly demanded that Congress suspends China’s MFN status. Under the 
Sweeney administration, the AFL-CIO continued to replace its advocacy efforts as 
part of a broader struggle for social justice: “The AFL-CIO believes strongly that we 
have a responsibility to work to strengthen democratic forces, improve economic 
conditions, and advance human rights in China” (Sweeney, 1999). The Federation’s 
“sample letters to the editor” in its lobbying kit included calls to change “the rules of 
the game,” and to reject a deal with “one of the biggest polluters in the world,” a 
country that “denies its citizens religious freedoms.”283  
Finally, organized labor relied heavily on inside lobbying tactics. To complement 
their grassroots efforts at the local level, unions mobilized thousands of their members 
on Capitol Hill. The AFL-CIO also organized one-on-one meetings with House 
representatives as well as group sessions with moderate Republicans, the Black 
                                                
281 See below.  
282 For instance, in his congressional testimony, Teamsters’ representatives Chuck Mack declared: 
 “Please understand that the Teamsters Union is not anti-trade. In fact, we support trade that benefits 
people. We think American workers should face fair competition, not competition based on a race to 
the bottom: fair trade – not free trade.” (Mack, 2000; see also Hoffman, 2000).  
283 See appendices 7, 8 and 9. 
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Caucus and the New York congressional delegation (Greenhouse, 2000; Swoboda, 
2000; Eilperin & Broder, 2000; IUST, 02/04/00).  
The proximity of congressional elections complicated labor’s intense lobbying 
efforts. On the one hand, many Democrats who feared for their reelection were 
tempted to follow labor’s call to oppose PNTR. On the other, labor leaders were 
ambivalent about scaling back their support for Democrats for fear this might 
jeopardize their chances of winning back Congress, a top priority on labor’s agenda 
(Swoboda, 2000). As is often the case, the AFL-CIO adopted a more cautious 
approach than independent unions. According to Steve Rosenthal, political director of 
the AFL-CIO, unions would not make the PNTR vote “a litmus test” for supporting 
Democratic candidates.  In fact, John Sweeney himself admitted that he had never 
threatened retribution against PNTR supporters in his meetings with congressmen 
(Greenhouse, 2000). Both the Teamsters and the UAW, however, adopted a tougher 
line and openly threatened to punish unfaithful Democrats. Teamsters President James 
Hoffa put it clearly: “there are no free votes. This is the line in the sand” (cited in 
Shoch, 2001, 242). After warning Democrats that it would cut its financial support 
and reduce its get-out-the-vote efforts for the congressional elections, the UAW 
withheld its support for Democratic presidential candidates and brandished the threat 
of backing Green Party nominee Ralph Nader (Swoboda, 2000; Kosterlitz, 2000; 
Eilperin & Broder, 2000). While these might have seemed like empty threats, a study 
by Jackson and Engel (2003) showed that labor PACs did punish pro-PNTR 
Democrats – especially vulnerable candidates – in the 2000 congressional elections.  
Environmentalists were also active inside the Beltway. A group of green 
organizations managed to rally a group of Democratic “environmental champions” in 
Congress, who pledged to oppose Clinton’s trade bill. In a joint letter to the 
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administration, the legislators raised their concerns for the “litany of missed 
opportunities” to address environmental problems, among them trade in endangered 
species or global warming, and exhorted their fellow lawmakers to reject PNTR: "We 
should neither put our seal of approval on this flawed agreement, nor give up our 
annual opportunity to scrutinize the environmental implications of U.S.-China trade" 
(Friends of the Earth 2000a & b).  
Finally, Public Citizen, drawing the lessons of the NAFTA fight, sought to 
counter the arm-twisting methods of the Clinton administration by warning 
congressmen of empty promises. As the PNTR vote neared, Lori Wallach’s Global 
Trade Watch sent a report entitled “The Clinton Record on Trade Vote Deal Making: 
High Infidelity” to all congressional offices (Public Citizen, 2000b). This tactic might 
have contributed to the reduction of pork-barrel deals between the White House and 
“undecided” representatives (see below). 
In sum, labor and its environmental, consumer and human rights allies launched a 
powerful lobbying campaign against PNTR, making extensive use of grassroots and 
information resources outside and inside the Beltway, putting House representatives 
under strong pressure to oppose the trade bill. For the purpose of this study, what is 
important to note is that despite a few weaknesses – dissenting voices among local 
labor unions or the AFL-CIO’s ambivalence about threatening Democratic candidates 
– the mobilization of fair traders against PNTR was at least as vigorous as it had been 
during the fast track battle of 1997 (IUST, 11/16/99). Did these advocacy efforts have 
the same impact on the House vote as they had in 1997? And if not, what obstacles 
prevented them from delivering another blow to free trade forces?  
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Impact of mobilization  
The vigor of fair traders’ mobilization, particularly the advocacy efforts of labor 
unions, did not pay off as much as in previous trade battles. Most importantly, fair 
traders did not manage to sway enough votes in either political party to defeat PNTR. 
On May 24, 2000, the House approved the trade bill by 237 to 197 votes, a 
surprisingly comfortable margin considering that the PNTR fight had so much in 
common with the fast track battle. 
What fair traders managed to accomplish, however, was to prolong a national 
dialogue on fair trade, the social and environmental ramifications of America’s trade 
policy. The blue-green alliance’s frequent references to NAFTA’s record and the 
Seattle protests, as well as the growing involvement of human rights organizations, 
showed that the PNTR debates went beyond the free-trade/protectionism dichotomy 
of the pre-NAFTA era.  
As during previous debates, fair traders won the “popular vote” on PNTR. A 
BW/Harris Poll released in April 2000 revealed that the blue-green alliance had 
managed to gain considerable support for its agenda over the decade. Indeed, 74% of 
Americans believed that preventing unfair competition by countries that violate 
workers’ rights should be a major priority of U.S. trade agreements; 80% thought that 
protecting the environment should be a key objective of American trade policy; and 
77% thought that preventing the loss of U.S. jobs should be at the top of 
Washington’s agenda. In contrast, three common arguments in favor of free trade – 
keeping foreign markets open to U.S. exports, keeping prices for U.S. consumers low, 
and encouraging competition in U.S. markets –  were seen as a major priority for U.S. 
trade policy by, respectively, only 56, 58, and 64% of the public. This reveals that 
although free trade arguments still had traction among Americans, fair trade seemed 
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to have become a more popular trade policy model. Indeed, 51% of respondents 
declared to be “fair traders” (“someone who believes in trade with some standards for 
labor and the environment”), 37% of them claimed to be protectionist (someone who 
thinks “there should be rules to protect U.S. markets and workers from imports”) 
while only 10% called themselves “free traders” (“someone who believes in trade 
without any restriction”). Of course, the meanings of these labels are always 
ambiguous: the protection of intellectual property rights associated with “free trade” 
actually restricts the trade of goods and services, while fair trade usually implies a 
certain degree of import protection. What is important is the uneasiness of American 
citizens toward trade liberalization and their growing support for measures to address 
the environmental and social implications of trade policy, in contrast with the “clean” 
bills favored by the White House. In the case of PNTR, Americans were also at odds 
with the free trade agenda of the Clinton administration. When asked if the best way 
to improve human and worker rights in China would be “not to restrict trade but 
engage China and include it in World Trade Organization and give it permanent 
access to U.S. markets” – the main argument of PNTR advocates – only 15% of 
respondents agreed. In contrast, 79% believed that “Congress should only give China 
permanent access to the U.S. markets when it agrees to meet human rights and labor 
standards” (Business Week, 2000).  
If fair traders lost the PNTR legislative battle, they also still managed to preserve 
a pool of sympathizers in Congress. Despite the comfortable margin of the final vote, 
the passage of PNTR long remained uncertain. The intense pressures from both fair 
traders and free traders led lawmakers to shy away from taking a position until the 
final days of the campaign. Thus, a week before the vote, neither side could claim to 
have secured the 218 votes it needed to prevail (Greenhouse, 2000, IUST, 05/14/99). 
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For all this uncertainty, however, the China trade bill was never as threatened as other 
major trade bills under consideration in this dissertation. First, the scheduling of the 
PNTR vote was not subject to the repeated delays of the NAFTA and fast track bills. 
Second, despite the uncertainty surrounding the vote, free traders were confident that 
they could rally enough lawmakers to support such a lucrative business agreement. 
For instance, three days before the vote, Secretary of Commerce William Daley 
anticipated that he could obtain 70 to 80 Democratic supporters and about 150 
Republican allies to back PNTR, a prediction that proved close to the final tally 
(IUST, 05/22/00).  
More surprising to PNTR advocates was the comfortable margin of the vote, 
which according to the New York Times surprised even Tom Delay, the chief 
Republican counter (Schmitt & Kahn, 2000). In the end, 73 out of 211 Democrats 
backed PNTR while 164 out of 222 Republicans supported it. The fact that only 35% 
of Democrats followed President Clinton’s free trade lead testified to the influence of 
PNTR opponents on the final vote. Indeed, under his presidency, Democrats had 
supported MFN annual renewal by an average of 65.5%. While support for MFN 
among Democrats had somewhat declined across the decade, no fewer than 110 of 
them still backed preserving China’s trade status in 1999. Of course, permanent 
normalization of U.S.-Chinese trade relations was different from the annual review 
process. Yet, the fact that 40 House Democrats suddenly turned against PNTR seems 
to reveal that fair traders’ mobilization did have a significant impact on the vote. If 
the support for PNTR among Democrats was considerably weaker than for MFN 
renewal throughout the decade, it was also notably stronger than Democratic backing 
for fast track renewal had been in 1997 and 1998. While 1 in 3 Democrats supported 
PNTR in 2000, only 1 in 5 had defended free trade in 1997 and 1 in 7 in 1998. This 
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means that fair trade mobilization may not have achieved its full potential among 
Democratic representatives. 
On the Republican side, anti-PNTR advocacy efforts hardly made a difference. 
First, compared with the 1999 MFN vote, support for trade liberalization with China 
actually increased from 68% to 74% for the PNTR vote. It was slightly superior to the 
70-per-cent average support for MFN renewal among GOP members under the 
Clinton administration. Republican support for PNTR also increased in comparison 
with the fast track votes, surprising both Daley and Delay. In 1998, only 67% of 
Republicans defended trade liberalization (Shoch, 2001, 225, 243).  
To what extent did fair traders convince or fail to convince members of congress 
to oppose PNTR? Here again, congressional studies of the PNTR vote provide some 
answers to this question. As often, the story behind lawmakers’ decision was partly 
one of sectional interests. On the one hand, PNTR opponents found great comfort 
among representatives from districts with high level of blue collar, unionized and 
trade-related manufacturing jobs, districts where labor’s grassroots operations were 
most likely to be more effective (Xie, 2006). Thus, Democrats from states like New 
Jersey, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Indiana, Illinois and Michigan were particularly prone to 
oppose the China trade bill. On the other hand, labor and their allies had more trouble 
winning the hearts of representatives from districts with strong agriculture or high 
tech interests, especially including big states like Texas, California and New York 
(IUST, 05/26/00).  
As mentioned earlier, the influence of sectional factors on congressional votes 
does not necessarily negate the importance of financial donations. In this case, it can 
mean that, for certain districts, the strong lobbying efforts of the high tech and farm 
industries were more effective than the grassroots operations of fair traders. Again, 
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one should not underestimate the sustained degree of uncertainty on congressional 
votes and the difficult political decisions that representatives face when they are 
cross-pressured by fair and free traders. For instance, Inside U.S. Trade reported that a 
few weeks before the vote, the AFL-CIO narrowed its focus to 15 undecided 
members from both parties, which included difficult votes like that of future free trade 
leader Cal Dooley (D-CA). In the end, 6 of these targets (3 Democrats and 3 
Republicans) ended up opposing PNTR, while 9 (6 Democrats and 3 Republicans) 
supported the trade bill (IUST, 04/28/00). This shows that votes were in flux until the 
final weeks before the vote, and either fair trade mobilization or free trade 
countermobilization could make a difference in the final outcome.  
While congressional analyses may not always be suited to assess the impact of 
grassroots tactics, they are more effective at capturing the effect of campaign 
contributions. Here, two studies of the PNTR vote establish a correlation between 
labor PAC contributions and opposition to PNTR. Hasnat and Callahan (2002) find 
that an increase of 1% in PAC contributions decreased the likelihood of a member 
supporting PNTR by 4.2%. Similarly, a study by the Center for Responsive Politics 
reveals that PNTR opponents received on average $25,000 more in union money 
(PAC and individual donations) than PNTR supporters.284 This aggregate pattern, 
however, obscures partisan cleavages. Among Democrats, fair traders’ allies took in 
an average of $76,000 compared to $59,000 for opponents. In contrast, GOP 
representatives opposing the trade bill received only $12,000 on average, while PNTR 
supporters from the Republican Party only obtained $6,400.  
This reveals the imbalance in labor’s campaign contributions, regardless of a 
lawmaker’s position on PNTR. Although labor’s outside and inside tactics did bolster 
                                                
284 The former category received on average $58,000 while the latter received only $23,000.  
256 
  
opposition to PNTR among Democrats, its ability to convince Republicans seemed 
constrained by its traditional allegiance to Democratic congressmen. The fair traders’ 
dependency on the Democratic Party might not have been so problematic if a 
powerful alliance between the White House and the business community had not 
decided to launch an all-out campaign to win the heart of representatives from both 
parties. The next section turns to their joint countermobilization.  
 
The business counteroffensive  
If there were slight divisions on the fair trade front, the free trade alliance was 
united beyond any precedent. The countermobilization of business groups in favor of 
PNTR operated at three interconnected levels: 1) conglomerate business organizations 
like the BRT, ECAT, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, NAM and the U.S.-China 
Business Council; 2) sectorial business organizations or ad hoc alliances such as the 
“Agriculture Coalition for U.S. China Trade” (representing 80 agribusinesses and 
trade groups)285, the Coalition of Service Industries, the U.S. High Tech Coalition on 
China286 and the American Council of Life Insurance287; and 3) a motley-crew of 
individual companies with strong interests in PNTR, including Boeing, Motorola, 
General Motors, General Electric, American International Group (AIG), Caterpillar, 
whose independent efforts sometimes created tension with the rest of the coalition 
(IUST, 04/02/99; Public Citizen, 2000, 19).  
                                                
285 Among the most active farm groups were the American Farm Bureau Federation, the National 
Cattlemen’s Beef Association and the National Pork Producers Council (Stone, 2000, 945).  
286 This older organization included the American Electronics Association, the Electronic Industries 
Alliance and the Semiconductor Industry Association, all of which were very pro-active in the pro-
PNTR campaign. A lobbyist for the Electronic Industries Alliance declared PNTR to be “the biggest 
vote of the decade” (cited in Public Citizen, 2000, 12). 
287 The American Council of Life Insurers represented 512 companies in the insurance and proved 
bullish about the market-agreement negotiated by Washington (Stone, 2000). 
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In the first half of 1999, the business community rallied its forces under the flag of 
the “Business Coalition for U.S. China Trade.”288 As mentioned earlier, the 
involvement of this wide range of corporate interests in the final legislative battle was 
only the final phase of a long lobbying campaign that had begun in the first half of the 
1990s.  
What distinguished the final counteractive lobbying efforts on behalf of PNTR 
from earlier trade battles like NAFTA and fast track was not only the better timing but 
also the scale of their offensive on all fronts: from a carefully planned media blitz to a 
new emphasis on grassroots mobilization and a more balanced approach to campaign 
contributions. In conjunction with the aggressive efforts undertaken by the White 
House (see below), the free traders’ lobbying operations shattered the hopes of fair 
traders by securing a strong majority of congressional votes.  
The first pillar of the business community’s lobbying strategy rested on its 
vigorous communications campaign, principally coordinated by the Business 
Roundtable. The latter had laid the groundwork in its public relations efforts in 1998 
and 1999, by commissioning a series of studies on the business opportunities that 
increased trade with China could generate for each of the 50 states (Business 
Roundtable, 2000). These studies would serve as ammunition for both outside and 
inside efforts on behalf of PNTR.  
The Business Roundtable relied on a traditional combination of national television 
spots and radio and print ads to target Congress members in 50 districts. Its 
communication efforts intensified from the Easter recess to the final weeks before the 
vote, when the BRT capitalized on editorial endorsements for PNTR (Business 
Roundtable, 05/16/00). Other business organizations like ECAT, the U.S. Chamber of 
                                                
288 The Business Coalition for U.S. China Trade had 4 co-chairmen who were respectively top 
executives from Boeing, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, ECAT and the U.S.-China Business Council 
(IUST, 05/14/99).  
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Commerce, NAM and the agriculture and high tech coalitions also launched 
independent media campaigns in numerous districts (Business Roundtable, 05/16/00). 
Similarly, corporate heavyweights like Motorola, Citigroup and Boeing purchased 
advertising in prominent newspapers like The Washington Post, The New York Times, 
The Chicago Tribune etc. (Stone, 2000; Public Citizen, 2000, 26-8). An in-depth 
analysis of the pro-PNTR campaign by Public Citizen estimates the total advertising 
costs of the BRT and the USCC at between $13 and $15 million,289 i.e. about seven 
times as much as labor unions’ advertising expenses ($2 million). To put the PNTR 
lobbying efforts in perspective, this sum represents more than the combined costs of 
the “Harry and Louise” ad series against healthcare reform in 1993 ($4 million) and 
the entire NAFTA advertising campaign ($8 million) (Public Citizen, 2000, i).290  
The second pillar of the business campaign for PNTR was its new approach to 
grassroots – or, according to some, “astroturf” or “grasstops”291 – operations. Recent 
trade battles – fast track, MAI and the Seattle protests – seemed to prove that 
grassroots mobilization had been a powerful weapon of the fair trade coalition. The 
business community realized that it had to rebuild confidence in trade liberalization 
within the American public (Hirsch, 2000).  
The BRT’s efforts to collect economic data on the local impact of trade were part 
of a new decentralized approach to trade politics. BRT Trade Taskforce Chairman 
Phil Condit vowed that the business pro-PNTR campaign would have a “higher local 
                                                
289 Given their partiality, Public Citizen’s studies must be examined carefully and submitted to cross-
comparisons. However, unlike many other partisan sources, these reports systematically cites their 
sources of information, often derived from the local, national or specialized press. They can offer rare 
accounts of the inner works of corporate lobbying. In this case, Public Citizen’s estimates of the 
advertising costs of the PNTR campaign does seem conservative – as claimed by the organization – 
considering that a week worth of TV advertising cost the BRT $1.5 million (Stone, 2000).  
290 The average monthly cost of advertising for PNTR exceeded the average monthly advertising 
expenditures of all issue advocacy efforts over the previous 15-month period (Public Citizen, 2000, 
25). 
291 “Grasstops,” like “astroturf,” refers to the artificial production of local support for legislation, but 
applies more specifically to business’s recruitment of executives as political advocates, in 
contradistinction with “grassroots” mobilization.   
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content” than efforts on behalf of NAFTA and fast track (Koffler, 2000). In 1998, the 
BRT launched its “GoTrade” Website, designed to “help Americans better understand 
the benefits of trade.” It featured economic data, trade and investment myths and 
realities and copies of the BRT’s recent print and TV ads.292 In a similar vein, the 
Chamber of Commerce recognized the need to address its credibility deficit in the 
trade sphere. Thus, at the end of the 1990s, USCC President Tom Donahue decided to 
create Trade Roots, “a sustained, national trade education program dedicated to 
building grassroots support for trade in the U.S. Congress and to stopping anti-trade 
protectionism” (TradeRoots, undated) According to Senior Director of International 
Policy Christopher Wenk, this long-term, “programmatic” grassroots strategy differed 
from the more sporadic efforts undertaken by the USCC and their allies during 
previous battles (Wenk, 2008*; also, Reilly, 2007*). Yet, it could also be easily 
adapted to short-term campaigns, as illustrated by the creation of “TradeRoots 
China,” an initiative designed to provide local facts and figures about U.S.-China 
trade.  
Corporate interests’ epiphany about the importance of grassroots operations led 
them to multiply initiatives to build local support for PNTR. To mobilize business 
owners and workers, the private sector relied on a combination of traditional and 
innovative grassroots tactics. Business organizations drew on labor’s modus operandi 
in several respects. They used all media channels – letters, phone-banking 
operations,293 emails – to exhort workers and executives alike to pressure Congress 
members to support PNTR. Less typically, certain employers like the agribusiness 
giant Farmland printed messages on their employees’ paychecks. In addition, the 
                                                
292 See Business Roundtable (1998); see also Harbrecht (1998).  
293 One of the most extreme case of the business community’s “astroturf” tactics was the BRT’s 
purchase of $40,000 worth of telephone cards with pro-PNTR messages distributed by hired temporary 
workers to Washington commuters (Public Citizen, 2000, 24).  
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Electronic Industries Alliance provided its 2,100 member companies with Web-based 
lobbying tool kits to recruit activists (BRT, 04/13/00; Public Citizen, 2000, 21-22; 
Stone, 2000). In most cases, business organizations provided their recruits with 
talking points and “local” materials, linked them with other CEOs from larger firms 
and helped organize meetings with House representatives in their districts. The BRT’s 
grassroots network claimed to have conducted nearly 300 face-to-face meeting with 
congressmen between January and April, in addition to  “thousands of letters, faxes, 
e-mails, and phone calls to Congress in the [weeks leading to the Easter recess]” 
(BRT, 04/19/00).  
The business community countered the fair traders’ grassroots efforts not only at 
the local level, but also in Washington, by organizing various pro-PNTR events such 
as rallies with farmers and workers,294 as well as the distribution of baskets filled with 
export products to China (cell phones, computer chips, Pepsi etc.) to 300 House 
members (Public Citizen, 2000, 11). 
This combination of traditional and innovative lobbying tactics was, according to 
BRT President Samuel L. Maury the “stealth weapon” and the “real backbone” of the 
PNTR campaign (BRT, 05/24/00). While the BRT downplayed the influence of 
corporate contributions in the legislative battle, both free traders and fair traders 
agreed that the grassroots efforts of PNTR advocates partly played a role in deflecting 
the powerful grassroots opposition to the China trade bill. Even Public Citizen 
acknowledged that, despite their high costs, “astroturf” campaigns mattered: “When 
done well, it created the appearance of local pro-PNTR counter-force to the real, 
natural anti-PNTR coalitions existing across the country” (Public Citizen, 2000, 21). 
                                                
294 When the Business Coalition for U.S. China organized a “lobby day” to counter the 20,000 union 
workers mobilizing for an anti-PNTR rally on Capitol Hill, an estimated 300 workers took the free trip 
to Washington (Public Citizen, 2000, 23; IUST 04/07/00). 
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Business’s new emphasis on grassroots tactics was one defining aspect of its pro-
PNTR campaign that epitomized the evolutionary nature of countermobilization. The 
private sector had adapted its lobbying tactics to offset the grassroots power of fair 
trade advocates.  
Its inside-the-Beltway strategy would reflect a similar learning process. On 
Capitol Hill, the private sector relied on traditional arm-twisting methods. What 
changed between 1997-1998 and 2000 was the greater scope of the business 
community’s lobbying efforts, and more specifically its decision to rebalance its 
financial support between the two political parties.  
Following a common practice of annual MFN debates, the Business Coalition for 
U.S. China Trade organized series of fly-in visits for business owners in Washington 
(Stone, 2000; Public Citizen, 2000, 11). On Capitol Hill, corporate interests deployed 
an armada of lobbyists to push the China trade bill. According to Public Citizen, the 
U.S. Chamber of Commerce had more than half of its 45 registered lobbyists working 
on PNTR and dedicated at least one lobbyist for each undecided voter on the day of 
the vote. The Business Roundtable reportedly hired seven firms for a total of more 
than $1 million and mobilized 27 lobbyists to work on China trade issues during 1999 
(Public Citizen, 2000, 15-20). 
As during previous debates, these lobbying efforts inside the Beltway were 
coordinated with White House officials. Secretary of Commerce William Daley, 
former “NAFTA czar” in charge of the PNTR campaign, maintained a close 
relationship with business representatives through strategic meetings that sometimes 
included congressional leaders (Koffler, 2000). One particularly telling example of 
the collaboration between the private sector and the White House was the fact that 
large multinational corporations like Aetna, AOL, Boeing and Citigroup hired former 
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USTR Mickey Kantor to lobby for PNTR (Stone, 2000). As during the NAFTA 
debates, the “revolving door” between the public and private spheres functioned as 
another facet of the “special relationship.”  
If political insiders are useful resources on the Capitol, financial contributions are 
even more important in an election year. Here, the business community used the 
promise of campaign donations as both carrots and sticks. Like labor, business 
representatives did not refrain from threatening House representatives who might 
oppose PNTR. USCC President Thomas openly declared: “If somebody’s on the 
margin and they screw up this vote, they’d better not look for me for money” (cited in 
Public Citizen, 2000, 9).  
In addition, business representatives lured ambivalent lawmakers by promising to 
hold fundraisers for those under pressure from labor and environmental 
constituencies. With the help of congressional allies like Cal Dooley (D-CA), 
corporate organizations established a Political Action Committee called the “New 
Democratic Network.” Funded by multinational corporations like AOL, Motorola, 
Citigroup and Boeing, this PAC is estimated to have raised $250,000 for pro-PNTR 
Democrats. Between March 2000 and the PNTR vote, the New Democratic Network 
planned to hold four fundraisers (Stone, 2000; Maggs, 2000; Public Citizen, 2000, ii). 
In at least one other case, these vote-buying methods were even cruder: Rep. Merrill 
Cook (R-UT) was offered $200,000 to change his vote, according to one of his 
spokespersons (Public Citizen, 2000, 10).  
According to Public Citizen, the Business Roundtable spent $68.2 million on 
PAC, soft money and individual donations to Congress between January 1999 and 
May 2000. While PNTR was clearly a top priority for the business community in 
2000, however, it is impossible to estimate what fraction of this sum the private sector 
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would have been spent in the absence of the trade vote. Thus, it is safe to say that 
Public Citizen’s estimate exaggerates the cost of the PNTR campaign. Just the same, 
this imperfect estimate is useful when compared with labor donations to congressmen 
in the period preceding the PNTR vote. This sum amounted to $31 million or less 
than half of business contributions (Public Citizen, 2000, ii-iii). In the period 
preceding the vote, the contrast is even more salient. BRT members spent 11.5 times 
more soft money than labor unions in the month preceding the May 2000 vote (Public 
Citizen, 2000, 8).  
Perhaps as important as the size of corporate donations was their bipartisan nature. 
As mentioned earlier, the business community made a deliberate effort to offset the 
pressures (financial or constituency-based) exerted by labor and its allies on 
Democratic members by providing pecuniary incentives to support PNTR. This 
attempt to rebalance the lobbying operations of the private sector came from the 
realization that socially conservative Republicans were not always in tune with 
corporate interests. For instance, in a 1998 memo, the Business-Industry Political 
Action Committee (BIPAC) went as far as suggesting that business end its cozy 
relationship with the GOP to support candidates in both parties who share its 
worldview (Dunham, 1998). As mentioned earlier, this rebalancing act was also 
encouraged by the New Democratic Coalition and the Democratic Leadership 
Council, which had consistently promoted a pro-business agenda under the Clinton’s 
presidency.295 This tactical move aimed to reduce the Democrats’ dependency on 
labor’s financial support. It was another sign of the evolutionary nature of 
countermobilization.  
                                                
295 For a discussion, read Shoch (2001, 306-9) and Hirsch (2000).  
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In sum, the business community launched an unprecedented lobbying campaign 
on behalf of PNTR that rested upon three main pillars: a well-planned 
communications campaign, sophisticated grassroots operations and a better balanced, 
bipartisan approach to inside lobbying.  
What impact did the corporate offensive have on the PNTR vote? Analyzing 
campaign contributions is the first place to start to test business influence on the 
PNTR vote. Here, Hasnat and Callahan’s (2002) study reveals a positive correlation 
between business PAC contributions and support for PNTR. More specifically, a one-
percent increase in campaign donations would increase a member’s likelihood to 
support the trade bill by 1.8%. The Center for Responsive Politics’ analysis of the 
PNTR vote confirms this tendency. House members who approved the China deal 
received an average of $44,000 in PAC and individual donations, while lawmakers 
voting “no” took in an average of only $25,000. These trends were comparable 
between Republican and Democratic members. Pro-PNTR Republicans received an 
average of $47,000 while opponents took in only $31,000. Free trade Democrats 
received $37,000 compared with $22,000 for anti-trade or fair trade representatives 
(Center for Responsive Politics 2000). These figures illustrate the more balanced 
distribution of corporate donations in comparison with those of labor unions. 
According to Shoch (2001, 247-8), this was a crucial factor behind the free traders’ 
victory. As mentioned earlier, the private sector’s seduction campaign found 
sympathetic ears among pro-business Democrats, many of whom sought political 
donations from the high tech industry (IUST, 05/26/00).  
Another way to measure the impact of the strong lobbying campaign launched by 
the business community is by comparing its lobbying objectives with the outcome of 
the legislative battle. A close examination of the business whip list released by Inside 
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U.S. Trade reveals that out of 89 targeted members, the business community managed 
to rally 48 members or 54% of them behind the PNTR cause. This included 22 out of 
the 52 targeted Democrats (or 42%) and 26 out of 37 Republicans (77%). Of course, 
not all these votes can be attributed to the lobbying efforts of the business community. 
Many of the targeted members had consistently supported MFN renewal during the 
1990s and/or could also have been swayed by other factors, including the president’s 
own lobbying efforts. What this seems to confirm, however, is that the business 
community, unlike fair traders, exerted influence on both political parties. 
Among Republicans, the most unexpected votes came from a number of 
conservative members, many of whom had opposed MFN during the 1990s out of 
security concerns. Thus, GOP support for trade liberalization with China rose from 
150 for the 1999 MFN vote to 164 for PNTR. Here, it seems that the strong lobbying 
efforts of the business community mitigated the effects of ideological factors, factors 
that had been strong predictors of support for MFN during the previous decade  
(IUST, 02/18/00).296 This unexpectedly strong support of Republicans behind PNTR 
proved all the more crucial to the PNTR victory since President Clinton’s lobbying 
efforts had little impact on Republican lawmakers, and particularly conservative 
representatives.  
Also crucial to the passage of PNTR was the free traders’ ability to neutralize 
influential Democrats, i.e. to prevent them from rallying party members against the 
China trade bill. In this regard, it is not coincidental that among Democratic 
representatives, the influential Charles B. Rangel (D-NY), who belatedly sided with 
the PNTR-supporters, was the second largest recipient of the Business Roundtable’s 
2000 campaign contributions (Center for Responsive Politics, 2000b; Schmitt, 2000). 
                                                
296 In his analysis of the MFN votes in the 1990s, Nokken captures the dynamics of ideological factors 
with the expression “The Ideological Ends Against the Middle” with moderates typically defending 
MFN renewal against liberal Democrats and conservative Republicans (Nokken, 2003).  
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Rangel’s endorsement may have contributed to the surprisingly large support for 
PNTR among representatives from New York, a state with a traditionally strong union 
presence. 297 Similarly, the business community managed to neutralize the persuasive 
powers of the once vocal protectionist Dick Gephardt (D-MO). After the Missourian 
lawmaker came out against the trade bill, the high tech industry exhorted him to 
remain neutral in the debate while threatening to cut the Democrats’ funds for the 
upcoming congressional election. Acknowledging the importance of corporate 
donations and New Democratic candidates for the party’s chances of regaining the 
House in 2000, Gephardt’s staff began to downplay the issue (Stone, 2000; Shoch, 
2001; Hirsch, 2000).298  
In sum, the powerful lobbying efforts of the business community made a 
difference among members from both political parties, as exemplified by both 
congressional analyses of the PNTR vote and reports on the inner struggles of the 
legislative process. Once again, their campaign was closely coordinated with the 
lobbying offensive of the White House. 
 
Clinton’s campaign: full-scale countermobilization 
The scale of the lobbying efforts undertaken by the Clinton administration marked 
a sharp contrast with its hands-off approach to fast track renewal that, as described in 
the previous chapter, had resulted in a political fiasco. In addition, the PNTR 
campaign was the first time that the lobbying efforts of the executive branch and its 
coordination with the private sector came under congressional investigation, a first 
attempt to officially expose the special relationship examined in this analysis.   
                                                
297 A majority of New York’s 31 representatives voted for the measure (IUST, 05/26/00). Rangel’s 
endorsement of PNTR is said to have influenced the vote of several members of the Congressional 
Black Caucus (Schmitt & Kahn, 2000).  
298 His spokeswoman declared: “We are by no means ‘whipping’ it” because Gephardt wants members 
to vote “their conscience” (Hirsch, 2000).  
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After the fast track fiasco, the collapse of the MAI talks and the failure to start a 
new round at the WTO, PNTR was crucial to Bill Clinton’s foreign economic policy 
legacy. For domestic reasons, the China trade bill was also a must-win issue, without 
which the Democratic leadership could jeopardize the rest of its political agenda.299 
Accordingly, the Oval Office launched what Public Citizen has called “the largest 
legislative effort the White House has made over the last two terms – surpassing 
notable fights such as NAFTA and health care” (Public Citizen, 2000, 28). Of course, 
both the Democratic and Republican teams in Congress also played an important role 
in building support for PNTR. But, in parallel with the business community’s 
lobbying efforts, the White House’s offensive was essential to secure what became a 
surprisingly strong legislative victory.  
This time, the Clinton administration meticulously planned its legislative 
campaign. On February 1, 2000, under the request of the President, Secretary of 
Commerce Bill Daley established the China Trade Relations Working Group, a team 
of high-level officials in charge of coordinating interagency activities associated with 
the passage of PNTR for China. The group was structured around 10 principals, five 
of whom were presidential advisers, while the five others were department or agency 
heads, including Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, USTR Charlene Barshefsky, 
Secretary of Agriculture Dan Glickman, Secretary of Treasury Lawrence Summers 
and former “NAFTA czar” Secretary of Commerce Bill Daley. The latter closely 
coordinated the House lobbying effort, in conjunction with Steve Richetti, a “classic 
revolving door lobbyist” who had navigated between business groups and the White 
House over the course of the 1990s (Public Citizen, 2000, 35; IUST, 01/14/00; 
Simendinger, 2000). This team of first-class lobbyists would multiply testimonies, 
                                                
299 Among the political reforms that the Democrats hoped to accomplish were a patients’ bill of rights, 
prescription drug benefits for the elderly, and more gun control (Harris, 2000; Maggs, 2000).  
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speeches and congressional visits on behalf of PNTR.300 They relied on no fewer than 
23 full-time staffers drafted from the Commerce, State, Agriculture, Labor 
Departments, USTR and White House offices (Simendinger, 2000).  
One spectacular example of the administration’s full-scale countermobilization 
for PNTR was its attempt to send Congressional delegations to China – a lobbying 
tactic borrowed from the NAFTA campaign.301 In this case, the White House had 
planned to sponsor two congressional delegations for trips to China to witness the 
“real” working and living conditions in the Middle Kingdom and meet Chinese 
officials, business leaders and academics. In the end, only four members of Congress 
– including 2 undecided Democrats – were flown to China with no less than a dozen 
White House officials.302  
By mobilizing substantial resources to secure the passage of PNTR, President 
Clinton sought to avoid a repeat of the “leadership failure” of 1997. Committed to 
adding a final landmark to his foreign policy legacy, the free-trader-in-chief plunged 
into the trenches of legislative warfare. Through mid-May, the President met with 
about 100 lawmakers, at first in small groups, until the final weeks of the battle, when 
he focused on one-on-one meetings with undecided Democrats. The final week before 
the vote, the chief executive spent several hours each day contacting reluctant 
lawmakers by phone or personal appointments. The President also flew from the West 
Coast to the Great Lakes and the Midwest to display his support for PNTR supporters. 
In a controversial case, the President lobbied members of the New York delegation on 
a flight aboard Air Force One to the funeral of Cardinal John O’Connor – setting a 
                                                
300 Lloyd Bentsen, Charlene Barshefsky and Bill Daley were particularly active. For a tentative tally of 
their lobbying visits, speeches, and testimonies, read Public Citizen (2000).  
301 See chapter 3.   
302 Public Citizen estimated the cost of this high-class lobbying stunt at $600,000 (Public Citizen, 2000, 
39). 
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precedent for high-altitude arm-twisting.303 The White House’s all-out effort 
contrasted with its hands-off approach to fast track, and even to the president’s strong 
but belated involvement in the NAFTA fight. One senior White House official 
commented: “[Clinton] doesn’t give anybody a pass” (O’Neill, 2000, 939).304 By 
throwing his full weight behind PNTR, the President offered political cover to 
Democrats who faced considerable pressure against supporting the trade bill in an 
election year (Public Citizen, 2000; Maggs, 2000).  
As if the prestigious personnel of the PNTR “War Room” was not enough, the 
Clinton administration and its business allies lined up the support of an army of 
former government officials, the most prominent of whom were ex-presidents Ford, 
Carter and Bush. This time, however, endorsements reached a completely different 
scale from the small cast of the NAFTA campaign (which had nonetheless featured 4 
former U.S. presidents and a long list of economists). At a press conference, the 
White House gathered an impressive cohort of foreign policy heavyweights, including 
former secretaries of state Henry Kissinger, Alexander Haig, James Baker and Warren 
Christopher, along with Brent Scowcroft, James Schlesinger, Robert McNamara, 
Mickey Kantor, Leon Panetta and Zbigniew Brzezinski (Public Citizen, 2000, 33-
4).305 The White House and the U.S.-China Business Council also released an 
unprecedented vast series of pro-PNTR petitions signed by various categories of 
political, military and economic experts: current state governors, former Treasury 
Secretaries, former Agriculture Secretaries, former National Security Advisers, 
                                                
303 Bill Clinton’s successor adopted this lobbying tactic (see chapter 6). 
This paragraph is drawn from Maggs (2000); Simendinger (2000b); Public Citizen (2000, 33) and 
Schmitt & Kahn, 2000). 
304 ECAT President Cal Cohen shared this view: “My impression is that [the White House is] hitting on 
all cylinders and doing a good job listening to members’ concerns” (cited in Maggs, 2000, 1587). 
305 As noted by Public Citizen, many of these former officials like Henry Kissinger, Al Haig, Brent 
Scowcroft or Colin Powell had moved onto the business consulting sector and had, therefore, a direct 
interest in the development of economic exchanges between the United States and China (Public 
Citizen, 2000, 34-5). 
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academic experts on China. The Oval Office also tapped into the reputations of 
Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan and “champion of American security” 
Gen. Colin Powell (Business Coalition for U.S.-China Trade, 2000; WSJ, 05/19/00; 
IUST, 04/07/00). The Hollywood-like cast of the PNTR campaign was the most 
salient media through which the White House broadcast its economic and security 
messages. Other communication channels included economic reports, booklets and 
even a special website designed to promote PNTR.  
The administration’s communication strategy was designed to spread two 
principal messages: one revolving around the security implications of engaging with 
the PRC; the second based on the economic benefits of the China trade bill. As 
mentioned in the first section of this chapter, the White House justified its decision to 
shift from conditionality to engagement with the Kantian idea that trade liberalization 
had both democratic and peaceful virtues that would steer the PRC away from 
authoritarianism. Alternatively, the President argued that the PRC would interpret a 
rejection of PNTR as a strategic decision by Washington to turn from cooperation to 
confrontation, thereby strengthening the power of hardliners within the Chinese 
leadership (Swoboda, 2000). Thus, a strictly commercial agreement was wrapped into 
the security flag, a tactic that would become common currency under Bill Clinton’s 
successor.   
The economic arguments in favor of PNTR have already been examined in detail 
and need not be developed again. What is interesting to note here is that, once again, 
the White House closely collaborated with the business community to build up its 
lobbying resources. According to Inside U.S. Trade, a year before the vote, the USTR 
requested industry estimates on the exports and jobs that PNTR was expected to 
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generate (IUST, 04/09/99).306 This possibly explains why the USTR reports – like its 
analysis of NAFTA’s economic legacy – continued to downplay the adjustment costs 
of trade liberalization.  
In sum, the White House mobilized an unprecedented pool of lobbying resources 
to push for PNTR. Not only did the administration reinforce the USTR’s meager 
cohort of trade warriors with a host of current and former high-level officials, but the 
President also devoted considerable time to the legislative battle. In many instances, 
the White House closely collaborated with the private sector. Given the exceptional 
vigor of the free trade campaign undertaken by the administration and the business 
community, the special relationship came under congressional scrutiny.  
 
The “special relationship” under scrutiny 
The stated role of the Working Group on PNTR was to coordinate interagency 
activities associated with the passage of PNTR for China, including outreach efforts 
to business, labor, environmental and other groups. What was surprising was the 
blatant contrast between the White House’s lack of dialogue with fair traders and the 
special relationship it cultivated with free traders. As in previous trade battles, the 
White House and the business community regularly exchanged information on their 
lobbying operations. This collaboration operated through different channels. First, the 
“revolving door” between the public and private spheres facilitated communication 
exchanges. For instance, the former USTR and new lobbyist Mickey Kantor was said 
to have played an important role in defining an industry strategy to win the vote in 
Congress (IUST, 04/09/99). Second, the free trade campaign was coordinated through 
                                                
306 This proved to be problematic for a certain number of industries to the extent that Washington had 
not reached a agreement with China and, therefore, the final details of the negotiations were not always 
known, despite the private sector’s input in the trade policy process.  
272 
  
regular meetings between members of the public and private spheres. For example, 
BRT leaders Phil Condit (Chairman of the Trade Taskforce) and Robert Burt (BRT 
Chairman) regularly met with government officials for updates on the PNTR 
campaign. In addition, the White House directly or indirectly exhorted business 
leaders to press congressmen from both parties to support the U.S.-China trade 
agreement, as “PNTR czar” Bill Daley did at numerous corporate events  (see Koffler, 
2000; IUST, 01/28/00). 
The large scale of the pro-PNTR campaign and the close collaboration of the 
White House and the private sector prompted Rep. Frank Wolf (R-VA) to request that 
the Government Accountability Office (GAO) investigate whether any of these 
practices constituted a violation of anti-lobbying provisions of American laws. 
Indeed, the latter prohibit the expenditure of appropriated funds for “substantial307 
‘grass roots’ lobbying campaigns of telegrams, letters and other private forms of 
communication designed to encourage members of the public to pressure members of 
Congress to support Administration or Department legislative or appropriations 
proposals.”308 Under Wolf’s request, the GAO examined the practices of the White 
House China Trade Relations Working Group through a meticulous analysis of 
speeches, talking points, fact sheets and email messages.  
Its investigation reported “extensive outreach and communication by the 
Administration with private sector groups such as public corporations and trade and 
business coalitions, to garner support for China PNTR” (GAO, 2000b, 2). In contrast, 
the report makes no reference of any comparable dialogue with labor, environmental 
or human rights advocates – in contrasted with the stated goals of the Working Group. 
                                                
307 “Substantial” involves the expenditure of $50,000 or more (GAO, 2000). 
308 This provision from 18 U.S.C. § 1913 also appears under section 627 of the Treasury and General 
Government Appropriations Act for fiscal year 2000 (cited in GAO, 2000). 
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The GAO found only one instance that constituted a violation of the applicable anti-
lobbying appropriation provision. In this case, a representative of the Commerce 
Working Group asked a staff member of the Agriculture Working Group for 
information materials to convince a skeptical congressman:  
Yesterday, during a meeting with Treasury Dep Sec Eizenstat, [the Member] 
indicated that the labor unions where [sic] walking around with an article from 
the March 15 Hill [newspaper] that said that Ag does not benefit from trade with 
China. [The Member] also said that he hasn’t heard from any of the farmers in 
his district about the agreement. Can you help identify what we have that could 
be helpful for Treasury to send up to [the Member]?  
 
Within minutes after receiving this email, the Agriculture representative 
forwarded it to several addressees including two farmers’ organizations. The message 
said: “We need to work on this ASAP. [The Member] needs to hear from the farmers 
in his district” (GAO, 2000, 2-3). According to the GAO, this explicit email was in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1913 to the extent that resources from the White House were 
employed for lobbying purposes. However, the email was considered to involve only 
a “minimal” – as opposed to “substantial” – expenditure of appropriated funds and 
hence did “not warrant further action on [the GAO’s] part or a referral to the Justice 
Department under 18 U.S.C. 1913” (GAO, 2000, 4).  
The fact that the GAO report considered this email to be “the only violation to 
date” (GAO, 2000b) of anti-lobbying restrictions can seem puzzling, in the light of 
the numerous examples of the White House-business coordination examined in this 
dissertation. Two remarks must be made to shed light on the conclusions of the GAO. 
First, the GAO itself recognized the several limitations of its study, and particularly 
the fact that it relied only on documents that White House officials agreed to submit. 
For instance, certain expenditure data like the personnel costs of the 10 principals 
associated with the Working Group were never submitted by government officials 
because the White House believed it had a strong interest in protecting the 
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confidentiality of how the President’s senior advisers spend their time (GAO, 2000b). 
Second, the fact that there was no violation of the anti-lobbying restrictions of 18 
U.S.C. 1913 should not be understood as lack of evidence for the coordination 
between the White House and the business community. As mentioned earlier, the 
study explicitly reports “extensive coordination” with the private sector. Thus, it is 
safe to say that White House officials know how to operate within the constraints of 
American laws, i.e. to promote a particular bill without violating anti-lobbying 
restrictions stricto sensu. For instance, interviews in Washington revealed that USTR 
officials were very cautious of using the “L-word” – for lobbying – when describing 
their activities, even after providing detailed accounts of the White House’s 
coordination with the business community. Instead, they prefer to highlight 
information exchanges between free trade advocates, even if this information 
exchange can be “member X has not heard from industry Y.” 
The point here is not to determine whether the USTR’s activities are legal or not. 
For the purpose of this dissertation, the GAO report is useful because it offers a clear 
picture of the process of countermobilization which, in this particular case, can be 
broken into three steps: 1) a White House official identifies the source of a 
lawmakers’ opposition to PNTR; 2) he conveys the information to the White House’s 
war room, which identifies the business groups whose grassroots resources might help 
change the lawmaker’s position; 3) business groups respond by encouraging their 
member groups to contact the lawmaker and stress the benefits deriving from PNTR. 
This example exposes the cooperation between the executive branch and free traders 
and how it serves the “free” trade cause. Admittedly, this process of problem-solving 
is also common among fair traders. For instance, Public Citizen identifies lawmakers’ 
priorities and uses its network to mobilize local actors (whether unions, 
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environmentalists, or human rights advocates) against a trade bill. What distinguishes 
mobilization from countermobilization, however, is that fair traders do not benefit 
from the invaluable institutional support from the White House. This shows that, 
during the lobbying phase as during the negotiating phase of the trade policy process, 
the executive does not behave as the “disinterested referee” that conventional societal 
models of trade policy expect (Ikenberry, Lake & Mastanduno, 1988, 8). Instead, the 
president has used his institutional capabilities to pursue an agenda that serves the 
interests of the private sector.  
This process was particularly clear during the final weeks preceding the vote, 
when the president used its familiar deal-making tactics to win over congressional 
votes. In this case, however, the Clinton administration proved less generous than it 
had been during the NAFTA fight, relying on fewer policy concessions and pork-
barrel deals. Although the absence of concessions to fair-trade-minded congressmen 
contributed to the legislative defeat of 1997, the Clinton administration seemed, at 
first, reluctant to distribute collective side payments to PNTR opponents.  
This time, the initiative came from Congress, where Rep. Sander Levin (D-MI) 
and Doug Bereuter (R-NE) sought to build up bipartisan support for trade 
liberalization by amending the PNTR bill. The Levin-Bereuter amendment aimed to 
appease civil society opponents and rally liberal Democrats through the creation of a 
commission to maintain annual review of China’s conduct on human rights. It also 
included a clause to provide assistance to U.S. workers hurt by a surge in Chinese 
imports and impose sanctions on Beijing if the latter violated international trade 
rules.309 Designed as a classic side payment for fair-trade-minded representatives, 
Levin’s proposals, did not escape from the close monitoring by the White House’s 
                                                
309 (Destler, 2005, 276; McGregor, 2000). For more details on this proposal, see Sander Levin’s 
presentation at the congressional hearing on PNTR (Levin, 2000). 
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“War Room.” In another example of Clintonian triangulation, the administration 
wanted to make sure that the amendment would add more votes to the PNTR pool 
than it would subtract – especially among Republicans. Thus, Levin held a 
“seemingly endless series of one-on-one meetings with colleagues and members of 
the Administration” to ensure that they hold all the cards of the PNTR game (Maggs, 
2000, 1590).  
The reaction among fair trade advocates was overwhelmingly negative. For 
human rights advocates, the Sander-Levin amendment to the PNTR was not 
commensurate to the challenge facing Chinese citizens.310 Unsurprisingly, union 
leaders also rejected the Sander-Levin amendment as a “fig leaf” that would do little 
to improve human and workers’ rights.311 In fact, whether or not labor’s concerns for 
the fate of Chinese citizens and workers were sincere, it is hard to believe that the 
weak mandate of the Levin-Bereuter amendment would ever come close to the 
political leverage of the MFN renewal process. In fact, a month after PNTR’s 
passage, the Clinton’s administration $21.2 million request to fund the commission 
envisioned by Levin and Bereuter was rejected by the Appropriations Committee 
(Public Citizen, 2000, 36). 
If the Levin-Bereuter amendment gained little support among fair trade 
organizations, it nonetheless proved to be a key strategic move for the Democratic 
leadership. Indeed, the non-committal Levin-Bereuter amendment was credited with 
bringing 20 lawmakers aboard the PNTR ship, without alienating Republican 
supporters of the bill (O’Neill, 2000; Schmitt & Kahn, 2000). This was undoubtedly 
                                                
310 Dissident Harry Wu, who had spent 19 years in labor camp before fleeing to the U.S., warned Rep. 
Sander Levin that he was “doing a terrible disservice to the struggle for human rights in China” (cited 
in McGregor, 2000). 
311 In a letter to Congress, twelve unions from the manufacturing and services sector described the new 
monitoring process as “nothing more than a meaningless reporting requirement that China could ignore 
without fear of any adverse consequences” (IUST, 03/03/00). 
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the most fruitful side payment of the legislative battle, one not designed yet closely 
monitored by the Clinton administration.  
A second policy concession was intended to appease environmentally friendly 
lawmakers. Before the PNTR vote, the Clinton administration promised to withdraw 
its appeal of the ruling of the federal court that required the administration to include 
environmentalists on the two industry sector advisory committees. According to 
Inside U.S. Trade, this promise, which President Clinton fulfilled a few weeks after 
the vote, helped secure the vote of Rep. Lloyd Doggett (D-TX) (IUST, 06/09/00). A 
third bargain was designed to appease textile interests and their representatives. The 
latter had grown uneasy with another trade bill that would help develop with poor 
nations in Africa and the Caribbean basin. Fearing that this resentment might have 
ripple effects on the PNTR vote – President Clinton’s unmistakable priority – the 
administration worked behind the scenes to design “rules-of-origins” to protect the 
textile industry.312 Although the impact of this policy concession is less clear than the 
Levin-Bereuter amendment, it is said to have won the support of the National Cotton 
Council for PNTR and appeased House members from the Carolinas and Texas. In 
addition, the signature of the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) on May 
18 was reported to have helped secure votes from the Congressional Black Caucus for 
the PNTR vote a week later (Maggs, 2000; Sanger, 2000b). A final policy concession 
consisted of the creation of a commission to study the trade adjustment assistance 
program in order to win the vote of Ken Bentsen (D-TX), a remake of the 1997 fast 
track deal. To do so, President Clinton issued an executive order, which would be 
rescinded by his successor a year later (Maggs, 2000; Public Citizen, 2000, 48).  
                                                
312 The final bill included requirements that African nations hoping to export more clothing to the 
United States duty free buy American fabrics, thereby defeating the development objectives of the bill. 
Few African nations could afford to import U.S. cotton, making the trade deal relatively worthless to 
African weavers and clothing manufacturers. The same type of rule of origins would be applied to 
CAFTA (see chapter 7).   
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Beyond trade-related policy concessions, pork-barrel deals were also an integral 
part of the White House’s strategy to win the PNTR vote. However, vote-buying 
operations for the China trade bill figured less prominently than they had for the 
NAFTA battle: not only did the administration make fewer deals than in 1993, but the 
individual pacts also involved less money. Public Citizen offers two possible 
explanations for this change. First, congressmen might have learned the lessons of 
Clinton’s “record on trade vote deal making” i.e. his “high infidelity”313, a claim that 
seems validated by the greater number of funding promises officially made before the 
vote – as opposed to after, as in the NAFTA battle (Public Citizen, 2000, 36). Second, 
and most importantly, the strength of the pro-PNTR lobbying efforts by both the 
White House and the business community must have limited the need for pork-barrel 
deals. More generally, the greater support that the China trade bill enjoyed in 
Congress – regardless of the vigorous PNTR campaign – made last-minute deals less 
urgent than they had been for NAFTA.   
The White House still negotiated nearly a dozen of deals to rally a few reluctant 
lawmakers behind the free trade cause. To capture the vote of three inner city 
Democrats, President Clinton and House Speaker Dennis Hastert announced the 
creation of new special investment zones designed to attract investment in inner cities. 
Announced 2 days before the House vote, this bipartisan urban renewal plan – 
announced as a “New Markets Initiative” – would cost $20 billion over 10 years. 
Other pet projects included: 
 the environmental clean-up of the Northrup Grumman aircraft 
manufacturing plant in Texas; 
                                                
313 This was the title of the report that Public Citizen sent to congressional members before the PNTR 
vote.  
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 the re-opening of a fifty-year-old oil pipeline linking Texas, Arizona and 
New Mexico, and traded against the votes of two Texan Democrats; 
 a pork-barrel “package” that helped a Californian Democrat establish a 
new zip code in his district and provided emergency government action to 
fight the pest threatening wineries in the Napa Valley; 
 extra funding to support an obsolete weather radar station in Alabama;  
 financial assistance to Voice of America’s Radio Free Asia in Illinois.314  
As during previous debates, not all of President Clinton’s deals may have been 
decisive to win “undecided voters.” The rebalancing of corporate donations across 
party lines meant that swing voters faced the dual pressure of presidential-corporate 
countermobilization. This most likely contributed to the rise of Democratic support 
for trade liberalization between 1997 and 2000. And if vote-buying deals were less 
frequent with Republicans, the strong leverage of the business community among 
GOP lawmakers compensated for the limited influence of the President across the 
aisle. Thus, the respective lobbying efforts of the executive branch and the private 
sector proved complementary, allowing them to win the PNTR vote by a comfortable 
margin.  
 
Conclusion 
The outcome of the PNTR battle brought the political ascension of fair traders to a 
halt. After emerging on the political scene in the early 1990s and winning a series of 
political victories at the end of the decade – fast track, MAI and Seattle – the fair 
trade coalition suffered a severe setback at the end of President Clinton’s presidency. 
Despite their strong mobilization – on par with their previous lobbying campaigns – 
                                                
314 For more details, see (Public Citizen, 2000, 36-41, 48-50; Maggs, 2000).  
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fair traders did not manage to repeat their legislative success of 1997. Unlike during 
the fast track debates, when free traders committed costly tactical mistakes, the 
campaign on behalf of PNTR was a prime example of the synergetic powers of 
presidential-corporate countermobilization. First, the business community rebalanced 
corporate donations to increase political leverage in the Democratic Party, a tactic 
combined with an unprecedented “astroturf” counteroffensive against the fair traders’ 
grassroots efforts. In the end, the PNTR campaign became one of the costliest 
lobbying campaigns ever launched on behalf of a piece of legislation. Second, the 
White House made full use of its institutional capabilities to join the private sector’s 
advocacy efforts: from its sophisticated “celebrity-ridden” communication campaign 
to its conventional deal-making tactics. The administration’s lobbying efforts were 
tightly coordinated with corporate interests. Business groups complemented the White 
House not only by cementing support for PNTR among conservative Republicans, but 
also by neutralizing the opposition of influential Democrats that could have tilted the 
balance against PNTR, making them more vulnerable to presidential pressure. The 
special relationship between the White House and the private sector allowed them to 
share information so as to optimize their operations: this applied both to their 
communications tactics and to their lobbying efforts inside and outside Washington. 
So close was their coordination that it came under the scrutiny of the Government 
Accounting Office.  
The joint countermobilization of the White House and the business community 
proved decisive to counter the lobbying efforts of human rights, labor, environmental 
and consumer advocates. For fair traders, this setback clearly reversed the progress 
that blue and green issues seemed to have achieved since the NAFTA debates. In fact, 
free traders had not only won a legislative victory, but had also managed to control 
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the terms of the agreement so as to exclude fair trade provisions. Here again, the 
institutional and political support of the executive branch had clearly served the cause 
of internationally-oriented businesses. On the one hand, corporate interests exploited 
their privileged access to the trade advisory system to exclude provisions related to 
human rights, labor or environment from the scope of the U.S-Chinese agreement, 
despite the extensive social and environmental side-effects that trade liberalization 
was expected to have. On the other, the private sector also used more informal 
channels to convince the Clinton administration to abandon its conditionality policy 
and opt for a “clean” trade bill. Thus, as in the NAFTA debates, the special 
relationship between the White House and the business community operated during 
both negotiating and legislative phases, blocking fair traders’ efforts throughout the 
whole policy process.  
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CHAPTER 6: Trade Promotion Authority 
 
The election of George W. Bush revived tensions over the ends and means of 
trade policy. This was due as much to the similar trade policy agenda that he shared 
with his Democratic predecessor as to the different relationship that he cultivated 
with interest groups. In the tradition of all postwar presidents, George Bush believed 
in the benefits of trade liberalization. Following the 2000 election, he had repeatedly 
stated that opening new markets was in America’s national interest. Like Bill 
Clinton, President George Bush also praised the moral virtues of commerce: 
“Freedom is exported every day, as we ship goods and products that improve the 
lives of millions of people. Free trade brings greater political and personal freedom” 
(Bush, 2001). The new president committed himself to re-energize America’s trade 
liberalizing agenda and requested the renewal of fast track authority (re-baptized 
“trade promotion authority”) in February 2001 (ibid). His political ambitions 
mirrored those of his Democratic predecessor, with a particular focus on NAFTA’s 
expansion on a hemispheric scale and the negotiations of a new round of multilateral 
trade negotiations (Zoellick, 2001). Like his predecessor, the 43rd President remained 
cognizant of the give-and-take of trade politics. His concessions to protectionist 
sectors – e.g. steel tariffs, the generous farm bill of 2002315 – revealed that his 
commitment to trade liberalization was never complete.  
What distinguished the Republican administration was its close ties with the 
business community and its hostility to both blue and green advocates. Admittedly, 
President Clinton had also striven to bring the Democratic Party closer to the private 
sector. Yet, this strategic alliance was never as solid as the one cultivated by the 
                                                
315 This bill increased farm subsidies by nearly 80% and reversed Republicans’ efforts to curb 
agricultural subsidies in 1996. Read Sanger (2002).  
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Bush administration. The Republican Party’s dominance of both the executive and 
the legislative branches – a situation unseen since Eisenhower’s presidency (1953-
4)316 – completed the rapprochement between the private sector and the GOP. Over 
the course of the Bush presidency, the relationship between the GOP and the private 
sector would become more intimate than it had been under the congressional lead of 
Newt Gingrich. Admittedly, the narrow margins of Republican majorities confined 
the scope of their political domination, as witnessed by the Democrats’ fortuitous 
seizure of the Senate after Jim Jeffords’ defection from the GOP ranks.317 This 
precarious challenge to Republican domination did not, however, prevent the Bush 
administration from pursuing a flurry of pro-business policies that would unite a 
broad and diverse business community under the banner of the GOP. Key to the 
ever-closer ties between the Republican party and corporate interests were President 
Bush’s mix of pro-business policies ranging from tax cuts to deregulation, tort 
reform (partially shelving business against class action cases), as well as his low-
profile use of administrative rules to undermine both environmental regulation and 
collective bargaining. The Republicans’ policies would reward a wide range of 
industries including the energy, defense, transportation, telecommunications, 
pharmaceutical, steel and agricultural sectors.318 In this new context, the private 
sector sensed political opportunities and raised its presence in Washington, with the 
number of registered lobbyists in the capital doubling between 2000 and 2005 to 
nearly 35,000 (Hamburger & Wallsten, 2006, 105).319 
                                                
316 Fortier & Ornstein (2003, 138). 
317 On May 24, 2001, Vermont Senator Jim Jeffords left the Republican Party and announced his new 
status as an independent. His decision changed the composition of the Senate from a situation of 50 
Republicans and 50 Democrats to give the Democrats a fragile advantage over the Republicans (50-49 
plus one independent) (Wikipedia, “Jim Jeffords”).  
318 For a more detailed discussion, read Edsall (2006, chapter 4) and Piven (2004, chapter 3).  
319 Chamber of Commerce Vice President Stanton Anderson declared that major corporations 
expanded their lobbying operations during President Bush’s first mandate “because they were 
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President Bush’s political signature was his ability to woo Wall Street 
entrepreneurs and the technology-intensive financial services industries away from 
New Democrats. His cuts on capital gains and dividend tax rates enabled the White 
House to bring Main Street and Wall Street interests into a single partisan 
coalition.320 The appointments of Robert Zoellick at the USTR and Henry Paulson at 
the Treasury Department, two insiders of the financial sector,321 also reflected the 
administration’s willingness to consolidate ties with the financial sector (Edsall, 
2006, 133-134).322 Thomas Edsall speaks of an exceptional “merger” between the 
Republican Party, the conservative movement and American business: 
 More than ever before, business, from Main Street to Wall Street, has been 
fully integrated into the Republican Party structure, from campaigns to policy 
making, from voter mobilization to whipping the vote in the House and Senate 
(Edsall, 2006, 107). 
 
The ever-closer relationship between the private sector and the GOP represented 
a direct threat to the respective political agendas of the labor and the environmental 
movements. Organized labor was the first to suffer the consequences of these 
political changes. Admittedly, Bill Clinton had never been a fervent defender of the 
unions’ cause. However, George W. Bush completely shut Washington’s doors to 
labor representatives, depriving them of any access to the policy process (Swepston, 
2006; Compa, 2006). In addition, in the early months of his presidency, the 
Republican leadership multiplied its attacks on union rights. Through a series of 
                                                                                                                                     
impressed by the ability to get things done in Washington and realized the window may not be open 
forever” (cited in Hamburger & Wallsten, 2006, 105). 
320 After the passage of the tax cuts, large financial companies like Morgan Stanley, Merrill Lynch 
and Goldman Sachs – all three members of the Business Roundtable – became leading fundraisers for 
George Bush’s 2004 presidential bid. 
321 After serving as Goldman Sachs’ chief executive, Henry Paulson – like Robert Rubin – became 
Treasury Secretary in 2006. Robert Zoellick had served as executive vice president for Fannie Mae in 
the 1990s, and followed Henry Paulson’s steps by becoming vice chairman and senior international 
adviser at Goldman Sachs in 2006, before his appointment to hold the presidency of the World Bank 
(Landon 2006; U.S. Department of State, 2005). 
322 In another example of President Bush’s reverence for business, the White House paired its reform 
of export subsidy system in 2004 with a cornucopia of benefits for multinational corporations, the 
latter being granted large tax breaks on repatriated income (with the tax rate falling from 35% to 
5.25%) along with a flurry of sectoral bonuses. 
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executive orders, the new president ended labor-management partnerships in the 
federal government, undermined collective bargaining agreements on federally 
funded public works projects and required federal contractors to post notices 
informing workers of their “right to work”. The Bush administration was also prompt 
to undermine workplace safety rights through a series of measures e.g. by repealing 
ergonomics regulation and slashing the budget of the Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration  (Piven, 2004, 59-61; Murray, 2001). Perhaps the most significant 
attacks upon labor rights were the reform of overtime compensation323 and the 
restrictions on union membership among employees with “supervisory duties” 
(Greenhouse, 2006). These were only a few of myriad policies and administrative 
tactics designed to weaken labor interests, an agenda largely condoned by the 
Department of Labor.324  
On the environmental side, President Bush similarly revived the anti-regulatory 
agenda of Ronald Reagan (Vig, 2006, 111). The fact that environmental protection 
was in the hands of two former oil-men – the president and his vice president Dick 
Cheney – did not bode well for the green movement. The new executive leadership 
left environmental policies vulnerable to the attacks of the powerful energy industry, 
a faithful donor to the Republican Party.325 Unlike in the 1980s, environmental 
organizations could not count on the Democratic control of Congress. In fact, 
President Bush faced fewer checks on his use of presidential powers to redefine 
America’s environmental commitments than any of his predecessors since Richard 
Nixon proclaimed the first environmental decade in 1970 (Vig, 2006, 117-8). Among 
                                                
323 The 2004 reform of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 adopted an expansive view of the 
managerial class, which is ineligible to overtime pay. This holds the risk with the risk of denying 
compensation for millions of workers. See New York Times (2004). 
324 A recent New York Times op-ed criticized the “regulatory sabotage” undertaken within the 
Department of Labor itself (NYT, 2008).  
325 On this point, read Piven (2004, 48-9).  
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the most prominent anti-environmental stances of the Bush administration were 
America’s withdrawal from the Kyoto protocol, its constant refusal to engage the 
country in the reduction of CO2, and its repeated attempts to allow oil drilling in 
Alaska’s Arctic National Wildlife Refuge (ANWAR) – a policy long advocated by 
Dick Cheney’s corporate-friendly Energy Task Force326 and that recently resurfaced 
amidst concerns about rising oil prices327 (Hamburger & Wallsten, 2006, 108). 
The scope of the Republicans’ anti-environmental agenda, however, went much 
deeper than these prominent debates on conservation. To fully understand President 
Bush’s deregulatory policies – whether related to labor or environmental regulation – 
one must focus on his distinctive “administrative strategy” (Hult, 2003, 68-9), i.e. his 
tendency to undermine regulation through “minor adjustments, quiet repeals, no-big-
deal new policies” (Ivins, 2003, cited in Piven, 2004, 48).328 In the environmental 
field, this translated into a weakening of the Environmental Protection Agency329 – 
whose agenda, like that of the Department of Labor and the National Labor Relations 
Board became increasingly receptive to industry grievances – and into a series of 
micro-level deregulatory initiatives with significant ecological implications e.g. 
easing wetlands rules affecting developers, relaxing construction regulation in 
national forests and easing restrictions on mining on public lands (Hult, 2003, 68-
9).330  
                                                
326 It was revealed that the taskforce had 714 contacts with energy industry insiders and only 19 
contacts with environmentalists and other outsiders (Piven, 2004, p. 49).  
327 In June 2008, the President lifted restrictions on offshore oil drilling, urging Congress to follow his 
lead and rescind its ban as well. For a critical discussion, read Barringer (2008).  
328 For more details on the consequences of this strategy, read Hult (2003, 67-9) and Piven (2004, 48-
63).  
329 For instance, after the former director of the EPA’s Office of Regulatory Enforcement resigned in 
2001 after 12 years of service, Bush administration did not replace him for over 18 months (Hult, 
2003, 68-9).  
330 President Bush’s administrative tactics prompted environmentalists to engage in repeated legal 
battles to compel the administration to enforce existing laws (Bosso, 2005, 1-3). 
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This hostile political context threatened to jeopardize the already meager 
progress that fair trade advocates had achieved under a Democratic administration. 
Yet, despite this changing context, interest groups dynamics during the TPA debates 
largely mirrored those that took place during the 1990s. Once again, organized labor 
and its allies mobilized against a “free trade” bill that provided little scope to social 
and environmental issues. Through inside and outside lobbying tactics, they came 
inches close to defeating the Trade Promotion Authority bill. Yet, as during the 
NAFTA and the PNTR battles, the joint countermobilization of the private sector and 
the executive branch neutralized their advocacy efforts and helped free trade 
advocates win an extremely narrow victory. As in the 1990s, the executive branch 
mobilized its institutional resources to rescue business advocates from the lobbying 
attacks of the blue-green alliance. Exploiting his role as commander-in-chief and 
doling out side payments, President Bush rallied reluctant lawmakers behind his 
lead, to the benefits of the private sector. Thus, once again, the special relationship 
between the business community and the executive branch was a key obstacle to the 
success of fair trade advocates.  
 
In search of trade promotion authority  
The pervasive tensions between the Bush administration and the labor and 
environmental movements and the contentious nature of trade debates under the 
Clinton administration meant that the new “trade promotion authority” was bound to 
generate fierce debates among fair trade advocates. In fact, promptly after President 
Bush declared his intention to obtain trade negotiating authority in early 2001, anti-
globalization groups started to manifest their dissent by organizing a series of 
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international protests against the Free Trade Area of the Americas in Quebec City in 
April 2001 (Destler, 2005, 290; Greenhouse, 2001).  
The Republican administration was well aware of the challenges that the blue-
green alliance had posed to the passage of free trade legislation under the Clinton 
presidency. On the one hand, the President knew he would need the support of at 
least a minority of Democratic legislators to obtain trade-negotiating authority. Thus, 
the White House declared its willingness “to consider a whole host of ways to 
[improve labor standards and environmental conditions],” in the words of the new 
U.S. Trade Representative Robert Zoellick (cited in Greenhouse, 2001, 31). 
However, the chief executive and his U.S. Trade Representative alienated supporters 
of blue and green provisions early on by repeatedly dismissing them as 
“protectionists” or “isolationists” (Mitchell, 2001; Stokes, 2001; JOC, 2001). On the 
other hand, the White House remained aware that it would need flexibility to keep 
Republican lawmakers and their business allies onboard. George Bush’s call for a 
“labor and environmental toolbox” as a complement to American trade policy was 
the offspring of this “triangulation”. His non-committal approach suggested actions 
to promote labor rights and environmental standards with the support of international 
organizations, yet at the same time carefully avoided linking blue and green issues to 
the negotiation of free trade agreements (Mitchell, 2001). 
If President Bush’s promises were certainly elusive,331 the first legislative 
initiative that emerged in the Republican House excluded labor and environmental 
standards entirely.332 Unsurprisingly, the Crane bill – named after Ways and Means 
Committee vice-chairman and staunch free trader Phil Crane (R-IL) – infuriated both 
                                                
331 Labor unions and their Democratic allies criticized President Bush’s low-enforcement approach to 
environmental and labor issues, describing his “toolbox” as “empty” (Mitchell, 2001).  
332 This paragraph and the next two are drawn from Destler (2005, 280, 290-1, 333-42). 
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labor advocates and Democratic lawmakers.333 Cognizant of the challenges they 
might face, the administration and the House Ways and Means chairman Bill 
Thomas (R-CA) were careful not to endorse the Crane bill, opting for a slightly less 
partisan approach.  
The result was the so-called “Bipartisan Compromise,” a legislative proposal 
drafted in collaboration with three centrist Democrats: Cal Dooley (D-CA), John 
Tanner (D-TN) and William Jefferson (D-LA). At first sight, Thomas’ legislation 
appeared more labor- and environment-friendly than the aborted 1997 fast track 
proposal. Indeed, the bill included, for the first time, labor and environmental 
standards (“the Dooley principles”) as “principal negotiating objectives.” In regard to 
core labor standards, the administration would seek “to strengthen the capacity of 
U.S. trading partners to promote respect for core labor standards,” while ensuring 
environmental and labor practices would not serve as “disguised barriers to trade” – 
the latter provision being explicitly designed to protect businesses. In addition, the 
text of the bill also required that the President would “seek greater cooperation 
between WTO and ILO” (Sek, 2002, 20, 30). These objectives aimed to ensure that 
trading partners would enforce their own environmental and labor laws. Finally, the 
TPA bill seemed to respond to three principal concerns expressed by 
environmentalists over trade: 1) by encouraging consultative mechanisms to protect 
environmental standards; 2) by promoting the consideration of multilateral 
                                                
333 Minority leader Dick Gephardt (D-MO) presented the Crane bill as “the most extreme view on the 
other side” (cited in Destler, 2005, 333). AFL-CIO Executive Vice President Linda-Chavez 
denounced the proposal as a “giant step backward” and called for a new generation of trade and 
investment agreements that would give greater attention to “human rights, worker rights and the 
environment, not just business interests” (Chavez-Thompson, 2001). 
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environmental agreements; and 3) by vowing to pursue investment agreements in a 
manner consistent with U.S. legal practices (Audley, 2002a, 2-4).334 
The language of the Thomas bill, however, seemed to step back from the 
provisions of the U.S.-Jordan Free Trade Agreement. Negotiated at the end of Bill 
Clinton’s presidency, the U.S.-Jordan FTA advanced the linkage of worker rights 
and trade beyond NAFTA’s side agreement by including labor provisions in the 
body of the agreement. In addition, blue and green provisions shared a dispute 
resolution procedure on a par with trade in goods, intellectual property, and e-
commerce. As a result, the U.S.-Jordan FTA binds – at least, on paper335 – both 
countries to enforce their national regulations and encourage them to improve their 
labor and environmental standards (Kahn, 2000; “US-Jordan Free Trade Agreement 
(2001)”; Bolle, 2001a; Destler, 2005, 333).336 Unlike the U.S.-Jordan agreement, 
however, the TPA’s provisions were not enforceable through trade sanctions to the 
extent that they allowed parties to “retain the right to exercise discretion with respect 
to investigatory, prosecutorial, regulatory, and compliance matters” (Sek, 2002, 20). 
For trade expert Mac Destler at the pro-trade Institute for International Economics, 
the bill was a remake of the “no mandates/no new restrictions” formula advanced by 
the Democratic Leadership Council in 1997 (Destler, 2005, 291). 
Thus, in practice, Bill Thomas’ proposal did little to bridge the party divide over 
the rules of trade policy. In fact, the Ways and Means chairman had refused to 
negotiate with trade experts such as Charles Rangel (D-NY), Sander Levin (D-MI) or 
                                                
334 For a more detailed review of TPA’s environmental provisions, see Sek (2002, 12-16). See also 
Audley (2002a) and Destler (2005). 
335 One detail that went largely unnoticed was the confidential correspondence between U.S. Trade 
Representative Bob Zoellick and his Jordanian counterpart, who declared that they would not expect 
or intend to employ trade sanctions to enforce labor provisions (Destler, 2005, fn. 4, 333).  
336 Owing partly to its innovative “fair trade” language and to its marginal social and labor impact, the 
Jordan FTA won the support of labor advocates – it was endorsed by the AFL-CIO – and 
environmentalists (including the Sierra Club and the National Wildlife Federation). 
292 
  
Robert Matsui (D-CA) – whose support for trade liberalization had been crucial to 
the passage of controversial bills in the 1990s. The Republican leadership chose 
instead to deal with three junior pro-trade Democrats with little influence on their 
party.337 Hence, instead of creating solid bipartisan foundations to the trade proposal, 
the Republican leadership decided to provide symbolic language on blue and green 
provisions without consulting senior Democrats, with the risk of alienating the 
majority of the opposition. According to one Republican trade insider, “Thomas 
relished the fight. His view on the labor stuff was… (…) ‘I would rather win this 
vote 218 to 217 than win it 230 to 205 because that just means I gave too much to 15 
Democrats.’”338 
Once the administration realized that the House leadership risked compromising 
the support of pivotal pro-trade Democrats, it admonished Speaker Dennis Hastert 
and House Ways and Means chairman Bill Thomas to meet with Charles Rangel to 
smooth over party differences. While the President’s involvement did lead to a 
bipartisan meeting, Thomas soon cut the dialogue with senior Democrats. In the end, 
the administration nonetheless endorsed Thomas’ “bipartisan compromise,” whose 
text was in tune with its non-committal, flexible approach to blue and green issues.339 
Needless to say that the Republican administration’s brief concerns about the scope 
of the bill should not be interpreted as a willingness to provide stronger labor and 
environmental provisions than Bill Thomas had provided. In fact, an interview with 
the Assistant USTR for Labor reveals that the administration, in conjunction with the 
                                                
337 Charles Rangel, Sander Levin and Robert Matsui proposed an alternative bill which included much 
stronger labor provisions including the proposal to create WTO Working Group on Trade and Labor 
and, most importantly, requirements that future FTAA countries implement and enforce ILO core 
standards. For more details, read Destler (2005, 331-42). 
338 The informant asked not be cited. 
339 Secretary of Commerce Don Evans and USTR Robert Zoellick declared: “This bill should allow 
the Congress to move forward quickly in a cooperative fashion to grant the President vitally needed 
trade negotiating authority” (cited in Destler, 2005, 291). 
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Republican leadership, worked hard to ensure that blue and green provisions would 
not be on par with commercial objectives. This was largely due to the broad 
opposition of the business community to enforceable labor provisions. Thus, 
although the text of the Trade Promotion Authority stipulated that all trade 
negotiating objectives would be treated equally, the report of the conference 
committee in 2002 clarified that “equal” treatment did not mean “identical,” a caveat 
that allowed for distinctive enforcement models between commercial issues and 
labor and environmental provisions (Clatanoff, 2007*). This shows that even though 
the Republican leadership in Congress was the architect the TPA bill, the Bush 
administration was largely complicit in the former’s efforts to constrain the scope of 
labor and environmental provisions. In this case, however, the White House did not 
rely on the trade advisory committee system. As mentioned in chapters one and four, 
fast track authority bills are, unlike trade agreements, elaborated in congressional 
committees. In 2001 as in 1997, the special relationship proved most decisive not at 
the agenda-setting phase, but at the final lobbying phase, when the White House 
mobilized its institutional capabilities on behalf of the private sector.    
 
 
I) FAIR TRADE MOBILIZATION 
 
The mobilization of the blue-green alliance against TPA mirrored in many 
respects the trade battles of the Clinton era. Once again, both unions and 
environmentalists saw the blue and green provisions of the trade bill as largely 
symbolic and demanded that their policy objectives be addressed on par with 
commercial and investment clauses. In 2001 as in 1997, the specter of NAFTA 
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haunted debates on trade liberalization. As far as coalition tactics were concerned, 
fair trade advocates built on the anti-MAI revolt, the Seattle protests and the PNTR 
battle to rally more and more civil society actors to their cause. Labor was 
particularly prone to reach out to new organizations, while the environmental 
movement involved in trade politics seemed to expand. The most notable 
achievement of this mobilization was the central position occupied by labor and 
environmental issues in the trade debates. The prominence of blue and green 
questions and the growing support of Democratic lawmakers for the fair trade cause 
not only perpetuated NAFTA’s political legacy, but also raised hopes for labor and 
environmental advocates. What distinguished the mobilization of the blue-green 
alliance in the TPA case was the new political environment in which it occurred. For 
fair trade advocates, operating under a united Republican government meant two 
things. First, in an increasingly partisan context, Democratic lawmakers, including 
centrist pro-trade members would be more receptive to the arguments of the blue-
green alliance. Second, their ability to lobby GOP representatives would be seriously 
undermined by the arm-twisting methods of the Republican free-trader-in-chief and 
the heavy pressure of its business allies.  
 
Labor unions and TPA 
Given the “militant anti-union stance” of the Bush administration (Piven, 2004, 
59), organized labor had reasons to be skeptical about the promises of the TPA bill. 
For labor advocates, the bill’s “fair trade” language obscured the voluntary, non-
enforceable nature of the TPA’s environmental and labor provisions. For the AFL-
CIO, the absence of enforcement mechanism meant that nothing would ensure that 
negotiating objectives would be met or that new provisions on ILO-WTO 
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cooperation would be enforced (AFL-CIO, 2001). According to AFL-CIO Secretary 
Treasurer Richard Trumka, the Thomas bill was “substantively the same flawed fast 
track we saw in 1997 and 1998, with just a little window dressing added as a nod to 
the surge of popular support for a more fair global economy” (Trumka, 2001). As 
during previous debates, the Federation continued to demand that environmental and 
labor provisions receive equal treatment with commercial terms, i.e. that they be 
subject to the same dispute resolutions and enforcement provisions, including trade 
sanctions (AFL-CIO, 2001b). The AFL-CIO was also particularly skeptical of the 
White House’s willingness to promote labor rights through international institutions, 
noting that Bush’s 2002 budget proposal would in fact reduce funding for 
international labor programs by more than half (AFL-CIO, 2001b).340 
Beyond their worries over the specific wording of the Thomas bill, labor 
advocates reiterated their concerns over the imbalanced socio-economic impact of 
globalization. Once again, NAFTA’s legacy occupied a prominent place in the 
debates. Given George Bush’s ambitions to re-energize the FTAA negotiations – an 
agenda made more tangible by the Quebec summit in April 2001 – the prospect of 
“NAFTA expansion” became again a recurrent theme of labor’s anti-fast track 
campaign. Unions presented NAFTA as a “case study in why Fast Track negotiating 
authority is bad policy” (AFL-CIO, 2001b). This time too, they condemned 
NAFTA’s heavy toll on job losses in the United States – 700,000 according to the 
                                                
340 Throughout his presidency, George Bush has repeatedly proposed sharp cuts in funding for the 
ILO and for the promotion of labor standards. Although Congress initially managed to maintain the 
appropriation for the Bureau of International Labor Affairs, the recent budget cuts in the Department 
of Labor (DOL)’s Bureau of International Labor Affairs have corroborated labor’s fears. For more 
details, see DOL (2008). 
In addition, the recent reductions in the State Department’s budget is likely to reduce America’s 
commitment to most international organizations, including the ILO (Elliott & Freeman, 2003, 107; 
Swepston, 2006*).  
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AFL-CIO – and its disappointing social record in Mexico – a combination of 
declining wages and rising poverty.  
After years of coalition-building on the trade battle lines, environmental issues 
had also become an integral part of labor’s lingua. In an evocative instance of labor’s 
outreach to the environmental movement, the AFL-CIO’s four-page pamphlet 
against trade promotion authority contained no fewer than 16 references to 
ecological issues. Not only had environmental standards become inseparable from 
labor standards in unions’ testimonies and reports, but the labor federation constantly 
framed its mobilization as a struggle to protect “workers, the environment, and the 
public at large” (AFL-CIO, 2001b, 2).  
Labor advocates were aware that fast track authority granted a political 
advantage to the business community: “President George W. Bush and giant 
corporations want a special bill that will let them rush trade agreements through 
Congress with no changes and minimal review” (AFL-CIO, 2001c). For the AFL-
CIO, “the NAFTA record amply demonstrate[d] why corporations and wealthy 
investors have such a huge stake in rushing action on Fast Track” (2001b, 2). In a 
time when multilateral and regional trade agreements went far beyond narrow 
commercial issues – affecting intellectual property rights, tax and regulatory policies 
etc. – organized labor warned Congress against the social and environmental 
consequences of yielding its constitutional prerogatives to the executive branch. 
Calling for a new “direction for future trade and development policies,” labor 
demanded that trade agreements set out “responsibilities,” “not just rights” for 
corporations (ibid.).  
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Environmental and consumer advocates’ opposition to TPA 
Like labor advocates, environmentalists presented a relatively united front 
against the fast track bill, calling it a “major step back” from the key environmental 
provisions of the Jordan-FTA and NAFTA (Center for International Environmental 
Law et al, 2001; Defenders of Wildlife et al, 2001; League of Conservation Voters, 
2001). This time, the “public interest” opposition to TPA included not only regulars 
such as Public Citizen, Friends of the Earth or the Sierra Club but also “part-time” 
fair traders such as World Wildlife Fund (WWF) or the National Wildlife Federation 
(NWF). As usual, the environmentalists’ mobilization was, however, far from 
homogeneous, ranging from endorsing letters of support for fair trade principles to 
grassroots lobbying. 341  
Environmentalists’ concerns with the trade bill, like those of labor advocates, 
focused primarily on the voluntary nature of its ecological provisions. For all the 
eco-friendly terminology of the trade bill, environmentalists found few if any 
substantive provisions to be content with. For them, although the bill asked US trade 
negotiators to “seek to protect and preserve the environment,” it did not provide 
strong safeguards to ensure that trade agreements would meet this objective 
(Defenders of Wildlife et al, 2001). Friends of the Earth (FOE) president Brent 
Blackwelder’s remarks summarize the feeling of the environmental community 
toward TPA:  “What we have are wishy-washy environmental directives, backed up 
by toothless, almost nonexistent accountability procedures” (Friends of the Earth, 
2001).342 And for green organizations, the lack of enforcement mechanism in TPA 
                                                
341 The list of the main national environmental and consumer groups involved directly or indirectly in 
the debates included Defenders of Wildlife, Friends of the Earth, NRDC, WWF, CIEL, Earthjustice, 
NWF, the Sierra Club, Greenpeace, the National Environmental Trust, Pacific Environment, the 
League of Conservation Voters, and Public Citizen.  
342 Similarly, the Sierra Club argued that the Thomas bill only “raise[d] false hopes of environmental 
progress” (Sierra Club, 2001). 
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meant that U.S. would fall short of addressing the ecological pitfalls of past trade 
agreements, and most notably NAFTA. They raised two principal sets of grievances 
over fast track renewal: the conflict between trade liberalization and environmental 
regulation (whether domestic or international), and the “democratic deficit” of the 
trade policy process.  
 Of utmost concern to environmentalists was the idea that future free trade 
agreements negotiated under TPA might undermine domestic environmental laws 
(Defenders of Wildlife et al, 2001; CIEL et al, undated). As in 1997, NAFTA’s 
chapter 11 was at the center of fast track debates. In September 2001, Public Citizen 
and Friends of the Earth published an analysis of “investor-to-state cases” under the 
NAFTA regime. Entitled “Bankrupting Democracy,” the report concluded that 
NAFTA, by allowing corporations to challenge local and national regulatory 
provisions, had granted them expansive rights at the expense of families and workers 
(Public Citizen & Friends of the Earth, 2001). 
Compounding environmentalists’ fear about the conflict between trade 
liberalization and domestic legislation were TPA’s provisions against regulatory 
measures described as “unjustified trade restriction.” In contrast with the 
“precautionary principle” favored by consumer and environmental advocates, the 
TPA bill stressed the necessity that regulation be based on “sound science” and 
costs-benefits analyses. Many green organizations believed that these provisions, 
largely in tune with the WTO’s scientific approach to the regulation of sanitary and 
phytosanitary products, would in effect raise a barrier to agricultural, consumer and 
environmental regulation (Defenders of Wildlife et al, 2001). Environmentalists’ 
concerns over domestic regulation also extended to Multilateral Environmental 
Agreements (MEAs). By calling for the “consideration” of MEAs, the Thomas bill 
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allegedly failed to effectively protect them from potential conflicts with future free 
trade agreements (Defenders of Wildlife et al, 2001; CIEL et al, 2001).343 
Environmentalists’ second main concern pertained to the democratic deficit of 
American trade policy. To begin with, green organizations denounced the lack of 
accountability and transparency of trade negotiations. They demanded a greater 
public access to the trade policy process both at the preliminary phase, via the release 
of negotiating texts, and at the implementing phase, through the institutionalization 
of citizens’ petition filing procedures against environment/trade disputes (building on 
NAFTA’s side agreement) (CIEL et al, 2001; Defenders of Wildlife et al, 2001). 
Furthermore, environmentalists, like their labor and consumer allies, questioned the 
intrinsic value of fast track authority. They demanded that Congress, in accordance 
with its constitutional authority, hold trade negotiators accountable and exert greater 
oversight over the policy process. Proposals included congressional certification 
prior to the signature of trade agreements, as well as mandatory negotiating 
objectives (Defenders of Wildlife et al, 2001; CIEL et al., 2001; Sierra Club, 2001).  
One major difference between the arguments of environmental and labor 
advocates – beyond the focus of their advocacy – lay in the former’s lack of outreach 
in support of the latter’s cause. In contrast with labor’s coalition-building efforts, the 
tendency of environmentalists to embrace the labor cause in publications was more 
limited. In fact, joint petitions of environmentalists against TPA made little mention 
of workers’ rights and employment issues. Of course, many environmental 
organizations also endorse declarations/letters of fair trade coalitions, whose 
grievances went beyond ecological issues. However, the fact that environmentalists’ 
                                                
343 This concern was addressed in the recent compromise reached by Charles Rangel and the Bush 
administration in 2007.  
300 
  
own declarations neglected the labor cause confirmed the instability of the blue-
green alliance.  
 
Mobilization and its impact  
The fact that environmentalists were reluctant to become outright labor advocates 
should not obscure the scope of coalition-building efforts between blue and green 
organizations. In fact, the scope of the fair trade alliance had continued to grow since 
the last fast track debates, bolstered by the Seattle protests. While the 9.11 terror 
attacks affected the fair traders’ grassroots efforts, and more specifically their 
reliance on protests as “repertoires” of collective action (Tilly, 1978), cross-field 
cooperation continued to be an important component of fair trade mobilization.   
Early mobilizing efforts of fair trade advocates foreshadowed the coalition-
building efforts of the campaign against TPA. In April 2001, antiglobalization 
groups rallied en masse against the negotiations of the Free Trade Agreement of the 
Americas. In this case, mobilization took a transnational dimension involving 
organizations from Canada and the United States, as well as delegates from Latin 
American labor organizations, meeting with AFL-CIO within the framework of the 
Interamerican Regional Organization of Worker (Greenhouse, 2001).  
Once George Bush expressed his intention to obtain trade-negotiating authority 
in May, American fair traders focused on consolidating their efforts on the domestic 
front. On June 19, there were already 40 organizations opposing trade promotion 
authority, with a strong presence of labor unions344 and, to a lesser extent, 
environmentalists and consumer groups. From 40 in June, the coalition would grow 
                                                
344 Organized labor included not only unions in manufacturing sector but also public sector 
organizations like AFT and AFSCME along with SEIU in the service sector.  
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to 169 signatory groups opposing fast track in November  (AFL-CIO & Public 
Citizen, 2001).  
Where Global Trade Watch had traditionally been the coalition-builder in 
previous trade debates, organized labor assumed the lead in forming cross-field 
alliances in 2001. Living up to its promises to build new political alliances, the 
Sweeney leadership encouraged its affiliates to reach out to other anti-fast track 
groups through a variety of lobbying activities, including meetings and press 
conferences, lobby visits, marches and rallies, letters to congress etc.345 In addition to 
its usual alliance with consumer and environmental groups, the Federation 
acknowledged the recent role played by student organizations in trade debates346 and 
seized fast track debates as “a great opportunity to build and strengthen [its] ties to 
student activist organizations” (AFL-CIO, 2001c). In particular, labor hoped to 
benefit from students’ acquaintance with media and technology (ibid.) 
Beyond its leadership in coalition-building efforts, labor’s human and 
organizational resources provided once again the backbone of the mobilization 
against fast track. As during previous trade battles, the AFL-CIO launched an “all-
out effort” against TPA that included both inside and outside tactics (Kahn, 2001). 
Its grassroots tactics included all the ingredients of previous campaigns. Fast track 
toolkits were distributed to all state federations. The Federation provided sample op-
eds and articles to use in local newspapers.347 Flyers with a 1-800-number produced 
                                                
345 In its guidelines to organize press conferences on fast track, AFL-CIO’s coalition-building strategy 
is particularly explicit: “Any event you plan on Fast Track should include coalition partners. 
Environmentalists, consumer right activists, civil rights groups, immigrants’ rights groups, farmers, 
religious groups, students, debt-relief groups etc. are all possibilities” (AFL-CIO, 2001c) 
346 In the 1990s, student organizations led the anti-sweatshop campaign and were also involved in the 
Seattle protests of 1999. For more information, read Elliott & Freeman (2005). 
347 These articles consisted of “fill-in-the-blanks” documents where unions would add the name of the 
city where their event would take place, the names of the groups mobilized, the identity of the 
targeted representative etc. See appendix 11. 
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tens of thousands of phone calls. TV ads ran twice in 15 congressional districts. 
Other, less typical grassroots tactics in the AFL-CIO’s repertoire included:  
 A mock race to the bottom, where people dressed as corporate bosses 
would get to start half way through, while American workers and 
environmentalists would have to start at the very beginning. This was 
meant to symbolize the advantage that fast track gives corporations.  
 A farewell party for global standards that would feature black party hats, 
black balloons and a cake that would say “Fast Track: A Farewell to 
Good Jobs, Safe Food and Clean Air”, as well as a giant gift for large 
corporations (AFL-CIO, 2001c; AFL-CIO, 2001d). 
In addition to these innovative tactics, labor and their allies undertook more 
conventional lobbying efforts inside the Beltway. The AFL-CIO established a list of 
target congressmen, referencing the key constituencies of their district (e.g. 
environmentalists, agricultural interests, steel industry etc.) to maximize their 
grassroots efforts. To bridge the gap between inside and outside operations, local 
labor representatives had been asked to fill in “grassroots meetings reports” during 
their lobby visits. These reports were designed to provide an account of the 
arguments raised by legislators. This information would be centralized in 
Washington and exploited to address lawmakers’ individual concerns (AFL-CIO, 
2001c).  
While Democrats predictably represented a majority of congressional targets, 
labor did not neglect lobbying Republican lawmakers. AFL-CIO internal documents 
reveal that around one-third of House targets were Republicans, while the latter 
represented 40% of the Federation’s “primary targets.” In fact, organized labor had 
even designed a list of “talking points for meeting with Republicans”, which unlike 
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that drafted for Democrats, tended to mute criticisms of President Bush’s policies  
(AFL-CIO, 2001c). 
Before discussing the impact of fair traders’ mobilization on the House vote, it is 
important to pause to reflect on the importance of environmental and labor issues in 
the debates on fast track renewal. From President Bush’s guidelines to his final 
concessions on trade adjustment assistance, the fate of America’s trade liberalizing 
agenda seemed to hinge on the scope of blue and green provisions (Stokes, 2001b). 
According to House Ways and Means Committee Democratic member Robert 
Matsui, “the debate has shifted since 1997. Labor and environmental issues have 
come to the forefront, and there is a sincere belief among Democrats that they need 
to be addressed” (cited in Mitchell, 2001, 1413).  
The fact that environmental standards had become so resonant in barely a decade 
was even more remarkable. As explained in chapter two, labor standards had been 
part of American trade debates long before becoming the NAFTA controversies, 
although never with such prominence. The trade-environment nexus, however, 
seemed to have avoided this protracted gestation. Despite the non-enforceable 
character of environmental (and labor) provisions, the simple fact that ecological 
issues – unheard of in the trade policy sphere a decade before – had reached such 
prominence demonstrated the symbolic progress made by environmentalists in trade 
politics since the NAFTA debates. As trade-environment specialist John Audley 
notes,  
 
The Trade Act of 2002 reflects an important shift in U.S. trade policy. The 
argument over whether or not environment belongs in trade negotiations is 
now over; environmental policy is here to stay as an element of trade 
negotiations (Audley, 2002, 5).  
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Beyond environmental and labor issues, debates on congressional oversight, a 
long-time grievance of the blue-green alliance, had also become integral to trade 
controversies. As mentioned before, both environmental and labor advocates 
explicitly opposed the logic of fast track authority and its tendency to exacerbate the 
corporate bias of the trade policy process, to the detriment of fair traders and their 
supporters in Congress. Of course, one could argue that Congress’s growing 
uneasiness about delegating its constitutional authority to the executive branch had 
more to do with the increasing scope of free trade agreements than with the 
mobilization of the blue-green alliance. Isolating these two factors is, however, a 
fallacious exercise. In fact, the proliferating conflicts between national policies and 
trade liberalization had been a central grievance of the blue-green alliance since the 
early 1990s. In this regard, it is safe to say that fair traders’ advocacy efforts, and 
particularly the increasingly active consumer and environmental groups, played a 
vanguard role in sensitizing lawmakers to these political contentions – from the early 
debates on the Flipper-GATTzilla case to the Seattle protests.  
Another notable achievement of the blue-green alliance was the slow diffusion of 
their ideas across the political spectrum. In 2001, the growing awareness of fair trade 
principles was no longer confined to the liberal wing of the Democratic Party. In 
allegiance to their environmental and labor allies and in reaction against the partisan 
approach of the Republican leadership, a majority of centrist Democrats chose to 
oppose the bill. Most surprisingly, fair trade principles also started to infuse the 
rhetoric of the GOP For instance, as he was facing protests in Quebec City, President 
Bush acknowledged – not unlike Bill Clinton in Seattle – that “our commitment to 
open trade must be matched by a strong commitment to protecting our environment 
and improving labor standards” (Bush, 2001b). The fact that a Republican president 
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would, at least rhetorically, present fair trade ideas as a necessity, was by itself a sign 
of change in the scope of trade politics. Reflecting on the significance of President 
Bush’s remarks, Lori Wallach stated:  
You could have dialed 911 when I heard what Bush said -- I needed to be 
resuscitated… When we started organizing and educating on trade in the 
early ‘90s, no one but a handful of progressive Democrats understood what 
we were talking about. And now comes Mr. Trade-Uber-Alles Bush, saying 
we need to respect labor and environmental concerns. It shows the political 
shift. Now we’ve got to see the policy shift. (cited in Crook, 2001).  
 
Admittedly, the hortatory nature of TPA’s labor and environmental provisions 
shows that this policy shift was not to be completed in 2001. Yet, the intense 
controversies surrounding the inclusion of blue and green issues made the outcome 
of the TPA vote uncertain until the very last minutes of the vote. So divisive was the 
trade bill that it was repeatedly postponed (Boyer, 2001; FT, 2001). In fact, the 
partisan debates over trade promotion authority became so fierce that, on the day of 
the vote, the administration decided to withdraw the bill from the floor. In addition, 
the final vote was held open for 23 minutes after the 15-minute roll call in order to 
help the Republican leadership convince reluctant lawmakers (Broder, 2001; Destler, 
2005, 339). On December 6th 2001, the House finally passed the “Bipartisan” Trade 
Promotion Authority Act by a ballot of 215 to 214, making it, according to trade 
politics expert I.M. Destler “the most controversial partisan vote on such a bill since 
the 1930s” (Destler, 2005, 331). 
The House Democrats’ overwhelming opposition to fast track renewal reveals 
the influence of fair traders’ mobilization: only 21 (10 %) of them supported the 
pursuit of a trade liberalizing agenda under the conditions set by the Republican 
leadership.348 In contrast with the PNTR battle, the influence of the blue-green 
                                                
348 The results of the TPA vote can be found at:  
http://www.ecattrade.com/keytrade/content.asp?ID=220  
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alliance was not confined to Old Democrats. In 2001, 57 members of the pro-trade 
New Democrat Coalition – among them longtime free-traders Jim McDermott (D-
WA) and Robert Matsui (D-CA) as well as representatives from high-tech 
communities dependent on export markets – opposed fast track renewal. This group 
had been crucial to Clinton’s ability to normalize U.S-Chinese trade relations a year 
earlier. As a Republican president with little interest in a blue-green compromise, 
George Bush had little prospect of neutralizing the pressures of fair traders on 
Democratic lawmakers. In this regard, the opposition to free trade among Democrats 
also stemmed from their opposition to the party in power and the partisan tactics of 
the Bush administration.  
How successful were labor’s advocacy efforts? A recent study of the TPA vote 
reaches mixed conclusions. According to Biglaiser, Jackson and Peake (2004), 
constituency factors played a non-negligible role in shaping trade votes. 
Representatives from districts with higher numbers of blue-collar and unionized 
workers were more likely to oppose the bill. This means that unions’ grassroots 
efforts, designed to amplify the voices of local constituencies, contributed to rallying 
Democrats to the fair trade cause.  
In addition to the anti-fast track mobilization, labor’s outside tactics during the 
2000 elections may also have scored political points among Democrats. Thanks to 
their get-out-the-vote programs in the presidential campaign, unions helped Al Gore 
to win in Michigan, Wisconsin and Pennsylvania (Ramstack, 2001). This effort 
reinforced the links between the Democratic Party and the labor movement (Shoch, 
2002). As Financial Times journalist Schlaes wrote, “John Sweeney, AFL-CIO 
president, worked hard for the Democrats in 2000. The nays on TPA are his reward” 
(Shlaes, 2001).  
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Although labor’s grassroots work seemed to bear fruit, the impact of its financial 
contributions is less clear. On this account, the analysis by Biglaiser et al. reaches an 
unexpected conclusion: “The effect of labor PAC money on Democrats, [highly 
significant in 1997, disappears in 2001” (Biglaiser, Jackson & Peake 2004, 689). 
This diagnosis seems all the more puzzling considering that unions’ financial 
contributions continued to represent the lion’s share of Democratic campaign funds. 
In fact, the ever-closer ties between the business community and the Republican 
Party – examined in the subsequent section – even exacerbated the Democrats’ 
dependency on labor’s financial donations. Without relying on quantitative analysis, 
Shoch (2002) sees this situation as one of several determinants of Democratic 
opposition TPA. While the question may need further inquiry, it is clear that the 
mobilization of blue-and-green advocates – whether thanks to their inside or outside 
tactics – did influence the Democrats’ rejection of trade promotion authority, as 
illustrated by the stormy controversies surrounding labor and environmental issues.   
Even as fair traders managed to expand Democratic support, they were 
considerably less successful on the Republican side. In the end, only 23 GOP 
representatives voted against their party line, and 30 of those who had voted against 
fast track in 1998 voted in favor of TPA this time (Shoch, 2002). Labor PAC 
donations did have a negative effect on Republican votes (-18%) but this effect was 
considerably weaker than 4 years earlier, when Republicans receiving significant 
money from labor were 39% less likely to support fast track renewal (Biglaiser, 
Jackson & Peake, 2004, 689). While labor’s PAC donations might have influenced a 
few Republican members to vote against TPA, a majority of GOP leaders preferred 
to follow the lead of the free-trader-in-chief. Despite the importance that labor gave 
to Republican congressional targets, the offensive of the blue-green alliance was no 
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match for the institutional capabilities of the Oval Office, especially in the aftermath 
of a national security crisis that had empowered the president.  
 
II) COUNTERMOBILIZATION  
If the institutional design of the trade policy process predisposed the executive 
branch to collaborate with the private sector, the GOP’s political agenda also 
strengthened this “special relationship.” Their strong partnership would, once again, 
allow the business community to exert considerable control over the terms of the 
trade bill, relegating environmental and labor provisions to the backburner. It also 
enabled free trade advocates to coordinate their countermobilization efforts with less 
apprehension than they might have had under Bill Clinton’s presidency – e.g. before 
NAFTA’s side agreements were negotiated or before the Democratic leader released 
his 1997 fast track bill.  
As in 2000, business organizations adopted a decentralized lobbying strategy, 
gathering data on the economic benefits of trade in each district, encouraging 
“grassroots” mobilization among business members and recasting trade liberalization 
as essential to the well-being of U.S. farmers and workers. This time, however, the 
Republican president played a central role in rallying GOP troops under the free 
trade banner. Backed by business organizations and a particularly assertive House 
leadership, the White House’s “trade warriors”349 managed to win a narrow victory 
in a polarizing legislative battle. Like his predecessors, the Republican leadership 
used targeted side payments to buy precious congressional votes. Yet, beyond horse-
trading practices, the president primarily drew his legislative power from the rally-
around-the-flag effect of the 9.11 security crisis.   
                                                
349 Dryden (1995).  
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Setting the momentum for TPA 
In early 2001, the Business Roundtable published a report on America’s role in 
the world economy that provided the impulse for fast track renewal (Sek, 2002, 13). 
In its analysis, the BRT drew attention to a “New Era in trade negotiations” in which 
America’s trading partners showed increased activism in the trade sphere, while the 
“United States [had] been falling off the pace in recent years.” This lack of 
assertiveness constituted a departure from America’s historic role in international 
economic affairs:  
 The United States has, for more than 50 years, pushed for a rules-based, 
global system of trade agreements that serves to help all nations improve 
living standards through economic progress. This historic mission, stretching 
in an unbroken line over the service of every President from Franklin 
Roosevelt to George W. Bush, must not be lost (Business Roundtable, 2001, 
i). 
 
A sign of this alleged lethargy was the limited number of free trade agreements 
that Washington had signed over the past decade: only two (the U.S.-Israel FTA and 
NAFTA) out of the 130 estimated FTAs in the world.350 This simple fact became a 
recurrent argument of the TPA debates, as revealed by the testimonies of both 
business representatives and White House officials (Business Roundtable, 2001; 
Maury, 2001; Donohue, 2001). In March 2001, U.S. world economic leadership was 
the focus of a hearing of the House Ways and Means Subcommittee on Trade 
gathering prominent members of the business community. One after another, 
representatives from ECAT, the BRT and the USCC raised the alarm about the 
European Union’s international economic activism, on-going negotiations among 
South-East Asian countries through the Association of South-East Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), the economic and 
political expansion of Mercosur and the multiplication of bilateral trade agreements 
                                                
350 See appendix 10. 
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within the Western Hemisphere (Maury, 2001; McGraw, 2001). For the business 
community, America’s exclusion from international trade agreements represented 
short-term and long-term threats to “U.S. businesses, workers and farmers.” 
Corporate representatives were particularly concerned that they might lose business 
opportunities to foreign competitors because of discriminatory tariffs, or lose 
political leverage against new “blocked alliances” (Maury, 2001; McGraw, 2001; 
Donohue, 2001).  
Hence, the private sector called decision-makers to give new impetus to a multi-
faceted trade liberalizing agenda, including bilateral initiatives with Chile and 
Singapore, regional integration through the FTAA, and the completion of the 
“unfinished business of Seattle” at the multilateral level – i.e. a host of issue areas 
under consideration at the WTO, including services, intellectual property rights, 
investment, telecommunications, government procurement etc (Donohue, 2001; 
McGraw, 2001). For corporate interests, the renewal of fast track authority would be 
crucial to re-energize its trade-liberalizing agenda. “Without TPA,” noted Business 
Roundtable President Samuel Maury, “our trading partners will be reluctant to 
engage in comprehensive and time-intensive negotiations with the United States” 
(Maury, 2001).  
The business community’s sense of urgency also stemmed from its feeling that 
that the postwar political consensus over the benefits of trade liberalization had been 
shaken by recent trade debates surrounding NAFTA and the WTO. During the TPA 
debates, some corporate organizations like the BRT adopted a new tone, with which 
they seemed to acknowledge the political necessity to address labor and 
environmental issues:  
 International labor and environmental issues have emerged as the principal 
stumbling blocks [for the Executive Branch to move forward] (…). [T]he issue is 
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no longer whether they should be addressed in international trade and investment 
negotiations, but rather how to address them constructively (Business 
Roundtable, 2001, ii). 
 
After the 1997-1998 fast track fiascos and the stormy debates surrounding PNTR 
in 2000, corporate interests came to realize the political challenge that fair traders 
represented to the pursuit of America’s trade liberalizing agenda. As the BRT noted, 
“we cannot allow this debate to sideline the United States (Business Roundtable, 
2001, 16). This was the first time that the private sector seemed willing to reach a 
compromise with fair traders before the political battle had even started. Thus, the 
idea of fair trade had not only spread to the Democratic and Republican elites, but 
had also infiltrated the rhetoric of the business community at the beginning of the 
TPA debates.  
The business community’s change in tone on environmental and labor provisions 
did not reflect a real change of heart. In fact, business associations remained at best 
ambivalent about the idea of finding a political compromise on what they saw as 
“extraneous non-trade objectives” (Donohue, 2001). As ECAT chairman Harold 
McGraw noted,  
my initial view is that – for the most part – these issues are best addressed 
through their own agendas in organizations with the appropriate technical 
expertise and not as add-ons to the trade agenda (underlined in the text – 
McGraw, 2001).   
 
Similarly, U.S. Chamber of Commerce President Tom Donohue warned that the 
“other social agenda objectives” would require a considerably expanded level of 
technical expertise at the negotiating table (Donohue, 2001). In light of the 
increasing scope and complexity of international trade agreements – e.g. the 
inclusion of intellectual property rights, investment clauses and, to a large extent, the 
dismantlement of “non-tariff barriers” – it can seem ironic that the technicality of 
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environmental and labor provisions was invoked as a factor for their exclusions from 
trade policies.  
Despite its talk of compromise, the business community generally remained wary 
of strong labor and environmental measures, and particularly of the use of economic 
sanctions as enforcement mechanisms.351 In this regard, it showed uneasiness, if not 
open opposition to the U.S.-Jordan FTA model that had won acclaims among labor 
and environmental advocates for its sanctions mechanisms.352 The Business 
Roundtable instead recommended a “one size does not fit all approach” to labor and 
environmental issues that would give U.S. trade negotiators more flexibility.353 The 
provisions of Thomas’ TPA bill were in tune with the interests of the private 
sector.354 Not only did the limited scope of environmental and labor provisions 
appease business advocates, but the language of HR 3005 also allowed them to claim 
support for fair trade. In a letter to members of the House Ways and Means 
Committee, the BRT wrote:  
We hope the environmental and labor communities will see the clear benefits 
of this legislation for the United States overall, and seize the opportunities 
provided by the legislation to promote improved labor and environmental 
conditions across the globe (Business Roundtable, 2001b).  
 
If the rising prominence of environmental and labor principles attested to the 
impact of fair trade mobilization, the business community’s reluctance to give them 
more than symbolic consideration remained a major obstacle to the success of unions 
and their allies. This time, however, corporate interests did not exploit their 
                                                
351 In Tom Donohue’s words: “we must find a basis for addressing substantive labor and 
environmental concerns without holding U.S. competitiveness hostage to special interest efforts to 
achieve extraterritorial application of policy objectives that are not relevant to international 
commerce” (Donohue, 2001). 
352 The U.S. Chamber of Commerce explicitly cast the U.S.-Jordan FTA as a “dangerous” precedent 
and vowed to oppose “any trade agreement that includes labor and environmental provisions and 
accompanying sanctions in the agreement” (Donohue, 2001). 
353 According to one political commentator, the BRT threatened to oppose the renewal of presidential 
trade authority if FTA’s labor and environmental provisions were to be enforced by sanctions (Koffler 
2001). 
354 The private sector initially supported the “clean” Crane bill (Dougherty, 2001). 
313 
  
privileged access to the executive branch, as was usually the case for the negotiations 
of free trade agreements (NAFTA, PNTR), but instead relied on its close relationship 
with the Republican party leadership to control the terms of the TPA bill.355 
 
 Corporate countermobilization and its impact 
With Republicans in control of both the House and the White House, the 
business community was confident that the fast track bill would be in sync with its 
interests. However, the private sector took no chances and began to mobilize months 
before the first legislative proposal even emerged in Congress. As early as March 
2001, lobbyists and business groups planned a broad-based effort focusing on local 
constituencies and selling the benefits of trade to workers (Pethel, 2001). The final 
lobbying campaign came on the heels of the AFL-CIO’s advocacy efforts in July 
2001, and would last, intermittently until the Senate’s approval of the bill in May 
2002.  
This time, corporate organizations formed the “U.S. Trade” coalition involving 
as usual NAM, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the BRT, while the latter two 
launched their own multi-million dollar efforts (Stone, 2001). Committed to fast 
track renewal since the first months of Bush’s presidency, BRT’s new chairman John 
Dillon promised an aggressive effort on behalf of TPA. He pledged that his group 
would spend “what it takes to do the job” – with an initial budget of approximately 
$10 million, according to one BRT insider.356 
                                                
355 A year later, the Senate debates on the Durbin Amendment, designed to strengthen the 
enforcement of core labor standards, would revive business’s opposition to enforceable provisions, 
once again revealing their limited support for fair trade, and more specifically their fear that the 
extension of the labor-environmental agenda might foster regulatory reforms in the United States 
(ECAT, 2002a; ECAT, 2002b; Magnusson, 2002).  
356 The quote is from Koffler, (2001, 3), the budget estimate is drawn from Pethel (2001). 
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As in 2000, business operatives emphasized the need to build grassroots support 
for trade liberalization. The BRT perceived that its local advocacy efforts had been 
crucial to gain congressional approval of PNTR. As a BRT spokeswoman noted: 
“We found it was in the districts where we were really winning the war” (cited in 
Koffler, 2001). Thus in less than three years, the BRT dramatically expanded its 
grassroots operations. From 11 congressional districts in 1998 to 89 districts during 
the PNTR battle, its “GoTrade” programs would operate in 167 districts during the 
TPA debates (Maury, 2001; Koffler, 2001). The BRT’s increasing focus on outside 
lobbying added to the U.S. Chamber of Commerce’s long experience with grassroots 
operations. Their activities consisted of: 
 establishing locally organized, pro-trade networks comprising businesses, 
workers and academics; 
 generating letters and phone calls to members of Congress357;  
  conducting statistical and qualitative studies on the local impact of 
international trade, information that would be exploited by member 
companies during congressional office visits; 
 organizing community events  and forums to raise awareness on trade 
issues. 
 working with the news media to generate positive coverage of local trade 
successes.  
Other efforts included TV and radio ads by both the BRT and the U.S. Chamber 
of Commerce in sixty to eighty congressional districts. The business community also 
sought to obtain the blessing of prominent political figures like Colin Powell and 
                                                
357 NAM also mobilized their members to generate phone calls and letters.  
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former Secretary of Commerce William Daley to improve the appeal of its print 
advertising campaign (Maury, 2001; Business Roundtable, 2001c; Stone, 2001).  
As part of its new rhetoric about fair trade, and in response to Americans’ 
disatisfaction with free trade agreements, the business community sought to reframe 
its discourse in a more worker-friendly tone. First, business representatives presented 
America’s failure to negotiate new free trade agreements over the past few years as a 
source of lost opportunities for U.S. workers (Maury, 2001).  In other words, not 
only American companies, but also workers and farmers would pay the price for 
America’s alleged retreat from global leadership (Business Roundtable, 2001b). 
Second, the private sector acknowledged the dislocating effects of free trade and 
stressed the need to assist workers hurt by import competition. Thus, the BRT called 
for “new investments in the American worker” to “help those who lose today gain 
the skills and training needed to win tomorrow” (Business Roundtable, 2001d). 
Along similar lines, ECAT proposed a detailed reform of the Trade Adjustment 
Assistance program (McGraw, 2001; ECAT, 2001c). This policy proposal, which 
would become a hallmark of the 2002 TPA Senate bill, was not only a side payment 
to rally Democrats to the free trade cause, but an explicit attempt by the private 
sector to press the government to respond to American workers’ anxieties about free 
trade without creating new obligations for American companies. As Frank Vargo 
from the National Association of Manufacturers argued: “Nothing generates as much 
public support for new trade agreements as the idea that workers who might be 
adversely affected by trade will get government help” (cited in Magnusson, 2002).  
These grassroots tactics were paired with conventional lobbying tactics on 
Capitol Hill. The U.S.-Trade coalition sponsored fly-ins of hundreds of executives 
from small-to-medium sized companies in a variety of sectors (Stone, 2001; 
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Business Roundtable, 2002). As usual, business groups promised that they would 
reward TPA supporters with financial support.358 Overall, their efforts targeted 
nearly 70 Democrats and two dozen Republicans considered swing votes (Kahn, 
2001b). On the one hand, they sought to convince centrist Democrats by praising the 
labor and environmental provisions of the trade bill and calling for TAA reform. On 
the other, they reassured conservative Republicans that future trade agreements 
would not infringe upon America’s national sovereignty.  
What influence did business countermobilization exert over the TPA vote? The 
rare study of the TPA vote by Biglaiser and his colleagues finds that corporate 
countermobilization had a moderate impact on Democrats, who represented a 
majority of business’s congressional targets. According to them, House Democrats 
receiving greater than average support from business PACs were 12 % more likely to 
vote for TPA than those receiving average support (Biglaiser, Jackson & Peake, 
2004, 688-689). This means that business advocates were hardly more effective at 
mobilizing support among their Democrats than unions were among Republicans. 
However, in a close vote like TPA, every vote matters. Thus, even the minimum 
influence that the business community might have had on a few centrist Democrats 
could have made a difference.  
More difficult to evaluate is the actual impact of business PAC donations on 
Republican votes. As Biglaiser, Jackson and Peake note, the effect of this factor is 
obscured by the predominant influence of the legislative support for the president on 
GOP votes. Indeed, Republicans were intensely cross-pressured by the White House. 
This does not mean, of course, that business interests had no influence on the 
Republican vote. Such a conclusion would be hard to sustain in light of the ever-
                                                
358 For instance, the Information Technology Industry Council told lawmakers that it would count 
their vote on TPA twice when assessing their support to the high-tech cause. 
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closer relationship that the Republican Party nurtured with the business community 
from the mid-1990s. Once again, congressional analyses can reveal only part of the 
complex confluence of factors that shape trade votes and cannot be abstracted from 
their political context. Likewise, it is difficult to measure the exact impact of the 
businesses’ “grassroots” efforts on TPA votes, to the extent that no analysis of vote 
determinants to this day has attempted to test their effect  – e.g., using the number of 
phone calls, letters or visits to congressional offices. However, the more 
decentralized tactics adopted by free traders since PNTR seem to have at least partly 
offset the grassroots efforts of fair traders. Reflecting on the importance of free trade 
countermobilization, the USCC Senior Director for International Policy, a former 
congressional staff member remarked:  
 At the end of the day, members of Congress need to be hearing from 
supporters of these [business] groups, especially from constituents. Having 
worked on Capitol Hill, I remember, (…) during TPA, my boss at the time had 
said ‘Let me see all of our letters that have come into our office, pro and con.” 
He had me stack them up in front of him just so he could see… He knew he was 
gonna vote for TPA but it was always an important thing for him to do (Wenk, 
2008*).  
 
This means that grassroots countermobilization may not have been the decisive 
factor influencing congressional votes, but rather functioned as a validator for free-
trade leaning lawmakers under heavy pressure from fair trade pressure groups.  
In sum, business groups played a key role in launching the debates on fast track 
renewal in the very first months of Bush’s presidency. Their alarming tone over the 
decline of U.S. global leadership set the momentum for the administration’s trade 
agenda. From the beginning of the debates, the business community and its 
Republican allies, despite their rhetorical support for a bipartisan compromise on 
trade policy, still strove to limit the scope of fair trade issues to ad hoc, non-
enforceable provisions. In response to the strong mobilization of labor and its allies 
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against the TPA bill, corporate interests once again launched a sophisticated 
campaign to save the trade bill. If their lobbying efforts helped to offset the inside 
and outside lobbying efforts of fair traders, their role in the TPA victory came only 
second to that of the president, who, with the help of the Republican leadership, 
managed to rally congressional votes and save fast track from a legislative defeat.   
 
The White House saves the day  
The political context in which the Republican administration lobbied for TPA 
differed from the environment in which its Democratic predecessor promoted its 
trade agenda. As previous chapters have shown, Bill Clinton’s leadership in the trade 
sphere operated under the constraints of divided government and often consisted of 
compromising with the opposition while intensively lobbying party members. In 
contrast, George Bush could count on a majority of partisan supporters in the House 
of Representatives and showed little interest in reaching any consensus with labor- 
and environment-friendly lawmakers. This partisan approach to trade politics was 
only one example of Bush’s presidential style, a way of governing that became 
increasingly confrontational in the aftermath of 9/11. Capitalizing on the “rally-
around-the-flag effect” that succeeded the terror attacks, the Republican leader 
departed from his bipartisan approach to policy-making – displayed on behalf of 
education reform and the extension of prescription drug benefits for Medicare – and 
shed his campaign pledge to be “a uniter, not a divider.” The short-lived period of 
“hyperbipartisanship” (Fortier & Ornstein, 2003, 156) soon became an era of 
hyperpartisanship, a dramatic political change foreshadowed by the bitter partisan 
debates.  
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Although these partisan dynamics are a crucial element of the TPA debates, this 
dissertation seeks to highlight the larger institutional forces that structured the 
involvement of the executive branch in the legislative battle and its relationship with 
the constellation of trade policy stakeholders. Regardless of his party affiliation, 
President Bush, like his predecessor, utilized his institutional capabilities to counter 
the mobilization of fair traders and defend the interests of the private sector under the 
“free trade” banner. To save the controversial TPA bill, the free-trader-in-chief 
coordinated a lobbying campaign with the business community and resorted to a 
common combination of policy concessions and pork-barrel deals. Although the 9/11 
terror attacks distracted the President from the nitty-gritty of trade politics, the new 
climate of fear also considerably empowered the chief executive, allowing him to 
exploit his position as commander-in-chief to galvanize support for a business-
friendly trade policy.  
 In the aftermath of 9.11, President Bush and his Republican allies were prompt 
to cast trade liberalization as instrumental to Washington’s “War on Terror.” At the 
forefront of these framing tactics was USTR Robert Zoellick, who barely two weeks 
after the terror attacks, wrote a controversial editorial for the Washington Post: 
Earlier enemies learned that America is the arsenal of democracy; today’s 
enemies will learn that America is the economic engine for freedom, opportunity 
and development. To that end, U.S. leadership in promoting the international 
economic and trading system is vital. Trade is about more than economic 
efficiency. It promotes the values at the heart of this protracted struggle (…). 
Congress, working with the Bush administration, has an opportunity to shape 
history by raising the flag of American economic leadership. The terrorists 
deliberately chose the World Trade towers as their target. While their blow toppled 
the towers, it cannot and will not shake the foundation of world trade and freedom” 
(Zoellick, 2001).   
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The “trade warrior”359 thus called for Congress to enact trade promotion authority 
to allow Washington to negotiate “agreements that advance the causes of openness, 
development and growth.” For Zoellick, America’s trade leadership could build “a 
coalition of countries that cherish liberty in all its aspects” (ibid). Similarly, the 
Republican House leadership warned its party members that a legislative defeat 
would undermine the president’s authority in a dangerous time of war (Martinez, 
2001).  
The administration’s tactical use of the “politics of fear” was, of course, not 
confined to the trade sphere. On the domestic front, the administration repeatedly 
referred to 9.11 to legitimize its political agenda, a “war at home” on behalf of 
corporate interests (Piven, 2004). At the international level, it is now common 
wisdom that 9.11 terror attacks were invoked to justify policies that went far beyond 
Washington’s struggle against al-Qaeda – the Iraq war being only the most obvious 
example of these framing tactics. The ramifications of the politics of fear in the trade 
sphere have received little attention,360 but are crucial to understand the key role that 
the president played in the TPA battle.  
Most analysts agree that the “rally-around-the-flag” effect of 9/11 considerably 
helped George Bush.361 The national security crisis enhanced the president’s capacity 
as party leader. Unlike in 1997, when certain GOP lawmakers had given in to the 
pressures of their labor constituencies in dissent from President Clinton’s trade-
liberalizing agenda, Republican lawmakers in 2001 faced an unavoidable dilemma: 
alienate voters or betray a popular president at war. As a result, several long-time 
opponents of fast track and trade liberalization like Cass Ballenger (R-FL), Duncan 
                                                
359 This is the title of Dryden’s book on the USTR (Dryden, 1995).  
360 Destler (2005, 279) is a notable exception.  
361 This is true for trade analysts such as Destler (2005) and Shoch (2002), as much as journalists such 
as Dougherty (2001b) and Martinez (2001). 
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Hunter (R-CA), Frank Wolf (R-VA) and Dana Rohrabacher (R-CA) switched their 
position to back TPA (Destler, 2005, 335). The latter justified his decision in these 
words: “I was sad. I would have preferred not to be put in that situation, but I think it 
was bin Laden who put me in that situation” (cited in Martinez, 2001, 2919). Thus, 
the president exploited his role as commander-in-chief to rally party followers 
behind his trade agenda.  
However, the White House’s 9/11 tactics had a polarizing effect on the 
legislature. This can seem surprising considering the general bipartisan atmosphere 
in the aftermath of the terror attacks. Yet, while new national security threats 
temporarily unified Congress in support of the national security leader, trade politics 
did not stop at the water’s edge. Far from swaying Democratic lawmakers, the Bush 
administration’s fear tactics infuriated them. For fair trade leader Lori Wallach, 
“[the] bogus, silly linkage [between terror and trade] has solidified Democratic 
opposition to the fast-track bill in a way that all the best work of the Seattle coalition 
over the past decade could not achieve” (cited in Blustein, 2001, 1). A key supporter 
of previous free trade initiatives, the influential Charles Rangel vehemently attacked 
Robert Zoellick’s attempt to “wrap [the] trade promotion authority bill in the flag” 
and demanded a public apology from the USTR for implicitly questioning the 
patriotism of Democrat congressmen. According to Rangel, even two (of the three) 
junior House Ways and Means Democrats who supported Thomas’ bill disapproved 
of Zoellick’s framing tactics (Rangel, 2001). Far from apologetic, the USTR 
displayed little concern for building bipartisan consensus: “I’ve never believed that 
close votes aren’t good votes, as long as you pass things” (cited in Blustein, 2001). 
Instead, the Republican Party focused its efforts on bringing its members in its ranks.  
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If the national security crisis of 9.11 empowered the Republican president, it also 
considerably constrained his ability to lobby for trade promotion authority. During 
the first months following the terror attacks, the mind of the White House was 
clearly more focused on the World Trade Center than the World Trade Organization. 
The president did not throw himself into the legislative battle until the week before 
the vote, when he finally devoted himself to phone calls and meetings with 
congressional members (Dale, 2001; Koszczuk, 2001). Days before the scheduled 
vote, some political commentators were alarmed by “Bush’s slow track” on behalf of 
TPA and asked “Where is George?” (FT, 12/03/01; Dale, 2001). In an interview on 
the lobbying efforts of the president for trade promotion authority, Press Secretary 
Ari Fleischer admitted that, two days before the vote, the president had met with 
only 41 House and 8 Senate members from both parties (19 Republicans and 30 
Democrats) over a period of 6 months (Fleischer, 2001). The next day’s press 
briefing on the same topic brought the number of meetings and phone calls to 
“probably about 75 to 90 members of Congress” (Fleischer, 2001b). Whatever the 
real tally of Bush’s lobbying efforts, it is clear that President Bush spent far less time 
lobbying for fast track than Bill Clinton had for PNTR in 2000 (Kahn, 2001a). 
Nevertheless, the president’s distraction from trade politics differed from Bill 
Clinton’s leadership failure in a crucial respect. While President Clinton’s protracted 
neglect of fast track would jeopardize the backing of his party members, George 
Bush’s focus on national security galvanized Republican support for a plethora of 
legislative proposals. Speaking of the president, Bill Thomas declared: “He’ll move 
as many people as he talks to” (cited in Eilperin, 2001a). While the House Ways and 
Means chairman might have overstated the persuasive powers of the Oval Office, it 
is clear that the White House had been instrumental in the conversion of many 
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Republican members to the free trade cause. As the 1997 revolt of Democrats against 
Clinton’s trade agenda had shown, in the contentious era of the new politics of trade, 
party allegiance could no longer be taken for granted. Commenting on the forces 
moving America’s trade policy agenda, one business insider confided: “Do not ever, 
ever underestimate the bully pulpit that the president occupies” (Goudie, 2007*).  
And to pursue his trade policy agenda, the president was not alone. As chief 
executive, he could count on the support of Republican House leaders Dennis 
Hastert, Tom Delay and Bill Thomas to convince GOP members to follow the party 
line (FT, 12/03/01; Shoch, 2002). In addition, the White House’s lobbying operations 
were tightly coordinated with the free trade campaign of the business community. 
USTR Robert Zoellick and Secretary of Commerce Don Evans, 362 both of whom had 
strong connections with the business sector, were at the center of presidential-
corporate countermobilization. Under the Bush administration, the Office of the U.S. 
Trade Representatives continued to play a leading role in rallying congressional 
support for trade initiatives. The budget of the USTR had increased 41 percent 
during Barshefsky’s tenure and its staff had grown by 22 percent (Stokes, 2001a). At 
the beginning of the 21st century, the USTR had moved far beyond the role of 
interagency coordinator that Dryden had described in his historical narrative of 
“Trade Warriors” (Dryden, 1995). Zoellick’s advocacy for trade promotion authority 
borrowed heavily from the arguments developed by the Business Roundtable and its 
allies. As mentioned earlier, the administration repeated ad libitum that the United 
States was a signatory of only two out of 130 free trade agreements in the world, and 
saw fast track renewal as crucial to reassert Washington’s international economic 
leadership: “We cannot afford to stand still, or be mired in partisan division, while 
                                                
362 Don Evans was a former businessman from the oil and gas industry and a close Texan friend of the 
Bush family (Armbruster, 2001; see also New, 2001).  
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other nations seize the mantle of leadership on trade from the United States” (cited in 
Edmonson, 2001). Although Zoellick understood that rebuilding a bipartisan 
consensus on trade would be crucial to the president’s trade promotion authority 
(Clatanoff, 2007*), his views on labor and environmental issues hardly helped to 
build Democratic support. His “one-size-does-not-fit-all” on labor standards bore 
great resemblance to the recommendations of business groups (Samet, 2001; Pethel, 
2001).  
The Department of Commerce was also central to the administration’s lobbying 
efforts, operations that the Office of the USTR was technically not allowed to 
execute.363 Secretary of Commerce Don Evans was instrumental in reaching out to 
business organizations. By the time the TPA bill came to a vote, Don Evans had met 
with about 100 Congress members to rally support for the president’s trade agenda 
(Eilperin, 2001; Armbruster, 2001; see also New, 2001). This would be much more 
than the “war-time president” would ever be able to do. Asked about his role at the 
beginning of the TPA campaign, Evans replied that he would be “the one who’s a 
big advocate for the American business community” (cited in Memmott, 2001). 
Through its extensive network of regional offices, the DOC was also a great source 
of economic data, offsetting the USTR’s lack of resources.  
Like corporate organizations, the USTR and the Commerce Department 
emphasized the need to build local support for trade liberalization before lobbying 
Congress.364 As a USTR official remarked: “You gotta have a unified front, you 
                                                
363 An official of the USTR noted that Bob Zoellick was very conscious of the restrictions imposed on 
advocacy activities (Clatanoff, 2007).   
364 At a luncheon with Business Council for International Understanding, Evans’ remarks echoed the 
concerns of his business audience: 
“Frankly, we have done a very poor job of explaining the tremendous benefits we enjoy in 
this country thanks to our presence in the world marketplace. We have decades of results 
confirming the universal rewards of expanding trade and commerce, yet it is still not clear to 
Americans that increasing trade opportunities is in their best interests.” (cited in Armbruster, 
2001).  
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gotta get your shit together before you go to Congress” (Clatanoff, 2007*). In this 
prospect, the Bush administration used its institutional capabilities – the trade 
advisory committee system and the multiple branches of the Department of 
Commerce – to reach out to the business community (ibid.). To coordinate these 
lobbying efforts and build momentum for TPA, the president invited BRT executives 
at the White House (Labaton, 2001).365 The special relationship was key to the free 
traders’ inside lobbying to the extent that the private sector provided the USTR with 
crucial information to identify the “vulnerabilities” of House representatives. 
According to Assistant USTR on Labor William Clatanoff,  
[Business coalitions matter] because they have the resources and the 
knowledge, if you will, to know who in Congress needed to be leaned on for any 
particular issue. (…) They would know, their members would know who, in 
Congress, would be susceptible to their pressure. And we [the USTR] were just 
too small (Clatanoff, 2007*).  
 
To optimize the impact of presidential-corporate countermobilization, the chief 
executive, like his Democratic predecessor, relied on a cornucopia of policy 
concessions and pork-barrel deals. As other case studies have shown, protectionist 
side-payments are often an integral part of a president’s “free trade” agenda or, more 
adequately, of his business-friendly trade policies. By providing little scope to the 
consideration of environmental and labor provisions and invoking security 
arguments to legitimize its economic agenda, the Bush administration and its 
congressional allies had alienated House Democrats. Politically, this meant that the 
White House would have to broaden support within its own party and reach out to 
the most ardent protectionists in Congress – those representing steel, farm and 
textiles interests (FT, 12/05/01; Kahn, 2001b).  
                                                
365 In this case, trade policy was not the only policy on the agenda of this event.  
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The first step of the Bush administration’s deal-making strategy occurred in the 
early months of George Bush’s presidency. In March 2001, the administration 
considered imposing three-year restrictions on steel imports. Three months later, 
briefly after Republican congressman Phil Crane submitted his trade proposal, the 
president took an initial step toward raising steel tariffs by filing a Section 201 
“escape clause.”366 George Bush requested that the U.S. International Trade 
Commission investigate whether the U.S. steel industry – which had been going 
through a severe crisis since 1998 – had been harmed by a surge in the import of 
steel products (WT, 06/25/01; Shoch, 2002).367  
Political analysts have offered a number of explanations for the White House’s 
move, none of which are mutually exclusive. Often cited is the idea that George 
Bush’s willingness to protect the steel industry stemmed from a desire to increase his 
popularity in steel-producing states such as Ohio, West Virginia and Pennsylvania in 
the anticipation of the 2004 elections (Murray, 2001; Shoch, 2002, Hubbard, 2007*). 
What is rarely explained, however, is why the President took this step only six 
months into his first term instead of waiting until the presidential campaign. More 
credible is the conjecture that George Bush might have sought to reward the steel 
industry for its support during the 2000 election. Yet, here again, it seems 
questionable that the administration would have inaugurated its trade agenda with a 
blunt protectionist move without any other political calculation. In reality, the White 
House’s decision to protect the steel industry was an integral part of its lobbying 
                                                
366 The escape clause is a provision of both GATT articles and U.S. law authorizing import relief as a 
temporary safeguard designed to protect American producers injured by import competition. Cases 
are filed by industries or unions in front of the U.S. International Trade Commission, after which the 
president approves whether temporary protection serves the “national economic interest.” Congress 
may override the president’s decision through enactment of a joint resolution (Destler, 2005, 346).  
367 George Bush’s initiative represented a break from the inaction of the Clinton administration that 
had constantly resisted the protectionist calls of both steel labor and management (Hubbard, 2007). 
Although the steel industry won a number of antidumping cases, it never obtained comprehensive 
protection granted under escape clause cases (Destler, 2005, 248).   
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efforts on behalf of trade promotion authority. With the steel sector in serious 
disarray since 1998, support for trade liberalizing initiatives among steel-friendly 
representatives remained uncertain. President Bush’s tactical move aimed to provide 
Rustbelt lawmakers with political cover to support future trade initiatives (Murray, 
2001). According to Institute of International Economics trade expert Gary 
Hufbauer, “Basically, [USTR] Zoellick is a strategic thinker, and he’s saying, ‘Steel, 
well, that’s the price to pay for fast track’” (cited in Cooper & Phillips, 2001).   
This strategy proved particularly fruitful among GOP congressmen. Indeed, 46 of 
52 Republican members of the House Steel Caucus voted in favor of TPA (Shoch, 
2002). On the Democratic side, the effect of President Bush’s steel deal appeared 
more limited (Cooper & Phillips, 2001).368 This was partly due to the little substance 
given to labor standards in the TPA bill and the Steelworkers’ refusal to endorse 
TPA – despite the import protection that it temporarily enjoyed.  
Beyond the steel industry, the Republican administration also sought to appease 
agricultural interests. While the farm lobby had provided critical political muscle to 
win congressional backing for NAFTA, the Uruguay Round and PNTR, it seemed, 
this time, to suffer from a “trade fatigue” due to increased international competition 
for a range of fruit and vegetables, as well as declining prices for many U.S. 
commodities. In a typical replay of President Clinton’s P.R. tactics, the agriculture 
department released a letter signed by 10 former secretaries of agriculture that called 
Congress to back trade promotion authority, warning that American farmers “have 
too much to lose if Congress fails to seize this opportunity” (Alden, 2001). Like his 
Democratic predecessor, the president also relied on his executive prerogatives to 
persuade two Republicans on a trip to Florida aboard Air Force One – a second case 
                                                
368 A spokesman for steel-friendly Indiana Democratic Representative Peter Visclosky reflected the 
intransigence of “old” Democrats: “Nothing the administration may or may not do (…) would in any 
shape or form influence Mr. Viclosky’s opposition to fast track” (WT, 06/25/01). 
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of “first-class arm-twisting at 37,000 feet” (Eilperin, 2001; Martinez, 2001)369 
Furthermore, the administration’s support for the generous farm bill of October 2001 
is likely to have appeased ambivalent lawmakers (Destler, 2005, 294). Finally, the 
White House offered a range of policy concessions that included a pledge to protect 
the Florida citrus industry from import surges from Latin America and a promise to 
create of a Task Force on Florida Agriculture Trade in charge of finding new 
markets for Florida’s farm products. While it is always difficult to trace the impact of 
such deal-making tactics, it is important to note that despite long-lasting doubts 
about the outcome of the TPA vote, a large majority of Republican representatives 
close to farm interests – 32 out of 34 Republican members of the House Agriculture 
Committee and the House Agriculture Appropriations Subcommittee – backed 
George Bush’s bid for TPA (Shoch, 2002).  
The third pillar of the White House’s deal-making strategy targeted 
representatives from textile states. As George W. Bush sought fast track renewal, the 
U.S. textile industry was alarmed by declining employment and textile mill 
shipments partly due to the increased competition of Asian imports.370 Once again, 
the president would act as a trade lobbyist, inviting representatives from hard-hit 
textile states to the White House (Koszczuk, 2001). To appease half a dozen 
Republican lawmakers from textile districts, the chief executive committed not to 
increase Pakistan’s market access in the U.S. textile and apparel market via an 
increase or reallocation in Pakistan’s quotas (Public Citizen, 2005, 45). The Bush 
administration and its congressional allies eventually managed to convince two 
reluctant House representatives from North Carolina, Cass Ballenger and Robin 
                                                
369 In the end, however, the two Republicans decided to oppose TPA. The details of the vote are 
available at: http://www.ecattrade.com/keytrade/content.asp?ID=220  
370 The textile industry sought to emulate the recent success of the steel sector and called the White 
House for protection. Read Hong Kong Trade Development Council (2001).  
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Hayes, both of whom had claimed that they would oppose the trade bill as the floor 
debate began (Kahn, 2001a). According to the New York Times, the former saw it as 
his duty to support the president (ibid). The latter representative is sometimes 
credited with tipping the vote in favor of TPA and was rewarded by an immediate 
presidential statement endorsing his stand, as well as textile trade concessions 
(Destler 2005, fn. 34, 295).371 But the most dramatic moment on the textile front 
came several minutes into the actual vote on TPA, when Republican Jim DeMint (R-
SC) joined the free traders’ side after obtaining a concession on textile imports. This 
concession, strongly opposed by House Ways and Means chairman Bill Thomas, 
came in the form of a letter signed by President Bush, who promised that any trade 
bill would have to ensure that Caribbean and Andean garment imports would use 
fabric finished and dyed in the United States (Destler, 2005, 295; Public Citizen, 
2005, 43). DeMint’s vote broke the 214-214 status quo and gave the Bush 
administration the narrowest trade victory it could win (Eilperin, 2001b; Martinez, 
2001a). The White House was indebted to the strong arm-twisting methods of the 
Republican House leadership, which played a key role in assisting the administration 
in its deal-making efforts.  
Despite the limitations of the “bipartisan” compromise negotiated with Cal 
Dooley and his two colleagues – three precious votes considering the narrow margin 
of the legislative victory – the Bush administration proved slightly more conciliatory 
toward Democratic lawmakers as the vote came closer. The White House’s bait for 
Democratic lawmakers included an economic-stimulus package to help workers 
affected by 9.11 and a promise to reform Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) and 
                                                
371 The Bush administration pledged to add 72 new customs inspectors to fight textile/apparel 
transshipment, a promise that it never kept (Public Citizen, 2005, 43).  
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increase its budget to at least $3 billion.372 Of course, the administration’s labor-
friendly concessions were always attuned to the priorities of the private sector. As 
mentioned earlier, ECAT and its allies had shown constant support for government 
aid to displaced workers since the first hearings on TPA, while opposing the 
enforcement of international labor and environmental standards. The White House’s 
side payments to Democratic lawmakers reflected these preferences. This does not 
mean that the administration’s outreach to the opposition was totally ineffective. 
According to Cal Dooley, these measures, fine-tuned during a meeting between 
George Bush and 12 Democrats helped unlock a few Democratic votes for TPA. 
Dooley, who had himself met with the President, estimated Democratic support at 
about 20 votes the day before the vote, an estimation that proved close to the final 21 
Democratic votes in favor of TPA (Dougherty, 2001b; Kahn, 2001b; Destler, 2005, 
295).373   
Most of the vote-buying measures delivered by the Bush administration and the 
Republican leadership were policy concessions that were directly related to trade 
liberalization. Unlike its predecessor, the Republican president granted pork-barrel 
deals in only a few cases.374 These included an increase in immigration staffing at 
U.S. border-bridges in Texas and an allocation of $10 million for a Center for 
Disease Control in Colorado. Overall, the practices of the Bush administration 
mirrored the horse-trading tactics on which President Clinton had relied to overcome 
the opposition of fair traders.  
                                                
372 The reform of TAA would become the focus of the Senate vote on TPA in 2002.  
373 According to Destler, TAA reform in the Senate the following year added four Democratic votes in 
favor of the final House TPA bill (2005, 298).  
374 One Republican member expressed his regret for not trading his support for a pet project: “it was 
just plain stupidity”, “this is ‘Santa Claus is coming to town’ time” (cited in Eilperin, 2001a). 
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In the end, the lobbying efforts of the White House and its congressional allies 
proved effective. Republican votes reached 89%, a remarkable increase from the 
Republicans’ average 65%-to-75% support to free trade measures in the previous 
decade. This included 28 members who had opposed fast track renewal in 1998 
(Shoch, 2002). Particularly significant was the conversion of the conservative wing 
of the Republican Party (Biglaiser, Jackson & Peake, 2004, 689), a group constantly 
opposed to trade liberalizing initiatives during the previous decade that likely 
responded to national security arguments. Their conversion offset the strong 
mobilization of Democrats against President Bush’s free trade agenda.  
Undeniably, the advocacy efforts of the corporate-White House alliance 
benefited from the unconditional support of the House leadership. After all, without 
the determination of Tom “the Hammer” Delay, the Bush administration might have 
backed down at the last minute. Yet, of even greater significance for the passage of 
the vote was the president’s ability to draw allegiance from Republican lawmakers. 
Overall, GOP members who had voted with the president on roll calls in 2001 were 
particularly likely to back TPA. According to Biglaiser and his colleagues, 
legislative support for George Bush in 2001 was by far the strongest determinant of 
support for trade promotion authority – with a maximum relative effect of positive 
47% (Biglaiser, Jackson & Peake 2004, 689). The authors’ comparison of the 1997 
and 2001 votes on fast track renewal reveals that the party of the President can 
actually eliminate the effects of labor’s influence – stemming from blue collar 
constituencies and unions’ PAC donations. This fact provides statistical evidence 
that presidential countermobilization can thwart both inside and outside tactics of 
mobilizers. Magee (forthcoming) reaches a similar conclusion, showing, with a 
332 
  
counterfactual analysis, that a Democratic President would have been unable to 
gather enough support for the TPA vote.  
What must be added to this static picture of intra-branch relations is the active 
role that the executive branch must play to rally congressional support for trade bills 
in jeopardy, and the power implications of presidential lobbying. As previous case 
studies have shown, when congressmen are under heavy pressure to oppose trade 
liberalization, the executive branch cannot take partisan loyalty for granted and must 
utilize its institutional capabilities to counter the effects of fair trade mobilization. 
The Bush administration, like its Democratic predecessor, closely collaborated with 
the business community to win support among GOP members. It also relied on a 
conventional arsenal of policy concessions and pork-barrel deals – with fewer of the 
latter – to win approval of the vote with a narrow margin. Peculiar to the Bush 
administration’s advocacy efforts was its use of “fear tactics,” whereby the 
commander-in-chief invoked security objectives to promote its international 
business-friendly agenda and overtake the fair trade coalition on the finish line.  
 
Conclusion 
The interest groups dynamics of the TPA debates mirrored the fierce trade battles 
of the Clinton era. Although the prospect of defeating a united Republican 
government first seemed out-of-reach, the fair trade alliance came one vote short of 
achieving this daunting task. To fair traders’ credit, environmental and labor issues 
occupied the center of the trade debates, sometimes even infusing the rhetoric of 
Republican leaders. More importantly, fair traders managed to rally an 
unprecedented majority of centrist Democrats behind their cause, bringing the TPA 
bill to the brink of collapse. Yet, once again, the executive branch joined the 
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lobbying efforts of the business community to cement congressional support for 
trade liberalization – and import protection. In a context of partisan polarization, the 
president utilized his institutional prerogatives on behalf of the private sector. By 
collaborating with the business community and granting targeted side payments to 
the steel, textile and agricultural sectors, George Bush and his allies managed to keep 
Republican lawmakers loyal to the president’s agenda. As in 1997, the special 
relationship between the executive branch and the private sector did not occur during 
the negotiating phase but at the final lobbying phase. Key to the success of the free 
trade coalition was President Bush’s ability to capitalize on the “rally-around-the-
flag” effect of the 9/11 terror attacks. By using trade liberalization as a policy tool 
for the “war on terror,” the Bush administration managed to obtain the support from 
an unprecedented majority of his party followers. These fear tactics offset George W. 
Bush’s distraction from the nitty-gritty of domestic trade politics. With the help of an 
assertive House leadership and a militant duo at the helm of the USTR and DOC, the 
White House and its corporate allies delivered a new blow to labor and 
environmental advocates. The partisan polarization in Congress and the perennial 
conflicts surrounding trade debates led trade insiders to interpret the tight passage of 
the trade promotion authority bill as “a pyrrhic victory” or a “recipe for trouble” that 
would jeopardize the passage of future free trade agreements.375 The next legislative 
battle would test their predictions – and the political significance of the special 
relationship. 
                                                
375 The first expression was Charles Rangel’s verdict on the TPA vote (cited in Kahn, 2001b). The 
second was Destler’s analysis as reported in the Washington Times (Dougherty, 2001b). 
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CHAPTER 7: The Dominican Republican - Central 
American Free Trade Agreement 
 
After its protracted battle to renew trade promotion authority, the Bush 
administration shifted gear to pursue its trade-liberalizing agenda, starting with the 
negotiations of small bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs) with Chile and 
Singapore. The administration’s penchant for bilateral routes was partly driven by the 
“competitive liberalization” strategy of United States Trade Representative Robert 
Zoellick, who saw these initiatives as building blocks for larger regional agreements 
like the Free Trade Agreement of the Americas (FTAA). Following this logic, the 
United States concluded negotiations with El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and 
Nicaragua to establish a Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) in 
December 2003. Later in 2004, Costa Rica and the Dominican Republic announced 
their intention to join the agreement. The U.S.-Dominican Republic-CAFTA – 
hereafter referred to as CAFTA – became the largest of the FTAs that entered into 
force under the Bush administration (Heiser & Swann, 2005).376 Designed on the 
same lines as the controversial NAFTA, CAFTA was bound to generate much 
political heat. More than a small regional agreement, CAFTA represented another 
referendum on the rules of globalization as defined by the NAFTA model (Meyerson, 
2005; WP, 07/26/05; Engler, 2004). 
Like the TPA battle, the CAFTA debates took place in an increasingly partisan 
context dominated by the Republican Party, which consolidated its House majority in 
both 2002 and 2004, while also asserting its dominance in the Senate. While 
important to the outcome of the vote, the partisan context of the TPA debates did not 
alter the larger institutional dynamics of the trade policy process. Once again, this 
                                                
376 This was true in 2005 as it is at the end of President Bush’s tenure. The list of these FTAs includes: 
Jordan, Singapore, Chile, Jordan, Morocco, Australia, CAFTA, Bahrain and Peru.  
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political fight pitted a coalition of civil society groups against an alliance between the 
private sector and the executive branch. As in previous case studies, the institutional 
prerogatives of the business community constituted a major obstacle to the fair trade 
cause, whether during the negotiating phase (as the first section will show) or during 
the lobbying phase (as the second section will demonstrate).   
 
I) SHAPING THE TERMS OF THE CAFTA DEBATES 
CAFTA’s business-friendly design 
The interests of the business community in the negotiations of CAFTA mirrored 
the enthusiasm that the private sector had shown a decade earlier. At first sight, it can 
seem surprising that a set of such small countries – with the combined size of the 
Czech Republic (Meyerson, 2005) – would draw such strong support from corporate 
organizations. Yet, as the latter would repeatedly argue during the CAFTA debates, 
Central American countries were avid consumers of American exports, importing 
more U.S. goods and services in 2001 than India, Indonesia and Russia combined 
(U.S. Chamber of Commerce (USCC) & Association of American Chambers of 
Commerce in Latin America (Chamber of Commerce of the USA & Association of 
American Chambers of Commerce in Latin America (AACLA), 2002; CCUSA, 
2005).377 In terms of market size, CAFTA was also the largest FTA negotiated under 
the Bush administration (Erikson, 2004/2005). At the turn of the century, Central 
America stood as America’s second-largest market for U.S. exports in Latin America 
(McGraw, 2005). One third of these exports constituted textile and apparel products; 
another third was computers and electronics; and another large part was farm goods 
(Fendell, 2005).  
                                                
377 The five Central American countries purchase about 70 % of their non-oil imports from the United 
States (CCUSA & AACCLA, 2002). 
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Before the negotiations, bilateral trade between Central America and the United 
States operated within the framework of the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI), which 
unilaterally – albeit conditionally – opened America’s market to Central American 
exports.378 Large business associations saw CAFTA as an opportunity to “level the 
playing field” between all trading partners (USCC, 2005) and boost American exports 
of both manufacturing (e.g. textile, chemicals, auto products, machinery etc.) and 
agricultural goods, as well as services like telecommunications, insurance and 
banking (Castellani, 2005; Sowinski, 2006).  
As with NAFTA, the business community’s interests in CAFTA went beyond 
trade in goods and services. Once again, investment ranked at the top of the private 
sector’s agenda. In manufacturing sectors, particularly in the textile and auto 
industries, some companies hoped to exploit new investment opportunities to 
consolidate their business operations on a regional scale. These transnational 
processes were reminiscent of corporate restructuring under NAFTA. In the business 
magazine World Trade, the Executive Director of the Pro-Nicaragua Investment 
Promotion Agency declared: “Everybody is talking about China, but you can have 
‘China-type’ cost structures within a two-hour flight from the U.S.” (cited in 
Sowinski, 2006, 68). Needless to say that auto and textile workers did not see these 
“cost structures” in the same light. This means that, once again, capital liberalization 
would split industries along class lines: while American capital hoped to increase its 
competitiveness through offshoring, labor was likely to be the first victim of these 
restructuring processes. 
In the service sector, CAFTA promised to create new opportunities for U.S. firms 
in a wide range of sectors including consulting, banking or IT services in the Central 
                                                
378 See chapter 2.  
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American countries – opportunities that could be safeguarded by a strong, NAFTA-
like dispute settlement mechanism (Sowinski, 2006). Finally, intellectual property 
rights had become integral part of America’s “free” trade agenda. Building upon 
success achieved at both regional (NAFTA) and multilateral (WTO) levels, business 
organizations pressed U.S. negotiators to adopt strong provisions for intellectual 
property rights.  
Drawing from the NAFTA model, CAFTA would meet most, if not all, of the 
grievances formulated by the internationalist business community. Not only would 
CAFTA expand market access beyond the WTO government procurement 
agreements,379 but it would also protect American investors in Central American 
countries in the same fashion as NAFTA’s controversial chapter 11 (Castellani, 
2005). As for intellectual property rights, CAFTA was so generous that it would raise 
new concerns about access to affordable medicine among development NGOs. 
CAFTA’s chapter 15 on intellectual property rights was, indeed, designed to delay or 
restrict competition from generic medicines. As such, it creates new obstacles for the 
use of compulsory licenses380 and extends patent protection beyond the 20 years 
granted to corporations under the WTO’s Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights (TRIPs) (Oxfam America, 2003).381  
CAFTA also met the expectations of American exporters by immediately 
eliminating tariffs on 80 % of U.S. manufactured goods and 50 % of U.S. farm 
products with the rest phased out over longer periods (USCC, 2005). But as Central 
American delegates would soon realize, Washington’s agenda had less to do with 
                                                
379 None of the CAFTA countries were signatories of the WTO agreements.  
380 Governments issue compulsory licenses to temporarily override a patent so as to protect the public 
interest (Oxfam America, 2003). 
381 In addition, CAFTA restricts the use of test data for pharmaceutical products for 5 years, thereby 
denying generic manufacturers important information for the release of new drugs (Oxfam America, 
2003).  
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“leveling the playing field” than aggressively defending American business interests. 
Under the pressure of U.S. textile industries, Washington included strong rules of 
origin to restrict Central American textile industries’ ability to import yarn from 
China and Southeast Asia. These rules of origin would ensure the pivotal support of 
the textile industry for CAFTA,382 which stood in stark contrast with the vehement 
opposition of UNITE. 
By forcing Central American countries to use only regional – i.e. U.S. – textile 
components, U.S. trade negotiators imposed higher costs on an industry increasingly 
challenged by Asian competition. Second, owing to the fierce lobbying efforts of the 
powerful U.S. sugar lobby,383 CAFTA imposed strict limits on sugar exports to the 
United States. Thus, after fifteen years, Central America will get only a market access 
quota amounting to 1.7 percent of total U.S. production.384 More than anodyne 
addenda to a complex agreement, these provisions undermine the comparative 
advantage of Central American economies in two pivotal sectors (Erikson, 
2004/2005, 21; Griswold & Ikenson, 2004, 6).385 Thus, Washington’s official 
commitment to lift CAFTA countries out of poverty through trade liberalization 
contrasts with the unleveled playing field of U.S.-Central American trade under 
CAFTA. This revealed that, once again, the voice of American businesses had largely 
dominated trade and investment negotiations, a reality confirmed by the narrow scope 
of environmental and labor provisions.  
 
                                                
382 For more details on the rationale behind the textile industry’s interests in CAFTA’s rules of origins, 
see National Council of Textile Organizations (2005). 
383 Although sugar only represents 1 percent of U.S. farm revenues, the industry has accounted for 17 
percent of agriculture’s political donations since 1990 (Erikson, 2004/2005, 20).  
384 In contrast, Washington – under the pressure of the business community – rejected the demands of 
Central American countries for sectorial exceptions. Read Business Coalition for U.S.-Central America 
Trade (2003). 
385 The textile industry represents one fifth of the region’s jobs (Erikson, 2004/2005, 25).  
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The labor and environmental smokescreen  
From the beginning of the negotiations, the business community resisted the 
linkage between trade, labor and the environment. In a November 2002 report, the 
U.S. Chamber of Commerce declared it “inappropriate to address these issues in the 
text of a trade agreement” and denounced fair trade as “protectionism by another 
name” (USSCC & AACLA, 2002). As in previous debates, business associations 
continued to favor a voluntary, low-enforcement approach to environmental and labor 
provisions that would exclude trade sanctions as punitive mechanisms. They 
reaffirmed the positive impact of trade liberalization on environmental and labor 
standards and recommended separate “capacity-building” measures to assist Central 
American nations in these fields (Business Coalition for U.S.-Central America Trade, 
2003b).  
To protect themselves from accusations of opposing social and environmental 
progress, key members of the pro-CAFTA business coalition formed the “Business 
Coalition for Capacity Building” in the second half of 2003386 – at the same time as 
their advocacy efforts on behalf of CAFTA took shape. The organization consisted of 
a “private, non-partisan coalition of companies that work with governments, 
international organizations, and NGOs to promote effective capacity building in the 
developing world” with a core focus on “the rule of law and good governance, labor 
standards, economic development, education and environmental stewardship” 
(BCCB, 2003). Without a doubt, this business initiative aimed to de-link trade from 
environment and labor issues – like the “clean” TPA bill designed by the Republican 
                                                
386 Members are Gap, AIG, Exxon Mobil, Intel, Limited Brands, Microsoft, Pfizer, and Procter & 
Gamble. For more details, see the BCCB’s website:  
http://bccb.info/pages/who.htm  
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leadership a few years earlier. It was also part of the free trade communications 
campaign devised by the private sector.  
To what extent did the Bush administration follow the low-enforcement formula 
prescribed by the business community? At first sight, the inclusion of both 
environment and labor chapters in the core text of CAFTA – an innovation from 
NAFTA’s side agreements – seems to show that the White House did not heed the 
private sector’s exhortations. Yet, a closer examination of the language of CAFTA’s 
blue and green provisions reveals that the administration’s promises did not go much 
further than the table of contents. 
In fact, CAFTA’s text follows the low-enforcement prescriptions established 
under the Trade Promotion Authority. The agreement only requires the enforcement 
of each country’s national labor and environmental laws, whether or not these are 
consistent with international standards. As in the Chile and Singapore FTAs, the 
signatory countries ostensibly reaffirm their commitment to the ILO’s “Declaration 
on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work” and recognize that it is “inappropriate 
to encourage trade or investment by weakening or reducing the protections afforded 
in domestic labor laws”. However, the only obligations subject to the dispute 
settlement mechanism pertain to the failure to enforce national laws, not the ILO’s 
core labor standards387 (like the U.S.-Jordan FTA). Even this restrictive clause gives 
the negotiating parties “a reasonable exercise of discretion” for investigatory and 
compliance matters. Most importantly, the violation of labor and environmental 
provisions can only be remedied through monetary assessments, not sanctions – a 
crucial distinction for business advocates (CAFTA-DR, articles 16.2 & 17.2). The 
treatment of labor and environmental issues contrasts with the violation of 
                                                
387 The ILO’s four core labor standards are 1) the freedom of association and the right to collective 
bargaining; 2) the elimination of forced and compulsory labor; 3) the abolition of child labor; and 4) 
the elimination of discrimination in the workplace. See ILO (1998).  
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commercial provisions, which can lead to sanctions or punitive fines to compensate 
for financial damages. In sum, the low-enforcement of CAFTA’s labor and 
environmental chapters was clearly in sync with the priorities of the business 
community (Elliott, 2004). 
The administration’s emphasis on capacity-building also mirrored the preferences 
of the private sector. In one of its CAFTA policy briefs, the USTR highlighted its 
financial commitments to raise environmental and labor standards through capacity-
building. Its efforts to protect workers’ rights in Central America included, among 
others, a pledge to help CAFTA countries to modernize their labor justice system and 
improve their ability to monitor and enforce labor laws. On the environmental side, 
the USTR praised the merits of its new Environmental Cooperation Agreement, an 
entity that would allegedly help Central American nations strengthen their 
environmental institutions and comply with international environmental treaties 
(USTR, 2005b). CAFTA members also established a new Environmental Affairs 
Council to promote cooperation among representatives from environmental ministries 
and agencies in annual meetings. Yet, the fact that CAFTA, unlike NAFTA, did not 
establish a permanent institution to foster environmental cooperation meant that 
environmental advocates would have even greater difficulties to promote conservation 
in Central America than they had in Mexico.  
The joint praise of CAFTA’s blue and green provisions by the USTR and the 
private sector during the CAFTA campaign was a clear sign of their agreement. 
Business advocates hailed CAFTA as “a strong catalyst for promoting improved 
working and environmental conditions in the region” (Castellani, 2005). “Free” 
traders based their claims on two assumptions that stood in stark contrast with the 
criticisms raised by fair trade advocates. First, they argued that CAFTA’s blue and 
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green provisions, and particularly its “robust” capacity-building mechanisms went 
beyond those of previous agreements (McGraw, 2005). Second, business 
organizations depicted CAFTA’s “binding commitments” to enforce national laws as 
strong guarantees for the protection of labor and environmental standards (McGraw, 
2005; Castellani, 2005). They held the ratification of the ILO’s eight core conventions 
by 5 out of 6 Central American countries as solid proof that workers’ rights would be 
respected (McGraw, 2005; Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America & 
Association of American Chambers of Commerce in Latin America, undated).388  
If the business community often exaggerated the merits of CAFTA’s 
environmental and labor package, the policy briefs of the USTR were even less 
nuanced. First, the USTR remained silent over NAFTA’s controversial legacy in both 
labor and environmental fields. Second, it emphatically defended CAFTA’s labor 
provisions as “world class, best ever” and its “environmental firsts” as “strong 
procedural guarantees” for the respect of environmental laws (USTR 2005c; USTR 
2005). Third, the USTR misleadingly stated that CAFTA’s environmental and labor 
provisions were superior to both NAFTA and the U.S.-Jordan FTA – an assumption 
contested both by fair traders and policy analysts.389 The hyperbolic tone of the USTR 
and its partiality toward corporate interests was not merely a manifestation of 
President Bush’s political agenda. In fact, it resembled the eulogistic reports that the 
                                                
388 Raising a taboo for the private sector, one business advocate implied that the U.S. labor law may not 
be as compliant to ILO standards as Central American countries:   
 
Speaking as both a former member of the United Auto Workers and a former manager in the 
U.S. offices of an airline whose workers were members of the International Brotherhood of 
Teamsters, my experience is that the laws on the books in these countries are more protective of 
workers’ rights than union contracts in the United States today (Fendell, 2005). 
 
389 For labor provisions, read Elliott (2004). For environmental ones, read Audley (2003) and Gallagher 
(2005).  
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USTR had produced on NAFTA under the Clinton administration (USTR, 1999), 
despite the agreement’s mixed economic record in the three NAFTA countries.390  
 
Fair traders’ views on CAFTA’s package 
While the administration’s voluntary approach to labor and environmental issues 
won acclaim within the business community, it drew fierce criticisms from fair 
traders. Soon, the White House’s “enforce-your-own-laws” formula occupied the 
center of the debates on CAFTA. To refute free traders’ optimistic assessments of the 
state of labor laws in Central American countries, American labor unions – in 
conjunction with their Central American counterparts and human rights advocates like 
Human Rights Watch and Oxfam – garnered evidence of the pervasiveness of worker 
rights violations in each of the CAFTA countries.391 The AFL-CIO and its allies 
underlined the inability and/or unwillingness of Central American governments to 
meet the ILO’s international labor standards (AFL-CIO, 2004).  
For them, CAFTA fell short of improving Central America’s respect of workers’ 
rights in any substantive way. Far from being the “best ever” – as claimed by the 
USTR – the agreement’s labor provisions represented a step back from the U.S.-
Jordan FTA, whereby the dispute settlement mechanism could – at least officially392 – 
address violations of ILO core standards as opposed to national laws (AFL-CIO, 
2005; Trumka, 2005). More unsettling for labor unions, CAFTA eliminated the 
sanction-based enforcement provisions contained in the General System of 
                                                
390 NAFTA had a modest impact on the U.S. and Canadian economies, yet had generated serious 
adjustment shocks for Mexican agriculture. For more details, read Polasky (2006) and Azuelos, Cosio-
Zavala & Lacroix (2004). 
391 Frequently reported among workers’ rights violations were inhuman working conditions and faulty 
work inspections, delays and obstructions in law enforcement by labor ministries, a collusion between 
the latter and employers to deny workers’ rights to organize, and procedural impediments to calls for 
strikes (Lee, 2002; AFL-CIO, 2005b; AFL-CIO, 2004). 
392 See chapter 6, fn. 337, page 295. 
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Preferences (GSP) and the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) (Levinson, 2005, 7; 
Trumka, 2005). As explained in chapter two, these had been pioneering institutions 
for the linkage between trade and labor rights (Charnovitz, 1987, 573-4; Compa & 
Vogt, 2001, 202).393 For unions, CAFTA’s weak enforcement system would 
undermine this system of preferences and give employers and governments “more 
freedom to deny workers their fundamental human rights” (AFL-CIO, 2005b). 
In addition, labor advocates rejected the Bush administration’s preference for 
technical cooperation or “capacity building” as a means of strengthening Central 
American labor laws. For the AFL-CIO, the millions of U.S. dollars spent on labor 
rights programs over the past few years had done little to protect Central American 
workers. Labor advocates were all the more skeptical of these programs since labor 
rights funding to CAFTA-countries had fallen by 43 percent between 2003 and 2004. 
George W. Bush’s repeated efforts to shrink the budget of the Department of Labor’s 
(DOL) International Labor Affairs Bureau (ILAB) undermined the credibility of his 
commitment to worker rights (AFL-CIO, 2005c).394   
Environmentalists and consumer organizations raised similar criticisms over 
CAFTA’s green package. Once again, a chorus of green organizations, joined by the 
vocal Global Trade Watch, expressed their disapproval of what they deemed as an 
“anti-environmental trade agreement.”395 First, environmentalists rejected CAFTA for 
                                                
393 At a hearing before the House Ways and Means Committee, AFL-CIO Secretary-Treasurer Richard 
Trumka described the GSP’s legacy in hyperbolic terms:   
“Nearly every labor law reform that has taken place in Central America over the past fifteen years has 
been the direct result of a threat to withdraw trade benefits under our preference programs” (Trumka, 
2005, 5). 
394 During his presidency, George W. Bush has constantly requested dramatic cuts in the ILAB budget. 
Although Congress rejected his proposals, it did cut the ILAB budget from more than $140 million in 
2002 to $72 million in 2007 (AFL-CIO, 2005C; see also Elliott 2004). George W. Bush’s request for 
2009 would cut the ILAB budget by 81% (OMB, 2008, 759). 
395 This coalition included former NAFTA-backers like the National Wildlife Federation and the 
Natural Resources Defense Council. Other prominent actors included the Sierra Club, Friends of the 
Earth, the League of Conservation Voters, Defenders of Wildlife, Earthjustice and the Center for 
International Environmental Law (Defenders of Wildlife et al, 2005).  
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its failure to build on the institutional gains achieved over the previous decade. If they 
criticized Washington for applying the NAFTA-model to CAFTA’s investment rules, 
they also saw the Central American accord as a “step back” from NAFTA’s 
environmental innovations. This was primarily due to the absence of a permanent 
environmental cooperation institution like the North American Commission on 
Environmental Cooperation (NACEC) (Center for International Environmental Law 
(CIEL) et al, 2004; Defenders of Wildlife et al, 2005). Second, like labor and human 
rights advocates, green organizations denounced the shortcomings of the Bush 
administration’s capacity-building approach to trade-environment questions. While 
acknowledging modest progress in the CAFTA’s public submission process, most 
environmentalists questioned the government’s willingness to produce concrete 
environmental gains. Drawing from the lessons of the implementation of previous 
bilateral free trade agreements,396 they warned Congress that it would be unable to 
meet its environmental objectives without adequate funding for its capacity programs 
(CIEL et al, 2004; TEPAC 2004, 5). Third, unlike labor and human rights advocates, 
environmental and consumer advocates were not concerned as much by Central 
American countries’ weak law enforcement as by the administration’s failure to 
reform NAFTA’s investment model (CIEL et al, 2004).397 Once again, environmental 
and consumer organizations were alarmed by the “harmful anti-environmental suits,” 
whereby investors could challenge domestic regulation in front of international 
tribunals (CIEL et al, 2004; Wallach, 2005; Defenders of Wildlife et al, 2005). Public 
Citizen also drew attention to CAFTA’s wording on “indirect expropriation” and the 
                                                
396 The Bush administration never followed through its commitment to provide technical assistance and 
establish a cooperative trade and environment agenda with its FTA partners – Jordan, Chile and 
Singapore (Audley 2003, 3). 
397 CAFTA’s investment provisions were defined in chapter 10. Given the controversies that had 
surrounded NAFTA’s chapter 11 over the decade, one can surmise that the change in number – like the 
change from fast track to trade promotion authority – was not fortuitous.  
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intrusive nature of its government procurement clauses. According to Lori Wallach, 
CAFTA would not only restrict a country’s ability to give preference to local firms or 
workers in government contracts, but also prohibit the imposition of “performance 
requirements” on contractors like the implementation of environmental or labor 
standards (Wallach, 2005, 3-5).  
Not all environmental organizations opposed CAFTA, however. Amidst a chorus 
of criticisms, the Humane Society International (HSI) became an isolated yet 
prominent supporter of the trade agreement. In testimony to the House Ways and 
Means Committee in April 2005, its president Patricia A. Forkan reminded her 
audience of her participation in the Seattle protests398 and criticized other green 
organizations for not acknowledging “the far reaching and innovative provisions of 
DR-CAFTA.” In dissent from the stance adopted by other environmental 
organizations, she insisted that the obligations of CAFTA-countries under the accord 
had “teeth” (Forkan, 2005, 6, 5). HSI’s defection from the green ranks drew severe 
criticism from other environmental groups and eco-friendly Democrats, some of 
which attributed HSI’s support of CAFTA to a $500,000 United States Agency for 
International Development (USAID) grant the organization received in October 2003 
to conduct projects in Central America. HSI’s critics pointed out that before receiving 
the grant, the Humane Society had opposed all major trade-liberalizing bills including 
NAFTA and PNTR. They also accused HSI of illegally using some of its grant money 
to lobby in favor of CAFTA and demanded investigations by the GAO (Blustein, 
2005).399  
                                                
398 The Humane Society allegedly created the famous turtles costumes (Forkan, 2005, 2).  
399 Forkan denied accusations of corruption, claiming that she changed her position after participating 
in a capacity-building committee sponsored by the USTR in late 2002:  “When you’re offered a seat at 
the table, as Ambassador Zoellick did, it didn’t make any sense to not at least try to improve the 
situation” (cited in Blustein, 2005, 1).  
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HSI’s apostasy was a clear example of the decentralized nature of the 
environmental movement: despite years-long efforts to formulate a political 
consensus on the trade-environment linkage, each green NGO remained free to pursue 
its own interests. Regardless of the real motives behind HSI’s support for CAFTA, its 
mutiny bore little resemblance to the split that the environmental movement had 
experienced during the NAFTA debates. Not only was the green organization isolated 
in its support for CAFTA but, as a whole, environmental groups never became the 
pivotal constituency they had been in the early 1990s. This was due to two factors. 
First, labor unions, while reaching out to other fair trade advocates continued to play a 
central role in the mobilization against free trade. As a result, their concerns over job 
losses and workers’ rights prevailed – as had fears of a “giant sucking sound” a 
decade earlier. Second, environmental problems in Central America were never as 
tangible to Congressmen or to the press as air and water pollution in the Mexican 
maquiladoras. 
For the purpose of this study, what is important is that most U.S. environmental 
and consumer organizations involved in the CAFTA debates saw the terms of the 
trade agreement as largely inadequate – in contrast with administration officials and 
business advocates who had worked together to restrict the scope of CAFTA’s labor 
and environmental provisions.  
 
Tracing the institutional roots of CAFTA’s skewed design 
As with previous trade agreements, the private sector’s privileged access to trade 
negotiations largely accounted for CAFTA’s skewed design. Once again, the special 
relationship between the executive branch and the business community operated 
through both formal and informal channels. The institutional bias of the trade policy 
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process was exacerbated by the close ties between the Republican Party and the 
business community, and particularly by the deliberate attempts of the White House 
to misrepresent or simply ignore the voice of labor, environmental and consumer 
interests.  
In December 2002 – a few months after the Senate ratification of Trade Promotion 
Authority – the Bush administration announced its list of appointments for the 2003-
2004 membership of the Advisory Committee for Trade Policy and Negotiations 
(ACTPN), the most influential tier of the TAC pyramid. According to the non-
polemical Inside U.S. Trade, the thirty-two appointments of the White House 
represented “a mix of major Republican campaign donors, free trade theologians and 
a few people with close ties to USTR Robert Zoellick” (IUST, 12/13/02). As the 
PNTR case study has shown, the fact that the Bush administration rewarded political 
donors was not unusual in the trade policy sphere. Unprecedented, however, was, the 
complete overhaul of the ACTPN – the dismissal of all of President Clinton’s 
appointees – and the White House’s refusal to include any labor, environmental or 
consumer in the trade policy process. In this case, President Bush exerted his political 
leeway not to broaden the range of stakeholders taking part in the decision-making 
process, as his two predecessors had done, but to exacerbate the corporate bias of the 
trade government machinery. In the words of a former ACTPN member: “There’s 
been no effort to try to provide a diversity of opinion. It really takes away any 
credibility from the process” (cited in IUST, 12/13/02).  
George W. Bush’s decision to exclude fair traders from the TAC system elicited 
strong reactions from the labor community. The AFL-CIO filed a lawsuit in the U.S. 
District Court for the District of Columbia to demand that the White House comply 
with the provisions of the Trade Act of 1974 requiring that the committee “include 
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representatives of non-Federal governments, labor, industry, agriculture, small 
business, service, industries, retailers, nongovernmental, environmental and 
conservation organizations, and consumer interests” (Trade Act 1974 § 2155(f); IUST 
12/20/02).400 According to AFL-CIO President John Sweeney, the Bush 
administration’s restructuring of the ACTPN membership “defeats the entire purpose 
of the advisory committee system, which – at its best – could help shape U.S. trade 
policy so that it would serve the broad public interest, rather than simply forward an 
exclusively corporate agenda” (AFL-CIO, n.d.). What was surprising in the AFL-
CIO’s response was not the fact that it contested its total exclusion from the policy 
process but the fact that it sometimes seemed to defend the logic of the TAC – in 
contradiction with earlier criticisms that labor advocates had raised against the 
shortcomings of this institutional apparatus.   
In response to these grievances, President Bush appointed two additional members 
to the ACTPN: Teamsters President James Hoffa and a representative of “Citizens for 
a Sound Economy,” an industry-funded organization promoting free market policies 
(Source Watch, nondated). The latter was arguably appointed as a “phony” consumer 
organization – to use the words of AFL-CIO Legislative Director Thea Lee – to 
complement the representative of the “Global Environment & Technology 
Foundation,” a business consultant standing for environmental interests. Even after 
these additional appointments, 28 out of 34 members – more than 80% – were 
representatives from the business sector. A few months later, a coalition of NGOs 
addressed a letter to the USTR demanding that CAFTA be postponed because of the 
inadequate input of civil society groups (IUST, 12/20/02). 
                                                
400 I am grateful to AFL-CIO Legislative Director Thea Lee for raising this point.  
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The private sector’s domination of the policy process allowed it to tailor the free 
trade agreement to its interests, whether this pertained to investment, IPR provisions, 
or the scope of labor and environmental clauses. At the end of the negotiations, 
ACTPN members almost unanimously praised the terms of CAFTA: “We believe the 
agreement fully meets the negotiating objectives laid out in the Trade Act of 2002, 
and believe it to be strongly in the best economic interest of the United States” 
(ACTPN, 2004, 1). James Hoffa submitted the only dissenting opinion within 
ACTPN, declaring that “CAFTA simply replicates the flawed trade policies of the 
past.” (ibid, 8). 
The membership of the second tier of advisory committees was even more biased 
toward business interests, giving hardly any opportunity of participation to either 
labor, environmental or consumer advocates. As during the 1990s, the vast majority 
of Industry Sectoral Advisory Committees (ISAC) members were representatives 
from the business sector. According to a study by Darves and Dreiling (2007), ISAC 
members in 2003 had the following characteristics: they were commonly the largest 
firms in their sectors, politically very active through high levels of PAC donations, 
and highly interconnected with other firms and corporate alliances like “the Business 
Coalition for U.S.-Central America Trade.”401 Thus, during the CAFTA debates as 
during the NAFTA and PNTR battles, many firms played the roles of both trade 
“policymakers” and lobbyists, first participating in the negotiations of the trade 
agreement with the White House, before lobbying intensively for its ratification in 
Congress – with the help, once again, of the Oval Office.  
In contrast, the role of fair traders in the policy process was confined to the 
lobbying phase. Unions continued to be excluded from ISACs. The absence of labor 
                                                
401 This coalition led the business campaign on behalf of CAFTA. The second section of this chapter 
describes its lobbying activities in greater details 
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delegates in the ISAC tier was notable considering the divergence between producers’ 
interests – in favor of developing a “strong and successful supply chain between the 
U.S. and Central America” (ISAC-8, 2004) – and those of workers who might lose 
their jobs as a result of these economic processes. Despite clear class cleavages within 
sectors like the textile or auto sectors, labor did not have even a single representative 
in the trade advisory committees on textiles and apparel (ISAC-15), transportation, 
construction, mining and agricultural equipment (ISAC-16)402 or footwear, leather 
and leather products (ISAC-8). Thus, it was not only the political appointments made 
by the Bush administration but, in a more systemic manner, the sectoral structure of 
the TAC system that, through another case of path dependence, continued to be ill-
adapted to the class conflicts corollary to capital liberalization.   
Environmentalists were hardly better represented in this institutional maze. Not 
until they filed another lawsuit against the executive did they manage to obtain a 
permanent seat on the industry sector advisory committee on chemicals. This added to 
the two seats they had won in the ISAC for paper and paper products (ISAC-12) and 
for lumber and wood products (ISAC-10) – once again, after a court injunction. Also 
absent from the negotiating table were consumer or public health advocates, who had 
become alarmed by CAFTA’s far-reaching scope, particularly in regard to its 
provisions on intellectual property rights. In a diatribe entitled “Public Health and the 
Rigged U.S. Trade Advisory System”, Joseph Brenner and Ellen Shaffer, co-directors 
of the Center for Policy Analysis on Trade and Health denounced the corporate bias 
of the trade policy process: 
Business and trade association representatives dominate [trade advisory] 
committees. But international trade agreements do not just affect narrow 
commercial interests. There is growing recognition that these trade deals can 
                                                
402 During the CAFTA negotiations, the ISAC-16 represented primarily the motor vehicles and motor 
vehicle parts and equipment industries (ISAC-16, 2004, 3). 
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significantly shape public health-related policies both in the United States and in 
other countries, by requiring changes in laws and regulations and especially by 
foreclosing policy options that countries may wish to pursue in the future 
(Brenner & Shaffer, 2004).  
 
Thus, the structure of the TAC membership was ill-adapted to the far-reaching 
scope of free trade agreements, allowing corporate interests to dominate the trade 
policy process to the detriment of the growing pool of trade policy stakeholders such 
as environmental, consumer and public health advocates. Brenner and Shaffer (2004) 
listed a number of advisory committees whose mandate had clear ramifications with 
public interest issues, but where corporate advocates faced no constraints from civil 
society groups: the Intellectual Property Rights advisory committee (Industry 
Functional Advisory Committee – IFAC – 3), largely dominated by the 
pharmaceutical industry; the Tobacco, Cotton and Peanuts ATAC (Agricultural 
Technical Advisory Committee for Trade), striving to reduce barriers and taxes on 
tobacco products; and perhaps more ironically, the Consumer Goods advisory 
committee (ISAC-4), which excluded representatives from consumer organizations.  
Even in the third tier of the trade advisory committee system, supposed to 
represent labor and environmental interests, the voices of fair traders were muffled. In 
the Trade and Environment Policy Advisory Committee (TEPAC), only 6 of the 28 
members came from independent environmental groups, while 2 represented 
consumer interests. In contrast, 15 members – a majority – belonged to the business 
community (TEPAC, 2004). This explains why there were such divergences within 
the final TEPAC report. On the one hand, a majority of TEPAC’s members declared 
that CAFTA “meets Congress’s negotiating objectives as they relate to environmental 
matters” and declared “that trade agreements can create opportunities to enhance 
environmental protection” (TEPAC, 2004, 3). On the other, almost all environmental 
and consumer NGOs dissented from the committee’s final report, explaining the 
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reasons for their opposition to CAFTA and their broader concerns with American 
trade policy in the report’s appendixes. United or divided, the TEPAC remained an 
isolated voice in the trade policy process, a form of “window dressing” – in the words 
of a member of the committee (Magraw, 2008*)403 – that dealt with questions of 
marginal significance to trade policymakers. Admittedly, the TEPAC’s 
recommendations did lead CAFTA-members to sign a supplemental “Environmental 
Cooperation Agreement” to encourage environment capacity-building through a new 
allocation of $1 million in addition to regular USAID funding (Hornbek, 2005, 27). 
Yet, as is often the case, this promise stood in stark contrast with the sharp funding 
cuts of USAID environmental programs that the Bush administration had undertaken 
since the beginning of its term.404 Center for International Environmental Law 
President Daniel Magraw, a member of TEPAC expressed its disillusions with the 
policy process:  
 Right now, the system is not working very well. I don’t think, as I said, that 
this government cares about health and the environment, except as something to 
trade off… so they don’t really want to listen much. (Magraw, 2008*).  
 
The members of the Labor Advisory Committee (LAC) faced similar challenges 
to make their voices heard in the trade policy process. Unlike the TEPAC, however, 
the LAC was united in its opposition to CAFTA, declaring that “the agreement 
repeats many of the same mistakes of the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA), and is likely to lead to the same deteriorating trade balances, lost jobs, and 
workers’ rights violations that NAFTA has created” (LAC, 2004, 1). In a clear display 
of the class dimension of trade conflicts, the LAC did not release any dissenting 
                                                
403 Another interviewee on the labor side used the same expression to describe the role of labor 
representatives in the TAC system (Levinson, 2008*).  
404 Programs for managing natural resources and protecting the global environment represented the 
largest area of funding cuts in U.S. foreign aid since the beginning of President Bush’s first mandate, 
plunging 20% below their levels of 2001 (Tarnoff & Lowells, 2004). 
 
355 
   
 
views, despite the large variety of unions represented in the advisory committee – 
from traditional protectionists like the Steelworkers to more internationalist sectors 
such as the International Longshoremen and Warehousemen’s Union and others less 
affected by trade including the American Federation of State, County and Municipal 
Employees (AFSCME) or the American Federation of Teachers (AFT) (LAC, 2004). 
For all its unity, however, the LAC was only a lonely voice in the chorus of trade 
advisory committees praising the economic merits of CAFTA.  
The private sector’s overwhelming domination of the TAC system allowed it to 
exert key influence on the terms of the trade agreement. With the assistance of the 
executive branch and through “constant monitoring of the negotiations” (Wenk, 
2008*), business associations managed to tailor CAFTA to their needs. As with the 
negotiations of NAFTA and PNTR, the private sector’s prerogatives went beyond the 
formal structure of the TAC to take more informal forms. Through a routinized 
process of consultation (emails, faxes, ad hoc meeting, etc.), the executive branch 
sought constant guidance from the private sector, allowing it to shape the terms of 
CAFTA and limit the scope of labor and environmental provisions (Brenner & 
Shaffer, 2004). 
Some have argued that the scope of CAFTA’s blue and green package was the 
result of a difficult compromise between the demands of fair trade advocates, business 
representatives and America’s trading partners, who feared that Washington might 
invoke environmental and labor protection for protectionist purposes (Schott, 2005). 
Yet, this argument is hardly more convincing as an explanation for what happened in 
2005 than it was for the NAFTA outcome. Here again, there is little doubt that 
American trade negotiators could have imposed much stronger labor and 
environmental conditions on their Central American counterparts: the intrusive nature 
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of CAFTA’s intellectual property rights provisions is only one example of the 
significant concessions that America’s trading partners were willing to accept to 
conclude the CAFTA negotiations.  
 
Conclusion 
In sum, during the CAFTA negotiations, the private sector overwhelmingly 
dominated the three tiers of the TAC system, allowing business associations to shape 
the agreement in accordance with their interests. As with previous trade agreements, 
the structure of trade advisory committees remained ill-adapted to the far-reaching 
implications of the CAFTA, leaving out important stakeholders from the policy 
process. First, trade negotiations continued to be conducted under the rationale that 
capital and labor share the same interests, despite the intra-industry class conflicts 
corollary to investment liberalization. The executive branch excluded union 
representatives from the negotiating phase and, for both institutional and political 
reasons, provided little scope to labor provisions. Second, the TAC system continued 
to marginalize or simply exclude environmental, consumer and public health interests 
from the decision-making process, leaving business interests in full charge of 
designing policies that went far beyond the narrow scope of customs duties: from 
intrusive provisions on government procurement to a constraining IPR regime and a 
controversial investment regime with the potential to undermine domestic regulation 
etc. Thus, as Brenner and Shaffer (2004) note, “industry influence is structured into 
the very machinery of the U.S. governmental trade bureaucracy.” To control the terms 
of the trade agreement, the private sector relied on its privileged access to the 
executive branch. The latter pursued a particular conception of the U.S. national 
interest, one that empowered corporations through various policy concessions but 
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ignored the grievances of a variety of civil society actors, among them labor unions 
and public interest advocates. To use the words of Washington Post columnist Harold 
Meyerson, the U.S. Trade Representative acted as a “sales representative,” not only 
for the pharmaceutical industry – as CAFTA’s strong intellectual property rights 
regime reveals – but for the business community as a whole (Meyerson, 2005). 
Hence, by granting trade promotion authority to the president in 2002, Congress did 
not exactly isolate the policy process from the pressures of local constituencies but 
instead exacerbated the inequalities of power embedded in the institutional apparatus, 
by giving more leeway to the executive branch to conduct its business agenda to the 
detriment of the fair traders’ cause.  
As this section has shown, there were more than institutional obstacles blocking 
the progress of the blue-green alliance. Corporate interests also drew their power from 
the Republican administration’s deliberate efforts to kow-tow to the political and 
economic demands of the private sector. President Bush’s anti-environmental and 
anti-labor agenda seriously exacerbated the corporate bias of the institutional 
apparatus, as witnessed by his early attempt to exclude all NGOs from the ACTPN, or 
his decision to include “phony” business-friendly members to represent 
environmental and consumer interests. Lori Wallach highlighted the privileged access 
that corporations enjoyed under George W. Bush’s presidency:   
CAFTA is the linchpin of a trade agenda written by Bush campaign backers 
representing utility companies, drug companies and Wall Street, and carried out 
by its servants in the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (cited in Mekay, 
2004).  
 
Thus, under the Bush administration as under Bill Clinton’s presidency, the 
special relationship between the executive branch and the private sector hinged both 
on the institutional design of the policy process and on the political will of the White 
House to maintain or exacerbate its corporate bias. 
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II) MOBILIZATION AND COUNTERMOBILIZATION 
The first section of this chapter has shown that the private sector’s close 
collaboration with the executive branch gave fair trade advocates little chance to 
influence the policy process during the trade-negotiating phase. The following section 
analyzes the constraining effects of this special relationship at the end of the policy 
process, i.e. during the lobbying phase that preceded the House vote on CAFTA. As 
in previous debates, the mobilization of labor and its allies did alter the course of the 
debates. First, labor and human rights occupied the center of the CAFTA 
controversies, thereby raising the prominence of the fair trade cause. Second, 
capitalizing on partisan divisions, the blue-green alliance managed to rally a vast 
majority of House Democrats behind their cause. Once again, their mobilization 
seriously threatened the passage of CAFTA. Yet, the uncertainties surrounding 
CAFTA’s passage triggered the joint countermobilization of the business community 
and the White House, which launched a powerful campaign to rebuild confidence in 
trade liberalization.  
 
Mobilization and its impact 
The mobilization of fair trade advocates during the CAFTA debates resembled 
their previous advocacy efforts in many regards. This was certainly due to the clear 
parallels that fair traders – and congressmen – could draw between CAFTA and the 
unpopular NAFTA, a communication strategy that was at the crux of their lobbying 
campaign. If, in the early 1990s, unions and their allies had relied on ominous 
predictions on the socio-economic impact of NAFTA, a decade later they used 
NAFTA’s record – or, at least, their interpretation of its record – to prophesize 
CAFTA’s effects. The AFL-CIO denounced CAFTA as a “two-way street to job loss 
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in the Americas.” In other words, the free trade agreement would be a source of 
unemployment for both the United States and Central American countries. For the 
United States, organized labor based its prognosis on America’s growing trade deficit 
with its NAFTA partners – a twelve-fold increase from $9 billion in 1993 to $111 in 
2004) – and on the 900,000 net job losses allegedly resulting from this imbalance.405 
Citing a study by the U.S. International Trade Commission anticipating an increase in 
America’s trade deficit with Central American countries, the AFL-CIO predicted a 
new wave of job losses in the United States (AFL-CIO, 2005d, 1-2; Levinson, 2005, 
3). New to the AFL-CIO’s communication tactics was the use of detailed state-by-
state fact sheets on the dislocating effects of NAFTA on U.S. manufacturers. Entitled 
“CAFTA and Job Loss in …” (e.g. Tennessee), these fact sheets reported the number 
of workers certified under the NAFTA-Trade Adjustment Assistance program and 
listed the names of the closing firms, their location, the number of employees laid off, 
and the cause of their closing (increased competition from or shift in production to 
Canada or Mexico).406 Labor’s tactical use of state-by-state economic data mirrored 
the decentralized information tactics used by the Business Roundtable and the U.S. 
Chamber of Commerce since the end of the 1990s and focused on sensitive states 
where the support of lawmakers would be pivotal for CAFTA’s defeat (TN, PA, OH, 
NY, NJ, MO, MI, IN, AL, WI).407 Another innovation among labor’s decentralized 
communication tactics was its listing of all state-level legislative initiatives – joint 
resolution by state legislature/chamber, dissenting opinions from governors etc. – 
adopted in opposition to CAFTA. 
                                                
405 This estimate was based on Scott (2003). 
406 Although outsourcing to Mexico was logically more frequent, some business restructuring 
operations involved shift in production to Canada.  
407 See appendix 11. 
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In contrast with the NAFTA debates, the Federation predicted net job losses not 
only for America but also for its trading partners. This was primarily due to NAFTA’s 
devastating impact on Mexican farmers, many of whom had not withstood the large 
influx of heavily subsidized farm goods from the United States (ibid, 5).408 According 
to the AFL-CIO, Central American farmers would follow the path of Mexican corn 
producers, a concern echoed among experts on Central American economies (ibid, 5-
6).409 Perhaps as prominent as the now common debates on “NAFTA-math” were 
controversies surrounding the situation of workers in Central American countries, a 
subject of conflicting interpretations on both fronts of the trade battle. This 
communication war was, of course, directly related to the terms of CAFTA’s labor 
provisions, which promised to enforce the national labor laws of Central American 
countries.  
In addition to these framing tactics, the AFL-CIO and Global Trade Watch 
reached out to a variety of environmental, human rights and religious groups with a 
history of involvement in Central America (e.g. within the framework of the 
Caribbean Basis Initiative). Although never united under a single formal alliance, 
these civil society groups collaborated within different fora, whether for informal 
coordinating meetings, joint press conferences or anti-CAFTA rallies (IUST, 
12/03/04). Under the joint leadership of Carl Pope and Leo Gerard, the Sierra Club 
and the U.S. Steelworkers consolidated their bilateral “Blue-Green Alliance”410 via 
joint declarations and protests. These coalition-buildings efforts added to the separate 
                                                
408 In a 2006 testimony in front of the Senate Finance Committee, trade expert Sandra Polaski 
estimated Mexican job losses in the agricultural sector at 2 million and job creations in the maquilas 
falling from 800,000 in 2001 to 700,000 in 2006 (Polaski 2006, 5, 8). 
409 See Erikson (2004/2005). Oxfam (2004) was also particularly critical of CAFTA for this reason. 
The World Bank, although more optimistic about the overall economic benefits of the free trade 
agreement, similarly anticipated potential dislocating effects for Central American farmers (World 
Bank 2005, chapter 5). 
410 This formal entity differs from the informal and broader “blue-green” alliance between 
environmentalists and labor. See: http://www.bluegreenalliance.org  
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grassroots efforts undertaken by a number of large organizations like the Sierra Club, 
Public Citizen and dozen of individual labor unions, at times coordinated by the AFL-
CIO (Strand, 2007*; Hubbard, 2007*). Fair traders also benefited from the support of 
the sugar and textile industries, which at least until they were appeased through trade 
concessions by the Bush administration, heavily lobbied representatives from both 
parties (IUST, 13/03/04). 
In a more innovative mix of coalition-building and public relations tactics, the 
AFL-CIO invited a delegation of Central American unions’ representatives411 and 
launched a “CAFTA We Don’t Hafta,” tour across the United States. This 
transnational labor alliance was scheduled to visit a number of congressional offices 
in Washington in May 2005 (AFL-CIO, 2005e). 
U.S. unions’ solidarity with Central American unions was somewhat ironic 
considering that the U.S. textile industry had pressed Washington to impose rules of 
origin on America’s trading partners. These rules of origins would precisely 
undermine the competitiveness of Central American manufactures by restricting 
imports of yarn from China and Southeast Asia and imposing the purchase of higher-
priced U.S. components (Erikson, 2004/2005, 21).  
Finally, unions relied on conventional “inside” tactics to convince undecided 
lawmakers to oppose CAFTA. Their lobbying efforts focused on House Democrats 
and a minority of Republicans with whom labor had a working relationship (IUST, 
12/03/04). This time, labor promised to “get tough” on any House Democrat who 
would support the Republican free trade initiative. Labor sent Democratic leaders a 
letter of warning signed by a surprisingly large variety of unions that went far beyond 
manufacturing organizations:  
                                                
411 The major unions’ federations in Central America opposed CAFTA. For more details, read ART 
(2004). and Meyerson (2005). 
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Simply put, there must be real and measurable consequences for opposing 
labor on this issue. The stakes are too high for the workers of America. We cannot 
and will not give any Democrat a pass on CAFTA.412  
 
More specifically, unions threatened to withhold financial support to “frontline 
candidates” – i.e. vulnerable incumbents supported by the Democratic Congressional 
Campaign Committee (IUST, 07/29/05). They also concentrated their lobbying efforts 
on the members of the Hispanic Caucus, especially from districts without a clear 
benefit or with the potential of suffering a loss from CAFTA. According to one NGO 
source, these votes were “pretty much up for grabs”, and were, therefore, political 
magnets for both fair traders and free traders (IUST, 12/03/04). 
As during previous debates, the prominence of environmental and labor standards 
in the CAFTA debates was a tribute to the impact of fair traders’ mobilization. At the 
end of the battle, John Sweeney stressed the “tremendous progress in bringing the 
issues of fairness and workers’ rights to the center of the trade debate” (Sweeney, 
2005b).413 Over the course of a decade, the rhetoric of the fair trade alliance had 
redefined debates on trade policy and influenced traditional supporters of trade 
liberalization like Sander Levin, who declared:  “For us [who have favored expanded 
trade and have helped to pass trade agreements (…) in the past decade], CAFTA is a 
line in the sand regarding the future of globalization” (Levin, 2005). Indeed, for many 
Democrats, the CAFTA vote represented a new referendum on the merits of NAFTA-
like initiatives that fair trade advocates had so vehemently criticized, a cross-roads 
between a corporate-driven process of economic liberalization and a more socially 
and environmentally friendly trade policy (Meyerson, 2005; Engler, 2004; Delta Fram 
Press, 05/06/05; WP, 07/26/05). Even a Republican member conceded that debates 
had taken a new turn: “I think a lot of members have moved away from simply saying 
                                                
412 A sample of the letter is available in IUST (07/29/05). 
413 Similarly, Lori Wallach spoke of a “dramatic shift in US trade politics” attesting that the “NAFTA 
trade model is dead” (Wallach, 2005).  
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they are pro-free trade to saying they favor trade but want to look at the deals 
themselves”  (cited in Nichols, 2005).  
In addition, the fair trade cause continued to enjoy the overall support of 
American citizens, as revealed by a 2005 study of American public opinion on 
CAFTA and American trade policy. While only one of two Americans supported 
CAFTA (against 39% who opposed it) in June 2005, 65% said they would support the 
agreement “if the U.S. government were to increase federal spending on trade 
adjustment assistance and to make sure that Central American countries enforce 
health and safety standards for their workers.” Furthermore, only 16 % of Americans 
approved of the way Washington conducts trade policy, whereas a majority of them 
supported fair trade principles that both Democratic and Republican administrations 
had been reluctant to implement: 90% of Americans considered that minimum labor 
standards (including freedom of association and a ban on child labor) should be 
required for free trade agreements; 93% favored the inclusion of environmental 
standards; and 63% thought the government should increase TAA funding (Kull, 
2005). A survey conducted by Ipsos for AmericansforFairTrade.org found even lower 
support for CAFTA among Americans – 51 % of opponents versus 32% of supporters 
(Ayres & McHenry, 2005).414  
Another sign of the impact of fair trade advocacy on the CAFTA debates was the 
delay of the House vote. Like most major trade bills since the early 1990s, CAFTA 
long remained a divisive issue with an uncertain outcome. In early 2005, the 
conventional wisdom in Washington was that the agreement was going down, 
                                                
414 However, the poll also revealed that 83% of the respondents had not heard about CAFTA. Once 
defined, however, CAFTA hardly gained any support from Americans. Instead, opposition to the trade 
agreement would rise after respondents were briefed about the purpose of the accord: “As you may 
know, the CAFTA issue is about a possible free trade agreement between the U.S. and Costa Rica, El 
Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and the Dominican Republican. CAFTA would eliminate 
almost all restrictions on imports, exports, and business investments between the countries in the 
agreement.” (Ayres & McHenry, 2005, 12).  
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attesting, once again, to the impact of fair traders’ mobilization (Caruso & Vaida, 
2005). Less than two weeks before the vote, CAFTA still appeared short of the votes 
needed for its ratification (Norton, 2005). In fact, the Republican House leadership 
delayed the formal filing of the committee report until July 21 to ensure that 
lawmakers could not move the trade bill to the floor before enough votes had been 
gathered (IUST, 07/22/05; Stokes, 2005b). In the end, the Republican leadership 
decided to postpone the House vote until the end of July 2005 – even though the 
accord was signed in May 2004 (Nichols, 2005). 
Predictably, the final vote was another ferocious battle whose dynamics resembled 
those of previous case studies. This time, the vote took almost an hour as some 
Republicans, many from textile states, waited for their fellow party members to give 
the president their crucial votes. On July 28, 2005, CAFTA eked through the House 
217 to 215, while two CAFTA opponents “failed” to vote or abstained from voting. 
Like the renewal of fast track authority a few years earlier, the narrow margin of 
CAFTA’s passage showed how contentious trade policy had become (NYT, 07/29/05; 
Public Citizen, 2005b, ECAT, 2006). 
The dearth of congressional studies of the CAFTA vote makes it difficult to assess 
the impact of fair trade mobilization. Magee’s analysis (forthcoming) does factor in a 
wide array of voting determinants, but its results focus on presidential support and 
partisan affiliation. Until new congressional analyses of the CAFTA vote are 
published, one must rely on alternative primary and secondary sources to gauge the 
impact of fair trade mobilization. 
Perhaps the most significant outcome of the CAFTA debates was the erosion of 
support for trade liberalization among House Democrats, only fifteen of whom – the 
“CAFTA 15” – voted for the agreement. In the end, 90% of Democratic 
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representatives voted against the trade agreement. The dissent of centrist Democrats 
was a clear shift away from the line of the Democratic Leadership Council (Weisman, 
2005) and seemed like a great, albeit insufficient, accomplishment to fair traders. If 
centrist Democrats had granted pivotal support for trade liberalization in the 1990s, 
they repeatedly demanded that the Bush administration renegotiate CAFTA’s labor 
and environmental provisions and/or increase support for worker-retraining programs, 
education and aid to dislocated workers (Edsall, 2005; Vaughan, 2005b; Weisman, 
2005; Becker 2005). Thus, it seems that work-related issues were a primary factor 
behind their strong opposition to the Central American accord, a sign that labor’s 
advocacy efforts did have an impact on congressional votes. Labor and its allies also 
seemed to strike a chord among members of the Hispanic Caucus, a large majority of 
whom voted against CAFTA, despite free traders’ promises that the agreement would 
improve the lives of Central Americans.   
To a certain extent, the fair traders’ coalition-building efforts also mattered. 
According to the legislative director of Rep. Mike Michaud, a leader of the anti-
CAFTA campaign in the House:  
KG: When [labor and environmentalists] got involved in CAFTA, when we 
were having rallies almost every single day up here on the Capitol, their voices of 
labor and environmentalists] added to the debate and also gave some members 
some backing of huge constituencies. It wasn’t like members were just going off 
on their own (…) There was this overwhelming fact that there so many groups 
opposed across different…different Hispanic groups, different environmental 
groups, labor group, religious groups… every sort of constituency that you could 
think of, that gives members the backing that they need. And some members who 
are undecided… sometimes that’s a make or break. How are the unions standing? 
Where are the environmental[ists]? Those are some of the first questions they ask 
when we’re whipping. Where are these groups?  
JBV: Then, do you believe that this alliance…that coalition-building really 
matters? 
KG: Absolutely. It’s key. It really is. (Glas, 2008*). 
 
In short, the backing from such a variety civil society groups provided political 
cover for many Democrats, whether they were genuinely pro-trade or simply 
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protectionist. The CAFTA debates confirmed that strong labor and environmental 
provisions had become indispensable to building broader support for trade pacts 
(Cardenas & Vyborny 2005, 9). 
The mobilization of fair traders, however, did not always prove to be successful. 
The  dissent of the “CAFTA 15” – the 15 Democrats that supported CAFTA – was 
clear evidence that trade liberalization still hinged on a modicum of bipartisan 
support. In this case, labor’s open threat to punish CAFTA supporters415 did not 
convince what one critic called the “Bush-Democrats,” who supported the agreement 
either because of ideological convictions or to reap financial rewards from business 
donors (Nichols, 2005b).  
On the Republican side, the fair traders’ advocacy efforts had an even more 
limited impact. Despite the Republicans’ the “trade agreement fatigue” and the heavy 
pressures from labor constituencies in heavily trade-impacted districts (IUST, 
07/15/05), only 27 eventually dissented from the party line (plus two who did not 
vote). Most undecided Republican members finally caved in under the heavy 
pressures of the administration and the House leadership. Once again, the 
countermobilization of free trade advocates in both the business community and the 
executive branch proved fatal to the lobbying efforts of the blue-green alliance.  
 
Business countermobilization 
The business community was closely involved in the CAFTA debates long before 
the protracted House vote of July 2005. As explained at the beginning of this chapter, 
the private sector had privileged access to the negotiations process through the Trade 
Advisory Committee system. Before the last round of negotiations in October 2003, 
                                                
415 Organized labor sent a letter to the Democratic House leadership to identify and warn three CAFTA 
supporters (IUST, 07/29/05).  
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the CAFTA business coalition started to reorganize and shift its focus from 
negotiations to mobilizing congressional support. Corporate organizations established 
a new steering-committee of Washington-based business representatives with four 
companies as corporate co-chairs: Procter & Gamble, Sarah Lee, Pfizer and Intel, 
while ECAT served as secretariat, coordinating the group’s lobbying activities and its 
communication strategy. The members of the steering committee included executives 
from the Business Roundtable, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, the National Foreign 
Trade Council, the Grocery Manufacturers of America and the American Apparel and 
Footwear Association (IUST 10/31/03). Together they officially formed “the Business 
Coalition for U.S.-Central America Trade”, a typical free trade alliance of more than 
400 companies and trade associations (Caruso & Vaida, 2005). As mentioned before, 
support for CAFTA within the business community was broad, including major farm 
and manufacturing organizations, as well as the high-tech and pharmaceutical 
industries (Edsall, 2005; IUST, 10/31/03). 
As in previous legislative battles, business counter-mobilization was largely 
decentralized through a complex confluence of networks, with different business 
associations managing their own lobbying initiatives. Both the Business Roundtable 
and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce coordinated “grasstops” lobbying efforts – e.g. 
calls from CEOs –to counterbalance the outside tactics of the fair trade coalition. U.S. 
Chamber of Commerce Senior Director for International Policy Christopher Wenk 
recognized both the challenges and the necessity of grassroots operations: 
The sad reality is… I think that trade supporters, especially business groups… 
it’s hard for us to match the grassroots that they have. It’s on a different level. 
It’s also hard to equate what they do with what we do. I think it’s very, very 
different. Like I said, this is a big challenge that business supporters have right 
now is ‘how do we keep this sustained effort? (Wenk, 2008*). 
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To mobilize local support for CAFTA, the Chamber was ready to play big. In an 
unprecedented display of its financial and organizational resources, the U.S. Chamber 
organized a tour across the country for Central American presidents in May 2005 – 
ironically, within a week of labor’s own tour with Central American unions. The 
group of presidents attended events in major U.S. cities to promote CAFTA before 
being escorted to Washington, DC, where they would meet with Congress members 
and finally congregate with the president and the USTR.  
One major objective of business communication efforts was to temper growing 
anxieties over the disruptive effects of trade liberalization. To do so, the private sector 
launched a series of “education programs” designed to highlight the benefits of free 
trade – a remake of the PNTR campaign. Relying on its extensive organizational 
network, the U.S. Chamber released a series of state-by-state economic impact studies 
that revealed “substantial economic gains for American workers and the economy 
from CAFTA” (cited in Fendell, 2005). Similarly, the Business Roundtable launched 
an interactive map highlighting state-specific benefits from CAFTA. In addition, the 
BRT pushed its trade-liberalizing agenda though a national Internet campaign called 
“Americans for Growth Through Trade.” Its director of international trade and 
investment policy Brigitte Gwyn described it as a “grassroots trade information 
program that educates people about the benefits of free trade.” These temporary 
campaigns complemented the more sustained education programs that the U.S. 
Chamber had developed with TradeRoots (Wenk, 2008*; Fendell, 2005).  
Beyond reassuring the public, the communication strategy of the business 
community also aimed to situate CAFTA within the framework of America’s national 
economic and security interests. As during the TPA debates, business advocates 
portrayed CAFTA as a “strategic nexus” between NAFTA and FTAA (Rasmus, 
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2005). For ECAT Chairman McGraw, congressional approval of CAFTA would send 
a positive message to Latin American countries showing that Washington is serious 
about regional integration (McGraw, 2005).  In addition, and in tune with the White 
House’s rhetoric, free traders highlighted the political virtues of free trade and the 
perils of turning America’s back on fragile American democracies. In a letter to 
Congress, the Business Roundtable went as far as to claim that “CAFTA is needed to 
prevent a return to the violent political and social conditions of the 1970s and 1980s” 
(BRT, 2005). 
On the Hill, the free trade coalition launched another intensive lobbying offensive 
to counterbalance the heavy pressures exerted by fair trade advocates. Business 
organizations held daily meetings with dozens of lawmakers and their staff members 
to coordinate their lobbying efforts (Wenk, 2008*). According to Brigitte Schmidt 
Gwyn, Business Roundtable Director of International Trade and Investment Policy: 
“We are leaving no stone unturned,” and spending “way in the millions” (Caruso & 
Vaida, 2005). The pro-CAFTA coalition sought support in both parties. According to 
Inside U.S. Trade, it targeted 78 House members – 46 Republicans and 32 Democrats 
(IUST, 07/15/05).  
As usual, they combined “sticks and carrots” – i.e. threats to CAFTA opponents 
and promises of financial rewards to trade supporters. For instance, U.S. Chamber of 
Commerce President Tom Donohue openly warned congress members: “we’re going 
to key vote this issue and we’re going to count it twice. If you’re going to vote against 
it, it’s going to cost you” (cited in Heiser & Swann, 2005). In contrast, the “CAFTA 
15” would be generously rewarded for their steadfast support for free trade 
(Confessore, 2005; Weisman, 2005b). After the passage of CAFTA, NAM, the 
Electronic Industries Alliance (EIA) and the Business Roundtable organized a fund-
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raising event hosted by NAM President John Engler as a “thank you” to the 15 
heretics (Schor, 2005).  
The inside tactics of the Business Coalition for U.S.-Central America Trade were 
tightly coordinated with the Bush administration through weekly meetings between 
corporate members, USTR officials and cabinet members from the Departments of 
State, Commerce and Agriculture, as well as delegates from the six signatory 
countries (Caruso & Vaida, 2005). These meetings allowed free traders to exchange 
crucial information about the specific concerns of swing voters and the current steps 
taken both by the business community and the executive branch to rally support for 
CAFTA (Wenk, 2008*). Linda Menghetti describes this process as follows: 
There are formal structures like that… where there are weekly meetings, or 
every other week, something like that, which usually happens right when you’re 
in that last two months or so of the vote. Leading up to that and going forward on 
that, you know, the business coalitions, we all do our lobbying, we write reports, 
and there’s someone in the coalition who shares that information with people in 
the administration. ‘Member so and so is leaning this way,’ ‘Member so and so 
would like to hear about this’. And then the same thing comes back to us. We hear 
from the administration, ‘Member so and so says they’ve never heard from 
business about this free trade agreement’ ‘Member so and so would like to hear 
from someone in his or her district about this or “It’s nice to hear from people in 
Washington, we’d like to hear people back in Seattle or Maine or whatever the 
locality is” (Menghetti, 2008*).  
 
Did the inside lobbying efforts of the business community make a difference for 
the final vote? Although the answer to this question must be partly hypothetical, a 
number of elements tend to prove that corporate countermobilization mattered. First, 
the influence of business PAC donations on CAFTA votes emerges from a study 
published by Public Citizen a year after the vote. According to this report, a group of 
Democratic and Republican congressmen deemed most unlikely to support CAFTA – 
based on the economic constituencies they represented – had received a total of $2.8 
million in donations from pro-CAFTA business groups between January 2005 and 
September 2005 (Public Citizen, 2006, 3-4). 
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Of course, one cannot always differentiate the effect of presidential lobbying – 
more closely examined at the end of this section – from the influence of business 
interests. However, the close coordination between the White House and the business 
community means that their lobbying efforts should be seen as complementary rather 
than mutually exclusive. As USCC Senior Director for International Policy 
Christopher Wenk explains,  
It is very much a team approach … because they are things that the 
administration can’t do in terms of advocating on these trade agreements, that the 
business community can… and there are things that the business community can’t 
do, you know, that the administration can (Wenk, 2008*).  
 
In many cases, K Street lobbying and grassroots efforts served mainly to provide 
political cover for Republicans to follow George Bush’s lead (Vaughan, 2005). Thus, 
the lobbying efforts of the business community seem to have made a difference on 
Republican votes – or in a rarer case, on a member’s “failure” to vote.416  
Given the limited efforts of the president to reach across the party line, the 
influence of the free trade coalition was particularly important on the Democratic 
side. A week before the vote, business lobbyists said they had locked in the support of 
7 Democratic members and were confident that they could ultimately secure 15 to 16 
for the vote. This prediction, more optimistic than the prognosis of Democratic 
leaders who expected no more than 10 or 12 dissenters, proved to be well on target, 
and crucially so, given the extremely narrow margin of the CAFTA vote (IUST, 
07/22/05). 
Of course, the support of the “CAFTA 15” may not have resulted entirely from 
the lobbying efforts of the Business Coalition for US-Central America Trade. As this 
dissertation has repeatedly shown, a complex interplay of factors – partisanship, 
                                                
416 Under heavy pressures from both fair traders and free traders, Charles Taylor (R-NC), long-time 
public opponent of CAFTA, “failed” to vote on CAFTA. He blamed his “lost” vote to a machine error. 
For more details, see Public Citizen (2005b).  
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ideology, sectional interests – shape trade votes. However, business efforts made a 
difference in a number of cases. Most commonly cited among analysts of the CAFTA 
vote are the unexpected reversals of Melissa Bean (D-IL), Eldophus Towns (D-NY), 
and Gregory Meeks (D-NY), all of whom had raised serious concerns about 
CAFTA’s social impact in the United States and abroad. In each case, the evidence of 
intense pressures from free trade advocates – Boeing, Caterpillar and Wrigley for 
Bean; Pfizer and other drug companies for Meeks and Towns – as well as the increase 
in CAFTA industry PAC contributions after the vote seem to show that the business 
lobbying efforts did make a difference (Vaughan, 2005; Wenk, 2008*; Public Citizen, 
2006; Public Citizen, 2005c; Public Citizen, 2005d; Public Citizen, 2005e).417  
Of course, the small pool of CAFTA supporters among Democrats also reveals 
that the free trade coalition was far from almighty in the contentious arena of post-
NAFTA politics. Yet, in an era of ferocious partisan wars, in which the president had 
little sway across the aisle, the free trade coalition’s ability to gain even a few 
Democratic votes was invaluable. In this sense too, the lobbying efforts of the 
business community and the executive branch were complementary.   
 
Presidential countermobilization 
 
The partisan politics of CAFTA’s renewal strongly resembled the TPA battle. 
Once again, the administration’s refusal to make any concession to free trade 
Democrats meant that the CAFTA fight was predestined to be bitterly partisan or 
“ugly” – to borrow the words from a business representative (Goudie, 2007*). Facing 
a united Democratic front against NAFTA’s sister accord, the Bush administration 
                                                
417 Most notably, Rep. Melissa Bean, who received almost no pro-CAFTA industry PAC money in her 
first election campaign saw contributions from these sources increase by 550 percent in 9 months 
(Public Citizen, 2006, 13). 
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would have to mobilize all Republican votes, even if this required compromises with 
protectionist members.   
The final countermobilization of the president and his trade team once again 
proved crucial to obtaining a narrow legislative victory. In close collaboration with 
the business community, the White House put ambivalent members under heavy 
pressure. To win this decisive victory, the administration employed a familiar set of 
strategic tools: a communications’ campaign coordinated with the business 
community and endorsed by prominent politicians; policy concessions to appease 
cross-pressured members; and pork-barrels to seal the deal. 
To round up support for CAFTA, the White House mobilized cabinet officials and 
political heavyweights inside and outside the government. Within President Bush’s 
circle, the new Secretary of Commerce Carlos Gutierrez and Agriculture Secretary 
Mike Johanns played a prominent role alongside the USTR and worked incessantly to 
reassure congressional members of the benefits of CAFTA. Also involved were 
Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice, her deputy, former USTR Robert Zoellick and 
the National Security Adviser Stephen Hadley. During the final week of the vote, 
Vice-President Dick Cheney joined the battle by holding meetings with undecided 
lawmakers and praising CAFTA supporters, while Laura Bush and Karl Rove 
reassured wavering members of the administration’s support (IUST, 07/29/05; Public 
Citizen, 2005f; Strand, 2007*; Public Citizen, 2005g; Public Citizen, 2005h).  
Perhaps the most important change in the president’s team came from the USTR, 
where the affable Rob Portman replaced the more divisive Bob Zoellick in May 2005. 
A former Ohio congressman, Portman was the “right person at the right time,” 
according to former (Democratic) USTR Mickey Kantor (Stokes, 2005b, 3186). In a 
Congress polarized by the abrasive behavior of the Bush administration, Portman’s 
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pragmatic and bipartisan approach surprised free trade advocates and opponents alike. 
Even before his confirmation as USTR, Portman was allegedly working the halls and 
hideaways on Capitol Hill. His compromising approach to trade politics won him the 
title “hero of CAFTA”418 in the business community. One trade lobbyist credited 
Portman for “stopping the hemorrhaging” of votes on the free trade side (IUST, 
05/27/05). Perhaps as important as Portman’s consensual nature was the good 
relationship he enjoyed with President Bush. According to NAM Vice President 
Frank Vargo, “he got the president involved to a degree the president hadn’t been 
involved before. He was brilliant on CAFTA” (Stokes, 2005b, 3188).  
Indeed, the president was much more involved in the CAFTA debates than he had 
been during the TPA battle, during which he was still dealing with the domestic and 
international consequences of the terror attacks. In the case of CAFTA, the president 
fully joined the battle two months before the vote, multiplying congressional visits 
and personal phone calls until the final days. George W. Bush also made ample use of 
the bully pulpit to convince his party members to follow his lead on free trade. His 
commitment to CAFTA culminated in an extraordinary appeal to dissident members 
on the day of the vote. 
To save CAFTA from the brink of legislative defeat, the administration launched 
a two-pronged communication strategy. First, in a philosophy reminiscent of the Cold 
War era, yet clearly alive under its Democratic predecessor, the Bush administration 
linked free trade with the promotion of democracy and regional stability.419 Similarly, 
Bob Zoellick – before leaving his position – presented CAFTA as a panacea that 
                                                
418 This is the term that U.S. Chamber of Commerce Senior Vice President for International Affairs 
Daniel W. Christman used to introduce Rob Portman at a recent convention at the U.S. Chamber of 
Commerce (“Next Steps for the American Trade Agenda”, U.S. Chamber of Commerce, January 17, 
2008, Washington, DC).  
419 “For the Western Hemisphere, CAFTA would bring the stability and security that can only come 
from freedom” (Bush, 2005). 
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would “strengthen democracy by promoting growth and cutting poverty, creating 
equality of opportunity, reducing corruption and strengthening the role of civil 
society”  (Zoellick, 2005; see also Portman, 2005).  
If the administration did not exploit 9/11 as it had during the TPA battle, the 
specter of the war on terror sometimes lurched into the CAFTA debates. Thus, 
Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld claimed that CAFTA would help combat the 
threat of “an antisocial combination of gangs, drug traffickers, smugglers, hostage 
takes, and terrorists” in Central America (Becker, 2005). More explicitly, in the final 
weeks before the vote, administration officials warned that a vote against CAFTA 
would make the president a lame duck while he is engaged in a war on terrorism  
(IUST 07/15/05).  
Second, to respond to criticisms over CAFTA’s disregard for social and 
environmental issues, the USTR published multiple reports and factsheets. The 
administration praised the accord’s “strong protections for labor rights” and its 
“tough, effective enforcement provisions” (USTR, 2005a; USTR, 2005b). It also 
countered – or obscured – the negative analyses of human rights and labor 
organizations. In one controversial case, the Department of Labor, which had 
commissioned the International Labor Rights Fund (ILRF) to draft reports on Central 
American labor laws and working conditions, prevented their release to Congress 
after they turned out to contradict the administration’s optimistic diagnosis (Forero, 
2005). This action revealed the corporate bias of the executive branch and its tight 
control on the trade policy process. 
The White House also coordinated its communication strategy with the business 
community by exchanging information to refute the accusations of CAFTA 
opponents. According to ECAT’s Vice President Linda Menghetti, this collaboration 
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allowed free traders to respond to specific concerns raised by congressmen and 
consolidate trade support through the release of detailed fact sheets or reports by the 
USTR or business organizations. It was particularly useful to the extent that civil 
society groups had formulated a wide array of attacks ranging from CAFTA’s impact 
on national sovereignty to its effect on access to dental care (Menghetti, 2008*). 
Another classic lobbying tool that the White House-corporate alliance used to 
temper anti-CAFTA criticisms was political endorsements. As during the NAFTA 
campaign, the administration launched its lobbying offensive in a theatrical manner. 
The visit of Central American presidents to Washington – coordinated by the U.S. 
Chamber of Commerce – served as a kick-off for the administration to increase the 
visibility of CAFTA (IUST, 05/20/05). The administration’s endorsement tactics were 
primarily designed to draw support from Democratic members. First, administration 
officials asked former president Jimmy Carter to put his free trade cap back on to 
promote CAFTA. Although ambivalent about the progress accomplished in the labor 
field, the Georgian echoed the Bush administration’s discourse by defending the 
Central American accord on security grounds: “Our own national security and 
hemispheric influence will be enhanced” (Weisman, 2005). Other supporters on the 
Bush administration’s endorsement list included an army of former Clinton 
administration officials, among them National Security Adviser Sandy Berger and 
cabinet members Warren Christopher, Henry Cisneros, Dan Glickman, William Perry 
and Donna Shalala (ibid).   
If communication and endorsement tactics were an integral part of the White 
House’s broad lobbying strategy, they were less important than the political 
bargaining that would take place in the final weeks before the vote. As mentioned 
earlier, in early 2005, fair trade advocates were on the right track to derail CAFTA. 
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This meant that congressional ratification of the Central American accord would 
require a tremendous push by President Bush’s lobbying team. According to Lori 
Wallach, 
 Those trying to pass the CAFTA signed by President Bush in 2004 recognize 
that either they must renegotiate to develop an agreement that meets the demands 
of a majority in Congress, or they must abandon hope of selling CAFTA on its 
merits and try to buy the votes with more pork barrel deals, arm twisting, and 
assorted promised policy covers (cited in Public Citizen, 2005, 32).420 
 
In early June, political insiders speculated that, based upon a firm whip count, the 
Bush administration would decide which deals it would have to cut to get enough 
CAFTA votes. Policy concessions sought to address two types of concerns emanating, 
from, first, members close to the textile and sugar industries worried by foreign 
competition and second, from centrist Democrats anxious about the limited scope of 
CAFTA’s labor provisions. 
Even before the beginning of the CAFTA negotiations, the importance of the 
textile sector in Central American countries had been a concern to American 
industries and their representatives in Congress. Although Washington’s negotiators 
had spent considerable time to reach an agreement on rules of origins with its trade 
partners, the support of lawmakers from textile constituencies remained uncertain. 
Expecting to obtain additional policy concessions or simply hoping that their fellow 
party members would provide the missing votes, House Republicans from textile 
states remained “undecided” until the day of the vote (IUST, 07/15/05).   
To gain their precious support, the White House delivered a cornucopia of side 
payments. First, the Bush administration committed to a rules-of-origins change to 
ensure continued U.S. sales of pocketing and lining to Central America. Amidst 
controversies surrounding the administration’s ability to impose this change on 
                                                
420 Anticipating another series of last-minute bargains, Public Citizen warned legislators against 
political bargaining by publishing a report retracing the broken promises made by President Clinton 
during the NAFTA debates (Public Citizen, 2005). 
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CAFTA countries, USTR Rob Portman secured a series of letters signed by CAFTA 
ambassadors as evidence of the administration’s good will. According to Inside U.S. 
Trade, these letters were said to have brought the votes of at least five Republicans 
from textile states (IUST, 07/15/05; IUST, 07/22/05b; IUST, 07/29/05). Second, the 
Bush administration also secured textile votes by declaring that Nicaragua had agreed 
to use a tariff-preference level under the agreement in a way that would minimize 
economic damage to U.S. companies that ship fabric to Central American countries. 
This commitment was similarly expressed in a letter to the U.S. government by the 
Nicaraguan ambassador. Third, in a letter to Republican members, the USTR offered 
to delay a provision in the CAFTA that would have allowed Mexico to ship two kinds 
of fabric to Central America as inputs for apparel production (IUST, 07/29/05; IUST, 
07/29/05b). 
Targeted side-payments went beyond the scope of U.S.-Central America trade 
relations. To temper lawmakers’ anxiety about the disruptive effects of trade 
liberalization, Republican leaders in both the White House and Congress played the 
“China-card.” Amidst negotiations with CAFTA countries, the administration 
announced in November 2003, that it would stem the flow of certain textile imports 
from China. When the CAFTA vote lurked on the congressional agenda, the Chinese 
bogeyman unexpectedly reappeared. One day after the administration’s kick-off of the 
CAFTA campaign, President Bush announced that it would restrict Chinese clothing 
imports by imposing new quotas on cotton shirts, trousers and underwear. According 
Kimberly Elliott, trade specialist at the Institute for International Economics, this 
aimed to appease the textile industry so as to win support for CAFTA (Becker, 
2005b).  
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A month later, a handful of House members withheld support from CAFTA in an 
effort to get GOP leaders to agree first to vote on a legislation attacking alleged unfair 
practices by China. In response to these concerns, two weeks before the CAFTA vote, 
House Ways and Means Chairman Bill Thomas unveiled a bill that allowed the 
imposition of countervailing duties on imports from non-market economies 
(Vaughan, 2005b; Vaughan, 2005c; IUST, 07/15/05b). While the administration 
officially distanced itself from this legislation,421 Portman and Gutierrez paradoxically 
promised Republican lawmakers to offer them additional protection from Chinese 
imports (Gutierrez & Portman, 2005).422 In a letter to Robert Aderholt (R-AL) co-
signed by Gutierrez and Portman, the administration pledged to protect the socks 
industry from competition by renegotiating a 10-year phase-out period for U.S. tariffs 
on sock imports instead of immediate duty free treatment (Gutierrez & Portman, 
2005). Despite the administration’s official position on import protection, President 
Bush himself kept Aderholt in line by calling him before the vote (IUST, 07/29/05). 
The administration’s stunt seemed to bear its fruit. According to Republican 
sources, the China bill increased support for CAFTA by as much as five members 
(IUST, 07/22/05).423 In general, the administration’s targeting of textile interests 
through side-payments also proved to be effective. According to Inside U.S. Trade, 
Republican members from southern textile states like South Carolina, Alabama and 
Georgia were largely swayed by the White House’s side payments. Overall, the 
administration and the congressional leadership managed to rally nine Republican 
                                                
421 Portman declared: “It was not my [China] bill, it was not the administration’s bill.” (IUST, 
07/29/05). 
422 U.S. Trade Representative Portman declared: ““If we don’t solidify our trade relationship with this 
region through CAFTA, these factories are likely to move to Asia.” (Portman, 2005) 
423 These included Robin Hayes (R-NC), who had cast a vote against CAFTA soon after the roll call 
began before switching to approve the deal  (IUST 07/15/05; Public Citizen, 2005, 17; IUST, 07/29/05; 
Public Citizen, 2005g). According to one political reporter who covered the CAFTA debates in 
Congress, Robin Hayes was under such pressure from the Republican leadership that he burst into tears 
after the end of the vote (Cohen, 2008*).  
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lawmakers they had counted as no votes, according to one textile industry source. 
They were less successful among representatives from North Carolina – only two of 
whom eventually backed CAFTA. Yet, it is highly probable that the White House’s 
scorecard also included two “undecided” Republican members from Virginia and 
North Carolina who were registered present but ended up not voting on CAFTA 
(IUST, 07/29/05). 
However generous it may have been with the textile sector, the Bush 
administration proved less patient with the powerful and obstructive sugar industry. 
Like textile interests, the sugar lobby had obtained protections from Central American 
competition. Owing to persistent pressures from sugar interests, Agriculture Secretary 
Mike Johanns reassured representatives by promising that he would not let sugar 
imports flood the U.S. market.424 After Johanns’ letter, however, the dialogue 
between White House officials and sugar interests turned increasingly bitter (IUST, 
07/22/05; Vaughan, 2005b). Unwilling to grant additional side payments to sugar 
representatives, President Bush adopted a more threatening tone declaring that the 
next farm bill “could look awful bad” for sugar interests if CAFTA was not approved 
(IUST, 08/12/05). Whether through threats or promises, the administration managed 
not only to convert decisive members like Mark Foley (R-FL), but also to secure the 
support of members from several states with sugar beet producers including 
Nebraska, Montana and Minnesota as well as the majority of Republican members 
from Florida and Louisiana (IUST, 08/12/05; IUST, 07/29/05).  
This mix of carrots and sticks was mostly designed for Republican members. To 
lure centrist Democrats to back CAFTA, the Bush administration adopted a different, 
“fair trade-leaning” approach: it emphasized its commitment to labor and 
                                                
424 More specifically, in a letter to the Senate, he pledged that he would not let sugar imports exceed 
1.532 million tons if the U.S market could not absorb them (IUT, 07/22/05). 
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environmental issues. This was destined to be an uphill battle. Not only had the 
government exacerbated partisan tensions throughout five years of uncompromising 
governing, but it had, for TPA as for CAFTA, literally ignored the grievances of 
centrist Democrats.  
Portman’s arrival at the USTR marked a turn toward a more compromising 
approach to trade politics. According to Bill Thomas, Portman was “indefatigable in 
trying to work with Democrats on CAFTA,” listening attentively to their concerns 
without ever taking no as a definite answer (Stokes, 2005b, 3188). The Ohioan’s 
congeniality would re-establish a dialogue across the partisan divide.  
In the last months before the vote, the administration aggressively reached out to a 
block of 11 undecided House Democrats – in parallel with its campaign to gain 
Democratic votes in the Senate. In early June, Rob Portman announced that he would 
seek to increase funds for labor standards enforcement in Central America and 
consider establishing a monitoring system (IUST, 06/10/05). In what was perhaps its 
most theatrical stunt, the White House and U.S. trade officials organized a donor’s 
conference sponsored by the Inter-American Development Bank and featuring vice 
ministers of labor from several CAFTA countries. Held a week before the vote, the 
event was designed to gather Democratic support for CAFTA by unveiling how the 
administration would spend the funds appropriated for labor and environmental 
capacity-building provisions. USTR Portman declared: “I hope people realize that a 
no vote for CAFTA means the possibility of not having those additional enhanced 
worker rights protections. If they want to see better worker rights, vote for CAFTA” 
(cited in IUST, 07/22/05). In parallel, the GOP also exhorted the business community 
to boost its efforts to gain Democratic support for CAFTA (ibid). 
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The administration’s belated attempt to reach across the aisle did little to convince 
prominent Democratic free traders like Sander Levin, who declared that “[b]etter 
enforcement of inadequate [labor] laws is not the solution”  (Vaughan, Smallen & 
Mitchell, 2005). Although six of the targeted Democrats ended up supporting 
CAFTA, it is more likely that they did so out of ideological conviction or under the 
influence of business pressures than in response to the White House’s newfound 
commitment to the labor cause (Nichols, 2005b). 
Finally, in the tradition of congressional trade politics, the CAFTA vote had its 
quota of last-minute pork barrels. Here, the commitment of the House leadership was 
as crucial as the president’s backing. With dozens of Republicans “wavering” until 
the last minute, party leaders once again put on their Santa Claus costumes. They 
hinted at trade-offs by pointing out that both energy and highway bills were on the 
floor on the same month as the CAFTA vote (IUST, 07/22/05; IUST, 07/29/05). One 
Republican lawmaker estimated the cost of buying the CAFTA votes at between $75 
and $100 billion. Although he did not explain his estimate, some speculated that he 
may have been referring to the projects in the highway bill that Congress passed after 
CAFTA (IUST, 08/12/05). 
 
Conclusion 
In sum, the White House once again played a decisive role in gathering 
congressional support for CAFTA. The president relied on his capacity as party leader 
to rally GOP members behind a highly unpopular free trade agreement. As the 
National Journal reported after the CAFTA vote, “According to observers, the real 
drivers behind Republican support for CAFTA, which passed the House 217-215, 
were the personal influence of President Bush and the desire among GOP members to 
give him a win on an issue that he said would enhance regional stability” (Vaughan, 
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2005, 2532). According to Magee’s counterfactual analysis (2007), the importance of 
party leadership was such that a Democratic president could not have obtained 
enough votes to pass CAFTA. As this chapter has shown, however, the Bush 
administration’s ability to deliver on the CAFTA vote went beyond the fortuitous 
context of a united government. Overcoming the “trade agreement fatigue” among 
Republicans required a pro-active lobbying strategy. Through a sophisticated 
communication campaign, a myriad of policy concessions and pork barrels, the 
president acted as a “chief lobbyist” to turn “firm nos”, “leaning nos” and “undecided 
members” from his party into pivotal CAFTA supporters. 
However effective, these lobbying efforts would not have been successful without 
the assistance of the private sector. While consolidating Republican support for 
CAFTA, the countermobilization of the business community was even more decisive 
to gain votes among centrist Democrats whose backing was beyond the reach of a 
polarizing administration. The private’s sector campaign contributions and its 
“grasstops” efforts convinced more Democrats than both the party leadership and fair 
traders had expected. This means that, once again, the lobbying efforts jointly 
undertaken by the executive branch and the business community were 
complementary. While the Bush administration secured the backing of a vast majority 
of GOP members through policy concessions, pork barrels and appeals to national 
security, the private sector managed to woo centrist Democrats with both “inside” and 
“outside” tactics. As one corporate lobbyist commented, for major – i.e. more 
controversial – trade bills to be successful, “it has to be all hands on deck,” not only 
on the Hill, but also in the executive branch, including the president and his cabinet 
officials, in the business community and across the country (Wenk, 2008*; 
Eissenstatt, 2008*).  
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Thus, once again, corporate-presidential countermobilization saved another trade 
bill from the brink. The achievement of the White House-corporate alliance was all 
the more remarkable given the Democrats’ overwhelming opposition to CAFTA – 
their  “retreat from global engagement” in the words of the DLC chief executive 
(cited in Weisman, 2005) – and the general ambivalence of the American public about 
free trade agreements. Yet, as during the NAFTA and PNTR debates, the influence of 
the special relationship was not confined to the lobbying phase of the trade battle. If 
the private sector owed its legislative victory to the intense lobbying efforts of the 
“First Free Trader” and its officials, its ability to control the terms also hinged on its 
privileged access to the executive branch. Exploiting its dominance of the trade 
advisory committee system, business associations shaped CAFTA according to their 
interests. The Bush administration’s deliberate pursuit of an anti-labor, anti-
environmental agenda exacerbated the business bias of the trade institutional 
apparatus, which was already ill-suited to incorporate the grievances of civil society 
groups. These inequalities of power, embedded in the trade bureaucratic machinery, 
engendered another trade agreement that expanded corporate rights – e.g. through a 
strong IPR regime, extensive investment opportunities and new market openings – 
with little consideration for the social and environmental implications of these new 
prerogatives, as witnessed by the limited scope given to CAFTA’s blue and green 
provisions. 
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CHAPTER 8: Conclusion 
 
This research project has aimed to analyze the effects of more than a decade of 
mobilization on behalf of “fair trade.” I have sought to explain the factors that 
hampered the progress of the growing coalition of civil society groups fighting for a 
more socially and environmentally responsible U.S. trade policy. My close 
examination of both secondary and primary sources – including interviews with 
numerous trade policy actors – led me to broaden my initial work on the blue-green 
alliance and undertake a more comprehensive analysis of interest groups dynamics in 
the trade policy sphere. As a result, the five case studies have provided a broader 
picture of the “new politics of American trade” and shedding light on the crucial role 
played by so-called “free” traders in both public and private spheres. 
The central premise of this dissertation is that the special relationship between the 
executive branch and the private sector has been a key obstacle to the progress of the 
fair trade alliance. As such, each case study – NAFTA, fast track renewal (1997), 
PNTR, TPA and CAFTA – is structured in a way that highlights the mechanisms and 
effects of the White House-business alliance, at the risk of sometimes 
overemphasizing the role of this hybrid political entity. To avoid the pitfalls of 
functionalism, however, this dissertation has also given great importance to political 
context and alternative explanations – whether this applies to partisan dynamics or 
international affairs. In other words, the objective of this research project is less to 
provide a monocausal interpretation of recent trade policy outcomes than to shed light 
on an understudied facet of the American trade politics kaleidoscope: the tendency of 
the executive branch to favor business interests over civil society groups. As my case 
studies have shown, this phenomenon is at play during the entire duration of the trade 
policy process: during the negotiating phase of free trade agreements, when the 
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executive and the private sector jointly shaped the scope of trade laws; and during the 
lobbying phase that precedes trade votes, when presidential-corporate 
countermobilization can neutralize the lobbying efforts of fair traders and rally 
congressional support for trade-liberalizing bills.  
During trade negotiations, structural constraints have relegated labor, 
environmental, and consumer advocates to the margins of trade negotiations. This is 
primarily due to the skewed design of the institutional apparatus, a legacy of the 
Trade Act of 1974. The latter established a complex system of trade advisory 
committees that has proven to be ill-adapted to the new challenges of globalization in 
two main regards. First, the TAC pyramid is organized along sectoral lines, under the 
assumption that employers and workers share the same economic interests in the trade 
policy sphere. However, free “trade” agreements have given increased importance to 
the liberalization and protection of transnational investment, creating new offshoring 
opportunities for American industries threatened by international competition. 
Outsourcing has different meanings for employers and workers, being synonymous 
with cost-savings for the former and layoff for the latter. Despite these pervasive 
conflicts of interests, the TAC system has continued to operate under a sectoral logic, 
following the guidance of its overwhelming majority of business representatives 
while ignoring the grievances of the minority of labor members.  
Second, the structure of the trade advisory committee was not designed to give a 
strong say to civil society groups, whose interests were long deemed marginal to the 
conduct of trade policy. As Sander Levin’s trade analyst Tim Reif notes, when the 
Trade Act of 1974 was designed, “trade was about trade” (Reif, 2008*). Over the past 
decades, however, trade agreements have gone far beyond the scope of import duties 
to intrude on tax policy, domestic regulation, investment and intellectual property 
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rights protection. Despite these significant changes and the extensive ramifications of 
recent trade laws, the TAC system continues to underrepresent or simply exclude 
public interests from the trade policy process.  
This means that the Trade Act of 1974 has generated both access and exclusion 
from the trade policy process. It has created corporate “policy clienteles,” giving them 
considerable control over the terms of trade debates while, at the same time, leaving 
labor and public interests on the sidelines. My analysis of the NAFTA, PNTR and 
CAFTA negotiations reveals that the skewed design of the trade bureaucratic 
machinery has allowed the business community to shape trade agreements according 
to its interests, to control the “rules of the games” (Levinson, 2008*)– to use the 
words of one labor advocate – offering them generous markets openings, iron-clad 
investment regimes, and strong intellectual property rights protections while, at the 
same time, relegating environmental and labor provisions to supplemental and often 
voluntary provisions.  
The study of TAC membership during the negotiations of each of these trade 
initiatives explains why fair traders never had much weight. First, the business 
community represented typically 80% or more of the membership of the ACTPN, the 
most influential trade advisory committee of the TAC pyramid, under both President 
Clinton and his successor. Labor, consumer and environmentalists shared only a 
handful of seats to express their dissatisfaction with the terms of the agreement.  
Even more skewed against fair traders is the membership of Industrial Sectoral 
Advisory Committees (ISACs). All three trade agreements under consideration 
promised to facilitate offshoring through investment liberalization – whether to 
Mexico, China, or Central America – yet ISACs constantly excluded labor 
representatives, even in labor-intensive sectors such as the auto or textile sectors that 
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were inherently more prone to outsource production units. Likewise, 
environmentalists were excluded from ISACs until 2000, when they won a lawsuit 
requiring that the Clinton administration grant them seats on two advisory 
committees. In 2003, green interests challenged President Bush under similar 
circumstances, winning an additional seat in the ISAC system. Overall, however, the 
voice of public interests remained largely absent from ISACs, despite the far-reaching 
implications of these committees’ policy prescriptions in the realm of public health, 
environmental regulation or consumer protection.  
The only committees where labor and environmental advocates could raise their 
concerns were the Labor Advisory Committee (LAC) and the Trade and Environment 
Policy Advisory Committee (TEPAC). Amidst the 26 corporate-friendly committees 
shaping U.S. trade policy, these voices – as formulated in LAC and TEPAC’s reports 
– went largely ignored. Even the TEPAC was not exempt from corporate dominance. 
For instance, during the CAFTA negotiations, almost two thirds of the committee 
members appointed by the Bush administration were representatives of the private 
sector.  
Business representatives involved in the committee were usually large, highly 
politically active multinational corporations that often took part in intensive advocacy 
efforts to defend the policies they had helped design. In other words, corporate 
interests combined the roles of policymakers and lobbyists, first shaping trade 
agreements in conjunction with the chief executive, before lobbying Congress, once 
again, with the help of the White House. In the case of PNTR, the ACTPN explicitly 
declared that the promotion of the U.S.-China agreement in Congress was its sole 
agenda for 2000, despite lingering controversies among its labor representatives.  
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As the NAFTA, PNTR and CAFTA case studies reveal, these institutional factors 
transcend party politics, operating under Democratic and Republican presidents alike. 
This means that political analyses of contemporary U.S. trade politics, then, should go 
beyond a focus on partisan politics to acknowledge the inequalities of power 
embedded in the policy process and their consequences for policy outcomes. The 
control that the private sector exerts over the terms of trade policy is reinforced by 
fast track authority, a procedure that circumscribes Congress’s intervention in the 
policy process. Through a process of “path dependence”, the trade bureaucratic 
apparatus creates both access (for private interests) and exclusion (of fair traders), 
thereby constraining the ability of unions and environmentalists to influence policy 
outcomes.  
The business-White House partnership, however, is more than the product of a 
“path dependence” process set in stone since 1974. As this dissertation has repeatedly 
shown, it also hinges on the political will of the president – whether Democratic or 
Republican – to pursue a “free trade” agenda or, more exactly, a business-friendly 
trade policy. State power and business influence are, in this case, truly interactive: the 
collaboration between the public and the private sectors serves their respective 
political and economic interests. In the case of NAFTA, both George H. W. Bush and 
Bill Clinton sought to broaden the scope of ACTPN members by inviting 
environmentalists to the negotiating table to begin a dialogue on the trade-
environment linkage. These, however, were mostly symbolic gestures that resulted in 
few substantive political gains for environmentalists, who continued to be largely 
marginalized from the trade policy process – as were their consumer and labor allies. 
In contrast to his two predecessors, George W. Bush used his power of appointment 
to restrict the already limited access of fair traders to the advisory committee system, 
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prompting strong reactions within the fair trade community. If the policies of Bill 
Clinton and George W. Bush did not fundamentally alter the trade policy process or 
the scope of trade negotiations, they also showed that the chief executive could utilize 
his institutional prerogatives to preserve, exacerbate or challenge the corporate bias of 
the trade policy process. In a conversation over the institutional constraints faced by 
fair traders, AFL-CIO Legislative Director Thea Lee raised the idea that the skewed 
design of the TAC system may be a symptom as much as a source of corporate power 
(Lee, 2008*). Similarly, Mark Levinson, chief economist at UNITE HERE, argues 
that trade advisory committees are used to shape the agenda that the administration – 
whether Republican or Democratic – seeks to implement (Levinson, 2008*). This 
does not negate the importance of the trade advisory committee system, but rather 
confirms to the idea that the president deliberately chooses to maintain a close 
relationship with the private sector. As Tichenor (Tichenor, 2003, 330-1) notes, the 
chief executive always retains the power to “alter the prevailing interest group system 
[he] encounter[s].” In fact, at the end of his term, President Clinton briefly considered 
– or, at least, feigned to consider – an overall reform of the TAC system, which he 
might have undertaken had he been more committed to it. The point here is that the 
institutional constraints that block fair traders from the trade policy process should not 
obscure the political decisions that recent presidents have made to preserve – or 
exacerbate – this status quo.  
Of course, one could argue that presidents make these choices on ideological 
grounds, guided by the belief that free trade serves the national interest. This 
argument, however, tends to obscure power dynamics that undergird the conduct of 
American trade policy and that this dissertation has sought to disclose. In addition, 
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“free” trade agreements are neither truly free, as the negotiations of NAFTA, PNTR 
and CAFTA have demonstrated.  
The executive branch’s bias toward the private sector is not confined to the 
negotiating phase but also manifests itself during the lobbying phase of the trade 
policy process. Here again, the president makes ample use of his institutional 
capacities on behalf of his “free” trade agenda and, not incidentally, that of the 
business community. In the contentious era of post-NAFTA trade politics, the special 
relationship between the private sector and the executive branch has proven to be a 
decisive element in presidential legislative victories. All the major trade battles 
analyzed in this dissertation reveal similar interest groups dynamics, despite the 
changing partisan contexts between 1991 and 2005. In all cases, a coalition of civil 
society groups including labor, environmental, consumer and human rights advocates 
mobilized against what it deemed as a skewed trade proposal that would empower 
corporations to the detriment of American or foreign citizens. To challenge the 
passage of each bill in Congress, this loose alliance, dominated by labor unions 
launched a communication campaign to denounce the environmental and social 
pitfalls of the trade agreement in question. It relied on a combination of “outside” (i.e. 
grassroots) and “inside” (on Capitol Hill) lobbying tactics to convince congressmen 
from both parties to reject the trade bill.  
In all cases, the mobilization of fair traders had a significant impact on the 
legislative debates. First, starting with NAFTA, the blue-green alliance managed to 
bring social and environmental questions to the front of the political scene, forcing 
congressmen to acknowledge the expanding ramifications of trade liberalization. 
Under both Democratic and Republican administrations, the scope of environmental 
and labor provisions often monopolized the debates on free trade. Second, unions and 
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their allies not only raised the prominence of the fair trade cause but, more often than 
not, gained the support of American citizens. As numerous polls have shown, the 
latter have generally become increasingly skeptical of trade-liberalizing bills and very 
supportive of the inclusion of strong labor and environmental standards in trade 
agreements. Third, in most case studies, except perhaps PNTR, the political 
mobilization of fair traders seriously threatened the passage of the trade bill, forcing 
decision-makers to postpone the vote until they could rally enough support in 
Congress. In the case of fast track (1997), the administration decided to cancel the 
vote after realizing that it hadn’t secured the necessary votes. Finally, the unions’ 
lobbying efforts had a significant impact on trade votes as illustrated by the series of 
regression analyses consulted for each case study.  
Although the mobilization of fair traders altered the course of trade debates from 
NAFTA to CAFTA, the countermobilization of free traders prevented the blue-green 
alliance from winning legislative victories on most occasions. In each trade battle, the 
White House and the business community joined forces to consolidate support for 
free trade in Congress. Corporate interests systematically formed ad hoc coalitions – 
USA*NAFTA, Americans Lead on Trade (ALOT), the Business Coalition for U.S. 
China Trade, GoTrade and the Business Coalition for U.S.-Central America Trade – 
to coordinate their lobbying campaign on behalf of trade liberalization. These 
coalitions of business organizations typically involve the U.S. Chamber of 
Commerce, the Business Roundtable, ECAT, the National Foreign Trade Council and 
the National Association Manufacturers as well as large independent corporations. 
Each of these actors played its part to promote trade bills through an informal division 
of labor. As one business insider explains: “The Business Roundtable’s got the 
money, the Chamber provides the people and the meeting room and the NAM’s got 
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the ideas.”425 Of course, the division of labor of free trade coalitions is never this 
straightforward, as the interviewee acknowledged. However, it is clear that these 
cross-sector business coalitions coordinated their lobbying efforts in a way that is far 
from the fragmented, sectoral picture of business interests that is common to 
economists’ studies of American trade policy. As this dissertation has shown, 
business interests are often united in support of free trade agreements partly because 
the latter are neither “free” nor simply about trade. In other words, the various 
provisions of these agreements – from market openings and strong protection of 
intellectual property rights, to investment liberalization and sector-specific protection 
through rules of origin – can satisfy a wide range of private actors (including both 
import-competing and export-oriented industries). 
Business interests rely on the same lobbying tactics as the fair trade alliance with 
three notable differences. First, the private sector enjoys much larger financial 
resources, as cost estimates of the NAFTA and PNTR campaigns illustrate. Second, it 
generally benefits from the overall support of the mainstream media, which considers 
free trade to be in the interests of the nation. Another major difference between fair 
trade and free trade advocacy resides in their respective human resources: while 
unions and their allies often capitalize on an extensive grassroots network, business 
groups found it more difficult to elicit enthusiasm for trade liberalization among local 
constituencies. As this dissertation has shown, this has been a constant concern for the 
private sector, which, since the end of the 1990s, has multiplied its efforts to generate 
grassroots support for its trade agenda.  
In conjunction with the lobbying campaigns of the private sector, the executive 
branch has been the key broker in the stormy legislative battles of the past decade. In 
                                                
425 The author asked not be cited.  
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pursuit of its trade agenda, the White House collaborated with corporate interests to 
counter the lobbying efforts of the fair trade coalition and consolidate congressional 
support for free trade. Peculiar to this process of corporate-presidential 
countermobilization is the constant exchange of information between representatives 
of the business community and executive officials. Under both Democratic and 
Republican administrations, both public and private wings of the free alliance looked 
for lawmakers’ Achilles’ heel, running the risk of transgressing U.S. legal lobbying 
restrictions on the executive branch. If legality issues only emerged during the PNTR 
debates and more briefly during the CAFTA battle, the close coordination between 
the executive branch and the private sector is endemic to presidential-corporate 
countermobilization, as all interviews with business representatives illustrate – USTR 
officials being logically more cautious in describing these lobbying processes. As 
ECAT Vice President Linda Menghetti notes, a successful lobbying campaign 
depends on information sharing between different members of the free trade coalition.  
However important, information sharing is only one of the many weapons on 
which the president relies to consolidate congressional support for trade-
liberalization. First, his position as party leader is a key determinant of his success in 
Congress. Thus, President Clinton’s inability to win the allegiance of House 
Democrats in 1997 was fatal to his attempt to renew fast track authority. In contrast, 
President Bush’s legislative victories during the TPA debate owed more to the post-
9.11 “rally-around-the-flag effect” within the Republican Party than his own 
presidential lobbying efforts. Here lies a second card the chief executive can play in 
the trade policy arena: his ability to use his status of commander-in-chief to invoke 
security necessities. If the Bush administration monopolized “fear tactics,” the 
Clinton administration also frequently emphasized the linkage between free trade, 
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national security and the promotion of democracy abroad. In addition, both presidents 
made ample use of the “bully pulpit” on behalf of trade liberalization, capitalizing on 
the positive media coverage that the leader of the nation typically enjoys in 
controversial congressional debates (Rankin, 2006).  
To convince “undecided members” under heavy lobbying pressure from fair 
traders to back his free trade agenda, the president can take neither his persuasive 
powers of party leader nor his role of chief executive for granted. In the contentious 
era of the new politics of American trade, complacency can be source of legislative 
defeat, as President Clinton experienced in 1997. This means that the White House 
must make full use of its institutional capabilities to rescue fledgling trade bills from 
the brink. The most common tactics employed for presidential countermobilization 
are the vast array of side-payments that the White House uses to target specific 
lawmakers. These include promises of policy concessions, which are adopted in 
response to trade-related concerns and range from import protection (quotas, rules of 
origin, longer phase-out periods etc.) to symbolic policies on labor and environmental 
issues (NAFTA’s side agreements or the Bereuter-Levin amendment to PNTR). 
Another type of the president’s deal-making tactics is campaign support. This form of 
side payment is tailored to the needs of vulnerable incumbents, but usually consists of 
campaign events featuring the president or a prominent member of his cabinet. 
Finally, the chief executive can also win votes through pork-barrel deals, i.e. promises 
to fund pet-projects that are unrelated to trade. Of course, as Public Citizen has 
shown, these promises are rarely kept.426 However, they provide important political 
cover for representatives anxious about voting against the will of their constituents. 
As such, they can neutralize the lobbying efforts undertaken by fair traders.  
                                                
426 Public Citizen’s study of 2005 revealed that between 1992 and 2004 (before the CAFTA vote), 
presidents had made 92 deals with congress members, 82.6% of which were “unkept, reversed or 
meaningless.” Read Public Citizen (2005, appendix).  
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Both Democratic and Republican administrations also exploited the general 
consensus around the benefits of free trade among media sources, political figures and 
academia. Both presidents launched sophisticated communication campaigns to 
defend trade liberalization, winning endorsements from a wide range of economic and 
political actors, including economists, former secretaries of state, agriculture and/or 
the treasury and even former presidents. Perhaps as theatrical, the administration, in 
conjunction with the private sector, organized well-orchestrated trips for 
congressional delegations to witness working and environmental conditions in 
America’s trading partners (e.g. during the NAFTA and PNTR debates).  
Although it is always difficult to assess the exact impact that this set of lobbying 
tactics might have had on congressional votes, both primary and secondary accounts 
of congressional trade battles show that presidential countermobilization played a key 
role in consolidating support of trade liberalization. Often, the lobbying efforts of the 
administration proved complementary to those of the private sector. This was not only 
true for the crucial exchange of information between the White House and the 
business community, but also because their alliance allowed them to reach out to both 
parties. For instance, corporate lobbying efforts often proved crucial to secure a 
minority of Democratic votes that were pivotal to the passage of trade-liberalizing 
bills, either because these efforts made the lawmakers more vulnerable to President 
Clinton’s pressure, or because they mitigated the polarizing effects of the Bush 
administration’s partisan style on centrist Democrats. On the other hand, President 
Bush’s fear tactics helped to rally his party behind him, particularly right wing 
Republicans who had turned against free trade under the Clinton administration. In 
sum, the combined powers of the White House and the business community – 
deployed under the process of corporate-presidential countermobilization – proved 
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instrumental in defeating the lobbying efforts of organized labor and its 
environmental, consumer and human rights allies. 
From a theoretical standpoint, the very existence of a special relationship between 
the executive branch and the private sector runs against conventional analyses of 
American trade politics. In fact, the corporate bias of the executive branch during both 
negotiating and lobbying phases contrasts with the common idea that the president, 
unlike Congress, pursues a free trade agenda free from domestic interference (Destler, 
1986a; Pastor, 1980; Goldstein, 1994; Bailey, Goldstein & Weingast, 1997). In fact, 
the empowerment of the executive branch over the legislature – initiated with the 
Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934 and perpetuated through the Trade Act of 
1974 – has not merely allowed decision-makers to shift American trade policy away 
from protectionism, but has also given a privileged access to the internationally-
oriented business community over other political actors. Instead of rising above 
domestic politics, the President gives priority to the corporate segment of the interest 
groups constellation, to the detriment of the ever-larger pool of trade policy 
stakeholders that fair traders seek to represent.  In a globalized era when investment 
liberalization can divide industries along class lines and “trade” agreements have far-
reaching social and environmental ramifications, “what’s good for General Motors” 
may no longer be “what’s good for the country.”427 The point here is not to start a 
lengthy debate about what really constitutes America’s national interest. Rather, this 
dissertation seeks to challenge conventional views about the role of the chief 
executive as “disinterested referee” and shed light on the inequalities of power 
embedded in the trade policy process.  
                                                
427 For a discussion, see Reich (1992, chapters 11 and 12). 
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The political implications from this analysis of contemporary trade politics are 
clear. Unless trade policy makers decide to adapt the trade institutional apparatus to 
the new challenges of globalization and allow a broader range of stakeholders to 
provide input in the decision-making process, American trade policy will continue to 
serve the interests of the business community, whether or not these are compatible 
with the respect of worker and human rights, the protection of the environment or the 
enforcement of public health standards. Absent a comprehensive reform of the TAC 
system, trade advisory committees will likely continue to represent the interests of the 
private sector, with few obligations vis-à-vis American or foreign consumers, workers 
and citizens.  
Of course, if Washington is to adopt a more “balanced” trade policy – i.e. one that 
accommodates a broader range of stakeholders – institutional reforms must be paired 
with genuine political will. In other words, the chief executive must not work to 
undermine political reforms – as President Bush did by depriving the ACPTN of its 
new public interest representatives.  
Today, after more than a decade of bitter legislative battles, the executive may 
have to adopt a more compromising approach to trade politics. As the narrow votes on 
Trade Promotion Authority and CAFTA revealed, the polarizing manners of the Bush 
administration can hardly sustain bipartisan support for trade liberalization. A more 
consensual trade policy model has become all the more necessary since the 
Democrats regained the control of both houses of Congress in 2006 – a legislative 
victory that was partly due to candidates’ criticisms of George W. Bush’s trade 
policies.428  
                                                
428 According to Evenett and Meier (2006), voters replaced 16 “free trade” House Republicans and 5 
similar GOP Senators with Democratic critics of the current trade policy model. On the campaign trail, 
these Democratic candidates made an election issue of CAFTA and promised to include labor and 
environmental standards in future trade agreements.   
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In the face of the growing support of fair trade among Democrats, both business 
representatives and government officials acknowledged that more substantive 
concessions were needed if Washington was to pursue its trade-liberalizing agenda. 
The result was the “May 10th deal” (U.S. Bipartisan Compact on Free Trade 
Agreements) reached in 2007 by the Bush administration and the Democratic 
Congress and supported, albeit with some reluctance, by the business community.429 
The compact promises a series of critical changes to pending agreements with Peru 
and Panama, addressing issues long raised by fair trade advocates. These issues fall 
under six categories: labor, environment, patents and intellectual property rights, 
government procurement, investment and adjustment assistance. The May 10th Deal 
goes far beyond the minor concessions granted to labor and its allies since the 
NAFTA debates and attest to the long-lasting impact of fair trade mobilization.430 
 Yet, if the May 10th deal marks a political shift among both Republican officials 
and business members, it also falls short of remedying the intrinsic inequities of the 
institutional system that this dissertation has sought to reveal. Another initiative 
recently undertaken in the House of Representative, however, reveals a greater 
awareness of the structural constraints limiting the participation of civil society 
groups in the trade policy process. Designed by congressional supporters of the fair 
trade cause in consultation with a wide array of labor, environmental and consumer 
organizations,431 the Trade Reform, Accountability, Development and Employment 
(TRADE) Act of 2008 represents a significant departure from the current model trade 
                                                
429 Both the administration and the business community were initially reluctant to include a provision 
guaranteeing certain rights for labor in the trading partner countries, including a ban on child and slave 
labor and the right to organize (Weisman, 2007).  
430 For more details, see Cosbey (2007). 
431 Long-time fair trade advocates Sen. Sherrod Brown (D-Ohio) and Rep. Mike Michaud (D-Maine) 
led the negotiations with civil society groups. The TRADE Act was cosponsored by 70 House 
members and 7 Senators. Among fair trade organizations, supporters include Public Citizen, the 
Citizens Trade Campaign, the Sierra Club, Friends of the Earth, the AFL-CIO, Change to Win and 
most of the unions involved in trade debates.  
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policy model to the extent that it constricts the trade-negotiating powers of the 
executive branch and establishes strong social and environmental benchmarks for 
both existing and future trade agreements.432 These recent changes (particularly the 
May 10th Deal) attest to the progress accomplished by fair traders since the NAFTA 
debates. Not only have American lawmakers – particularly in the Democratic Party – 
begun to address key grievances of labor, environmental, and consumer advocates, 
but they have also become increasingly cognizant of the extent to which “process 
shapes substance” (Stokes & Choate, 2001). However, without more congressional 
support,433 this initiative has little chance to correct the imbalance of the trade policy 
process to the benefit of a wider range of trade policy stakeholders.  
Such a reform could depend on the new president’s decision to reform the trade 
policy process. Nevertheless, a deliberate move by the chief executive to curb his own 
power vis-à-vis Congress would be an unprecedented step in the era of the modern 
presidency. The fact that president-elect Barack Obama, despite the exhortations of 
the labor organizations (Tasini, 2008), has remained silent on the TRADE Act of 
2008 is indicative of the dilemma that fair traders face: not only is the new president 
unlikely to abandon his institutional prerogatives, but he may also refrain from 
alienating powerful business interests. Thus, if “Change” is to come in the trade 
policy sphere, the presidency will most likely have to retain its institutional 
prerogatives on the policy process. The real challenge for fair traders will be to win 
the favor of the president-elect and convince him to forge a more balanced trade 
policy in which all stakeholders have their say. Unless the White House 
acknowledges and vows to alter the skewed design of the policy process, the 
executive branch is likely to retain its special relationship with the private sector, 
                                                
432 For more details, see (H.R. 6180, §7, ¶b, 6 ). 
433 The bill has 72 co-sponsors but has not been scheduled for debate. 
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thereby maintaining the obstacles that have hampered the progress of the fair trade 
cause from NAFTA to CAFTA.  
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RÉSUMÉ EN FRANÇAIS 
 
L’expérience de l’ALENA et de ses accords latéraux représente un événement 
clé qui pourrait avoir des répercussions importantes au niveau mondial, 
notamment à travers l’émergence de nouveaux acteurs de la société civile dans 
le cercle traditionnellement fermé du processus décisionnel de la politique 
économique – un cercle longtemps dominé par un nombre limité d’agences 
gouvernementales et d’intérêts privés (Hinojosa-Ojeda, 2002, 228)434. 
 
 
Cadrage méthodologique 
Ce projet de recherche est né sous le signe de l’hybridité. L’hybridité est bien sûr 
une des qualités intrinsèques à toute œuvre civilisationniste, mais, dans ce cas précis, 
elle est aussi le produit interculturel et interdisciplinaire d’une convention de cotutelle 
entre l’École Doctorale des Études Anglophones de l’Université de la Sorbonne 
Nouvelle et le Département de Sciences Politiques  de la City University of New York 
(CUNY Graduate Center). Si ce projet de recherche est né au sein de l’Institut du 
Monde Anglophone de l’Université Sorbonne Nouvelle (Paris 3), il a été rédigé en 
anglais selon les termes de la convention de cotutelle, afin que les chercheurs 
américains du Graduate Center, et plus précisément la co-directrice de recherche, 
Madame le professeur Frances Fox Piven, puissent participer à son encadrement. 
Avant d’entamer une synthèse en français de ce travail de thèse, il apparaît important 
d’expliquer les implications de ce partenariat institutionnel pour le développement de 
mon projet de recherche.  
La mise en place de cet accord de cotutelle a été à la fois source d’opportunités et 
de défis. Ma formation en sciences politiques au sein du Graduate Center impliquait 
une lourde charge de cours et la validation d’examens écrits et oraux (comprehensive 
exams). Suivre le cursus de l’un des meilleurs programmes doctoraux des États-Unis 
                                                
434 “The experience with NAFTA and its side agreements represents a significant milestone, with 
potentially important global implications, in the emergence of new societal actors into the 
traditionally closed arena of international economic policy-making – an arena long dominated by 
a limited set of state agencies and economic interests.” (Hinojosa-Ojeda 2002, 228). 
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dans cette discipline435 m’a permis d’acquérir de solides compétences dans le 
domaine de la politique américaine et des relations internationales. En outre, mon 
séjour aux États-Unis m’a facilité l’accès à une multitude de sources documentaires 
primaires et secondaires qui ont, sans aucun doute, donné une tout autre envergure à 
mon projet de recherche. J’ai eu l’occasion de mesurer les bénéfices de cette 
formation de deux manières concrètes: en participant à de nombreux colloques 
organisés par les associations de sciences politiques régionales et nationales 
américaines ; et dans le cadre de mes recherches, en interviewant les acteurs de la 
politique commerciale à Washington, DC.  
Si les bénéfices de ce projet bilatéral ont dépassé toutes mes attentes, cette 
expérience n’a pas été sans contrainte. En dehors de la lourde de charge de travail qui 
incombe à tout candidat à un doctorat américain, l’adaptation aux normes 
méthodologiques des sciences politiques américaines a été peut–être le plus grand défi 
de ce projet de cotutelle. Au cours de ces trois années, j’ai donc redoublé d’efforts 
pour tenter de produire une thèse qui puisse satisfaire à la fois aux critères 
universitaires américains et français. Au terme d’une longue réflexion avec mes deux 
directeurs de recherche, et pour éviter de faire « le grand écart » entre deux 
disciplines, j’ai décidé de structurer mon analyse selon les normes en vigueur dans le 
département de sciences politiques du Graduate Center. Il est important d’insister sur 
la prééminence du cadre méthodologique américain dans la rédaction de cette thèse 
dans la mesure où la forme et le contenu de cette analyse seraient susceptibles de 
surprendre certains civilisationnistes français. Le choix du cadre méthodologique 
                                                
435 Selon un article publié en 2007 dans la Chronicle of Higher Education, le programme du Graduate 
Center a été jugé supérieur à 86% des programmes de sciences politiques américains. Lire : 
http://web.gc.cuny.edu/politicalscience/pages/news_events/newsletters/Newsletter_Spring2007Final.pd
f  
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américain permet de mieux comprendre ce qui pourrait être interprété comme un 
certain nombre « d’anomalies » par des civilisationnistes.  
Premièrement, la prééminence des normes universitaires américaines se manifeste 
par la forme de cette thèse : par exemple, dans le choix de faire figurer le cadre 
théorique et la problématique dans un chapitre à part entière (chapitre 1), plutôt que 
dans une introduction.  Deuxièmement, ce choix méthodologique a des répercussions 
inexorables sur le contenu de cette analyse. Si la contribution théorique d’une analyse 
est aussi importante en France qu’aux États-Unis, les normes universitaires 
américaines obligent les chercheurs à faire figurer cette contribution au premier plan 
de toute analyse – qu’il s’agisse d’un article, d’un ouvrage ou d’une thèse. Ceci 
explique pourquoi les conclusions de ce travail apparaissent non seulement dans le 
dernier chapitre de ce travail, comme il est d’usage dans les thèses françaises, mais 
aussi dans le chapitre introductif, sous la forme d’hypothèses de recherche (claims). 
Cette tendance à « conclure avant de démontrer » qui est très étrangère au modèle 
argumentatif français se retrouve également dans chacun des chapitres de cette thèse, 
voire au sein de certaines sections de ces chapitres. Il s’agit ici d’une contrainte 
méthodologique imposée par le modèle universitaire américain. 
En outre, l’argumentaire de cette thèse accorde une grande importance à la 
logique causale. Cette approche fonctionnelle, très mathématique est typique des 
sciences politiques contemporaines, notamment aux États-Unis. Cette discipline 
s’efforce d’interpréter des phénomènes politiques à travers le prisme de la causalité, 
cherchant à établir le lien entre la conséquence ou, en termes statistiques, la variable 
dépendante (dependent variable) et la cause ou variable indépendante (independent 
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variable)436. Mon travail de recherche a dû, là encore, s’adapter à ces contraintes 
méthodologiques. J’ai ainsi modifié ma problématique, pour me focaliser non plus sur 
une analyse des progrès politiques accomplis par la coalition pour le libre-échange 
depuis les débats sur l’ALENA, mais sur les facteurs qui ont limité son influence – et 
en particulier le facteur sur lequel les spécialistes de la politique commerciale ne se 
sont jusqu’ici pas penchés – en d’autres termes, ma contribution aux sciences 
politiques américaines. La structure de cette thèse témoigne de l’importance accordée 
à cette logique causale. Ainsi, cette analyse s’articule autour de cinq études de cas, 
dont l’objectif est de tester la validité des arguments avancés pour interpréter ces 
phénomènes de causalité.  
Si cette analyse s’efforce de répondre aux critères méthodologiques des sciences 
politiques, elle vise aussi à satisfaire les exigences de la civilisation américaine. Tout 
d’abord, ce travail accorde beaucoup d’importance à la contextualisation.  Par 
exemple, le deuxième chapitre s’attache à définir les différents acteurs de la politique 
commerciale, leur place dans la sphère politique et l’histoire de leur participation aux 
débats sur la libéralisation des échanges. En outre, si certains éléments sont 
considérés comme acquis par les politologues américains, ils se doivent d’être 
explicités pour les lecteurs civilisationnistes. Certes, cette contextualisation aurait été 
vraisemblablement approfondie si les études de cas n’avaient pas occupé une place si 
importante au sein de cette analyse. Toutefois, la longueur de ce travail reflète aussi 
les exigences du milieu universitaire français. En effet, les thèses américaines en 
sciences politiques excèdent rarement 250 ou 300 pages. Il a fallu trouver un équilibre 
entre contextualisation et concision, susceptible de répondre aux attentes des deux 
systèmes universitaires.  
                                                
436 Pour une discussion sur les objectifs méthodologiques des sciences politiques américaines, lire 
« Symposium on Qualitative-Quantitative Disputation » (1995) et Milner (1998).  
 
407 
  
 
Enfin, dans la tradition française, ce travail de recherche accorde beaucoup 
d’importance aux ressources primaires. Ce choix méthodologique se manifeste 
notamment dans l’analyse minutieuse des rapports, publications et archives des 
groupes d’intérêts et des institutions gouvernementales. Il apparaît aussi clairement 
dans la décision d’organiser des entretiens avec des acteurs de la politique 
commerciale américaine, entretiens qui ont considérablement enrichi cette analyse.  
En somme, la cotutelle de thèse a nourri un travail de réflexion très enrichissant 
sur les convergences et divergences méthodologiques entre deux disciplines issues de 
deux traditions universitaires différentes et sur les normes à respecter pour satisfaire 
les exigences de ces deux mondes : valorisation de la contextualisation historique, de 
l’exploitation des ressources primaires et de l’interdisciplinarité en civilisation ; 
prééminence d’une logique quasiment mathématique et de la contribution théorique 
de l’œuvre en sciences politiques, etc. Surmonter ces obstacles méthodologiques a été 
l’un des principaux défis de ce projet de recherche. Dans un souci interdisciplinaire et 
interculturel, le résumé ci-dessous propose une adaptation au cadre méthodologique 
français  de mon travail de recherche. Il ne s’agit pas ici de transformer la structure de 
cette analyse. Remettre en question la logique causale de cette analyse impliquerait 
une refonte totale de cette thèse. L’objet, plus modeste, de la synthèse qui suit est de 
retracer le cheminement intellectuel suivi dans le cadre de cette analyse en l’adaptant 
à une logique « plus française », qui se garde de conclure avant la fin de l’étude. 
 
*     *     *    *    * 
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En 1991, une coalition hétéroclite de syndicats, groupes écologistes et 
associations de consommateurs, la MODTLE  (Mobilization on Development, Trade, 
Labor and the Environment), se forme en réponse au projet d’accord de libre échange 
nord-américain (ALENA) lancé par le président George H. W. Bush. Pour eux, les 
architectes de la politique commerciale américaine ne peuvent plus ignorer les 
conséquences sociales et environnementales du libre-échange. Ainsi, la libéralisation 
des flux de commerce et d’investissement entre les Etats-Unis, le Canada et le 
Mexique prévu dans le cadre de l’ALENA doit s’accompagner de mesures visant à 
protéger les travailleurs, les consommateurs et l’environnement. 
La mobilisation de nouveaux acteurs de la société civile dans cette sphère 
politique jusqu’ici dominée principalement par les intérêts privés constitue un élément 
clé de ce que Destler et Balint (1999) appellent « la nouvelle dynamique politique du 
commerce américain »  (the new politics of American trade). Elle représente une 
réponse directe aux tensions de plus en plus fortes entre libéralisation économique et 
souveraineté nationale. Les revendications sociales et environnementales de ces 
organisations – allant de l’établissement de normes de travail internationales jusqu’à 
la promotion du développement durable en passant par le respect des droits de 
l’homme –  se rejoignent sous la notion de « fair trade », un concept dont la 
traduction française reste problématique. Cette difficulté provient des significations 
différentes que les anglophones accordent à cette expression. Ainsi, dans les années 
1970 et 1980, ce terme se définissait par opposition à la politique protectionniste 
déloyale (unfair trade) des rivaux des États-Unis, et en premier lieu, le Japon. Pour la 
plupart des Américains, ce terme signifie « commerce équitable », un concept défini 
comme le « partenariat commercial entre distributeurs du Nord et petits producteurs 
du Sud visant à augmenter le revenu de ces derniers et à promouvoir le 
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développement local » (Azuelos, 2006). Toutefois, dans la présente analyse, ce terme 
adopte un troisième sens : celui d’une politique commerciale plus responsable d’un 
point de vue social et environnemental, en accord avec les revendications des groupes 
de la société civile. Il s’agit donc d’une alternative à la logique éconocentrique de la 
libéralisation des échanges que l’on peut traduire par la notion « d’équité des 
échanges » .   
C’est au nom de cette cause qu’une nouvelle alliance entre les syndicats et les 
écologistes, épaulée par quelques figures populistes comme Ross Perot et Patrick 
Buchanan, lance une campagne virulente contre l’ALENA qui déstabilise le 
gouvernement et menace la ratification de l’accord au Congrès. Pour sauver 
l’ALENA d’une défaite législative, les milieux des affaires et le successeur de George 
H. W. Bush, Bill Clinton lanceront conjointement une « contre-mobilisation » sans 
précédent qui leur permettra d’obtenir une victoire in extremis au Congrès.  
Malgré leur échec, les nouveaux apôtres de l’équité des échanges ont réussi à 
redéfinir le cadre des débats sur le libre-échange en ramenant les questions sociales et 
environnementales au premier plan. Ils entendent bien continuer à lutter pour une 
politique commerciale plus compatible avec leurs intérêts respectifs. Trois 
évènements semblent entériner leur révolution politique. En 1997 et 1998, les 
syndicats américains et leurs alliés font échouer à deux reprises la tentative du 
Président Clinton de renouveler ses pouvoirs de négociation (fast track authority)437, 
sapant ainsi ses projets d’élargissement de l’ALENA (au Chili, voire à l’échelle 
continentale). En outre, au cours de la même période, une coalition d’organisations 
non gouvernementales (ONG), parmi lesquelles figure un grand nombre d’opposants 
à l’ALENA, se mobilise pour protester contre les négociations sur l’Accord 
                                                
437 Voir discussion ci-dessous.  
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multilatéral sur l’investissement (AMI). Cette alliance dénonce le caractère anti-
démocratique des négociations menées à huit clos au sein de l’Organisation pour la 
coopération et le développement économique (OCDE). S’appuyant sur un réseau 
international tissé à l’aide des nouvelles technologies de l’information, elle exerce de 
fortes pressions sur les négociateurs qui, encore à la recherche d’un terrain d’entente, 
finissent par abandonner les négociations de l’AMI. C’est à la suite de ces deux 
succès que la nouvelle coalition pour l’équité des échanges remporte sa victoire la 
plus symbolique. Craignant que les gouvernements occidentaux ne décident de 
transférer leur projet de libéralisation des investissements de l’OCDE à l’Organisation 
mondiale du commerce (OMC), les représentants de la société civile se mobilise pour 
la « bataille de Seattle. » Ainsi, non moins de 40,000 manifestants de plus de 1400 
ONGs en provenance de 89 pays438 manifestent contre le lancement d’un nouveau 
cycle de négociations multilatérales à l’OMC. Une fois encore, ils contribuent à faire 
échouer, du moins indirectement, le cours des négociations. Comme l’écrit Destler, 
« au vu de leur dimension théâtrale et de leur dénouement, [les événements de Seattle] 
furent un bien plus grand triomphe que ne l’avaient été les débats sur l’AMI ou sur la 
procédure de négociation accélérée439 ».   
Ainsi, à l’aube du vingt-et-unième siècle, il semblait alors que le gouvernement et 
le secteur privé ne pourraient plus ignorer les revendications sociales et 
environnementales de la société civile et devraient repenser la politique commerciale 
américaine. En 2005, la ratification de l’Accord de libre-échange centraméricain 
(ALEAC) offrait l’opportunité d’évaluer le bilan politique de plus d’une décennie de 
mobilisation sociale au nom de l’équité des échanges. Quelle influence les syndicats 
et leurs alliés ont-ils exercé sur le processus de décision depuis les débats sur 
                                                
438 Il s’agit des estimations de Public Citizen (2000, 3-4).  
439 “In its outcome and theatrics, [it was] a significantly greater triumph for the antiglobalist coalition 
than the MAI or fast track had been” (Destler, 2005, 273). 
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l’ALENA? Quels obstacles ont empêché l’alliance bleue et verte – en dépit de son 
large soutien populaire – d’accomplir ses objectifs politiques ? Ce travail analyse les 
conflits entre les partisans de l’équité des échanges et les défenseurs de la 
libéralisation commerciale dans le cadre de cinq batailles législatives entre 1991 et 
2005, dans le but d’identifier les facteurs qui ont contrecarré les projets politiques des 
syndicats et leurs alliés dans cette sphère politique.   
 
I) CADRE THÉORIQUE ET MÉTHODOLOGIQUE 
Comprendre la politique commerciale américaine  
La politique commerciale américaine a été l’objet d’un très grand nombre 
d’études que l’on peut classer en trois catégories440. Premièrement, les analyses 
systémiques comme les théories de la stabilité hégémonique441 ou les modèles 
marxistes (théorie de l’impérialisme, de la « dependencia », etc.) examinent les 
interactions et les liens de causalité entre la politique commerciale américaine et la 
distribution des pouvoirs au sein de l’économie mondiale.  
Un second courant de pensée se concentre sur l’État – une entité politique souvent 
présupposée comme unitaire – et évalue sa capacité à promouvoir l’intérêt national : 
depuis l’argument pour la protection des « industries naissantes » d’Alexander 
Hamilton (1791)442 jusqu’aux théories sur la politique commerciale stratégique 
(Krugman, 1986). 
Le troisième modèle qui domine l’analyse de la politique commerciale aux États-
Unis se penche non pas sur les déterminants systémiques ou étatiques, mais sur les 
forces sociétales qui influent sur le processus décisionnel. Affiliées à l’Économie 
                                                
440 Cette topographie s’inspire de Ikenberry, Lake and Mastanduno (1988), Odell (1990) et Milner 
(1999).  
441 Lire Kindleberger (1973), Gilpin (1975), Krasner (1976) et  Keohane (1980). 
442 Pour une riche histoire des idées en matière de commerce international, lire Irwin (1996). 
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politique internationale (International Political Economy –  IPE), la plupart de ces 
études s’inspirent des théories du commerce international, théories que l’on peut 
classer en deux catégories. Le premier modèle, dit Hecksher-Ohlin, Stolper-
Samuelson ou HOS, analyse les échanges internationaux par le prisme de la dotation 
des facteurs de production, facteurs considérés comme mobiles d’un secteur 
économique à l’autre. Ainsi, le commerce favorise les facteurs abondants (le capital 
aux Etats-Unis, les travailleurs en Chine) et sanctionne les facteurs rares (le patronat 
chinois, la main d’œuvre américaine), conduisant à terme à l’égalisation des prix des 
facteurs (Oatley, 2006, 70-74). Le second modèle, dit Ricardo-Viner, considère les 
facteurs de production comme « spécifiques » à une industrie ou fixes et se focalise 
sur les conflits entre secteurs des biens importables, qui réclament des protections 
douanières, et ceux des biens exportables, qui plaident pour l’ouverture des marchés.  
Bien que les théories de Ricardo-Viner, dont s’inspirent un grand nombre 
d’analystes en économie politique, soient souvent plus proches de la réalité empirique 
que le modèle HOS, elles ne permettent pas d’appréhender les dynamiques politiques 
qui sont au cœur de la présente étude. Premièrement, elles ignorent les conflits de 
classe intra-sectoriels – opposant les travailleurs et le patronat d’un même secteur 
économique – engendrés par la mobilité géographique du capital. À titre d’exemple, 
dans l’industrie automobile, les détenteurs du capital soutiennent généralement la 
libéralisation des flux d’investissement et de commerce qui facilitent les 
restructurations d’entreprises, tandis que les travailleurs s’opposent aux 
délocalisations et à la concurrence internationale par peur de perdre leurs emplois. 
Deuxièmement, le modèle Ricardo-Viner, tout comme les théories de Stolper et 
Samuelson, restent des modèles économiques qui ont tendance à dépolitiser le 
processus décisionnel et réduire les décideurs politiques à de simples « arbitres 
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désintéressés » (Ikenberry, Lake and Mastanduno, 1988, 8). En outre, ils ne peuvent 
rendre compte de la participation d’acteurs de la société civile comme les écologistes 
ou les ONGs de défense des droits de l’homme dans les débats sur la libéralisation des 
échanges. Dans la mesure où elles réduisent la politique commerciale à la dichotomie 
protectionnisme/libre-échange (ou une combinaison des deux)443, les théories du 
commerce international semblent donc inadaptées à l’étude de la mobilisation sociale 
pour l’équité des échanges. 
En dehors de l’économie politique internationale, certains politologues se sont 
penchés sur la récente mobilisation des syndicats contre le libre-échange (Shoch 
2001; Ross 2000; Turner 2001; Stillerman 2003; French 2002; McDonald 2005; 
Compa 2001; Moody 1997) et sur la participation des écologistes aux débats sur la 
politique commerciale (Esty 1998; Audley 1997 & 2004; Vogel 1997, 2000). 
Toutefois, leurs travaux n’ont laissé que peu de place à l’émergence et au 
développement d’une coalition pour l’équité des échanges – à l’exception de Dreiling 
(2001) et Mayer (1998) qui se sont focalisés sur les débats sur l’ALENA. À ce jour, le 
travail de Destler et Balint (1999) constitue le seul tour d’horizon des « nouveaux 
enjeux de la politique commerciale américaine. » Malgré son caractère innovant, cette 
analyse très condensée – publiée avant les manifestations de Seattle – ne permet pas 
de rendre compte des défis internes et externes que la coalition pour l’équité des 
échanges a rencontrés. Notre travail de recherche entend approfondir cette étude en 
jetant la lumière sur le rôle central joué par les institutions politiques américaines.  
 
                                                
443 Sur ce point, lire Milner & Yoffie (1989). 
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L’importance du cadre institutionnel 
Pour mieux appréhender les obstacles politiques qu’ont rencontrés les syndicats et 
leurs alliés dans la sphère commerciale, il faut replacer leur mobilisation dans son 
cadre institutionnel. La loi sur les accords commerciaux de réciprocité de 1934 
(Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act) transforma le processus décisionnel de la 
politique commerciale américaine, en transférant le pouvoir de négociation du 
pouvoir législatif vers l’exécutif. La loi commerciale de 1974 (Trade Act of 1974) est 
venue consolider l’autorité du président américain grâce à la création de la procédure 
de négociation accélérée (fast track authority). Selon cette procédure, le pouvoir 
législatif délègue son autorité commerciale à l’exécutif, en lui autorisant à définir les 
termes du projet de loi par le biais des négociations intérieures et extérieures. Le 
Congrès s’engage à voter dans une période de 90 jours sans amender la proposition de 
loi commerciale (Trade Act 1974, § 2191-2194). 
Beaucoup de politologues s’accordent sur la logique politique de ces réformes 
institutionnelles : en protégeant le processus décisionnel contre les pressions que les 
groupes protectionnistes locaux avaient jusqu’alors exercées sur le Congrès, Cordell 
Hull, Secrétaire d’État de Franklin Roosevelt, aurait réorienté la politique 
commerciale américaine vers le libre-échange (Haggard, 1988; Goldstein, 1994; 
Pastor, 1980; Goldstein, 1994). Cette interprétation historico-institutionnelle repose 
sur l’idée chère aux Pères Fondateurs selon laquelle le Président est moins soumis aux 
pressions des groupes d’intérêt et, en tant qu’architecte de la politique étrangère, est 
par nature prédisposé à mener une politique commerciale libérale jugée globalement 
plus bénéfique à ces concitoyens (Hamilton, 1788; Wilson, 1908, 65-9; Tulis, 1995, 
96-100; Sundquist, 1981, 440-59). Le problème de cette théorie est qu’elle semble 
ignorer un siècle et demi d’histoire (1789-1934), une période au cours de laquelle les 
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positions du président étaient parfois plus protectionnistes que celles des deux 
chambres du Congrès (Karol, 2007, 486; Shoch 2001, 24).  
La deuxième lacune de ce postulat réside dans son interprétation erronée de la 
relation entre l’exécutif et les groupes d’intérêts. Si le président est peut-être moins 
exposé aux pressions des organisations locales – que celles-ci œuvrent pour la 
protection tarifaire ou pour un commerce plus équitable – il entretient néanmoins une 
relation constante avec certains groupes d’intérêts depuis le début des négociations 
commerciales jusqu’aux dernières heures qui précèdent le vote au Congrès. Ceci tient 
à un volet souvent négligé des réformes de 1974 : la création du système de comités 
consultatifs (trade advisory committees), dont l’objectif consiste à guider le président 
dans la conduite de la politique commerciale, et notamment dans la négociation et 
l’application d’accords de libre-échange. Ce système est divisé en trois niveaux. Le 
comité consultatif du Président pour la politique et les négociations commerciales 
(Advisory Committee for Trade Policy and Negotiations – ACTPN) est le comité 
supérieur (et donc le plus influent) de cette pyramide institutionnelle. Ses 45 membres 
sont nommés par le président pour deux ans (renouvelable indéfiniment). Le second 
niveau regroupe quatre comités consultatifs – Intergovernmental Policy Advisory 
Committee (IGPAC), Agricultural Policy Advisory Committee (APAC), Labor 
Advisory Committee (LAC) et le plus récent Trade and Environment Policy Advisory 
Committee (TEPAC)
444
. Enfin, le troisième niveau est composé de 22 comités chargés 
de conseiller l’exécutif sur les questions commerciales liées à l’industrie et 
l’agriculture. Les membres de ces comités consultatifs sont nommés par le 
Représentant au Commerce indépendamment ou en accord avec d’autres 
départements comme ceux de l’Agriculture et du Commerce. Lorsque ces comités 
                                                
444 Le TEPAC fut créé en 1994.  
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furent créés, l’économie américaine commençait à peine à ressentir les effets 
politiques et économiques de la mondialisation. À l’époque, les conflits intra-
sectoriels résultant de la libéralisation des mouvements de capitaux et des 
délocalisations étaient un phénomène relativement nouveau – comme l’illustre le 
tournant protectioniste du mouvement syndical au début des années 1970. De même, 
les organisations de la société civile comme les écologistes ou les associations de 
consommateur ne prêtaient pas encore attention à la politique commerciale 
américaine dans la mesure où la libéralisation commerciale – du moins jusqu’au cycle 
de Tokyo (1973-1979)445 – n’avait pas encore réellement empiéter sur les questions 
de réglementation environnementale ou sanitaire. Par conséquent, la domination des 
représentants du patronat au sein de ces divers comités consultatifs n’était pas 
contestée. Toutefois, aujourd’hui, au regard des conflits d’intérêts que suscite la 
politique commerciale américaine, l’accès privilégié des milieux d’affaires à 
l’exécutif est devenu source de mécontentement au sein des groupes de la société 
civile.  
D’autre part, d’un point de vue théorique, cet aspect du processus décisionnel 
semble contredire l’idée selon laquelle le président serait à l’abri de l’influence des 
groupes d’intérêt. En réalité, il entretient un dialogue constant avec les membres des 
comités consultatifs, membres issus principalement du patronat. Afin de mieux 
comprendre les tenants et les aboutissants de cette relation, ce travail s’inspire des 
théories néo-institutionnalistes et de la littérature sur les relations entre la présidence 
américaine et les groupes d’intérêt. L’objectif est de mettre en relief les contraintes 
institutionnelles qui ont fait obstacle aux efforts politiques de la coalition pour 
l’équité des échanges.  
                                                
445 Lors des négociations multilatérales du cycle de Tokyo au GATT, les partenaires commerciaux 
s’attaquèrent pour la première fois aux « barrières non-tarifaires » comme les quotas ou les normes 
techniques (sanitaires, phytosanitaires).  
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Les théoriciens du néo-institutionnalisme (new institutionalism) ont mis au jour 
les relations entre contraintes structurelles et pouvoir politique, en démontrant que 
certaines institutions peuvent donner un accès privilégié à certaines « clientèles 
politiques » (policy clienteles) tout en excluant ou marginalisant d’autres parties 
prenantes. À travers un processus de « dépendance trajectorielle » (path dependence), 
les inégalités de pouvoir sont ancrées et perpétuées au sein même des institutions et 
du discours politique (Pierson & Skocpol, 2002; March & Olsen, 1998; Pierson, 
2000). Mon travail de recherche s’inspire de ce courant de pensée pour analyser 
l’incidence des facteurs institutionnels sur la participation des groupes d’intérêts à la 
formation de la politique commerciale. 
Pour mieux décrypter la relation entre le pouvoir exécutif et les parties prenantes à 
la politique commerciale, mon analyse s’appuie sur la littérature sur la présidence 
américaine. Un certain nombre de politologues se sont penchés sur la relation 
d’interdépendance qu’il existe entre le président et les groupes de pression, l’un ayant 
besoin de soutien électoral et financier pour accomplir ses objectifs politiques 
(élections, réformes), les autres cherchant l’appui de l’exécutif pour défendre leurs 
intérêts (Tichenor 2003; Martin, 1989; Polsky, 2000; Kumar and Grossman, 1984). 
Ce travail de recherche s’inscrit dans cette tradition et vise à analyser les mécanismes 
de la « contre-mobilisation, » un processus défini ici comme les efforts de lobbying 
entrepris conjointement par la Maison Blanche et le secteur privé en réaction à la 
mobilisation de la coalition pour l’équité des échanges.   
 
Méthodologie 
L’objectif de cette étude est double : premièrement analyser l’influence exercée 
par la coalition pour l’équité des échanges dans les récents débats sur la politique 
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commerciale ; et, deuxièmement, déterminer les facteurs qui ont contrecarré les 
efforts politiques de cette alliance. Ce travail de recherche se compose de cinq études 
de cas. Celles-ci correspondent aux batailles législatives liées aux principaux projets 
de libre-échange entre 1991 et 2005 : les débats sur l’ALENA (1991-1993), le 
renouvellement de la procédure de négociation accélérée (1997), la normalisation des 
relations commerciales sino-américaines (PNTR, 2000), l’octroi de la procédure 
accélérée rebaptisée Mandat pour la promotion des échanges (trade promotion 
authority, 2001-2002), et enfin la ratification de l’ALEAC (2005). Cette étude se 
concentre sur les débats à la Chambre des Représentants, où les votes sur les projets 
de lois commerciales sont habituellement beaucoup plus contestés qu’au Sénat, en 
raison des fortes pressions exercées par les groupes d’intérêts au niveau local446. 
Le processus décisionnel de la politique commerciale comprend deux phases : la 
phase des négociations et celle des débats au Congrès. La première étape est 
particulièrement importante pour l’élaboration des accords de libre-échange, dominée 
par l’exécutif et le système des comités consultatifs sur le commerce (trade advisory 
committees). Il s’agit d’une structure pyramidale de comités chargés de conseiller les 
négociateurs américains quant aux priorités politiques et économiques des groupes 
d’intérêt américains. L’élaboration des lois commerciales sur la procédure accélérée 
est légèrement différente dans la mesure où elle ne nécessite pas l’intervention de ces 
comités consultatifs. Les négociations ont donc principalement lieu au Congrès et 
peuvent donc être réduits à une seule phase dite « législative. » La seconde phase est 
celle qui précède le vote à la Chambre des Représentants. Elle met en scène les 
différents groupes d’intérêt qui se mobilisent pour faire prévaloir leurs priorités 
politiques.  
                                                
446 La validité de cette idée, très commune parmi les analystes politiques, pourrait être également mise 
à l’épreuve. Il s’agit ici d’un choix méthodologique visant à réduire la complexité de cette analyse. 
Pour une discussion critique appliquée à la politique commerciale, lire Karol (2007). 
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Pour évaluer l’influence des syndicats et leurs alliés sur les négociations des 
accords commerciaux, notre analyse se penche en un premier temps la composition 
des comités consultatifs, selon les listes et rapports fournis par le Bureau du 
Représentant au Commerce. Dans un deuxième temps, elle compare les termes des 
accords commerciaux (l’ALENA, l’accord sino-américain, et l’ALEAC), et 
notamment leurs clauses sociales et environnementales, avec les priorités respectives 
des parties prenantes à la politique commerciale. L’analyse des textes de lois 
commerciales s’inspire notamment des travaux d’experts juridiques comme Compa 
(2001), Elliott (2004) et Alston (2006) dans le domaine des normes sociales de travail, 
et Esty (1998), Audley (2002) et Gallagher (2005) pour les questions liées au 
commerce et à la protection de l’environnement. L’étude des perspectives des 
différents groupes d’intérêt est fondée sur l’exploitation de sources primaires comme 
les rapports, conférences de presse, témoignages au Congrès etc. Enfin, une vingtaine 
d’entretiens originaux avec des acteurs de la politique commerciale (représentants de 
l’Etat et des divers groupes d’intérêt) vient éclairer trois aspects de la phase des 
négociations : 1) les relations entre le législatif et l’exécutif ; 2) l’importance de 
l’accès et de l’exclusion des négociations commerciales ; 3) le rôle des facteurs 
externes dans la formation de la politique commerciale (enjeux électoraux, pressions 
internationales etc.). 
Pour évaluer l’influence de la coalition pour l’équité des échanges durant la 
seconde phase du processus décisionnel, cette étude examine la mobilisation et la 
contre-mobilisation des groupes d’intérêt et leur influence sur la Chambre des 
Représentants, ainsi que le rôle joué par l’exécutif dans les débats au Congrès. À cette 
fin, ce travail de recherche utilise là encore une combinaison de sources primaires et 
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secondaires. Premièrement, il s’inspire des analyses de régression447 des votes publiés 
par des économistes et des politologues (exemple : Baldwin & Magee, 2000; Steagall 
and Jennings, 1996; Conley, 1999). Bien que ces analyses permettent de comprendre 
les facteurs idéologiques, partisans et électoraux qui influencent les décisions au 
Congrès, leurs résultats doivent être replacés dans leur contexte politique pour être 
plus pertinents. Ainsi, à l’image de l’analyse de Shoch (2001), ce travail de recherche 
examine en détail les modalités des campagnes politiques lancées par les groupes 
d’intérêts pour et contre le libre-échange. Pour ce faire, il s’appuie sur l’étude d’une 
multitude de sources primaires : entretiens originaux avec une vingtaine d’acteurs 
politiques à Washington et New York448, discours, auditions au Congrès, textes de loi, 
archives (U.S. Trade Representative, AFL-CIO, Public Citizen, etc.), conférences de 
presse et divers rapports publiés par les principales organisations impliquées dans les 
débats. Un certain nombre de sources secondaires (ouvrages, revues spécialisées, 
journaux) vient compléter cette analyse. 
 
II) LE RÔLE DES GROUPES D’INTÉRÊTS DANS 
L’ÉLABORATION DE LA POLITIQUE 
COMMERCIALE AMÉRICAINE 
 
Pour bien comprendre les dynamiques de mobilisation et contre-mobilisation qui 
caractérisent la politique commerciale américaine contemporaine, il est important de 
bien définir chacune des parties prenantes engagées dans ces débats et de les resituer 
dans un contexte politique plus large. Il s’agit ici de mieux apprécier la position 
économique et politique que les milieux d’affaires, les syndicats ou les écologistes 
                                                
447 Ces analyses sont des outils quantitatifs classiques de la science politique. Elles consistent, par le 
biais de formules mathématiques, à quantifier un certain nombre de déterminants économiques et 
politiques pour en évaluer l’influence sur le vote des législateurs.  
448 La liste de ces entretiens figure dans la bibliographie. 
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occupent dans la constellation des groupes d’intérêts américains et leur relation non 
seulement avec les institutions politiques, mais plus précisément avec la politique 
commerciale. 
 
Le mouvement syndical américain 
L’histoire du mouvement syndical américain est jalonnée de conflits internes et 
externes qui ont souvent affaibli les syndicats dans l’échiquier politique. Ce ne fut 
qu’au terme de longues décennies de lutte que les travailleurs obtinrent le droit de 
représentation en 1935. Leur reconnaissance officielle marqua le début d’une alliance 
partisane fragile entre paysans du Sud et ouvriers du Nord au profit du Parti 
Démocrate de Franklin Delano Roosevelt. La « coalition du New Deal » fut très vite 
tiraillée par ses divergences régionales, divergences exacerbées par la Southern 
strategy du Président Nixon qui consistait à exploiter les préjugés raciaux pour 
reconquérir la classe ouvrière. L’effondrement de la coalition démocrate ouvrit la voie 
à l’alliance entre les Républicains et le patronat. Cette dernière allait dominer la 
sphère politique américaine à partir des années 1970 et s’efforcer d’affaiblir le 
mouvement syndical à travers un programme de déréglementation. Les Démocrates 
manquèrent à la fois de pouvoir et de volonté politique pour enrayer ces réformes449. 
Avec l’élection de Bill Clinton en 1992 et la victoire des Républicains au Congrès en 
1994, les Démocrates virèrent vers le centre, reléguant ainsi « la vieille gauche » 
syndicaliste au second rang (Piven, 1992; Ness, 2002; Yates, 1998). 
Le repli politique du mouvement des travailleurs va de pair avec le lent déclin des 
syndicats. Le taux de syndicalisation aux États-Unis a chuté de 35% en 1955 à 12% 
                                                
449 Il faut préciser que les premières mesures de déréglementation eurent lieu sous la présidence du 
Démocrate Jimmy Carter et ce, alors même que les Démocrates jouissaient encore d’une majorité au 
Congrès.  
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en 2008, dont 7,5% dans le secteur privé contre 35,9% dans le public (Bureau of 
Labor Statistics, 2008). Les causes de ce repli sont à la fois exogènes et endogènes. 
D’une part, la déindustrialisation a infligé de lourdes pertes aux syndicats des secteurs 
manufacturiers, dont les effectifs ont porté le mouvement des travailleurs depuis son 
émergence. D’autre part, l’inaction des dirigeants de l’AFL-CIO, et notamment leur 
incapacité à recruter de nouveaux travailleurs parmi les catégories croissantes de la 
population active (femmes, Afro-américains) est venu aggraver le déclin du 
mouvement syndical. Si John Sweeney avait promis de mettre un terme à cet 
attentisme lors de son intronisation à la tête de l’AFL-CIO en 1995, ses résultats 
politiques demeurent pour le moins ambigus. En dépit de leurs discours militants, les 
nouveaux dirigeants ne sont pas parvenus à redonner un second souffle à la fédération 
syndicale. Ceci a généré de nouvelles divisions au sein du mouvement syndical, 
comme en témoigne la récente scission entre l’AFL-CIO et la nouvelle alliance 
Change to Win, déterminée à se concentrer sur le recrutement de nouveaux 
travailleurs, notamment dans le secteur des services (Asher et al, 2001; Aronowitz, 
2005; Turner and Hurd, 2001). 
Cette analyse succincte du mouvement des travailleurs américains permet de 
replacer la récente mobilisation des syndicats dans le contexte difficile qu’ils ont 
traversé depuis quelques décennies. Jusqu’à ce que l’économie américaine n’entame 
sa phase de déindustrialisation, la participation des syndicats à l’élaboration de la 
politique commerciale se résumait à un soutien actif ou passif aux représentants 
patronaux de leur industrie, ces derniers jouant de leur influence pour encourager 
l’ouverture de nouveaux marchés ou obtenir des protections douanières. Depuis les 
années 1970, l’intensification de la concurrence internationale a engendré une rupture 
de ce consensus. Certes, certaines industries demeurent unies dans leurs 
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revendications protectionnistes. Toutefois, la libéralisation des flux d’investissements 
à l’échelle mondiale a généré de nouveaux conflits d’intérêts entre détenteurs du 
capital et travailleurs. En effet, les pressions de la concurrence étrangère ont amené 
beaucoup d’entreprises manufacturières américaines à réduire leurs coûts de main-
d’œuvre et délocaliser tout ou partie de leurs activités dans les pays en voie 
développement. Autrefois partisans du libre-échange, les syndicats ont protesté de 
plus en plus vigoureusement contre la libéralisation des flux d’investissements et de 
commerce, exigeant l’établissement de normes sociales de travail internationales et la 
protection douanière des secteurs manufacturiers en déclin. Si les syndicats ouvriers 
occupent les premières lignes de cette opposition à la libéralisation commerciale, ils 
sont épaulés par le reste du mouvement des travailleurs, y compris les syndicats des 
domaines publics (SEIU, AFT) et des agriculteurs (NFU). Depuis les années 1980, la 
cause des travailleurs a bénéficié également du soutien de nouveaux acteurs de la 
politique commerciale américaine, parmi lesquels les ONG oeuvrant pour le respect 
des droits de l’homme, le développement durable et la protection des consommateurs.  
 
Le rôle croissant des ONG 
Dans les années 1980, une coalition hétéroclite d’ONG pour la défense des droits 
de l’homme et des travailleurs se rallia à la cause des syndicats pour promouvoir une 
politique commerciale à dimension plus sociale. Au terme d’une bataille politique, ces 
groupes de la société civile parvinrent à faire inscrire le respect des normes sociales 
de travail comme l’un des critères du General System of Preferences, un système de 
préférences tarifaires accordées au pays en voie de développement. Une décennie plus 
tard, ce réseau d’organisations évolua au gré des débats sur le libre-échange, d’abord 
dans le cadre de l’ALENA, puis celui de la normalisation des relations commerciales 
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sino-américaines, et enfin de l’ALEAC. Si la mobilisation de ces groupes a parfois 
manqué de vigueur (notamment en raison de leurs moyens limités), leur participation 
aux débats aux côtés des syndicats a permis à ses derniers d’occulter leur image 
protectionniste en mettant l’accent sur les conditions de vie des travailleurs étrangers.  
Il en est de même de l’engagement des écologistes et des associations de 
consommateurs dans les débats sur la mondialisation. En réaction aux tensions de plus 
en plus vives entre réglementation nationale et accords internationaux, un nombre 
croissant d’organisations s’intéresse à la politique commerciale. Le catalyseur de cette 
prise de conscience est l’affaire « thons-dauphins ». En 1991, le GATT déclara une 
loi américaine pour la protection des mammifères contraire aux engagements 
commerciaux de Washington450. Cette décision suscita un véritable tollé au sein des 
associations de consommateurs et des organisations écologistes. « Flipper le 
dauphin » devint vite le symbole de la cause environnementale sacrifiée au nom des 
intérêts commerciaux représentés par le monstre « GATTzilla. » C’est dans ce climat 
tendu que commencèrent les négociations sur l’ALENA, dans le cadre desquelles 
émergea la coalition bleue et verte.  
Si le mouvement écologiste au sens large dispose d’importantes ressources 
financières et humaines (grâce à son large réseau de membres), son action politique a 
connu autant d’échecs que de victoires. Après une ascension fulgurante sur la scène 
politique dans les années 1970, les organisations environnementales ont aussi subi les 
conséquences de la révolution conservatrice. Le mouvement écologiste a en outre 
souffert de la complaisance du peuple américain qui est en théorie enclin à soutenir la 
                                                
450 Washington interdisait l’importation de thons mexicains sous prétexte que ceux-ci étaient pêchés à 
la senne coulissante, technique de pêche souvent fatale aux dauphins. Pour plus de détails sur cette 
affaire et ces implications, lire Esty, (1994, pp. 30-1), Vogel (2000) and Tabb (2004, pp. 342-4). 
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cause environnementale, mais, dans la pratique, ne prête que peu d’attention à 
l’application des lois451. 
En outre, il faut préciser que tous les groupes écologistes ne sont pas impliqués 
dans les débats sur le libre-échange, et ce, pour des raisons aussi idéologiques que 
financières. Certains groupes comme le Sierra Club ou Friends of the Earth sont 
activement engagés dans les campagnes contre les projets de lois commerciales. 
D’autres se contentent de donner leur soutien officiel à la cause de l’équité des 
échanges, sans toutefois mobiliser leurs adhérents. En outre, toutes les organisations 
écologiques n’ont pas les mêmes revendications, et ne s’opposent pas 
systématiquement à la libéralisation économique, comme les débats sur l’ALENA en 
témoignent.  
La participation des associations de consommateur est encore plus sporadique et 
ne mériterait guère notre attention si Public Citizen ne jouait pas un rôle si primordial 
au sein de la coalition pour le commerce équitable. Grâce à son large réseau 
d’adhérents, l’organisation de Ralph Nader est au centre de la coalition entre 
syndicats et groupes écologistes, jouant de son statut de défenseur de l’intérêt public 
pour promouvoir à la fois le respect des droits des travailleurs et la protection de 
l’environnement. Ainsi, Public Citizen diffuse des informations cruciales au sein de 
son réseau et, par l’intermédiaire de la Citizens Trade Campaign,  s’efforce de 
coordonner les efforts de lobbying des différentes composantes de la coalition.  
Il ne s’agit pas ici de mythifier l’alliance pour l’équité des échanges, qui demeure 
une alliance instable d’organisations aux intérêts foncièrement distincts. 
Historiquement, les syndicats et les écologistes ont plus souvent été ennemis qu’alliés 
politiques, qu’il s’agisse de questions liées à l’industrie nucléaire ou forestière ou, 
                                                
451 Pour plus de détails, lire Rosenbaum (2002), Hays (2000) et Dunlap & Mertig (1992). 
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plus récemment, à l’exploitation des ressources énergétiques en Alaska452. Tout en 
admettant qu’il existe des tensions au sein de cette coalition, on ne peut ignorer le 
caractère novateur de la participation conjointe de divers groupes de la société civile 
dans le domaine de la politique commerciale, jadis le fief des milieux d’affaires.  
 
Les milieux d’affaires 
Après avoir dominé la sphère politique de la seconde moitié du XIXe siècle aux 
années 1920, et lutté contre la réglementation de l’économie par l’État fédéral, les 
milieux d’affaires américains durent donner du lest dans le tumulte de la crise des 
années 1930. Au lendemain de la Seconde Guerre mondiale, le patronat fut contraint 
de faire davantage de concessions sociales en vertu de la vigueur du mouvement 
syndical et de l’intervention légitimée du gouvernement dans l’économie. Toutefois, 
ces concessions eurent lieu davantage à l’échelle corporative qu’au niveau fédéral. 
L’échec de la réforme sur la protection sociale universelle en 1947 et le passage de la 
loi Taft-Hartley453 la même année reflètent les limites politiques de l’action syndicale.  
Au milieu des années 1960, sous la pression des écologistes et des associations 
pour la défense des consommateurs, le gouvernement accrut son pouvoir de 
réglementation à travers une longue série de réformes (non moins de 25 entre 1965 et 
1975), réformes que le patronat perçut comme une attaque directe à l’encontre de ses 
intérêts économiques.  
Cette vague de réglementation fut un véritable catalyseur de l’action politique des 
milieux d’affaires. Dans un effort délibéré de regroupement politique, les acteurs 
privés décidèrent de redynamiser certaines organisations comme la U.S. Chamber of 
                                                
452 À ce sujet, lire Obach (2004), Siegmann (1985) et Kazis and Grossman (1982). 
453 La loi Taft-Hartley limite le pouvoir syndical, notamment en abolissant l’interdiction de se 
syndicaliser propre à certaines entreprises ou en interdisant les grèves de solidarité (Gervais, 2001, 92; 
Asher et al, 2001, 11).  
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Commerce ou la National Federation of Interdependent Business et de fonder la 
Business Roundtable, le nouveau défenseur des intérêts des grandes entreprises 
américaines. Parallèlement, le patronat intensifia ses activités de lobbying en 
accroissant sa présence à Washington. Enfin, ils lancèrent une offensive idéologique à 
travers le financement de think tanks libéraux (American Enterprise Institute, créé en 
1973) et de centres de recherche (Hoover Institution, American Institute for Public 
Policy Research) dans le but de contrebalancer l’influence d’institutions comme la 
Ford Foundation ou la Brookings Institution, jugées trop critiques vis-à-vis des 
mécanismes du marché.  
Le nouveau « militantisme » du monde des affaires porta rapidement ses fruits. 
Non seulement le patronat parvint à inverser le cours de la vague de réglementation 
qui avait menacé ses intérêts économiques, mais il fut aussi un des architectes de la 
résurgence politique du Parti Républicain. Depuis la présidence de Ronald Reagan, 
les milieux des affaires et le Grand Old Party ont entretenu une relation mutuellement 
bénéfique, au grand dam des écologistes et des syndicats. Les Démocrates ont eux 
aussi cherché à obtenir les faveurs du patronat sous l’impulsion de l’aile centriste du 
parti (Democratic Leadership Council) dont le Président Clinton fut l’un des 
représentants les plus influents. En somme, à l’aube du vingt-et-unième siècle, le 
monde des affaires jouit d’une influence politique qui transcende les clivages 
politiques.  
Si le pouvoir politique des milieux des affaires a fluctué au gré des contingences 
de l’histoire – comme l’a si bien démontré David Vogel dans Fluctuating Fortunes 
(Vogel, 1989) – les intérêts privés ont généralement réussi à maintenir certaines 
prérogatives dans le domaine de la politique commerciale. Jusqu’en 1934, la gestion 
des échanges extérieurs fut le fruit d’un compromis entre une majorité de groupes 
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protectionnistes, principalement dans le secteur secondaire, et une minorité d’intérêts 
orientés à l’exportation, notamment dans le secteur primaire. La révolution libérale de 
Cordell Hull – lancée grâce à la ratification du Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act 
(1934) – coïncida avec l’essor des exportations manufacturières américaines. Au 
lendemain de la Deuxième Guerre mondiale, Washington devint un véritable moteur 
de la libéralisation commerciale au service, certes, de ses intérêts stratégiques de 
guerre froide, mais également au bénéfice de son économie et de ses grandes 
entreprises qui dominaient alors l’économie mondiale.  
Au début des années 1970, l’émergence du Japon et de l’Europe de l’Ouest (en 
particulier l’Allemagne) comme puissances commerciales remit en question le 
consensus politique en faveur du libre-échange. Toutefois, l’émergence du « nouveau 
protectionnisme » (Nivola, 1986; Goldstein, 1986) s’accompagna d’une montée des 
« forces anti-protection » (Destler and Odell, 1987 ; Milner, 1988) – parmi lesquels 
les importateurs de matières premières et de semi-conducteurs, les exportateurs et les 
distributeurs de biens de consommation. Dans une économie de plus en plus 
internationalisée, les partisans de l’ouverture des marchés se mobilisèrent pour 
défendre leurs intérêts – comme en témoignerait la formation d’alliances ad hoc pour 
la promotion des projets de libre-échange dans les années 1990. 
Ainsi, plutôt que de se retrancher dans des politiques protectionnistes, Washington 
a continué à prôner la libéralisation commerciale – en protégeant malgré tout certains 
pans de l’économie américaine. À partir du milieu des années 1980, les Etats-Unis 
négocièrent des accords de libre-échange, initiatives politiques qui deviendraient la 
formule de prédilection de la Maison Blanche au cours de la décennie suivante. Ces 
accords vont bien au-delà de la réduction des tarifs douaniers et incluent de fortes 
protections pour les investissements, les droits de propriété intellectuelle, l’accès aux 
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marchés publics étrangers, mais aussi des mesures visant à protéger certaines 
industries (automobile, textile, etc.) comme les règles d’origine454. Certes, toutes les 
entreprises américaines ne bénéficient pas au même titre des accords de libre-
échange. Beaucoup ne sont en réalité pas concernés par la politique commerciale et se 
focalisent sur le marché intérieur455. D’autres petites et moyennes entreprises ne sont 
en mesure de délocaliser leurs activités de production à l’étranger et subissent donc de 
plein fouet les « chocs d’ajustement » de la libéralisation économique. L’opposition 
constante du U.S. Business and Industry Council – représentant de petites entreprises 
manufacturières – aux récents projets de libre-échange révèle que le patronat, comme 
le mouvement syndical ou les écologistes n’est pas non plus à l’abri des divisions 
internes. Toutefois, d’une manière plus générale, les accords de « libre » échange 
permettent de rallier une majorité des grandes (et donc influentes) entreprises et des 
principales associations patronales. 
Ceci ne ferait pas l’ombre d’une controverse si les intérêts des travailleurs étaient 
alignés sur ceux des détenteurs du capital. Toutefois, comme la section précédente l’a 
expliqué, la libéralisation des mouvements de capitaux et l’accélération des 
délocalisations ont créé des conflits de classe au sein de mêmes secteurs 
économiques. En outre, les tensions croissantes entre libéralisation commerciale et 
réglementation nationale ont poussé de nombreuses ONG (écologistes, associations 
de consommateurs) à réagir. La combinaison de ces changements politiques et des 
mutations de l’économie américaine (déindustrialisation et internationalisation) sont à 
                                                
454 Les règles d’origine restreignent les tarifs préférentiels aux marchandises principalement produites 
dans les pays inclus dans l’accord de libre-échange. Par exemple, dans le cadre de l’ALENA, les 
voitures doivent être composées à 62,5% de composants nord-américains pour pouvoir bénéficier des 
dégrèvements tarifaires en vigueur. Ces clauses permettent de protéger les entreprises contre la 
concurrence étrangère, notamment en provenance de l’Asie, qui pourrait profiter des bénéfices de 
l’accord pour infiltrer le marché américain. 
455 Selon une récente étude de UPS (2007) c’est le cas de deux tiers des entreprises américaines.  
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l’origine des conflits qui ont secoué le monde de la politique commerciale depuis les 
débats sur la mise en place de l’ALENA.  
 
III) L’ACCORD DE LIBRE ÉCHANGE NORD 
AMÉRICAIN 
 
Les débats sur l’Accord de libre-échange nord-américain révélèrent au grand jour 
les conflits d’intérêts inhérents à la conduite de la politique commerciale à l’ère de la 
mondialisation. En raison de ses implications sociales et environnementales, 
l’ALENA cristallisa les forces d’opposition au libre-échange.  
Le projet de libre-échange nord-américain s’inscrivait pourtant dans un long 
processus d’intégration économique régionale dans lequel les Etats-Unis s’étaient 
engagés à la fois avec le Mexique (programme Bracero en 1943-1964, création des 
maquiladoras en 1965 etc.) et avec le Canada (par la conclusion de l’Accord de libre-
échange entre le Canada et les Etats-Unis en 1988). Pour les entreprises américaines, 
l’objectif affiché était double : accéder librement au marché mexicain, et permettre la 
restructuration d’entreprises à l’échelle continentale pour réduire les coûts de main-
d’œuvre. L’ALENA bénéficia du soutien de la grande majorité des milieux 
d’affaires456. 
Bien que la classe des affaires fût unie par les bénéfices économiques de 
l’ALENA, ce projet suscita une vague de mécontentement sans précédent au sein de 
la société civile. Tout d’abord, les syndicats dénoncèrent les dangers d’un phénomène 
de dumping social (race to the bottom), par lequel les entreprises américaines 
délocaliseraient leurs unités de production au Mexique pour exploiter les conditions 
de travail précaires de la main-d’œuvre locale. Ils étaient épaulés par le mouvement 
                                                
456 Un sondage réalisé après la signature de l’accord (le 17 décembre 1992) révéla que 72% des patrons 
d’entreprises au chiffre d’affaires supérieur à 1 million de dollars soutenaient l’ALENA (JEI, 1992, 4).  
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populiste du candidat indépendant à l’élection présidentielle de 1992 Ross Perot, qui 
joua un rôle important dans la sensibilisation de l’opinion publique aux enjeux de 
l’ALENA457. L’AFL-CIO et ses alliés exigèrent l’inclusion de clauses garantissant le 
respect de normes sociales de travail (reconnaissance du droit de négociation 
collective, liberté d’association, élimination de la discrimination en matière d’emploi 
etc.). Leurs revendications sur l’amélioration des conditions des travailleurs 
mexicains et sur la protection de l’environnement marquaient un changement 
discursif dans l’opposition des syndicats au libre-échange, même si des tensions 
conservatrices restaient perceptibles parmi les sympathisants de Ross Perot et de 
Patrick Buchanan.   
L’autre élément clé de la mobilisation contre l’ALENA fut l’irruption des groupes 
écologistes et des associations de consommateurs dans les débats sur la politique 
commerciale américaine. Ces derniers s’inquiétaient, comme les syndicats, de voir le 
Mexique devenir un « havre de pollution » (pollution haven) pour les entreprises et 
exigèrent donc des mesures strictes en faveur de l’environnement. Effrayées par le 
précédent de l’affaire « thon-dauphin », ces ONG voyaient aussi en l’ALENA une 
véritable menace pour la réglementation nationale.  
Si beaucoup d’associations écologistes s’étaient montrées méfiantes lors des 
négociations de l’accord de libre-échange, toutes ne s’opposèrent pas à sa ratification 
au Congrès. Ceci s’explique par les modestes concessions environnementales que le 
Président George H. W. Bush et son successeur Bill Clinton accordèrent aux groupes 
écologistes. En invitant certaines associations à la table des négociations, les 
présidents républicain et démocrate réussirent à diviser la coalition pour l’équité des 
échanges, renforçant leurs chances de voir l’ALENA ratifié par le Congrès.  
                                                
457 Les mouvements populistes comme ceux de Ross Perot ou de l’ultra-conservateur Patrick Buchanan 
ne sont pas inclus dans cette analyse dans la mesure où leurs efforts politiques après la ratification de 
l’ALENA ont été moins réguliers que ceux de la coalition pour le commerce équitable.  
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Pourtant, les concessions accordées aux syndicats et aux écologistes par les 
occupants de la Maison Blanche étaient avant tout symboliques. En réalité, comme 
l’explique Mark Anderson, qui représentait l’AFL-CIO lors des négociations sur 
l’accord nord-américain pour la coopération dans le domaine de l’emploi,458 
l’administration Clinton se plia aux exigences des milieux d’affaires, aussi bien pour 
les clauses sociales et environnementales que pour la protection de l’investissement, 
les droits de propriété intellectuelle ou l’ouverture des marchés (Anderson, 2007*). 
Pour faire prévaloir leurs intérêts – sous l’administration de George H. W. Bush 
comme celle de Bill Clinton – les milieux d’affaires exploitèrent leur accès privilégié 
aux négociations par le biais des comités consultatifs de l’exécutif.  
L’analyse de la composition de ces comités durant les négociations de l’ALENA 
révèle qu’en dépit des sérieux conflits entre intérêts privés et publics liés à 
l’application de l’accord, les milieux d’affaires dominaient largement le processus 
décisionnel. Par exemple, parmi les 79 membres des deux comités consultatifs les 
plus influents dans l’élaboration de la politique commerciale, 77 étaient issus du 
milieu des affaires, contre seulement deux représentants pour le milieu syndical – les 
intérêts écologistes et ceux des consommateurs n’étant pas représentés. Ainsi, la 
structure institutionnelle sur laquelle reposait la conduite de la politique commerciale 
était-elle fortement déséquilibrée en faveur du patronat. Le secteur privé et l’exécutif 
entretenaient ainsi une « relation spéciale » qui opérait au détriment des groupes de la 
société civile. 
En dehors de sa dimension institutionnelle, cette « relation spéciale » était aussi le 
fruit de choix politiques. En effet, le président dispose d’une certaine marge de 
manœuvre pour diriger et n’est pas toujours contraint de préserver le statu quo. 
                                                
458 Cet accord latéral fut greffé à l’ALENA, tout comme l’Accord nord-américain pour la coopération 
dans le domaine de l’environnement et ce, en réponse aux revendications des syndicats et des 
écologistes. 
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Toutefois, pour des raisons politiques, ni George H. W. Bush, ni Bill Clinton ne jugea 
nécessaire de remettre en question les prérogatives des milieux d’affaires dans le 
domaine de la politique commerciale.  
Pourtant, la coalition pour l’équité des échanges, avec l’appui de Ross Perot, n’eut 
de cesse de protester contre les injustices de l’ALENA, au point de mettre en péril la 
ratification de l’accord. L’alliance entre syndicats et écologistes lança une campagne 
vigoureuse contre l’accord en s’appuyant sur un large réseau de militants et sur la 
puissance financière et l’influence politique – toutefois en déclin – de l’AFL-CIO. 
Cette campagne sans précédent contre un accord de libre-échange suscita un intérêt 
considérable parmi les médias et l’opinion publique, qui commença à douter des 
vertus économiques de l’ALENA.  
Cette campagne connut trois succès majeurs : la sensibilisation de l’opinion 
publique aux enjeux sociaux et environnementaux de la politique commerciale 
américaine ; la participation des groupes écologistes au sein des négociations sur la 
politique commerciale ; et l’élévation des normes sociales de travail au premier rang 
des débats sur le libre-échange. En outre, la coalition pour l’équité des échanges 
parvint à rallier une grande partie des Démocrates à sa cause, malgré les pressions 
antagonistes de leur chef de file Bill Clinton. Les syndicats et leurs alliés réussirent à 
semer le doute parmi les partisans de l’ALENA, si bien qu’en avril 1993, un des 
conseillers de Bill Clinton déclarait que l’ALENA était « mort dans l’œuf » (cité dans 
Destler, 2005, 201). Ce ne fut qu’au terme d’inlassables efforts que le président 
réussit à arracher une surprenante victoire législative.  
Les analyses de régression du vote sur l’ALENA à la Chambre des Représentants 
montrent que la mobilisation des syndicats exerça une influence non négligeable sur 
les décisions des représentants. D’une part, les contributions électorales des syndicats 
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incitèrent les représentants (en particulier parmi les Démocrates) à voter contre le 
projet de loi. D’autre part, le taux de syndicalisation des travailleurs au sein des 
districts électoraux fut également un déterminant d’opposition à l’ALENA.  
Ce dernier doit sa ratification au Congrès à la vigoureuse campagne politique 
lancée par la Maison Blanche et les milieux des affaires. Ce phénomène peut être 
traduit par le concept de « contre-mobilisation », une réaction aux efforts de lobbying 
lancée par la coalition pour l’équité des échanges, et dont l’objectif était de préserver 
le soutien des membres du Congrès en faveur de l’ALENA. Comme cette analyse l’a 
précédemment évoqué, les milieux d’affaires étaient particulièrement unis dans leur 
soutien à l’ALENA. En réponse à la mobilisation des groupes de la société civile, le 
patronat organisa une campagne de communication pour vanter les vertus 
économiques de l’ALENA en formant la coalition USA*NAFTA. Les milieux des 
affaires mobilisèrent d’importantes ressources financières – au total, entre 10 et 17 
millions de dollars, contre 6 millions pour la campagne anti-ALENA459 – dans le but 
de contrebalancer les efforts de lobbying de leurs rivaux. Comme les syndicats, les 
intérêts privés usèrent de leur pouvoir financier pour influencer le vote sur l’ALENA. 
Ainsi, les représentants bénéficiant de contributions électorales plus élevées se 
révélèrent plus enclins à voter en faveur de l’accord de libre-échange.  
Si la formation d’une « coalition de coalitions » entre intérêts privés constituait 
l’une des caractéristiques des « nouveaux enjeux de la politique commerciale 
américaine » (Dester & Balint, 1999), son étroite collaboration avec la Maison 
Blanche fut essentiel à la victoire législative des forces libre-échangistes. Non 
seulement l’échange d’informations permit à la coalition pro-ALENA de mieux cibler 
les besoins des législateurs indécis (swing voters), mais les contributions financières 
                                                
459 Ken Cole, un des dirigeants de la coalition USA*NAFTA estime son budget à 10 millions de dollars 
(McArthur, 2000, 222). Pour Dryden (1995), la campagne pro-ALENA coûta 17 millions de dollars, et 
celle des opposants à l’accord 6 millions.  
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des associations patronales rendirent aussi les représentants plus vulnérables aux 
efforts de persuasion du président. En d’autres termes, les opérations conjointes des 
milieux d’affaires et de la Maison Blanche se révélèrent complémentaires à plus d’un 
titre. 
Durant la phase législative des débats comme au cours des négociations, le soutien 
de l’exécutif à la cause de la communauté des affaires fut déterminant. En effet, le 
président Clinton mit ses pouvoirs institutionnels au service du « libre » échange – ou, 
plus exactement, d’une politique commerciale à la fois libérale et protectionniste 
orientée vers les intérêts privés. Dans un premier temps, le chef de l’exécutif eut 
recours à la stratégie du « divide and conquer » (diviser et conquérir) de son 
prédécesseur. Grâce à la négociation des accords latéraux sur l’emploi et sur 
l’environnement, l’administration réussit à préserver le soutien d’une partie de la 
communauté écologiste et à gagner les faveurs d’un grand nombre de Démocrates qui 
avaient été la cible des partisans de l’équité des échanges. En outre, la Maison 
Blanche n’hésita pas à employer les grands moyens pour « vendre » l’ALENA 
(McArthur, 2000). Pour lancer son opération de marketing politique, elle fit appel à 
trois ex-présidents (Gerald Ford, Jimmy Carter et George H. W. Bush). Elle 
coordonna sa campagne avec le secteur privé dans le cadre de réunions 
hebdomadaires à Washington. Enfin, dans les dernières semaines qui précédèrent le 
vote, le président multiplia ses entretiens individuels avec les représentants 
(principalement démocrates), utilisant un éventail de faveurs pour obtenir leur 
précieux soutien : appui électoral du président aux candidats en difficulté ; 
concessions sociales ou environnementales aux représentants sous la pression des 
syndicats et leurs alliés ; et enfin « pork barrels », subventions fédérales allouées à 
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des projets locaux en échange de faveurs politiques (dans ce cas, le soutien à 
l’ALENA).  
Comme au cours des négociations, la collaboration entre l’exécutif et le secteur 
privé fut fatale aux efforts de la coalition pour le commerce équitable. La contre-
mobilisation des forces pour le libre-échange permit non seulement de réhabiliter 
l’ALENA aux yeux de l’opinion publique américaine, mais aussi, et surtout, de 
ramener l’accord nord-américain à la vie grâce à la conversion de nombreux 
représentants indécis.  
En somme, bien que la nouvelle coalition pour l’équité des échanges fût parvenue 
à donner une nouvelle dimension aux débats sur le libre-échange, elle ne réussit à 
exercer qu’une influence modeste sur les termes de l’accord et échoua dans sa 
tentative de prévenir la ratification de l’accord au Congrès. Les syndicats et les 
écologistes se  heurtèrent à des obstacles à la fois structurels et politiques incarnés par 
la relation spéciale entre l’exécutif et le secteur privé. Contrairement aux 
représentations courantes du processus décisionnel, l’exécutif n’agit donc pas comme 
un « arbitre désintéressé » qui défendrait coûte que coûte la cause du libre-échange. 
En réalité, il fit preuve, tout au long des débats, d’une certaine partialité en faveur des 
milieux d’affaires – que ces derniers soutiennent la libéralisation économique ou 
qu’ils cherchent à obtenir des protections tarifaires.   
 
IV) LA PROCÉDURE DE NÉGOCIATION ACCELÉRÉE  
 
Le second conflit majeur qui opposa la coalition pour l’équité des échanges aux 
partisans du libre-échange fut la tentative de Bill Clinton de renouveler ses pouvoirs 
de négociation selon la procédure de négociation accélérée (fast track authority) en 
1997. Le président Démocrate avait pour ambition d’élargir l’ALENA au Chili et à 
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l’échelle du continent dans le cadre de la Zone de libre-échange des Amériques 
(ZLEA). Il espérait aussi promouvoir les intérêts économiques américains en Asie 
dans le cadre forum de coopération économique des pays d'Asie-Pacifique (APEC) et 
relancer les négociations multilatérales à l’OMC.  
Les débats sur la procédure de négociation accélérée se déroulèrent dans un 
contexte politique très différent de celui dans lequel l’ALENA fut ratifié. Après la 
défaite cuisante des Démocrates aux élections législatives de 1994, la Maison Blanche 
dut cohabiter avec une majorité républicaine au sein des deux chambres du Congrès. 
Cette alternance politique mit un terme à une période d’hégémonie démocrate de plus 
de 40 ans à la Chambre des Représentants et redéfinit les relations entre les groupes 
de pression et le législatif. D’une part, sous l’impulsion du Président de la Chambre 
des Représentants (Speaker of the House) Newt Gingrich, le Grand Old Party (GOP) 
s’efforça de consolider ses liens avec la communauté des affaires par tous les moyens 
– le « K Street project » 460. D’autre part, le programme de déréglementation des 
Républicains mit aussi bien les syndicats que les écologistes sur la défensive.  
C’est dans ce contexte que Bill Clinton demanda l’octroi des pouvoirs de 
négociation au Congrès. Face aux inquiétudes des Républicains, l’administration 
Démocrate opta pour un projet de loi commerciale dépourvu d’obligations 
environnementales et sociales (« clean bill »). La décision de Bill Clinton d’ignorer 
les revendications politiques des syndicats et des écologistes – alliés traditionnels du 
Parti Démocrate – s’explique à la fois par ces contraintes partisanes, et par la volonté 
du président d’ancrer la politique du Parti Démocrate au centre, elle-même motivée 
par l’espoir de s’attirer les faveurs des milieux d’affaires et d’élargir l’électorat du 
parti.  
                                                
460 K Street est une rue de Washington où se trouvent les sièges d’un grand nombre de groupes 
d’intérêts, notamment les associations patronales. 
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Contrairement à l’ALENA, le texte du projet de loi sur le renouvellement de la 
procédure accélérée ne fut pas conçu dans l’ombre des comités consultatifs de 
l’exécutif – ayant autorité sur les négociations des accords de libre-échange – mais 
finalisé au sein de la Commission des Voies et les Moyens (House Ways and Means 
Committee)
461
. Dans ce cas, la coalition pour le commerce équitable n’achoppa pas 
sur des barrières institutionnelles, mais plutôt sur des obstacles politiques.  
Les carences environnementales et sociales du compromis législatif entre la 
Maison Blanche et le Congrès engendrèrent une vague de mécontentement parmi les 
syndicats et leurs alliés. Ces derniers gardaient un goût amer des débats sur l’ALENA. 
Dans la mesure où l’administration envisageait d’élargir l’ALENA au Chili et à 
l’échelle continentale (dans le cadre de la Zone de libre-échange des Amériques), les 
débats sur la procédure de négociation accélérée firent figure de véritable référendum 
sur le modèle de libre-échange de l’ALENA. 
Avec la publication des premières études sur le bilan économique de l’ALENA 
(Scott, 1997), les syndicats dénoncèrent les effets néfastes de l’accord sur l’emploi 
aux États-Unis. Si l’ALENA ne créa jamais « l’appel d’air » (giant sucking sound) 
que Ross Perot avait annoncé462, l’accord ne fut pas non plus à la hauteur des 
promesses économiques de la Maison Blanche. Malgré de modestes créations 
d’emploi dans les secteurs exportateurs, dont les syndicats ne firent jamais mention, 
l’application de l’accord avait engendré certains coûts d’ajustement au sein de 
l’industrie manufacturière américaine, comme en témoignait la certification de 
132,000 travailleurs pour le programme d’aide à l’ajustement commercial de 
l’ALENA (NAFTA-Trade Adjustment Assistance) entre 1994 et 1997 (Bonior, 
                                                
461 Chargé de la gestion des revenus douaniers, cette puissante commission au Congrès constitue l’un 
des principaux laboratoires de la politique commerciale américaine. 
462 Cette expression faisait référence à un mouvement massif de délocalisations des industries 
américaines vers le Mexique (Perot, 1992). 
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1997)463. En outre, pour les syndicats, l’ALENA n’avait pas amélioré les conditions 
des travailleurs mexicains, dont les revenus réels avaient chuté depuis 1994464. Ceci 
était en partie due aux limites institutionnelles de l’Accord nord-américain de 
coopération dans le domaine du travail (ANACT), projet vis-à-vis duquel les 
syndicats s’étaient toujours montrés sceptiques465. Par ailleurs, les écologistes 
invoquaient les lacunes de l’ALENA dans le domaine de l’environnement pour 
justifier leur opposition au renouvellement de la procédure de négociation accélérée. 
Ils dénonçaient aussi le refus des négociateurs internationaux d’inscrire la protection 
de l’environnement comme condition à la libéralisation des échanges (à l’OMC) et 
des flux d’investissements (dans le cadre de l’AMI).  
Pour faire échouer le projet de libre-échange du Président Clinton, la coalition 
pour l’équité des échanges lança une campagne de lobbying très semblable à sa 
mobilisation contre l’ALENA, s’appuyant sur ses ressources humaines et financières 
pour militer à la fois à Washington, et au niveau local, dans les États des représentants 
« cibles ». Syndicats et écologistes parvinrent à nouveau à placer leurs revendications 
au centre des débats et à rallier l’opinion publique américaine à leur cause466. Mais ce 
qui distingua les débats sur la procédure de négociation accélérée de la bataille 
législative de 1993 fut la capacité de l’alliance pour l’équité des échanges à rallier 
suffisamment de partisans pour faire échouer le projet de loi à la Chambre des 
Représentants.  
                                                
463 En vertu du caractère restrictif des critères d’éligibilité au NAFTA-TAA, ce chiffre sous-estime les 
pertes d’emploi liées à l’ALENA. À ce sujet, lire Kletzer & Rosen (2005). Pour une analyse plus 
récente des effets de l’ALENA sur l’emploi, lire Hufbauer et Schott (2005) et Polaski (2006).  
464 Comme l’affirmaient les défenseurs de l’ALENA, la chute des revenus mexicains était largement 
liée à la crise du peso en 1995. Ce séisme financier était toutefois largement imputable à la 
libéralisation des flux de capitaux que l’ALENA avait entérinée.  
465 Bill Clinton avait négocié l’ANACT pour apaiser les inquiétudes de l’aile gauche de son parti. Déçu 
par les limites d’application de l’accord, le mouvement syndical avait refusé de soutenir l’ALENA.  
466 D’après un sondage conduit par la Bank of Boston, 73% des Américains pensaient que les accords 
de libre-échange devraient inclure des clauses environnementales et sociales. En outre, une enquête 
Wall Street Journal/NBC révéla que 62% de l’opinion publique opposait le renouvellement de la 
procédure accélérée (Glenn, 1999, 191 ; Shoch, 2001, fn. 81, 357). 
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Qu’est-ce qui explique ce succès ? Comment la coalition pour le commerce 
équitable parvint-elle à triompher en 1997 alors qu’elle avait échoué en 1993 ? 
L’analyse de la contre-mobilisation des milieux d’affaires et de la Maison Blanche 
permet de répondre à ces questions. À première vue, les efforts de lobbying entrepris 
par le patronat  ressemblent beaucoup à la campagne qu’il avait menée quatre années 
plus tôt. Une fois encore, ils formèrent une coalition ad hoc intitulée « Americans 
Lead on Trade » (ALOT) dans le but de coordonner leurs efforts à Washington et dans 
les districts des représentants jugés vulnérables. Toutefois, en 1997, un certain 
nombre d’erreurs tactiques vinrent saper la contre-mobilisation du secteur privé. 
Premièrement, les atermoiements de l’administration Clinton retardèrent la campagne 
politique du patronat. Deuxièmement, la dépendance financière accrue des 
Démocrates vis-à-vis des contributions des syndicats neutralisa l’effet des pressions 
exercées par les milieux d’affaires. En effet, en choisissant de rediriger leurs capitaux 
vers le Parti Républicain = sous la pression des architectes du « K-Street project – les 
associations patronales sacrifièrent leur influence politique sur l’opposition au 
Congrès.  
Si les milieux d’affaires eurent leur part de responsabilité dans la défaite 
législative de 1997, les erreurs tactiques de l’administration Clinton jouèrent un rôle 
de premier plan dans cet échec politique. Tout d’abord, le président repoussa à 
plusieurs reprises sa campagne pour obtenir les pouvoirs de négociation, tant pour des 
motifs électoraux (en 1996)467 que pour des raisons de calendrier politique. Ceci 
donna un avantage important à la coalition pour l’équité des échanges, qui réussit à 
s’assurer le soutien d’une majorité de représentants, en particulier au sein du Parti 
Démocrate. Par surcroît, l’administration Clinton, en cédant aux exigences des 
                                                
467 Bill Clinton craignait qu’un conflit avec les écologistes et les syndicats ne compromette ses chances 
de réélection. 
441 
  
 
dirigeants transiger du Parti Républicain et en ignorant les revendications sociales et 
environnementales des syndicats et des écologistes aliéna une grande partie des 
représentants Démocrates. Le Président semblait ignorer les leçons de l’ALENA, pour 
lequel la négociation d’accords bilatéraux lui avait permis de convaincre une partie 
des membres de son parti (39% pour l’ALENA, contre 21% en 1997).  
En somme, si la contre-mobilisation du secteur privé et de l’exécutif avait assuré 
la ratification de l’ALENA en 1993, les faiblesses de la campagne pour la procédure 
de négociation accélérée permirent à la coalition pour l’équité des échanges de 
triompher en 1997. Cette seconde étude de cas démontre que l’alliance entre les 
milieux d’affaires et l’exécutif est certes un obstacle déterminant au progrès de la 
coalition pour l’équité des échanges, mais n’en demeure pas moins faillible.  
 
V) LA NORMALISATION DES RELATIONS 
COMMERCIALES SINO-AMÉRICAINES 
 
Dans la foulée de la victoire de 1997, les syndicats et leurs alliés remportèrent une 
série de succès : le rejet d’un second projet de loi sur la procédure de négociation 
accéléré à l’initiative de Newt Gingrich quelques mois avant les élections de 1998 ; 
l’effondrement des négociations sur l’Accord Multilatéral sur l’Investissement à la fin 
de la même année ; et enfin, les manifestations de Seattle qui donnèrent une nouvelle 
ampleur aux débats sur les effets sociaux et environnementaux de la mondialisation.  
À l’aube du vingt-et-unième siècle, le moral des partisans de l’équité des échanges 
était au plus haut. C’est dans ce contexte que le Président Clinton entreprit de 
« normaliser » les relations commerciales sino-américaines, c’est-à-dire d’accorder de 
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manière permanente le titre de « nation la plus favorisée »468 à la Chine, condition 
préalable à l’adhésion de la Chine à l’Organisation mondiale du commerce. Ce projet 
nécessitait l’assentiment du Congrès qui, depuis 1979, évaluait chaque année les 
termes des relations commerciales sino-américaines en fonction de critères 
économiques et politiques. À l’instar des débats sur l’ALENA et sur le 
renouvellement de la procédure de négociation accélérée, la normalisation des 
relations sino-américaines (Permanent Normalization of U.S-China Trade Relations – 
PNTR) fit l’objet d’une nouvelle bataille législative opposant les partisans du libre-
échange aux défenseurs de l’équité des échanges.  
Pour les intérêts privés, les enjeux d’un accord bilatéral sino-américain étaient 
clairs. L’accès au marché chinois et ses 1,2 milliards de consommateurs ouvrait de 
grandes perspectives économiques pour un grand nombre d’entreprises américaines, 
qu’il s’agisse du secteur agricole, industriel ou des services. Comme l’ALENA, 
l’accord sino-américain était également très prometteur dans le domaine de 
l’investissement, aussi bien dans une logique de réduction des coûts de production 
que pour favoriser l’implantation des multinationales américaines au niveau local. 
Ceci explique pourquoi à la fin des années 1990, le groupement d’intérêts privés pour 
l’ouverture du marché chinois était devenu « peut-être la plus formidable coalition 
pour le libre-échange jamais lancée à l’initiative d’entreprises américaines »469. Si la 
Maison Blanche s’était engagée à placer la protection des droits de l’homme au centre 
des relations sino-américaines, les pressions de la communauté des affaires, dont 
                                                
468 La Clause de la Nation la Plus Favorisée constitue un des principes fondateurs de l’Accord général 
sur les tarifs douaniers et le commerce (GATT), selon lequel une nation X s’engage à ne pas imposer 
des droits de douane plus élevés sur les exportations d’une nation Y qu’elle n’en impose à toute autre 
partenaire commercial (Accord général sur les tarifs douaniers et le commerce, 1947, partie I, chapitre 
1).  
469 “The new China lobby” became “perhaps the most formidable, pro-trade coalition ever sustained by 
U.S. business on its own initiative” (Destler, 1995, 234).  
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Pékin se fit rapidement l’écho au nom du principe de non-ingérence, contraignirent 
Bill Clinton à renoncer à sa politique de « conditionnalité ». 
Comme ce fut le cas en 1993 et en 1997, les syndicats et leurs alliés voyaient la 
normalisation des relations sino-américaines d’un autre œil. Pour les représentants des 
travailleurs, l’accord entre Washington et Pékin promettait une nouvelle vague de 
délocalisations, cette fois non pas vers le Mexique, mais vers l’Asie. Dans certains 
secteurs comme l’automobile ou l’électronique, les positions antagonistes des 
représentants syndicaux et des associations patronales illustraient les « conflits de 
classe » inhérents à la libéralisation des investissements. En outre, la croissance 
rapide du déficit commercial entre les États-Unis et la Chine – de 10,5 milliards de 
dollars en 1990 à 83,8 milliards en 2000 (Destler, 2005, 274) – était aussi source 
d’inquiétudes au sein des syndicats, qui anticipaient une rapide augmentation des 
importations chinoises après l’application de l’accord bilatéral. Enfin, les syndicats 
dénonçaient la logique institutionnelle de la normalisation des relations commerciales 
sino-américaines : en privant le Congrès de son rôle de surveillance, l’exécutif 
renonçait à un outil de pression politique important vis-à-vis de Pékin.  
Ce dernier point était au centre des critiques de nombreux groupes de la société 
civile, parmi lesquels les écologistes, les associations de consommateurs et les 
organisations de défense des droits de l’homme. Bien que la communauté 
environnementale fût moins engagée en 2000 qu’en 1993 ou en 1997, certaines ONG 
participèrent toutefois à la campagne contre l’accord bilatéral sino-américain. Ces 
dernières accusèrent le Président Clinton de ne pas tenir les promesses qu’il avait 
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formulées à Seattle470 en soulignant l’absence de clauses environnementales dans les 
négociations entre Washington et Pékin. 
Une constellation de groupes de défense des droits de l’homme se greffa à la 
coalition pour l’équité des échanges. Bien que toutes ne fussent pas opposées à la 
libéralisation des échanges entre la Chine et les États-Unis, la plupart d’entre elles 
percevaient l’élimination sans condition de la procédure d’évaluation annuelle au 
Congrès comme un échec pour la promotion de la démocratie en Chine. 
Le mécontentement des groupes de la société civile vis-à-vis de l’affaiblissement 
du pouvoir législatif est tout à fait compréhensible, si l’on examine les conséquences 
de la relation spéciale entre l’exécutif et le patronat sur les termes de l’accord sino-
américain. En effet, grâce à son accès privilégié aux comités consultatifs de l’exécutif, 
le patronat réussit à obtenir des concessions généreuses dans un grand nombre de 
domaines comme l’ouverture des marchés, la protection des investissements ou 
encore les droits de propriété intellectuelle. En revanche, la minorité de représentants 
de la société civile ne parvint pas à convaincre les décideurs politiques d’inclure 
quelque obligation que ce soit dans le domaine des normes sociales de travail, de la 
protection de l’environnement ou du respect des droits de l’homme. Frustrés par leur 
sous-représentation au sein du processus décisionnel, les trois représentants des 
syndicats exigèrent une refonte du système des comités consultatifs, avant de 
démissionner du comité consultatif du Président pour la politique et les négociations 
commerciales (Advisory Committee for Trade Policy and Negotiations, ACTPN) – 
comité le plus influent du système de consultation. Les écologistes protestèrent 
également contre les déséquilibres institutionnels de la politique commerciale 
américaine en intentant une action en justice contre l’administration. Ils obtinrent gain 
                                                
470 Face à l’ampleur des manifestations, le Président démocrate avait promis de « redonner un visage 
plus humain au commerce » (Clinton, 1999). 
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de cause auprès d’une cour de district fédérale qui obligea la Maison Blanche à 
inclure un représentant de la communauté environnementale au sein de deux comités 
consultatifs sectoriels (dans l’industrie du papier et du bois). Toutefois, cette décision 
ne prit effet qu’après les négociations de l’accord sino-américain et fut loin de rétablir 
l’équilibre entre secteur privé et société civile au sein du processus décisionnel (IUST, 
06/09/00). En somme, les milieux d’affaires exploitèrent à nouveau leurs prérogatives 
institutionnelles pour contrôler les termes de l’accord sino-américain et exclure toute 
obligation sociale ou environnementale contraire à leurs intérêts.  
 Insurgée contre les termes de l’accord sino-américain, la coalition pour l’équité 
des échanges coordonna une vigoureuse campagne de lobbying contre le projet de loi, 
sous l’impulsion du mouvement syndical. Ce dernier lança « l’effort de ce type le plus 
intense jamais entrepris par les syndicats » (Shoch (2001b, 305). Avec l’appui des 
associations pour la défense des droits de l’homme, des écologistes et des associations 
de consommateurs, la fédération syndicale parvint encore une fois à semer le doute 
sur les termes de l’accord sino-américain, notamment au sein de l’opinion publique471 
et du Parti Démocrate. Toutefois, la coalition pour le commerce équitable ne réussit 
cette fois ni à retarder le vote sur la normalisation des relations sino-américaines, ni à 
le faire échouer. Le 24 mai 2000, la Chambre des Représentants ratifia l’accord à 237 
voix contre 197. 
Cette victoire sans appel pour les partisans du libre-échange devait beaucoup à la 
contre-mobilisation conjointe de l’exécutif et des milieux d’affaires. Pour éviter une 
défaite semblable à celle de 1997, la Maison Blanche organisa une campagne 
politique sans précédent sous la présidence de Bill Clinton. D’une part, le groupement 
d’intérêts privés pour la libéralisation des échanges sino-américains qui opérait de 
                                                
471 Selon une étude de Business Week, 79 % des Américains estimaient que le Congrès devrait 
uniquement donner à la Chine l’accès au marché américain si cette dernière s’engageait à respecter les 
droits de l’homme et des travailleurs (Business Week, 2000).  
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manière informelle depuis le début des années 1990 redynamisa son action politique à 
partir de 1999 en créant la Coalition d’affaires pour le commerce sino-
américain (Business Coalition for U.S.-China Trade). Cette dernière lança l’une des 
offensives politiques les plus coûteuses organisées au nom d’un projet de loi (entre 13 
et 15 millions de dollars), dépassant le budget cumulé des efforts de communication 
pour l’ALENA (8 millions) et contre la réforme du système de santé (4 millions) entre 
1992 et 1994. Certaines associations patronales comme la Business Roundtable et la 
U.S. Chamber of Commerce décidèrent d’adopter une stratégie plus décentralisée 
qu’au cours des batailles législatives précédentes. Elles s’efforcèrent, d’une part, de 
développer des réseaux d’employeurs et de travailleurs susceptibles d’influencer leurs 
élus au niveau local, et d’autre part, d’établir des bases de données sur les bienfaits 
économiques régionaux du libre-échange que leurs militants pourraient exploiter lors 
de leurs efforts de lobbying. Enfin, le secteur privé entreprit également un 
rééquilibrage de ses contributions financières en faveur des représentants Démocrates, 
réduisant la dépendance financière de ces derniers vis-à-vis des syndicats.  
La contre-mobilisation des milieux d’affaires allait de pair avec la campagne 
lancée par la Maison Blanche en faveur de l’accord sino-américain. Décidée à clôturer 
sa présidence par un succès diplomatique, l’administration Clinton s’investit 
pleinement dans cette nouvelle bataille politique. Pour ce faire, elle mit en place une 
véritable cellule de guerre, le China Trade Relations Working Group, équipe de hauts 
fonctionnaires chargés d’assurer coûte que coûte la ratification au Congrès de l’accord 
sino-américain. La Maison Blanche recruta par surcroît les services d’une multitude 
d’acteurs afin qu’ils apportent leur soutien à la normalisation des relations entre la 
Chine et les États-Unis : depuis le trio désormais classique d’ex-présidents 
américains, jusqu’aux anciens ministres du commerce ou de l’agriculture en passant 
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par une armada de diplomates confirmés. Aucun moyen ne fut épargné. Le Président 
Clinton lui-même se jeta à corps perdu dans la bataille législative, usant de son 
influence personnelle – parfois au moyen de concessions politiques – pour convaincre 
des Démocrates assaillis à la fois par les ennemis et par les défenseurs du libre-
échange. Les efforts de lobbying de l’administration Clinton furent si intenses qu’ils 
firent l’objet d’une enquête parlementaire visant à évaluer la légitimité des méthodes 
employées par la Maison Blanche. Si le rapport de la commission ne décela aucune 
infraction, il mit en évidence une étroite collaboration entre l’administration et le 
secteur privé (GAO, 2000b).  
La conjonction des efforts publics et privés permit aux forces libre-échangistes de 
rallier une solide majorité bipartite en faveur du projet de loi commerciale. D’une 
part, la campagne de la coalition privée consolida le soutien du Parti Républicain à la 
libéralisation des échanges. D’autre part, leurs pressions, notamment financières 
rendirent les représentants Démocrates encore plus vulnérables aux pressions de 
l’administration. Ainsi, en dépit des récents accomplissements des syndicats et leurs 
alliés dans le domaine de la politique commerciale, l’alliance entre l’exécutif et le 
secteur privé mit un terme à l’ascension politique de la coalition pour l’équité des 
échanges : d’une part, en excluant toute obligation sociale et environnementale des 
termes de l’accord sino-américain ; d’autre part, en endiguant l’offensive de la 
coalition pour le commerce équitable.  
 
VI) LA TRADE PROMOTION AUTHORITY 
 
L’élection de George W. Bush raviva les tensions sur le modèle de la politique 
commerciale américaine. Ceci tenait autant à ses convergences idéologiques avec son 
prédécesseur qu’aux divergences politiques qui séparaient les deux présidents. 
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Comme tous les chefs de l’exécutif depuis la Seconde Guerre mondiale, George W. 
Bush affichait un fervent engagement pour la libéralisation des échanges. En dehors 
des vertus économiques présupposées des accords de libre-échange, il considérait 
l’affirmation des libertés individuelles comme la conséquence logique du libre-
échange472.  
Aussitôt après son investiture, le Président s’engagea à redynamiser la politique 
commerciale américaine. Lors d’un discours devant le Congrès en février 2001, 
George W. Bush demanda au Congrès de rétablir la procédure de négociation 
accélérée, rebaptisée procédure pour la promotion des échanges (trade promotion 
authority). Comme Bill Clinton, le président républicain entendait promouvoir 
l’ouverture des marchés sur tous les fronts, c’est-à-dire par les voies bilatérale, 
régionale et multilatérale (Zoellick, 2001). À l’image de son prédécesseur, il dérogea 
toutefois à ses principes idéologiques, n’hésitant pas à recourir à certaines mesures 
protectionnistes pour apaiser les secteurs opposés à la libéralisation des échanges 
(acier, industrie agro-alimentaire).  
En revanche, George W. Bush entretenait des relations très différentes de son 
prédécesseur avec les parties prenantes à la politique commerciale. D’une part, dans 
le prolongement de la révolution conservatrice de Newt Gingrich, l’administration 
Bush chercha à consolider ses relations avec les milieux d’affaires, notamment par le 
biais de politiques chères au patronat : dégrèvements fiscaux, déréglementation, 
réforme du droit au recours collectif (class action), etc. D’autre part, le Parti 
Républicain continua à mener la vie dure aux syndicats et aux écologistes. Ainsi, la 
Maison Blanche entreprit une série de réformes portant atteinte à la liberté 
                                                
472 « Nous exportons de la liberté tous les jours, à mesure que nous échangeons des biens et des 
produits qui améliorent les conditions de vie de millions de personnes. Le libre-échange est vecteur de 
liberté politique et individuelle » (“Freedom is exported every day, as we ship goods and products that 
improve the lives of millions of people. Free trade brings greater political and personal freedom”  
(Bush, 2001c). 
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d’association et au droit de négociation collective. Elle s’efforça en outre d’affaiblir 
les institutions chargées de protéger les droits des travailleurs (National Labor Board 
Relations, Occupational Safety and Health Administration) au moyen de nominations 
partisanes et de réductions budgétaires. Enfin, l’administration républicaine et ses 
alliés au Congrès entretinrent un climat politique hostile aux intérêts des écologistes 
tant au niveau international (rejet du Protocole de Kyoto) qu’au niveau national 
(affaiblissement de l’Agence pour la protection de l’environnement, 
déréglementation, etc).  
D’âpres conflits partisans se greffèrent sur cette nouvelle donne politique. S’il 
avait promis de mettre un terme à la fracture partisane au cours de sa campagne 
électorale473, le président Républicain se montra rapidement plus apte à diviser qu’à 
unifier le Congrès. Les apparatchiks de la majorité républicaine se firent le relais de 
cette politique sans compromis, notamment au sein de la Commission des Voies et 
des Moyens de la Chambre des représentants (House Ways and Means Committee)474, 
organe essentiel à l’élaboration de la politique commerciale. Ces tensions vinrent 
exacerber les conflits sur le libre-échange qui avaient divisé le Congrès au cours des 
années 1990.  
L’élaboration du projet de loi sur la procédure pour la promotion des échanges ne 
fut  pas sujette aux contraintes institutionnelles qui caractérisent les négociations des 
accords de libre-échange (comme l’ALENA ou l’accord sino-américain). C’est en 
effet le Congrès, et non l’exécutif qui fut à l’origine de cette initiative, dont l’objet 
consistait, toutefois, à déléguer le pouvoir de négociation à l’exécutif. Ainsi, les 
milieux d’affaires ne purent-ils user de leur accès privilégié au système des comités 
consultatifs pour contrôler les termes du projet de loi. La majorité républicaine 
                                                
473 Lors d’une interview en 1999, il avait déclaré : « I’m a uniter, not a divider » (Bush, 1999). 
474 Le président du comité, Bill Thomas, contribua grandement à l’érosion du consensus bipartisan en 
faveur du libre-échange. Lire Cohen (2006).   
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s’évertua néanmoins à répondre aux exigences du patronat. Malgré leurs prétentions 
bipartisanes475 et leurs références symboliques aux principes de l’équité des échanges, 
les cadres du Grand Old Party s’attachèrent à exclure toute avancée en matière 
environnementale et sociale du texte de loi.  
Déjà largement prédisposés à s’opposer à la politique de George W. Bush, les 
syndicats et leurs alliés ne tardèrent pas à se mobiliser contre le projet de loi des 
Républicains, qu’ils jugeaient tout aussi lacunaire que la politique commerciale de 
Bill Clinton. La coalition pour l’équité des échanges exigea que les clauses sociales et 
environnementales de tout futur accord de libre-échange fussent soumises au même 
régime que les clauses économiques, et que leur application fît l’objet de sanctions 
commerciales. En dehors du texte de la loi bipartisane sur la procédure pour la 
promotion des échanges (Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act), les syndicats et 
leurs alliés s’opposaient à la logique institutionnelle de la procédure de négociation 
accélérée, qu’ils percevaient comme un contournement de la voie parlementaire au 
détriment de l’intérêt public. Ils avaient donc conscience des avantages politiques que 
les milieux d’affaires pouvaient tirer du transfert d’autorité du législatif vers 
l’exécutif.   
La mobilisation des partisans de l’équité des échanges contre le renouvellement 
du mandat pour la promotion des échanges s’inspira à plus d’un titre de leurs 
campagnes précédentes. Les groupes de la société civile multiplièrent leurs efforts de 
lobbying au niveau local et à Washington. Si les représentants démocrates étaient 
beaucoup plus réceptifs aux arguments des partisans de l’équité des échanges que les 
Républicains, ces derniers furent aussi la cible des syndicats et de leurs alliés. Une 
                                                
475 Les Républicains négocièrent les termes du projet de loi – intitulé Bipartisan Trade Promotion 
Authority Act – avec trois Démocrates centristes sans influence sur le reste du parti. Bill Thomas refusa 
le dialogue avec les membres Démocrates spécialistes de la politique commerciale comme Charles 
Rangel (D-NY), Sander Levin (D-MI) et Robert Matsui (D-CA). 
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fois encore, la question de l’application de normes sociales et environnementales 
figurait au centre des controverses. Ce simple fait témoignait de l’impact de la 
coalition pour le commerce équitable sur les débats au Congrès. Les dissensions au 
sein de la Chambre des Représentants étaient telles que l’administration Bush 
repoussa plusieurs fois le vote et y aurait peut-être renoncé si le chef de la majorité 
républicaine Tom Delay (R-TX) ne lui avait pas forcé la main. Ce n’est qu’au terme 
d’une bataille féroce que les Républicains parvinrent à arracher une victoire 
législative fragile, en dépit de la forte opposition des représentants démocrates476. Une 
seule et unique voix séparait le renouvellement du mandat de promotion des échanges 
de son rejet au Congrès. Selon l’expert de la politique commerciale Mac Destler, il 
s’agissait du « vote partisan le plus controversé sur un tel projet de loi depuis les 
années 1930 » (Destler, 2005, 331).  
Quel rôle la coalition pour le libre-échange joua-t-elle dans cette victoire 
législative ? La contre-mobilisation des milieux d’affaires s’inscrivait dans la lignée 
des efforts de lobbying entrepris pour défendre les autres projets de loi commerciale. 
En 2001, le secteur privé renouvela ses efforts sur le terrain (grassroots) et, conscient 
des inquiétudes des Américains vis-à-vis de la mondialisation, mit cette fois l’accent 
sur les bénéfices du libre-échange pour les travailleurs américains. Si les associations 
patronales continuaient à s’opposer à l’inclusion de clauses sociales et 
environnementales strictes dans le texte de loi, elles encouragèrent les décideurs 
politiques à réformer la politique d’aide à l’ajustement commercial. L’impact exact de 
leurs efforts, quant bien même difficile à évaluer, semble avoir pesé en faveur du 
projet de loi. D’une part, leurs contributions financières semblent avoir influencé le 
vote de la minorité de Démocrates qui soutinrent le projet de libre-échange – un atout 
                                                
476 90% d’entre eux s’opposèrent au renouvellement de la procédure de négociation accélérée.  
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non négligeable au vu du vote serré à la Chambre des Représentants. D’autre part, les 
liens étroits entre le Grand Old Party et la classe des affaires a vraisemblablement 
joué un rôle important dans la forte mobilisation des députés républicains en faveur de 
la procédure de négociation accélérée. Toutefois, leur influence est ici plus difficile à 
évaluer, dans la mesure où les Républicains obéirent avant tout au chef de leur parti.  
C’est en effet le président qui, directement ou indirectement, joua le rôle de pivot 
dans la ratification du projet de loi au Congrès. Au lendemain des attentats du 11-
Septembre, le « commandant en chef » invoqua à plusieurs reprises la nécessité de 
rétablir le leadership économique des États-Unis pour propager les valeurs de la 
liberté dans le monde. Si les questions de sécurité prirent le pas sur les enjeux 
commerciaux, la Maison Blanche parvint à mobiliser la grande majorité de son parti 
en faveur de son programme politique, les députés républicains n’osant pas trahir un 
président en temps de guerre. Cet effet de ralliement patriotique (rally-around-the-
flag effect) permit à la coalition pour le libre-échange de se passer de l’appui des 
Démocrates centristes, dont les voix en faveur de la libéralisation commerciale 
avaient été cruciales sous la présidence de Bill Clinton. En dehors de ses appels au 
patriotisme, la Maison Blanche coordonna ses efforts de contremobilisation avec les 
milieux d’affaires, échangeant de précieuses informations pour persuader les 
membres indécis de soutenir la cause du libre-échange. Enfin, les concessions 
politiques furent, une fois encore, partie intégrante des débats sur la procédure de 
négociation accélérée, comme l’illustrent les mesures de protection destinées à apaiser 
les représentants des industries de l’acier et du textile, ainsi que les faveurs accordées 
aux intérêts agricoles. L’adoption de ces initiatives protectionnistes semblait 
contredire les déclarations de l’administration Bush sur les bienfaits de la 
libéralisation commerciale.  
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En somme, la Maison Blanche mobilisa une nouvelle fois ses ressources au 
service des milieux d’affaires sous le couvert du libre-échange, repoussant une 
nouvelle fois l’offensive de la coalition pour l’équité des échanges. Si le patronat ne 
put cette fois exploiter son accès privilégié aux comités consultatifs, la majorité 
républicaine s’attacha à suivre ses prescriptions politiques, notamment à travers 
l’exclusion d’obligations sociales et environnementales du projet de loi. En dépit du 
soutien de la majorité des députés Démocrates, les syndicats et leurs alliés ne purent 
rivaliser avec la puissance politique des milieux d’affaires et d’un président en guerre.  
 
VII) L’ACCORD DE LIBRE-ÉCHANGE AVEC 
L’AMÉRIQUE CENTRALE  
 
Après avoir obtenu les pouvoirs de négociation par le biais de la fast track 
authority, le Président Bush entreprit la négociation d’une série d’accords de libre-
échange, dont le plus important économiquement et le plus controversé fut l’Accord 
de libre-échange avec l’Amérique Centrale (ALEAC). Négocié entre 2003 et 2004, 
cet accord visait à libéraliser les flux d’investissement et de commerce entre les 
économies de cinq pays centraméricains (le Salvador, le Costa Rica, le Guatemala, 
l’Honduras, et le Nicaragua) et celles de la République Dominicaine et des États-
Unis. Fondé sur le modèle de l’ALENA, cet accord devint l’objet de débats houleux 
sur les règles censées régir la mondialisation.  
Pour les milieux d’affaires, l’ALEAC promettait l’ouverture de nouveaux marchés 
friands d’exportations américaines. En 2001, les pays centraméricains importaient en 
effet plus de biens et services américains que l’Inde, l’Indonésie et la Russie réunies. 
Un grand nombre d’entreprises exportatrices espéraient bénéficier de cet accord, dans 
des secteurs allant des produits agricoles aux biens manufacturiers, en passant par les 
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services financiers et de télécommunications. Comme pour l’ALENA, l’intérêt du 
secteur privé pour l’ALEAC était aussi lié aux opportunités d’investissement et de 
restructuration économique – notamment pour les secteurs textiles et automobiles 
visant à réorganiser leurs chaînes de production à l’échelle régionale. Ces industries 
espéraient tirer profit des faibles coûts de main d’œuvre des maquiladoras 
centraméricaines, tout en se protégeant de la concurrence asiatique au moyen des 
règles d’origine.  
Une nouvelle fois, les associations patronales réussirent à atteindre la plupart de 
leurs objectifs politiques et économiques. Non seulement les concessions obtenues 
dans le cadre de l’ALEAC suivaient le modèle de l’ALENA, mais l’accord 
centraméricain semblait, à certains égards, mieux servir les intérêts des milieux 
d’affaires. En particulier, l’ALEAC, contrairement à son accord jumeau, ne prévoyait 
pas la création d’institutions permanentes censées veiller sur le respect des droits des 
travailleurs et de la protection de l’environnement. Certes, l’inclusion de chapitres sur 
l’emploi et sur l’environnement semblait, à première vue, s’opposer à la volonté du 
secteur privé d’exclure ces questions de la politique commerciale américaine. 
Toutefois, une analyse approfondie des clauses sociales et environnementales de 
l’ALEAC révèle que l’approche volontariste adoptée par les négociateurs américains 
et leurs partenaires correspondait tout à fait aux préférences affichées par la 
communauté des affaires depuis de nombreuses années. 
Au cours des négociations sur l’ALEAC, le système des comités consultatifs fut 
encore une fois largement dominé par les milieux d’affaires et notamment par les 
grandes firmes multinationales (Darves & Dreiling, 2007). Ceci était, d’une part, le 
fait de choix politiques. Après avoir obtenu les pouvoirs de négociation, le président 
recomposa le comité consultatif supérieur, l’ACTPN, et décida de congédier les 
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quelques membres de la société civile qui y siégeaient. Ainsi, syndicats et écologistes 
furent en un premier temps exclus non seulement des comités sectoriels (Industry 
Sectoral Advisory Committees – ISACs), comme cela avait été le cas au cours des 
années 1990, mais également de l’ACTPN, comité consultatif supérieur. En réponse 
aux vives critiques de l’opposition et aux actions en justice engagées par les syndicats 
et les écologistes, l’administration nomma de nouveaux membres (deux au sein de 
l’ACTPN, deux dans des ISACs), censés représenter l’intérêt public dans les 
domaines sociaux et environnementaux. Toutefois, même après ces quelques 
nominations, les milieux d’affaires représentaient toujours 80% des membres de 
l’ACTPN, la plupart des autres sièges ayant été accordés à des partisans du libre-
échange issus des sphères universitaire et politique. Selon les témoignages de deux 
membres de la société civile – l’un au nom du syndicat UNITE-HERE, l’autre pour 
l’organisation écologiste CIEL – ayant participé aux activités des comités des comités 
consultatifs, la nomination d’un petit nombre de représentants d’ONG ne serait rien 
d’autre qu’un « rideau de fumée » dans la mesure où leurs voix ne sont jamais 
sérieusement prises en compte (Levinson, 2008* ; Magraw, 2008*). En outre, les soi-
disant représentants de l’intérêt public étaient souvent proches des milieux d’affaires 
– c’était le cas des consultants d’entreprise en écologie, ou des Citizens for a Sound 
Economy, plaidoyers du libre-marché censés représentés les consommateurs au sein 
de l’ACTPN. En somme, le président utilisa sa marge de manœuvre politique non pas 
pour corriger les déséquilibres du système institutionnel, mais pour exacerber la 
domination du secteur privé.  
D’autre part, la structure du processus décisionnel continuait à être inadaptée aux 
nouveaux défis sociaux et environnementaux de la libéralisation économique. Ainsi, 
en dépit des conflits de classe qui caractérisaient les débats sur le libre-échange depuis 
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plus d’une décennie, les comités consultatifs sectoriels continuaient à ne représenter 
que les intérêts du patronat, y compris dans les secteurs de l’automobile et du textile, 
où les perspectives de délocalisations divisaient employeurs et travailleurs. Les 
écologistes et les associations de consommateurs étaient aussi exclus de la plupart de 
ces comités, même dans des sphères sensibles comme celles des droits de propriété 
intellectuelle (liés à des questions de santé publique comme l’utilisation des 
médicaments génériques) ou encore le commerce du tabac. Ces déséquilibres étaient 
l’héritage politique et institutionnel – « policy legacies » pour reprendre un concept 
cher aux institutionnalistes – des réformes de 1974 dont les ramifications ne 
deviendraient claires que quelques décennies plus tard. Les prérogatives 
institutionnelles des milieux d’affaires expliquent pourquoi les termes de l’ALEAC 
accordèrent si peu d’importance à la protection de l’environnement et au respect des 
droits des travailleurs – en dépit des références symboliques à ces principes dans le 
texte de l’accord. 
Assurément, les termes de l’ALEAC étaient le fruit d’un « processus de 
négociation à deux niveaux » (two-level bargaining)477 dans le cadre duquel les 
négociateurs centraméricains – et pas seulement les groupes d’intérêts américains – 
avaient aussi leur mot à dire. Toutefois, les concessions obtenues par Washington 
dans de nombreux domaines (investissement, marchés publics, droits de propriété 
intellectuelle etc.) montre que les négociateurs américains étaient en position d’exiger 
des mesures beaucoup plus strictes dans les domaines de l’environnement et de 
l’emploi.  
Conscients des obstacles institutionnels et politiques auxquels ils devaient faire 
face, les syndicats et leurs alliés se mobilisèrent contre le projet de libre-échange de 
                                                
477 Voir Putnam (1988). 
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l’administration Bush. En vertu des similitudes entre l’ALENA et l’ALEAC, les 
membres de la coalition pour l’équité des échanges présentèrent les débats sur 
l’accord centraméricain comme un nouveau référendum sur le modèle d’intégration 
nord-américaine et, dans une plus large mesure, sur le modèle de la politique 
commerciale américaine. Dans la même lignée, leurs alliés au Congrès replaçaient les 
débats sur l’ALEAC dans le contexte de la mondialisation et de ses répercussions 
sociales et environnementales. Selon Sander Levin: “Pour nous, [qui avons soutenu la 
libéralisation des échanges et œuvré pour la ratification des accords de libre-échange 
depuis une décennie], l’ALEAC est une limite à ne pas franchir concernant le futur de 
la mondialisation478. » 
Les syndicats et leurs alliés lancèrent une vive campagne contre le projet de libre-
échange centraméricain. Ils dénoncèrent systématiquement le bilan social et 
environnemental de l’ALENA – ou, plus précisément, leur interprétation pessimiste 
de ce bilan – pour augurer des conséquences de l’ALEAC : pertes d’emplois aux 
États-Unis comme en Amérique Centrale, aggravation du déficit commercial 
américain, dégradation de l’environnement, violations répétées des droits travailleurs 
au nom de la réduction des coûts de production etc. La coalition pour l’équité des 
échanges s’appuya sur un large réseau d’organisations actives en Amérique Centrale, 
tissant des relations avec des syndicats centraméricains et des organisations de 
défense des droits de l’homme.  
Une fois encore, l’alliance de la société civile parvint à ramener les questions 
sociales et environnementales au centre des débats sur l’ALEAC. L’opinion publique 
semblait une nouvelle fois soutenir la cause de l’équité des échanges, comme le 
révélait un sondage publié par le Program on International Policy Attitudes (PIPA) de 
                                                
478 “For us [who have favored expanded trade and have helped to pass trade agreements (…) in the 
past decade], CAFTA is a line in the sand regarding the future of globalization”  (Levin, 2005). 
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l’Université du Maryland en 2005479. Les représentants Démocrates se révélèrent 
particulièrement réceptifs aux arguments des syndicats et de leurs alliés. Au terme des 
débats, seuls 15 Démocrates décidèrent de soutenir l’ALEAC. Ceci était certes dû aux 
vives tensions partisanes qui divisaient le Congrès, mais aussi aux efforts de lobbying 
de la coalition, aussi bien dans les districts des représentants qu’à Washington. Bien 
que le vote du projet de loi fût repoussé à maintes reprises en raison des incertitudes 
qui demeuraient quant à sa ratification, la campagne anti-ALEAC ne parvint toutefois 
pas à faire échouer l’initiative politique de l’administration Bush. Cette dernière 
remporta une nouvelle victoire législative in extremis, avec 217 en faveur de l’accord 
contre 215 voix opposées à sa ratification480.  
La contre-mobilisation des forces libre-échangistes fut une nouvelle fois fatale 
aux efforts de la coalition pour l’équité des échanges. Premièrement, les milieux 
d’affaires réactivèrent leurs efforts de lobbying, coordonnés cette fois par la Business 
Coalition for U.S.-Central American Trade. Leur campagne était d’une part 
décentralisée, mobilisant des entreprises locales pour rendre plus saillants les 
bénéfices économiques de la libéralisation économique. Elle était d’autre part 
centralisée par le biais d’une étroite collaboration avec les membres de 
l’administration républicaine à Washington. S’il est parfois difficile d’évaluer 
l’impact exact de ces efforts de lobbying, la juxtaposition de ressources primaires 
(entretiens) et secondaires (articles de journaux, analyses du vote) montre que le 
secteur privé parvint non seulement à consolider le soutien des députés républicains 
pour la cause du libre-échange, mais également à convaincre certains représentants 
qui avaient le profil (idéologie, intérêts locaux) d’opposants à l’ALEAC, en 
                                                
479 Selon ce sondage, seul un américain sur deux soutenait la ratification de l’ALEAC en 2005, alors 
que 65% d’entre eux serait en faveur de l’accord si le gouvernement augmentait les dépenses fédérales 
pour l’aide à l’ajustement au commerce et s’il s’assurait que les pays centraméricains appliqueraient le 
respect de normes sociales de travail.  
480 Deux représentants républicains s’abstinrent de voter. 
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particulier parmi les représentants Démocrates – un accomplissement non négligeable 
au regard des incertitudes quant à l’issue du vote.  
Si les efforts du secteur privé furent décisifs au sein de l’opposition, la Maison 
Blanche garantit le soutien d’une grande majorité des Républicains. Pour cela, elle eut 
recours à une panoplie classique de manœuvres politiques allant d’une campagne 
sophistiquée orchestrée par les élites du Parti Républicain jusqu’à un lot de mesures 
protectionnistes. Cette fois, le président Bush s’impliqua beaucoup plus dans les 
débats qu’en 2001. L’administration et ses alliés au Congrès multiplièrent les 
concessions politiques pour apaiser les représentants des intérêts textiles. Les termes 
de l’ALEAC dans les secteurs du textile et de l’industrie sucrière semblaient 
contredire les principes même du libre-échange puisqu’ils menaçaient de remettre en 
question les avantages comparatifs dont les pays centraméricains jouissaient dans ces 
deux sphères économiques. La Maison Blanche accorda aussi un certain nombre de 
faveurs sans relation directe avec l’ALEAC (pork barrels) pour acheter le soutien de 
députés rétifs. En somme, les efforts de lobbying de l’administration et du monde des 
affaires se révélèrent complémentaires dans la mesure où ils permirent d’obtenir un 
nombre clé de représentants indécis dans chacun des partis politiques. Une fois 
encore, la contre-mobilisation de la coalition pour le libre-échange déjoua les projets 
politiques de la coalition pour l’équité des échanges, malgré toutes les incertitudes qui 
entouraient le vote et le soutien de l’opinion publique pour une politique commerciale 
plus responsable d’un point de vue social et environnemental.  
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CONCLUSION 
Cette analyse a retracé l’impact politique des efforts de mobilisation de la 
coalition pour le commerce équitable depuis son émergence lors des débats sur 
l’ALENA au début des années 1990 jusqu’à la ratification de l’ALEAC en 2005. Ce 
travail de recherche a eu pour ambition de révéler les obstacles politiques ayant 
empêché les syndicats et leurs alliés d’accomplir leurs objectifs politiques. La 
consultation de sources primaires – notamment les entretiens avec les acteurs 
politiques – et secondaires nous a poussé à élargir notre champ d’analyse pour 
examiner non seulement les dynamiques internes de la coalition pour l’équité des 
échanges mais également les interactions entre les parties prenantes à la politique 
commerciale américaine et les acteurs institutionnels. Ces cinq études de cas ont 
révélé le rôle particulier que joue le pouvoir exécutif dans le cadre des « nouveaux 
enjeux de la politique commerciale américaine » (Destler & Balint, 1999), et plus 
précisément sur la « relation spéciale » qu’il entretient avec le secteur privé. Cette 
alliance entre groupes d’intérêts et acteurs gouvernementaux opère tout au long du 
processus décisionnel et représente une véritable pierre d’achoppement pour les 
syndicats et leurs alliés. 
Premièrement, la structure institutionnelle qui régit le processus décisionnel de la 
politique commerciale tend à privilégier les intérêts des milieux d’affaires sur ceux de 
la société civile. Au cours de la phase des négociations, le secteur privé exerce une 
très forte influence sur les termes des accords de libre-échange grâce à sa 
collaboration étroite avec l’exécutif. Les milieux des affaires s’appuient sur leur 
domination du système de comités consultatifs. Institué par la loi commerciale de 
1974, ce système institutionnel apparaît aujourd’hui inadapté aux nouveaux conflits 
engendrés par la mondialisation. D’une part, les comités consultatifs continuent à 
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opérer comme si employeurs et travailleurs partageaient les mêmes intérêts et ce, en 
dépit des conflits de classe générés par la libéralisation des flux de capitaux. D’autre 
part, le mode de représentation au sein de ce système de consultation ne s’est pas 
adapté aux mutations des négociations commerciales qui, aujourd’hui, dépassent 
largement le cadre traditionnel des barrières tarifaires. Ce système laisse très peu de 
chances aux syndicats, écologistes et associations de consommateurs d’influencer la 
formation de la politique commerciale américaine. Ainsi, les intérêts privés 
continuent à contrôler les termes des négociations sur des sujets aussi sensibles que 
l’accès aux médicaments ou la réglementation des marchés publics etc. Ceci explique 
pourquoi les accords de libre-échange ont tendance à octroyer des concessions 
généreuses au secteur privé allant bien au-delà des dégrèvements tarifaires (protection 
des investissements et des droits de propriété intellectuelle, règles d’origine etc.) mais 
relèguent, en revanche, les clauses sociales et environnementales au second rang des 
négociations. En outre, bien que l’élaboration des lois sur la procédure de négociation 
accélérée ne fasse pas appel aux comités consultatifs de l’exécutif, cette procédure 
vise à restreindre le rôle du Congrès dans le processus décisionnel à un vote sous 90 
jours sans amendement, et a donc pour effet d’exacerber la marginalisation des 
représentants de la société civile et de renforcer les liens entre le secteur privé et 
l’exécutif.  
Deuxièmement, la relation spéciale entre acteurs publics et intérêts privés se 
manifeste au cours de la phase législative qui précède le vote au Congrès. Dans la 
plupart des études de cas, la contre-mobilisation coordonnée par la Maison Blanche et 
les milieux d’affaires a permis à la coalition pour le libre-échange de remporter les 
batailles législatives qui l’opposaient à la coalition pour l’équité des échanges. Les 
efforts politiques des syndicats et leurs alliés n’ont toutefois pas été complètement 
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vains. Tout d’abord, la mobilisation de la coalition pour l’équité des échanges a 
permis de redéfinir le cadre des débats sur la politique commerciale américaine en 
élevant les questions sociales et environnementales au premier rang des controverses 
sur la mondialisation. En outre, les groupes de la société civile sont parvenus à 
convaincre l’opinion publique américaine qui, dans l’ensemble, soutient désormais 
l’application de normes sociales et environnementales internationales dans le cadre 
des accords de libre-échange. Enfin, les syndicats et leurs alliés ont gagné les faveurs 
de la majorité des membres du Parti Démocrate, ralliant progressivement l’aile 
centriste à la cause de l’équité des échanges.  
Mais si la mobilisation de cette alliance a menacé la ratification des lois 
commerciales au Congrès à plusieurs reprises, les efforts de lobbying conjoints du 
président et du secteur privé se sont avérés déterminants pour maintenir le cap de la 
libéralisation des échanges et des investissements. Les échanges d’informations entre 
les milieux d’affaires et les membres de l’exécutif permettent en effet d’identifier et 
de remédier aux inquiétudes des représentants indécis, et sont souvent une partie 
centrale des efforts de contre-mobilisation. Les propos de Linda Menghetti, vice-
président d’ECAT résument l’importance de cette collaboration :  
Il existe des structures formelles …des réunions toutes les semaines, ou toutes 
les deux semaines, ou quelque chose comme ça, souvent au cours des deux mois 
qui précèdent le vote (…). Au sein des coalitions d’entreprises, nous faisons du 
lobbying, nous écrivons des rapports, et il y a quelqu’un au sein de la coalition qui 
partage cette information avec des gens de l’administration. « Tel représentant 
penche de tel ou tel côté », « Tel représentant aimerait en savoir plus sur telle ou 
telle chose ». Puis, tout cela revient vers nous. L’administration nous fait savoir 
que « Tel répresentant affirme que les milieux d’affaires ne lui ont pas fait 
connaître leur position sur l’accord de libre-échange », « tel représentant aimerait 
connaître l’opinion d’une entreprise de son district sur ce sujet » ou encore « c’est 
bien d’avoir l’avis des gens à Washington, mais nous aimerions entendre plus de 
personnes de Seattle, du Maine ou de n’importe quelle localité » (Menghetti, 
2008*)481.   
                                                
481 There are formal structures like that… where there are weekly meetings, or every other week, 
something like that, which usually happens right when you’re in that last two months or so of the vote. 
(…) You know, the business coalitions, we all do our lobbying, we write reports, and there’s someone 
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La relation spéciale entre les milieux d’affaires et le pouvoir exécutif a opéré aussi 
bien sous la présidence du démocrate Bill Clinton que sous celle de son successeur 
républicain George W. Bush. Certes, le contexte partisan de ces deux dernières 
décennies a influencé le vote des représentants au Congrès. Toutefois, on ne peut 
résumer les récents débats sur le libre-échange à un conflit partisan, dans la mesure où 
le processus de contre-mobilisation transcende les affiliations partisanes. Ainsi, 
Républicains et Démocrates ont mis les pouvoirs institutionnels de la Maison Blanche 
au service des milieux d’affaires. Pour défendre les projets de loi commerciale contre 
les attaques de la coalition pour l’équité des échanges, le chef de l’exécutif a eu 
recours à une panoplie de tactiques : campagnes de communication sophistiquées, 
concessions politiques, soutien électoral aux représentants en difficulté, etc. Ces 
techniques de persuasion sont venus compléter les efforts de lobbying de la 
communauté des affaires – aux niveaux à la fois local et fédéral – coordonnés par des 
coalitions ad hoc comme USA*NAFTA, ALOT ou Business Coalition for US-Central 
America Trade. En raison des vives tensions sur l’orientation de la politique 
commerciale, l’alliance entre le secteur privé et l’exécutif a joué un rôle primordial 
pour rallier les membres des deux partis sous la bannière du libre-échange.  
D’un point de vue théorique, l’existence de cette relation spéciale contredit l’idée 
selon laquelle le président agit comme un « arbitre désintéressé » au service de 
l’intérêt national. Loin d’être à l’abri des pressions locales, le président agit sous 
l’influence des grandes entreprises participant à l’élaboration de la politique 
                                                                                                                                      
in the coalition who shares that information with people in the administration. ‘Member so and so is 
leaning this way,’ ‘Member so and so would like to hear about this’. And then the same thing comes 
back to us. We hear from the administration, ‘Member so and so says they’ve never heard from 
business about this free trade agreement’ ‘Member so and so would like to hear from someone in his or 
her district about this or “It’s nice to hear from people in Washington, we’d like to hear people back in 
Seattle or Maine or whatever the locality is” (Menghetti, 2008*).  
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commerciale, au détriment des autres parties prenantes à la politique commerciale 
comme les syndicats, les associations de consommateurs ou les écologistes. Bien sûr, 
le rôle du chef de l’exécutif ne peut en aucun cas être réduit à celui d’une marionnette 
contrôlée par le patronat. Comme cette analyse l’a démontré, la relation spéciale est 
interactive. Elle n’est pas seulement le produit de facteurs institutionnels ; elle émane 
également d’une volonté politique de poursuivre un programme censé servir l’intérêt 
de la nation. En ce sens, le président a besoin de mobiliser les milieux d’affaires pour 
accomplir ses objectifs politiques, tout comme ces derniers ont besoin de l’exécutif 
pour défendre leurs intérêts.  
Toutefois, à l’ère de la mondialisation où la libéralisation des flux de capitaux 
engendrent des conflits de classe et où les accords de libre-échange empiètent de plus 
en plus sur la souveraineté nationale, « ce qui est bon pour General Motors », ne 
serait peut-être plus « bon pour le pays482. » L’objectif de cette étude n’est pas de 
relancer un débat sur la définition de l’intérêt national américain, mais plutôt de 
réfuter l’idée de la prétendue impartialité du chef de l’État qui, à l’abri des pressions 
exercées par les groupes d’intérêts, agirait en suivant les principes idéologiques du 
libre-échange pour le bénéfice de tous. En réalité, des inégalités de pouvoir entre 
intérêts privés et groupes de la société civile sont ancrées à la fois dans les institutions 
mais également dans le discours politique qui tend à défendre les milieux d’affaires 
sous le couvert de la cause du « libre-échange » et ce, même si les lois commerciales 
en question dérogent à plus d’un titre à ces principes idéologiques. 
Les implications empiriques de cette analyse sont claires. Tant que les membres 
du gouvernement américain ne se décideront pas à adapter les institutions américaines 
                                                
482 Cette idée contredit la célèbre citation du Secrétaire à la Défense Charles Wilson, ancien dirigeant 
de General Motors qui, interrogé sur les conflits d’intérêt potentiels entre son ancienne et sa nouvelle 
fonction, avait déclaré que les intérêts de GM et ceux des États-Unis ne faisaient qu’un. Pour plus 
d’informations sur ce débat, lire Reich (1992, chapitres 11 et 12).  
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aux nouveaux défis de la mondialisation – qu’il s’agisse des conflits de classe au sein 
d’un même secteur, ou des conflits de plus en plus fréquents entre la libéralisation des 
échanges et la souveraineté nationale – la politique commerciale américaine 
continuera à défendre les intérêts du secteur privé, que ces intérêts soient compatibles 
ou pas avec le respect des droits de l’homme et des travailleurs ou la protection de 
l’environnement. Sans une réforme globale du système de consultation, les comités de 
l’exécutif continueront à représenter les milieux d’affaires sans aucune obligation vis-
à-vis des consommateurs ou des travailleurs. Assurément, toute réforme 
institutionnelle doivent être accompagnées d’une volonté réelle de changement de la 
part des membres de l’exécutif. En d’autres termes, le président ne doit pas utiliser sa 
marge de manœuvre pour affaiblir les réformes institutionnelles.  
Aujourd’hui, l’impasse politique au niveau intérieur semble exiger une refonte du 
processus de décision de la politique commerciale américaine. Comme les votes sur 
procédure de négociation accélérée de 2001 et sur l’ALEAC l’ont montré, les 
stratégies partisanes ne peuvent à long terme assurer le maintien d’un consensus en 
matière de politique commerciale. « L’Accord du 10 Mai » 2007 entre le Président 
Bush et le 110ème Congrès – majoritairement Démocrate depuis 2006 – montre que les 
décideurs ont pris conscience de ce problème. Le consensus bipartite sur les accords 
de libre-échange (U.S. Bipartisan Compact on Free Trade Agreements) promet une 
série de changements importants pour les accords négociés avec le Pérou et le 
Panama. Ces changements correspondent à des revendications formulées depuis plus 
d’une décennie par les membres de la coalition pour l’équité des échanges (normes 
sociales de travail, protection de l’environnement, marchés publics, etc.) et attestent 
de l’influence de ces derniers sur les débats. Toutefois, cet accord ne remet 
aucunement en question la logique du processus décisionnel. Il risque donc de ne 
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résoudre que superficiellement (à court terme) les conflits inhérents à la politique 
commerciale américaine à l’heure de la mondialisation. Ainsi, en l’absence d’une 
prise de conscience des déséquilibres du système institutionnel accompagnée d’une 
réelle volonté de réforme, les décideurs continueront à perpétuer la relation spéciale 
entre l’exécutif et le secteur privé qui a tant fait obstacle au progrès de la coalition 
pour l’équité des échanges. 
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APPENDIX  1: The origins of the fair trade coalition  
 
Source: Magraw (1995, 644-5). 
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APPENDIX 2: Sample questions for interviews 
 
 
1) What has changed in U.S. trade politics from NAFTA to CAFTA? 
 
2) Has the mobilization of labor and environmentalists made any difference over the 
past decade? 
 
3) What are the key factors influencing trade votes in Congress according to you?  
 
4) What explains the erosion of support for free trade agreements among Democrats?  
 
5) What factors have constrained the progress of fair trade advocates?  
 
6) What role do political parties play in trade debates? Do they really matter or is 
trade too much of a cross-cutting issue?  
 
7) It seems to me that the executive branch has been a crucial actor to gather support 
for free trade agreements and fast track. Do you agree?  
 
8) Could you give me a few examples about the role played by the USTR / the 
Executive branch in recent debates (fast track, PNTR, TPA, CAFTA)? 
 
9) Do free trade business coalitions matter? What role do they play? 
 
10) How do these free trade coalitions operate?  
 
11) Could it be that it is the coordination of the Executive branch and free trade 
coalitions has been crucial to save America’s trade policy from its opponents? If so, 
how does this coordination work?  
 
12) How important are the current debates on the renewal of fast track authority? 
What do you think of the new trade deal? 
 
13) Do you think future trade agreements will have to give more room to non-trade 
issues?  
 
15) Are there people from the business community or Congress you would 
recommend that I contact for this research project?  
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APPENDIX 3: ACTPN membership list (1990-1991) 
 
 
 
Source: Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (1991)
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Appendix 4: The origins of the fair trade coalition (2) 
 
 
 
Source: Dreiling (2001, 59). 
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APPENDIX 5: Characteristics of USA*NAFTA State Captains 
 
 
 
Source: Dreiling (2001, 94) 
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APPENDIX 6: Anti-fast track flyer (1997) 
 
 
 
Source: AFL-CIO archives. 
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APPENDIX 7: AFL-CIO lobbying materials (2000) 
 
 
 
Source: AFL-CIO archives. 
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APPENDIX 8: AFL-CIO lobbying materials (2000) 
 
 
 
Source: AFL-CIO archives. 
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APPENDIX 9: AFL-CIO lobbying materials (2000) 
 
 
 
Source: AFL-CIO archives. 
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APPENDIX 10: Business Roundtable flyer (2001) 
 
 
 
Source: Business Roundtable (2001). 
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APPENDIX 11: AFL-CIO lobbying materials (2001) 
 
 
 
Source: AFL-CIO archives 
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APPENDIX 12: Local data on trade-related job losses 
 
 
 
481 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Source: AFL-CIO archives.  
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LIBÉRALISATION OU ÉQUITÉ DES ÉCHANGES ? 
Les conflits sur les modalités de l’élaboration de la politique commerciale américaine de 
l’ALENA à l’ALEAC (1991-2005) 
 
Aux Etats-Unis, les années 1990 ont été marquées par l’émergence de nouveaux débats politiques 
sur le libre-échange. Une large coalition de syndicats et d’organisations pour la protection de 
l’environnement et des consommateurs s’est pour la première fois mobilisée dans le but de redéfinir les 
règles de la politique commerciale américaine. Quel est le bilan de leurs activités politiques, près de 
quinze après leur première bataille législative contre l’Accord de libre-échange nord-américain 
(ALENA) ? Ce travail de recherche s’appuie sur une série d’entretiens avec des acteurs politiques, des 
documents internes de groupes d’intérêts (syndicats, écologistes, patronat, etc.) et les registres du 
Congrès pour analyser les conflits entre les défenseurs du libre-échange et les partisans d’une « équité 
des échanges » à travers cinq études de cas entre 1991 et 2005. L’analyse conclut que la « relation 
spéciale » entre le patronat et l’exécutif a été l’un des principaux obstacles aux progrès de l’alliance 
entre syndicalistes et écologistes depuis l’origine du processus de décision jusqu’à la ratification au 
Congrès. Non seulement les institutions américaines ont limité l’influence des groupes de la société 
civile à l’origine des négociations commerciales, mais le président a également fortement assisté les 
organisations patronales dans leurs efforts de lobbying, leur permettant de remporter la plupart des 
batailles législatives entre 1991 et 2005.  
 
Mots clés : Politique commerciale américaine, mouvement altermondialiste, syndicalisme, mouvement 
écologiste, votes au congrès, relations entre Etat et marché, néo-institutionnalisme  
 
 
 
“FREE” TRADE OR “FAIR” TRADE?  
The battle for the rules of American trade policy  
from NAFTA to CAFTA (1991-2005) 
 
The 1990s marked the emergence of the “new politics of American trade.” A large coalition of 
labor, environmental and consumer organizations fought to broaden the narrow economic scope of 
American trade policy and change the rules of globalization. More than fifteen years after their first 
legislative battle against the North American Free Trade Agreement, what is the legacy of their 
political mobilization? What factors constrained their progress? Drawing from interviews with political 
actors, lobbying materials from labor, environmental and business organizations, and congressional 
records, this dissertation analyzes the clash between “fair” and “free” traders in five major legislative 
battles from 1991 to 2005. It reveals that the “special relationship” between the business community 
and the executive branch was the key obstacle to the achievements of the “blue (collar)-green” alliance 
from the beginning to the end of the policy process. Not only did the private sector enjoy privileged 
access to the negotiations phase, but the president also assisted free trade coalitions in their lobbying 
efforts, allowing them to win most legislative battles. 
 
Key words: American trade policy, global justice movement, labor, environmentalism, congressional 
votes, business-state relations, neo-institutionalism 
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